




Recognizing the Stranger

RECOGNITION SCENES
IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN



KASPER BRO LARSEN

BRILL

Recognizing the Stranger

Biblical Interpretation Series

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VOLUME 93

Recognizing the Stranger

Recognition Scenes in the Gospel of John

By

Kasper Bro Larsen



BRILL

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2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Larsen, Kasper Bro.

Recognizing the stranger : recognition scenes in the Gospel of John / by Kasper Bro Larsen.

p. cm. — (Biblical interpretation series, ISSN 0928-0731 ; v. 93)

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN 978-90-04-16690-5 (hardback : alk. paper)

1. Bible. N.T. John—Criticism, interpretation, etc. 2. Recognition in literature. I. Title.

BS2615.52.L37 2008

226.5'06—dc22

2008008546

ISSN: 0928-0731

ISBN: 978 90 04 16690 5

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

it is no light thing for gods to appear in plain sight

– Hera’s words to Poseidon and Pallas Athena in the *Iliad* 20.131

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RECOGNITIONS

Writing a book is to embark on a personal odyssey. By publishing the present manuscript, I present the token that displays where the journey has gone. On my voyage, I have made contact with a number of individuals and institutions; and it is a pleasure to preface the present study with an expression of my sincere gratitude toward them. First, I would like to thank the PhD School of Theology and the Study of Religion as well as the Faculty of Theology at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, for offering me a three-year teaching and research scholarship attended by the best possible conditions for writing my doctoral dissertation *Recognizing the Stranger: Anagnōrisis in the Gospel of John*. The present book is a revision of that dissertation, not a substantial rewriting but intended as a more readable and pointed version, which takes into consideration some of the discussions that the dissertation has already yielded. One of them took place on September 20, 2006, when I defended the dissertation at a three-hour public session. I thank the members of the assessment committee—Jo-Ann A. Brant, R. Alan Culpepper, and Anders Klostergaard Petersen—for inspiring discussions, critical remarks, constructive suggestions, and encouragement, not least on that particular occasion and also at the seminar on “Cognition in John” the following day. In 2007 the dissertation was awarded the PhD Prize in Theology and the Study of Religion by the University of Aarhus Research Foundation. I am grateful for the significant grant and honored by the recognition it symbolizes.

While doing research for this book, I have been fortunate to be affiliated with the Department of Biblical Studies at the University of Aarhus, an environment of colleagues always willing to share their valuable insights, for which I am most grateful. This also applies to the scholars of the interdisciplinary Aarhus project *The Discursive Fight over Religious Texts in Antiquity* as well as the members of the Nordic Network in Qumran Studies.

Together with my family, I spent the fall semester 2004 in the United States at Yale Divinity School and the Department of Religious Studies at Yale University. I would like to thank the Dean, Professor Harold

W. Attridge, for hosting me, for taking time to discuss the project with me, and for introducing me to an inspiring milieu of gifted doctoral students engaged in New Testament, ancient Christianity, and Judaic studies. I am also very grateful to Professor Dale B. Martin for permitting me to attend his doctoral student class and for giving me the opportunity to present some of my early-stage material at the Yale New Testament Dissertation Colloquium. My stay in New Haven was a very profitable and stimulating experience; it would not have been possible were it not for the generosity of the foundations *Knud Højgaards Fond* and *Christian og Otilia Brorsons Rejselegat*.

My dissertation director, Associate Professor Ole Davidsen, deserves my utmost expression of appreciation. He has been a source of inspiration and support and has most open-handedly shared with me his experience and advice to an extent that exceeds what one could expect from one's supervisor. His admirable ability to pick the right moment for encouragement and for challenge, respectively, has never failed; and I have come to know him not just as an excellent supervisor and reader, but also as an original and extraordinary scholar. I am very much obliged to him for his guidance and support.

The process of publishing the book has been of great excitement. I thank the editorial board of the Biblical Interpretation Series for accepting the manuscript for publication; the staff at Brill, especially Louise Schouten, Willy de Gijzel, and Ivo Romein, for guidance on manuscript preparation; and Maryann Teale Snell for reading the proofs and sifting out the worst Danisms from my written English. I myself assume the whole responsibility for those still left in the text.

A voyage is not complete until the moment of homecoming. And even the present writer has a Penelope and children who have endured periods of absence in spirit. Now, as I come home, a touching recognition scene awaits. But this is not for the reader to witness. While my narrating voice shall accompany the reader into the world of Fourth Gospel recognitions, another part of me shall remain behind with my family in order to give them thanks, tête-à-tête, in a more appropriate setting than the present one.

Kasper Bro Larsen
October, 2007 in Aarhus, Denmark

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
ABRL	Anchor Bible Reference Library
AcB	Academia Biblica
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AnBib	Analecta biblica
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</i> . Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972–
ANTC	Abingdon New Testament Commentaries
AoK	Antikken og Kristendommen
BBB	Bonner biblische Beiträge
BETL	Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum lovaniensium
<i>Bib</i>	<i>Biblica</i>
<i>BibInt</i>	<i>Biblical Interpretation</i>
BIS	Biblical Interpretation Series
BRS	The Biblical Resource Series
BSR	Biblioteca di Scienze Religiose
<i>BTB</i>	<i>Biblical Theology Bulletin</i>
Budé	Collection des universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé
<i>BZ</i>	<i>Biblische Zeitschrift</i>
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBET	Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
<i>CBQ</i>	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
ConBNT	Coniectanea biblica: New Testament Series
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>DNP</i>	<i>Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike</i> . Edited by H. Cancik and H. Schneider. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1996–2003
<i>DRev</i>	<i>Downside Review</i>
<i>DTT</i>	<i>Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift</i>
<i>ETL</i>	<i>Ephemerides theologiae lovanienses</i>
FBE	Forum for Bibelsk Eksegese
FCNT	Feminist Companion to the New Testament and Early Christian Writings
FRLANT	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments
FTS	Frankfurter Theologische Studien

<i>GR</i>	<i>Greece & Rome</i>
HTKNT	Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
<i>HTR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
IBT	Interpreting Biblical Texts
<i>Int</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
<i>JBL</i>	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JLCRS	Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion Series
<i>JR</i>	<i>The Journal of Religion</i>
<i>JSNT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament: Supplement Series
<i>JTS</i>	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Meyer-Kommentar)
KJV	King James Version: <i>The Bible: Authorized King James Version</i> . Oxford World's Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LEC	Library of Early Christianity
<i>LS</i>	<i>Louvain Studies</i>
<i>LT</i>	<i>Literature and Theology</i>
LXX	Alfred Rahlfs, ed. <i>Septuaginta: Id est vetus testamentum graece iuxta lxx interpretes</i> . 2 vols. Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1935
NHS	Nag Hammadi Studies
<i>NLH</i>	<i>New Literary History</i>
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version: Wayne A. Meeks, ed. <i>The HarperCollins Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version</i> . New York: HarperCollins, 1993
NTAbh	Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen
NTGr	Neue Theologische Grundrisse
NTL	The New Testament Library
NTM	New Testament Monographs
NTOA	Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus
NTR	New Testament Readings
NTTS	New Testament Tools and Studies
<i>Od.</i>	Homer, <i>The Odyssey</i> . Translated by A.T. Murray, revised by George E. Dimock. 2 vols. 2nd ed. LCL. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995
PG	Patrologia graeca [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1886
PL	Patrologia latina [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 217 vols. Paris, 1844–1864
<i>Poet.</i>	Aristotle, <i>Poetics</i> . Translated by Stephen Halliwell. LCL. Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995
<i>PRSt</i>	<i>Perspectives in Religious Studies</i>

<i>RSR</i>	<i>Recherches de science religieuse</i>
<i>RvT</i>	<i>Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift</i>
SAC	Studies in Antiquity and Christianity
SANT	Studien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLMS	Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
SBLRBS	Society of Biblical Literature Resources for Biblical Study
SBL SBS	Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study
SBLSymS	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SC	Sources chrétiennes. Paris: Cerf, 1943–
SemeiaSt	Semeia Studies
SHR	Studies in the History of Religions (supplements to <i>Numen</i>)
SJLA	Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SP	Sacra pagina
StABH	Studies in American Biblical Hermeneutics
StBL	Studies in Biblical Literature
<i>Theol</i>	<i>Theology</i>
<i>TWNT</i>	<i>Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament</i> . Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. 10 vols. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933–1979
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
<i>ZNW</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i>

INTRODUCTION

Odysseus' Scar and Jesus' Wound Marks

This book is a study of recognition scenes and motifs in the Gospel of John. The recognition type-scene belonged to the storyteller's standard repertory in ancient Greco-Roman narrative and drama, especially in epic, novel, tragedy, and comedy, where motifs of hidden identities, veiling and revealing, *Sein* and *Schein*, deception and discovery often played a central role in the plot. One of the most celebrated recognitions in both ancient and modern times is the bath-scene in Homer's *Odyssey* (19.317–507). After twenty years' absence from his beloved Penelope, Odysseus at long last arrives at the shores of his native island Ithaca. He pays Penelope a visit but does not yet reveal himself, pretending to be an old acquaintance of Odysseus. Out of hospitality, his childhood nurse Eurycleia gives him a bath. The now grown-old Eurycleia complains of her distress to the apparent stranger, telling him how he resembles her missing master, while Odysseus tries to hide his telltale scar acquired during a boar hunt in his early days. As Eurycleia reaches for his thigh, however, her attention is inevitably drawn to the scar. She is awestruck and bursts into tears of joy in a touching moment of recognition: "Surely you are Odysseus, dear child..." (19.474; cf. 392–393 [Murray]).¹

In the western literary canon, the above bath-scene is often regarded as the very *locus classicus* of the recognition scene or ἀναγνώσις (*anagnō-*

¹ Recognition in the *Odyssey* has been an object of study since Antiquity. See N.J. Richardson, "Recognition Scenes in the *Odyssey* and Ancient Literary Criticism," in *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar: Fourth Volume 1983* (ed. Francis Cairns; ARCA Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs 11; Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1983), 219–235. References to modern scholarship appear in the following valuable contributions: Chris Emlyn-Jones, "The Reunion of Penelope and Odysseus," *GR* 31 (1984): 1–18; Sheila Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 181–190; Peter Gainsford, "Formal Analysis of Recognition Scenes in the *Odyssey*," *JHS* 123 (2003), 42, n. 6.

risis; henceforth, anagnorisis) as was Aristotle's designation of the phenomenon in the *Poetics* (e.g., 1450a33–34; 1452a28, 33, 38).² The Greek expression covers a fairly broad semantic field, and in other European languages, ancient and modern, it may be rendered as, e.g., *cognitio*, *agnitio*, *reconnaissance*, *agnition*, *éclaircissement*, *Entdeckung*, *Wiedererkennung*, *Anerkennung*, discovery, disclosure, revelation, recollection, acknowledgment, coming-to-know, and, as will occur as the standard translation in the present study, recognition.³ Having assigned a particular status to the *Odyssey's* bath-scene, one should keep in mind the fact that the scene is one example out of many, not only within the *Odyssey* itself, but also when viewed in a broader literary context. Oedipus' tragic discovery in Sophocles' *Oedipus tyrannus* and the mutual recognitions between Electra and Orestes are other prominent examples (cf. Aeschylus, *Choephoroi*; Sophocles, *Electra*; Euripides, *Electra*).⁴ Also Biblical literature displays examples of the recognition scene—from Joseph's reunion with his brothers (Gen 42–45) to the Emmaus narrative (Luke 24)—and one of the most conspicuous examples of its kind is indeed the climactic apparition narrative in the Fourth Gospel featuring the doubting Thomas, or as one might rather say, the recognizing Thomas. When confronted with Jesus' wound marks, the twin disciple makes a Eurycleian discovery and exclaims his epoch-making confession: "My Lord and my God!" (20:28 NRSV).

In the ongoing debate on the Fourth Gospel's employment of ancient literary forms and type-scenes, it is remarkable that little attention has been paid to the recognition scene—not least when considering the widespread existence of the device in ancient narrative. In his presidential address delivered at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Harold W. Attridge very convincingly advocated for a "version of form criticism" that studies the variety of genres occurring in the Fourth Gospel with reference to how and why

² Aristotle twice employs the variant ἀναγνορισμός, which appears to bear synonymous meaning (*Poet.* 1452a15–17).

³ See a partly overlapping list of renderings in Terence Cave, *Recognitions: A Study in Poetics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 5.

⁴ Bernhard Zimmermann takes the Electra-Orestes dramas as the epitome of anagnorisis; idem, "Anagnorisis," *DNP* 1:642–643. As to the canonization of the bath-scene in twentieth-century literary criticism, Erich Auerbach's classic account of *mimesis* in western literature played a key role. See his opening chapter "Die Narbe des Odysseus," in *Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur* (Bern: A. Francke, 1946), 7–30.

they undergo transformation when appearing in the Johannine mould.⁵ Attridge mentions a set of examples of such genres like hermetic quest-dialogue (John 3),⁶ the betrothal scene (ch. 4),⁷ forensic oratory (chs. 5; 8),⁸ homiletic *midrash* (ch. 6),⁹ “parable” (ch. 10),¹⁰ as well as testament and consolation literature (chs. 13–17),¹¹ but the recognition scene does not appear in the catalogue. This is probably due to the fact that although some scholars, especially those oriented toward narrative criticism (in particular R. Alan Culpepper and Mark W.G. Stibbe), have drawn attention to the presence of general anagnorisis phenomena in the Gospel, little effort has been made to document how the Fourth Gospel in many of its episodes employs and challenges literary conventions of genre related to the contemporary recognition type-scene.¹² This is quite unfortunate, not merely because such an investigation may help us toward a better understanding of the genre mosaic of

⁵ Idem, “Genre Bending in the Fourth Gospel,” *JBL* 121 (2002), 6. Besides suggesting a fruitful way of working with questions of genre in John, Attridge’s article also contains a reservoir of references to form-oriented studies of John’s Gospel from the second half of the twentieth century.

⁶ C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 10–53, 303–311.

⁷ See, e.g., Jerome H. Neyrey, “Jacob Traditions and the Interpretation of John 4:10–26,” *CBQ* 41 (1979): 419–437; Lyle Eslinger, “The Wooing of the Woman at the Well: Jesus, the Reader and Reader-Response Criticism,” in *The Gospel of John as Literature: An Anthology of Twentieth-Century Perspectives* (ed. Mark W.G. Stibbe; NTTS 17; Leiden: Brill, 1993), 165–182.

⁸ Harold W. Attridge, “Argumentation in John 5,” in *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference* (eds. A. Eriksson et al.; Emory Studies in Early Christianity 8; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity, 2002), 188–199; Jerome H. Neyrey, “Jesus the Judge: Forensic Process in John 8:21–59,” *Bib* 68 (1987): 509–542; Kasper Bro Larsen, “Hvem er manden? Johannevangeliet som retsdrama,” in *Apologetik i Det Nye Testamente* (ed. Aage Pilgaard; AoK 2; Copenhagen: Anis, 2005), 67–83.

⁹ Peter Borgen, *Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo* (NovTSup 10; Leiden: Brill, 1965).

¹⁰ John A.T. Robinson, “The Parable of the Shepherd,” *ZNW* 46 (1955): 233–240; Ulrich Busse, “Open Questions on John 10,” in *The Shepherd Discourse of John 10 and its Context* (eds. Johannes Beutler and Robert T. Fortna; SNTSMS 67; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10–11, nn. 35–39.

¹¹ The literature on the generic grid of this part of the Gospel is extensive. Two examples of valuable contributions are Fernando F. Segovia, *The Farewell of the Word: The Johannine Call to Abide* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991) and George L. Parsenios, *Departure and Consolation: The Johannine Farewell Discourses in Light of Graeco-Roman Literature* (NovT-Sup 117; Leiden: Brill, 2005). The latter work deals with how the last supper discourses resonate with Greek tragedy, *consolationes*, and the literary symposium.

¹² Regarding previous approaches to anagnorisis in John, see the following section (pp. 6–17).

the Gospel within its ancient literary environment, but also because the type-scene serves as an important vehicle for the central epistemological and expository problems attached to the Gospel's religious claims—not only in the postresurrection narratives. It is the purpose of the present study to address this deficit and thereby to contribute to Johannine scholarship by showing how the recognition type-scene constitutes an important epistemological and ideological laboratory in John's many-faceted narrative.¹³

Before presenting the history of anagnorisis in Fourth Gospel research and mapping out the previous accomplishments as well as unexplored territories, I shall briefly present the basic framework of epistemological problems, in relation to which the Gospel's recognition scenes are played out. These problems concentrate on the determination of the true identity of the main character. Who is Jesus? How and when can one tell? Who claims that he is the Son of God? Is that claim trustworthy? Such questions concerning the veridical status of the religious knowledge claimed by the text, however, are not at all peculiar to the Gospel of John. Viewed from the perspective of comparative religion, they rather latch parasitically onto any religious claim, whether ancient or modern. This has to do with the circumstance that religious discourse is characterized by the fact that the sacred never appears in immediate evidence, but becomes manifest only by intermediary signs that re-present the sacred (e.g., artifacts, narratives, cosmological phenomena, persons, and, in the case of the Gospel, the Jesus-character). Accordingly, in religious language the sacred occurs as a hidden object of signification, every alleged epiphany forming a *paradoxon* in the proper sense of the word, i.e., something that appears in the form of something else.¹⁴ The vehicles of the sacred are signs, and a sign is everything that can be used for telling lies.¹⁵ Since the signified is conspicuous by its absence, the relation between signifier and signified is not at all intrinsically evident, and thus it might come out

¹³ The object, method, and outline of the study is presented in more detail below (see pp. 18–23).

¹⁴ See Mircea Eliade, *Das Heilige und das Profane: Vom Wesen des Religiösen* (Rowohlt's deutsche Enzyklopädie 31; Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957), 8–9: "Man kann nie genug hervorheben, dass jede Hierophanie—auch die elementarste—ein Paradoxon darstellt. Indem er das Heilige offenbart, wird der Gegenstand zu etwas 'ganz anderem' und bleibt doch weiterhin er selbst...."

¹⁵ This rather unorthodox definition of the sign originates from the Italian author and semiotician Umberto Eco. See idem, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Advances in Semiotics; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 6–7.

that the sign's "testimony is not valid," to use a phrase used by Jesus' adversaries in John 8:13. The semiotic fact concerning the absence of the signified is in a radical sense a *condition religieuse*.¹⁶ The Gospel of John displays a remarkable awareness of the semiotic condition of religious language, and in one of its opening passages it therefore sets out explicitly this basic premise in continuation of the theological tradition of Second Temple Jewish religion: "No one has ever seen God" (1:18a; cf. 5:37; 6:46; 8:19, 55; 17:25).¹⁷ As one understands from the second half of the verse, however, this circumstance does not lead to agnosticism or epistemological apathy, but to the claim that the Son has overcome the cognitive distance between God and man and enabled religious knowledge: "It is God the only Son...who has made him known" (1:18b). Jesus is, in other words, the new sign that excludes all other signs of the sacred (see, for example, 14:6b). It is in this tension between the premise of 1:18a and the claim of 1:18b that the epistemological narrative unfolds, governed by John's overall purpose to promulgate belief in the divine identity of Jesus (20:31).

The Gospel seeks to eliminate God's inaccessibility and enable a *visio Dei* by means of the Jesus-sign. But from the reader's point of view, this only solves part of the problem. While no one has seen God, the implied reader even suffers from not having seen Jesus—a double absence (1:14; 19:35; 20:29–31). Therefore, the Gospel performs a second act of epistemological bridge building. It not only claims that Jesus represents God in the story-world, but also asserts that the text itself, as a testimony, represents Jesus in the reader-world. The Gospel constitutes a second sign that points toward Jesus and compensates the reader for being in a situation where the divine Jesus-sign is not

¹⁶ Yet, this may not always articulate in religious texts. In historical and sociological settings where the symbolic universe has gained a certain aura of fixed objectivity, the claimed relation between the sign and the transcendental signified may become a matter of course, either as a result of ideological displacement or as a symptom of amnesia; but in a time of cognitive crisis, when, for example, new religious claims appear, the question of the legitimacy of the sign will often rise to the surface of the discourse. John's Gospel is a narrative of cognitive conflict, and it is a plausible hypothesis that this reflects its socio-historical context of origin. See Wayne A. Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism," *JBL* 91 (1972): 44–72.; J. Louis Martyn, *History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel* (3rd ed.; NTL; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2003 [1st ed., 1968]).

¹⁷ In its context at the end of the prologue, the statement is also an expression of the superior status that the Gospel conveys upon Jesus (who has seen God) in comparison to Moses, who had to cast down his eyes in the presence of the Lord at Mount Sinai, lest he would perish (Ex 33:18; cf. Isa 6:15).

directly accessible. These are the basic conditions of communication in the Gospel, and in the present study we shall see how John seeks to bridge these horizons and overcome the epistemological and spatiotemporal gap by means of the recognition scene. In fact, anagnorisis is *the* ultimate moment of coming-into-presence, as it, within a split second of realization, eliminates the distance between the recognizer and the recognized.¹⁸

Before determining more accurately the aim and outline of the study, it is beneficial first to present some of the results of previous approaches dealing with anagnorisis in the Fourth Gospel. This will clarify how the present investigation contributes to the discussion.

Previous Studies in Johannine Recognition

Claiming that epistemological questions concerning the identity of Jesus are crucial in the Fourth Gospel is barely controversial at all. Even a first glance at the text exposes its massive use of cognitive terminology: e.g., πιστεύω (98 occurrences), οἶδα (77), γινώσκω (56), ἀλήθεια/ἀληθής/ἀληθινός (48); and as a consequence most studies of the Fourth Gospel touch on such questions in one way or another. As already stated, however, only a few scholars have undertaken to investigate these problems by using the Aristotelian concept of anagnorisis as a heuristic tool, and even fewer have studied anagnorisis in its capacity as a type-scene or a microgenre in John's narrative. This may on one hand come as a surprise, considering the fact that there is a well-established tradition in modern New Testament scholarship dealing with questions concerning literary subforms within the gospels. On the other hand, such an investigation would not naturally advance during earlier parts of twentieth-century research, as the main currents of the form-critical tradition to a large extent bypassed the Gospel of John.¹⁹ Characteristically, Dibelius' and Bultmann's classics focused on the Synoptic Gospels, which they both regarded as "Kleinliteratur,"²⁰ while the prevalent scholarly paradigm of the time saw John's

¹⁸ In contrast, spatial events of coming-into-presence (arrivals and approaches) take place more gradually.

¹⁹ A useful survey of pre-1980 scholarship on the literary forms in John, leading to the same conclusion, is presented in Johannes Beutler, "Literarische Gattungen im Johannesevangelium: Ein Forschungsbericht 1919–1980," *ANRW* 25.3:2506–2569.

²⁰ Martin Dibelius, *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums* (6th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr

Gospel as a carefully crafted work produced by a more skillful mind, in regard to both theology and literary artistry. Consequently, scholars often focused on John's creative use of literary sources (*Literarkritik* or source criticism), which was considered a method more in accordance with the material than socio-literary form criticism, which would leave less room for the Johannine genius to operate.²¹ This conception probably lay behind Bultmann's remarkable change in method from his work on the Synoptic Gospels (form criticism) to the commentary on John (source criticism).²² In the following quotation, Birger Olsson observes this change but also advocates another distinctive tendency in large areas of twentieth-century scholarship that for many years impeded anagnorisis from rising on the horizon of research.

Bultmann's main reason for his omission to work with form criticism in Jn is his source criticism, but perhaps also his derivation of his literary forms to a great extent from outside and not from an analysis of the texts themselves: there are in Greek literature—the Semitic was of less interest to him—no given equivalents of the Johannine forms.... A Johannine *Formgeschichte* is, to a great extent, referred to the Johannine texts themselves and, secondly, if the Gospel is rooted in a strong Jewish/Christian environment, to Jewish writings and the literary forms found there.²³

It is obvious that within this general conception of the literary environment of the New Testament as strictly Jewish/Christian, the Greek notion of anagnorisis can only be an alien element. During the past forty years, however, New Testament scholarship has gradually abandoned the false dichotomy between understanding early Christianity as either the legitimate breed and lawful successor of ancient Judaism, unblemished by gentile influence, or as a de-Judaized Pauline product of the Hellenistic religious mood. In the wake of Martin Hengel's *Judentum und Hellenismus*,²⁴ the notion of an insurmountable divide between

[Paul Siebeck], 1971 [1st ed., 1919]), 2; Rudolf Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (FRLANT 12/29; 7th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967 [1st ed., 1921]), 5.

²¹ Siegfried Schulz typifies this assessment in the following statement: "Aufs Ganze gesehen stellt die Formgeschichte im Joh-Ev einen toten Zweig dar"; idem, *Untersuchungen zur Menschensohn-Christologie im Johannesevangelium: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Methodengeschichte der Auslegung des 4. Evangeliums* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957), 76; cf. 75.

²² Idem, *Das Evangelium des Johannes* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1941).

²³ Birger Olsson, *Structure and Meaning in the Fourth Gospel: A Text-Linguistic Analysis of John 2:1–11 and 4:1–42* (ConBNT 6; Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1974), 5.

²⁴ Idem, *Judentum und Hellenismus: Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer Berücksichti-*

Judaism and Hellenism has been progressively deconstructed, resulting in a new understanding of Hellenism as an overall descriptive concept under which both the Judaism and the Christianities of the period appear as subsets. This development requires that we see the New Testament texts, including the Fourth Gospel, as inherent players in a larger Panhellenistic literary *koinē*, both with regard to content and form.²⁵ This paradigm of historical reconstruction is well established today, but still yields its fruits, not least because it has widened our understanding of the literary environment of the NT in general and of John in particular. Jörg Frey has formulated this point in a recent anthology on *Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums*:

Als “Kontexte” des Johannesevangeliums sind deshalb in einem weiten Horizont Texte vom Alten Testament über die unterschiedlichen früh-jüdischen Traditionsbereiche sowie Texte und rhetorische Formen der griechisch-römischen Welt bis hin zu den Zeugnissen der christlichen Gnosis und zur Rezeption des vierten Evangeliums und der Johannes-tradition bei einem Autor wie Irenäus zu berücksichtigen.²⁶

The redefinition of the ancient Mediterranean literary milieu in present-day scholarship has given access to new insights and has made it imperative to involve forms of Greco-Roman literature like anagnori-

gung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2. Jh. v. Chr (WUNT 10; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1969).

²⁵ The following book title illustrates the self-understanding of the present paradigm: Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ed., *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2001). For valuable discussions concerning the intrinsic ideologies of historical categorizations, see Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (JLCS 14; London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990) and Anders Klostergaard Petersen, “Kristendom og hellenisme—en skæbnsvanger konstruktion,” *RvT* 41 (2002): 51–75.

²⁶ Idem, “Auf der Suche nach dem Kontext des vierten Evangeliums: Eine forschungsgeschichtliche Einführung,” in *Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums* (eds. Jörg Frey and Udo Schnelle; WUNT 175; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 35. Mark W.G. Stibbe is more direct in his criticism of an understanding comparable to Olsson’s: “It is eminently possible to over-emphasize the Jewishness of John and to overlook the fact that the same gospel employs Greek techniques to treat themes of primarily Jewish concern.” *John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism and the Fourth Gospel* (SNTSMS 73; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 129–130. Within the study of early Christian narrative, the tendency to situate this literature in a broad Greco-Roman context is reflected in such publications as, e.g., Ronald F. Hock et al., eds., *Ancient Fiction and Early Christian Narrative* (SBLSymS 6; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998); Dennis R. MacDonald, *Mimesis and Intertextuality in Antiquity and Christianity* (SAC; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity, 2001); Jo-Ann A. Brant et al., eds., *Ancient Fiction: The Matrix of Early Christian and Jewish Narrative* (SBLSymS 32; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2005).

sis in the study of the New Testament and of John in particular. This paradigm has also brought a renaissance to the fruitful notion that the overall genre of the canonical gospels, instead of representing a form *sui generis*, closely resembles ancient Greco-Roman biography.²⁷ Yet, however widening of the scholarly horizon this appraisal has proven to be, it might have brought along an unfortunate side effect by casting a shadow over narrative devices in the gospels that are not found very often in the ancient *bios/vita*. Anagnorisis is such a device.²⁸ In light of this, it is notable that the first scholar to call attention to the importance of the recognition scene in John arrived at this conclusion not by reading the Gospel as ancient biography but through the observation of resemblance between the Gospel and another literary genre: the tragedy, or in a broader sense, the drama. In 1923 the Anglican clergyman F.R.M. Hitchcock published an article titled “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” Despite its modest size, the article still attracts attention, not only in its capacity as a forerunner of subsequent literary studies in the Gospel of John, but also as the locus of what appears to be the first scholarly attempt to apply the literary device of anagnorisis to the Fourth Gospel. Right from the outset of his exposition, Hitchcock answers the title question in the affirmative: The Gospel clearly resembles a Greek drama of five acts according to “the canons of Aristotle.”²⁹ In the course of Hitchcock’s presentation of the Gospel’s five dramatic acts, the exposition becomes particularly interesting for the purposes of the present study, as he reaches the garden scene of Jesus’ arrest in John 18. From this point on, events of anagnorisis begin to appear in the drama, and Hitchcock presents four examples. The first two of them are the attempts to recognize Jesus performed first by the soldiers

²⁷ See, e.g., Charles H. Talbert, *What Is a Gospel: The Genre of the Canonical Gospels* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977); David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (LEC; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), 17–76; Richard A. Burridge, *What Are the Gospels? A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography* (2nd ed; BRS; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2004 [1st ed., 1992]).

²⁸ The fact that the gospels belong to the overriding genre of biography ought not to result in the wrong conclusion that individual texts were unable to adopt literary features from other, more epistemologically plotted genres. Such a conclusion would, in fact, imply that genres are monolithic entities unable to develop, coalesce, disappoint, or surprise. On genre development in relation to the study of the gospels, see Burridge, *What are the Gospels?* 25–77; in particular 43–47.

²⁹ F.R.M. Hitchcock, “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” *Theol* 7 (1923), 307. The article elaborates on insights already presented in the chapter “The Artistic Structure of the Gospel,” in idem, *A Fresh Study of the Fourth Gospel* (London: S.P.C.K., 1911), 115–142.

in the garden, and second by Pilate in the praetorium (John 18–19). Since both attempts fail to come out successfully, however, they do not qualify as recognition proper, whereas two post-resurrection scenes are characterized as true anagnorisis scenes: the encounter between Jesus and Mary Magdalene and the pericope of Thomas the Doubter, both scenes appearing in John 20.³⁰ Although this identification of certain scenes in John as anagnorisis scenes is certainly valuable, Hitchcock, as a matter of fact, only provides us with a mere pointing out of scenes fitting to the category in question. The exposition lacks any description of the structure and character of the anagnorisis events, and insofar as Hitchcock does make a single comment on one of the recognition scenes, it turns out to be a somewhat subjective aesthetic value judgment as when he estimates the Mary Magdalene scene to be “one of the most pathetic and realistic in all literature...described with the self-restraint and simplicity of a master.”³¹ Furthermore, Hitchcock’s inclusion of certain scenes into the category of the anagnorisis type-scene lacks any explication of the underlying criteria for doing so, and it consequently becomes very impressionistic in nature.³² Another problematic feature in Hitchcock’s references to anagnorisis in John relates not to what he fails to develop, but to what he positively claims: Hitchcock consistently confines the anagnorisis scenes to the final chapters of the Gospel (John 18–20). In Greek drama, anagnorisis would sometimes appear as an element in the concluding *lysis* of the plot (e.g., in Euripides, *Ion*), so it is quite understandable that Hitchcock’s overall construction of a parallelism between John’s Gospel and Greek drama leads to such a conclusion. Yet, his interpretation of the “canons of Aristotle” governs the reading of John in too strict a manner. Not only is anagnorisis a plot device that appears in the beginning and the middle, not merely in the end of several ancient tragedies (e.g., in the

³⁰ One may wonder why Hitchcock does not add the resurrection appearances in John 21 to his list of examples of anagnorisis scenes. The reason for this is obviously not an understanding of John 21 as a later addition, considering his view of the Gospel as a unity. Hitchcock rather seems to take the chapter as an epilogue mirroring the prologue. See idem, “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” 308, 316.

³¹ Idem, “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” 316.

³² These shortcomings are, of course, partly due to the fact that anagnorisis scenes appear as merely secondary objects of interest in Hitchcock’s article and attract attention only insofar as they substantiate the overall thesis concerning the dramatic nature of the Gospel. In *A Fresh Study*, however, there is an additional note determining a basic difference between anagnorisis in John and in the *Oedipus tyrannus*: “Here it leads to victory, there to humiliation”; idem, *A Fresh Study*, 140, n. 1.

Electra-Orestes dramas), but also it seems that restricting anagnorisis in John to only the last chapters causes an unfortunate concealment of the ongoing anagnorisis process that, as we shall see later in this study, is present throughout the text. Thus Hitchcock's article, however illuminating it may be by drawing attention to dramatic devices like anagnorisis in the Gospel of John, reveals only the tip of the iceberg.

For many years, Hitchcock's article led a life in oblivion until it was rehabilitated by Mark W.G. Stibbe in his 1993 collection of significant articles from the history of research on *The Gospel of John as Literature*. Here, Hitchcock's article was included as the opening contribution.³³ In the meantime, however, anagnorisis had been rediscovered in another quarter of research. R. Alan Culpepper's *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (1983) was in many ways the first comprehensive encounter between the Gospel of John and narrative criticism. Although Stibbe's abovementioned anthology shows that the Gospel of John had been subject to sporadic literary studies earlier on in the twentieth century, the *Anatomy* constituted an important step into practically uncharted areas of study. In Culpepper's attempt to determine the nature of the Johannine plot, he made use of Aristotelian terminology, including anagnorisis, and pleaded for its permanent, heuristic value:

"These [sc. Aristotle's] judgments not only provide conceptual tools for analyzing the Fourth Gospel but correlate remarkably well with its focus on recognizing the *logos* enfleshed and its judgment on faith that is based on signs."³⁴

Unlike Hitchcock, Culpepper did not regard anagnorisis as a minor motif appearing toward the end of the story but claimed that "*anagnorisis* permeates the plot rather than serving merely as a device of the concluding scene...."³⁵ This is a very important observation, but in spite of its promising nature, Culpepper was very brief on the subject in the *Anatomy* and did not then develop the idea much further. In the 1990s, however, Culpepper and Stibbe took steps toward a more profound

³³ F.R.M. Hitchcock, "Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?" in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 15–24.

³⁴ Idem, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 81.

³⁵ Idem, *Anatomy*, 84.

employment of anagnorisis in Johannine studies.³⁶ Stibbe, in his commentary on John published in the same year as his abovementioned compilation (1993), did not confine himself to confirming Culpepper's claim in the *Anatomy* concerning the prevalence of anagnorisis in John, but initiated a process toward determining the particular scenes of relevance in addition to the ones previously pointed out by Hitchcock. Stibbe, in fact, drew up a list of story characters in the Gospel, whom he regarded as being confronted by the test of anagnorisis:

As the plot develops, the narrator will bring on stage a whole range of characters: the disciples, Nathaniel, the Jews, Nicodemus, John the Baptist, the Samaritan woman, the official's son, the crippled man at Bethesda, the crowds, the man born blind, Caiaphas, Annas, Pilate and so on. To each of these characters, the narrator issues the same challenge: the challenge to recognize what the paradigmatic reader can see, the real origin and identity of Jesus of Nazareth.³⁷

The element of anagnorisis appears in various locations in Stibbe's commentary, but it is unfortunately not investigated as a type-scene in its own right. A step toward such an endeavor was taken in two of Culpepper's publications from the second half of the 1990s. In the 1995 article "The Plot of John's Story of Jesus" and in the more elaborate fourth chapter of his commentary *The Gospel and Letters of John* from 1998, Culpepper continued the discussion concerning the plot of the narrative, which he had opened in the *Anatomy*, by relating the Gospel to ancient biography and drama.³⁸ Besides repeating the viewpoint that

³⁶ Outside the demarcations of New Testament scholarship, a 1989 work by Diana Culbertson also needs to be mentioned: *The Poetics of Revelation: Recognition and the Narrative Tradition* (StABH 4; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1989). Culbertson develops a narrative theology of recognition/revelation and also presents an interesting chapter on recognition in John: "The Gospel of John: The Limits of Darkness," 155–174.

³⁷ Idem, *John* (Readings: A New Biblical Commentary; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 30. Stibbe moreover states that "[i]n just about every episode of John the key question has always been, 'Will Characters recognize who Jesus really is?' The device of anagnorisis is fundamental to the emplotment of John's Gospel...." Idem, *John*, 203; cf. 18, 30, 160, 173, 193, 204, 210; idem, *John's Gospel* (NTR; London: Routledge, 1994), 30, 36.

³⁸ R. Alan Culpepper, "The Plot of John's Story of Jesus," *Int* 49 (1995): 347–358; "The Gospel as Literature," in idem, *The Gospel and Letters of John* (IBT; Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 62–86. As a pioneering work the *Anatomy* was by its very nature exposed to criticism. Some scholars saw a weakness in the fact that the analysis was relating to modern theories of the novel more than ancient conventions of narrative. See, e.g., Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, 10–11; Craig R. Koester, *Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel: Meaning, Mystery, Community* (2nd ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 15–17. Culpepper seems to be meeting this kind of criticism in the above publications.

John extended anagnorisis into a major plot element, Culpepper now depicts the Gospel as “a series of episodes that describe attempted, failed, and occasionally successful *anagnorises* (recognition scenes).”³⁹ In the course of his synopsis of the Gospel’s narrative trajectory, Culpepper even points out the individual recognition scenes, and does so in a more precise manner than was the case in the above quotation from Stibbe. In the list below, I have systematized the scenes that Culpepper classifies as anagnorises in the two publications mentioned. The scenes are designated by the name of the *recognizer/non-recognizer*, the first example being John the Baptist:

<i>“The Plot of John’s Story of Jesus” (1995)</i>	<i>The Gospel and Letters of John (1998), 77–86</i>
John the Baptist (1:29–34; recognition)	John the Baptist (1:29–34; recognition)
	Andrew (1:36–42; recognition)
Nathanael (1:47–51; recognition)	Nathanael (1:47–51; recognition)
Nicodemus (3:1–21; failed recognition)	Nicodemus (3:1–21; failed recognition)
The Samaritan woman (4:1–42; recognition)	The Samaritan woman (4:1–42; recognition)
	The nobleman and his household (4:46–54; “a recognition of a kind”) ⁴⁰
The Jews (ch. 5; failed recognition)	The man at the pool of Bethesda and the <i>Ioudaioi</i> (ch. 5; failed recognition)

³⁹ Idem, “The Plot,” 353; cf. 349, 357; idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 71, 77. James L. Resseguie agrees with Culpepper on this, but places anagnorisis on a particular level: “[A]nagnorisis is a plot *motif*; it is not the plot...A broader category than *anagnorisis* is needed to account for the other aspects of plot”; *The Strange Gospel: Narrative Design and Point of View in John* (BIS 56; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 170. According to Resseguie, this broader view regards the Gospel’s expository development from stability (ch. 1) through instability (chs. 5–19) to a new stability (chs. 20–21). See idem, *The Strange Gospel*, 169–196.

⁴⁰ Idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 80–81, 83.

<i>"The Plot of John's Story of Jesus" (1995)</i>	<i>The Gospel and Letters of John (1998), 77–86</i>
	The crowds (6:1–15; partial recognition)
The crowds (ch. 6; failed recognition [except Peter representing the twelve in 6:69])	The disciples (6:16–21) ⁴¹
	The crowds (6:22–71; failed recognition [except Peter representing the twelve in 6:69]) ⁴²
The Jews (chs. 7–8; failed recognition)	The <i>Ioudaioi</i> (chs. 7–8; failed recognition)
The man born blind (ch. 9; recognition in contrast to the Pharisees' failed recognition)	The man born blind (ch. 9; recognition in contrast to the Pharisees' failed recognition)
	"The Jews" (10:1–39; failed recognition)
Martha (11:17–27; recognition)	Martha (11:17–27; recognition)
Pilate (18:28–19:22; failed recognition)	Pilate (18:28–19:22; failed recognition)
	The Beloved Disciple (20:3–10; recognition)
Mary Magdalene (20:11–18; recognition)	Mary Magdalene (20:1–2, 11–18; recognition)
Thomas (20:20–28; climactic recognition)	Thomas (20:24–29; climactic recognition)
The Beloved Disciple and the other disciples (21:1–14; recognition)	The Beloved Disciple (21:1–14; recognition)

According to this illustration of Culpepper's observations, the number of recognition/nonrecognition scenes in John is impressive. Apart from the farewell discourses in John 13–17, the question of anagnorisis is present in almost every chapter of the text.⁴³ As may be seen, the list reveals some development from the first publication to the second. In the 1995 article, Culpepper describes thirteen recognition scenes distributed

⁴¹ It is not quite clear whether Culpepper sees the epiphany on the sea as a recognition scene. He is very brief on the question and states only that "Jesus again makes himself known to the disciples..."; idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 80.

⁴² "Peter is at least moving toward a full anagnorisis, but later scenes in the Gospel show that he still has a long way to go"; Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, 81.

⁴³ Stibbe, as a matter of fact, even detects anagnorisis in the farewell dialogue in 16:4b–33; see idem, *John*, 173. Francisco Lozada's outline of the Gospel's plot of either successful or unsuccessful anagnorises is basically in line with Stibbe and Culpepper. According to Lozada, the anagnorisis plot "aims to give a warning...to the implied reader. This warning is to either believe and remain loyal to the Son, or not to believe and remain disloyal as the Jews"; idem, *A Literary Reading of John 5: Text as Construction* (StBL 20; New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 57; cf. 50–58.

over two alternative categories (failed and accomplished recognition), while the picture is more detailed three years later. The number of scenes has increased from thirteen to nineteen, and the dichotomy between recognition and nonrecognition has become less distinct as terms like “mistaken *anagnorisis*,” “partial *anagnorisis*,” “recognition of a kind,” and “full *anagnorisis*” have emerged in the text.⁴⁴ Yet, the main message is still that *anagnorisis* is a basic, recurring feature in John’s episodic plot.⁴⁵

Up to now, Culpepper’s article and the chapter in *The Gospel and Letters of John* are the most comprehensive discussions of *anagnorisis* in John. In the latter publication, he gives examples of parallels in ancient Greek tragedy, the Hebrew Bible, and Jewish literature of the Second Temple Period and presents some valuable analytical distinctions regarding the type-scene (for example, self-disclosure versus discovery). The summary nature of his expositions, however, does not permit him to go into further detail, and so, Culpepper’s main contribution has been to extend and develop the catalogue of Johannine *anagnorises* for which Hitchcock made the first sketch. This pointing out of recognition scenes is most valuable for the present study, since it maps out pericopes that need not only to be identified as *anagnorises*, as done by Culpepper, but also to be further studied as such. From the point of view of a more exact, generic definition of *anagnorisis*, which is advocated for in the present study, we may not find as many recognition/nonrecognition

⁴⁴ Idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 80. In an article on the Thomas pericope in light of Odysseyan recognition scenes, Stan Harstine counts nine recognition scenes in John’s Gospel; see idem, “Un-Doubting Thomas: Recognition Scenes in the Ancient World,” *PRSt* 33 (2006), 440.

⁴⁵ Andrew T. Lincoln has criticized Culpepper’s description of John’s plot, suggesting that Johannine terminology rather points in the direction of a lawsuit narrative. See idem, *Truth on Trial: The Lawsuit Motif in the Fourth Gospel* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2000), 162. Although it is certainly correct that John extends the trial motif of the Synoptic Gospels, the alternative that Lincoln puts up is somewhat artificial, since the recognition scene shares terminology with ancient forensic rhetoric. After all, both genres are cognitive types of discourse (see Aristotle, *Poet.* 1455a; *Rhetoric* 1359a). Moreover, by basing his criticism on a general understanding of the ancient recognition scene as “one major event” in the plot of narrative and drama (*ibid.*), Lincoln canonizes a single variant of the type-scene. According to Lincoln, *anagnorisis* cannot be applied to John as done by Culpepper and Stibbe, because when “applied to the Fourth Gospel, this category now describes the reactions of all the other characters to the protagonist and is no longer a major turning point but a whole series of lesser progressions, most of which have to be categorized as *failed* recognition scenes” (*ibid.*). Should one follow Lincoln’s narrow understanding of the recognition scene as a single, pivotal event through to the full, one would in fact have to state that the *Odyssey* is void of *anagnorises*.

scenes in the Gospel as detected by Culpepper, and we may even discover alternative recognition type-scenes (e.g., 1:19–34; 13:18–30; 18:1–12, 15–18, 25–27), but Culpepper's studies in Johannine recognitions give a first indication of the fact that Aristotle's assertion concerning the *Odyssey*, that it is "pervaded by recognition" (ἀναγνώρισις γὰρ διόλου; *Poet.* 1459b15 [Halliwell]), applies equally well to the Fourth Gospel.⁴⁶

Since Stibbe and Culpepper put forward their suggestions in the 1990s, Jo-Ann A. Brant has taken the study of recognition in John a step further. In her recent work, *Dialogue and Drama: Elements of Greek Tragedy in the Fourth Gospel* (2004), anagnorisis plays a role in a chapter dealing with "The Plot Elements" of the Gospel.⁴⁷ Brant's main interest is to demonstrate how John not only recounts recognition episodes diegetically, but also shows them happening on a theatrical axis. As in ancient drama, the Gospel audience is informed about the recognitions taking place in the story through the dialogue and action of the actors, instead of through the omniscient narrator.⁴⁸ While this describes the theatrical aspect of Johannine recognitions, the following observation by Brant is more illuminating for the purposes of the present study:

Modern readers have a tendency to treat recognition in the Fourth Gospel as a function of character rather than plot. Nicodemus's failure to recognize Jesus is treated as a failure of character. If we situate the patterns of recognition found in the Fourth Gospel within the context of the tragic tradition, this failure becomes a plot element.... The characters who recognize Jesus have no power to prevent the plot from unfolding as it must.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ For the sake of completeness, I shall at the present point merely refer to studies of anagnorisis with regard to specific pericopes in John that have come to my knowledge: Sijf van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love in John* (BIS 2; Leiden: Brill, 1993), 199–208; Amy L. Huprich, "Jn 20:11–18: The Recognition/Reunion Scene and its Parallels in Greek Romance," *Proceedings of the Eastern Great Lakes & Mid-Western Biblical Societies* 15 (1995): 15–21; Adeline Fehribach, *The Women in the Life of the Bridegroom: A Feminist Historical-Literary Analysis of the Female Characters in the Fourth Gospel* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1998), 143–167; Stan Harstine, "Un-Doubting Thomas": 435–447; R. Alan Culpepper, "Cognition in John: The Johannine Signs as Recognition Scenes," *PRSt*, forthcoming. For further discussion of these contributions, see pp. 121, 185–213.

⁴⁷ Eadem, *Dialogue and Drama: Elements of Greek Tragedy in the Fourth Gospel* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2004), 50–57.

⁴⁸ "With dramatic economy and without the interjections of an omniscient narrator, the gospel represents the private experience of recognition through public displays of emotion." Eadem, *Dialogue and Drama*, 56.

⁴⁹ Eadem, *Dialogue and Drama*, 57, cf. 47, 50. Brant refers to Culbertson, *Poetics of Revelation*, 2.

Brant is certainly right that there has been too much focus on the role of anagnorisis in John's delineation of characters. As we have seen, this may to a certain extent apply to Culpepper's and Stibbe's works.⁵⁰ But Brant's alternative suggestion, which points toward the role of anagnorisis in plot development, needs further specification due to its possible ambiguities. If the term "plot" describes the underlying sequence of basic story events (the *fabula*), Brant's observation does not apply very well to John's Gospel. In the tragic tradition, recognition scenes are definitely plot-movers—for example, when the mutual recognitions of Electra and Orestes enable them to carry out their plan against their mother⁵¹—but in John, where the story is determined by the "hour" and has a strong episodic element, anagnorisis seldom plays this role.⁵² Yet, if, as I shall later argue, there is such thing as an epistemological plot in the story, which appears along with the story events, Brant has a strong point (see pp. 34–44). So, the main function of the recognition scenes is neither to characterize the successive story-world characters by subjecting them to objective tests of faith, nor to drive the story forward, but forms part of the Gospel's epistemological plot. Moreover, I shall propose that instead of moving the story, the recognition scenes move the reader. The recognition scenes appear within the course of a discursive communication process (the *sjuzet*) between the implied author and reader.⁵³ Accordingly, the form and function of the recognition scene is inextricably bound up with this situation of communication and develops as the scene serves to position the reader according to the changing phases in the process of reading through the Gospel. By stating this, I have already anticipated the following presentation of the present inquiry.

⁵⁰ And it clearly applies to the following studies of Johannine scenes of encounters between Jesus and story-world characters: Raymond F. Collins, "The Representative Figures of the Fourth Gospel," *DRev* 94 (1976): 26–46, 118–132, in particular, 31–32; Peter Dschulnigg, *Jesus begegnen: Personen und ihre Bedeutung im Johannesevangelium* (Theologie 30. Münster: LIT, 2002).

⁵¹ On the recognition scene as plot-mover in the *Odyssey*, see Pierre Han, "Recognition in *The Odyssey*," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 59 (1981), 52.

⁵² Exceptions may be the recognition scenes related to the passion story; e.g., the recognition scene in 18:1–12 (Jesus' arrest), which is a prerequisite for the trial and the crucifixion and thus moves the story forward.

⁵³ The analytical distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzet* is one of the conquests of

The Present Study: Aim, Method, and Outline

The present work is a study of how the Fourth Gospel employs and transforms the anagnorisis type-scene of ancient narrative and drama. The objectives of the study are to (1) demonstrate that a considerable number of Johannine encounter scenes thematize the question about Jesus' true identity by playing on ancient recognition-scene conventions; (2) examine how the form of the Johannine recognition scenes change in the course of the narrative (as Jesus arrives, becomes an object of controversy, and departs in the story-world), thus giving rise to a focus on the type-scene's function in the exposition process of the narrative (the *sjuzet*, the discourse) rather than on its role in characterization and the development of story events (the *fabula*, the story); and (3) discuss how the type-scene works as an integral medium for the Gospel's communication of its main issue concerning the recognition of Jesus, the stranger from heaven. While it is widely recognized that the Fourth Gospel represents a medley of microgenres, little attention has been paid to the recognition scene in this respect. The present study therefore seeks to include this particular type-scene in the topical discussion in Johannine studies about the Gospel's "bending" of microgenres. Unlike most of the previous approaches to anagnorisis in John, the present study does not use the anagnorisis concept as a trope for episodic belief challenges or events of coming-to-believe in a broad sense, but develops a generic understanding of anagnorisis, based on ancient literary parallels. This is thought to be a more exact, heuristic tool for dealing with anagnorisis and its role in the formation of John's religious narrative.

Before presenting the outline of the book, I shall make a few comments on the three main objects of the study, confining myself to only the most necessary, general remarks at the present moment. The detection of recognition scenes in the story (see 1 above) immediately raises interconnected questions of the "ontology" of literary genres and of authorial intent. It is a basic assumption in the present study that no text is an island. Texts make sense by relating to other texts in a process of imitation and mimicry; and this interrelation creates literary conventions of genre.⁵⁴ Genres accordingly function as "models of writing" for

Russian formalism; see the entries in Gerald Prince, *Dictionary of Narratology* (Aldershot: Scolar, 1988), 30, 87.

⁵⁴ See Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue, and Novel," in *The Kristeva Reader* (ed. Toril

authors and “horizons of expectation” for readers.⁵⁵ Yet, when speaking of literary genres in this way, we must be careful not to conceive of them as unchangeable Platonic ideas, since authors and readers constantly renegotiate their status and form. This negotiation takes place not only in terms of formal transformation but also relates to the ideologies that genres contain. Thomas O. Beebee puts it in the following way:

As a form of ideology, genre is also never fully identical with itself, nor are texts fully identical with their genres. Furthermore, if genre is a form of ideology, then the struggle against or the deviations from genre are ideological struggles.⁵⁶

Keeping this in mind, we must also notice that even though there was an extensive awareness of genre in Antiquity, literature may be bound to genre without it being consciously realized by the author.⁵⁷ For this reason, it is beyond the limits of the present study to determine whether the author(s) of the Fourth Gospel deliberately intended to employ and transform the conventional recognition type-scene of the time. The fact that recognition scene patterns are relatively common in the text might tempt us to infer that this was actually the case, but this remains a matter of conjecture since we know very little about the rhetorical education of early Christian writers. Likewise, we cannot demonstrate to what extent the Gospel’s intended audience was aware of the play on already established genres in the text—the Johannine community did not hand down to us a poetics of Johannine literature—though we know that at least some ancient, Christian readers did take the post-resurrection narratives as recognition type-scenes, as we shall later see (pp. 185–186).⁵⁸ What the present approach seeks to do instead is to

Moi; Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 37; Gérard Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree* (trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky; Stages 8; Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1997).

⁵⁵ Tzvetan Todorov, “The Origin of Genres,” *NLH* 8 (1976), 163; cf. Hans-Robert Jauss’ concept of “Erwartungshorizont”; see, e.g., idem, “Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft,” in *Rezeptionsästhetik* (ed. R. Warning; Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994), 135, 148 et al.

⁵⁶ Thomas O. Beebee, *The Ideology of Genre: A Comparative Study of Generic Instability* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 19; cf. Todorov, “The Origin of Genres,” 164.

⁵⁷ See Burridge, *What Are the Gospels?* 26–27, 54–59.

⁵⁸ Due to the above problems concerning author and audience, we shall confine ourselves to the relation between the implied author and reader in the text. For the sake of convenience, however, we shall continue to call the implied author, who appears as the *logopoios* in the reading, John.

present a particular reading of the Gospel perfectly plausible within its ancient literary environment. Such a reading, of course, does not respond to every stimulus given in the text, and it is certainly not claimed that a generic understanding of certain Johannine encounter stories as anagnorisis scenes lays down their formal essence once and for all; but by looking at them from this point of view, we are able to reactivate potential structures of meaning that may have contributed to the ancient reader's experience of the narrative. As historians in the wake of the linguistic turn, we can hardly hope for more.⁵⁹ Along with this, it is obvious that the present study does not consider it necessary to determine a direct, intentional cause-and-effect connection between the recognition scenes of ancient Greco-Roman and Jewish literature on the one hand and the Gospel of John on the other. Such an enterprise would not have much chance of a successful outcome.⁶⁰ Rather, the Gospel is seen as part of an ancient literary milieu where generic conventions and expectations were diffusing on various levels, through metaliterary scholarship, rhetorical *paideia*, the constant production, distribution, and reading of texts, as well as oral retelling, for example. The Gospel of John is a palimpsest (like any text), written on previous texts, but this does not imply that there is only one single subtext (either the Hebrew Bible or the Homeric epics, for example) between the parchment and the ink from John's pen, as it were. As a cultural product, the Gospel rather participates in and rewrites a wide, ancient literary tradition of storytelling, including the popular recognition-scene genre, which occurs in both Greco-Roman and Jewish literature.⁶¹

In regard to the internal development of the recognition scenes in the course of the Gospel (see 2 above) and its communicative role (3), these two aspects seem to be closely connected with the circumstance

⁵⁹ See Elizabeth A. Clark, *History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

⁶⁰ In Dennis R. MacDonald's distinctive studies of ancient Christian literature ("mimesis criticism"), he has tried to demonstrate how early Christian writers would intentionally quote and imitate Homer in order to supersede him. See, e.g., idem, *Christianizing Homer: The Odyssey, Plato, and The Acts of Andrew* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); idem, *The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). For balanced criticism of this approach, see Margaret M. Mitchell, "Homer in the New Testament?" *JR* 83 (2003): 244–260 and Karl Olav Sandnes, "Imitatio Homeri? An Appraisal of Dennis R. MacDonald's 'Mimesis Criticism,'" *JBL* 124 (2005): 715–732.

⁶¹ Margaret M. Mitchell envisions a promising "form critical" way for New Testament research: It includes "a study of how early Christian authors incorporated—sometimes integrating, sometimes merely juxtaposing—a range of cultural references, fragments, artifacts, and concepts in their writings, and, further, investigation of what

that Jesus is absent from the everyday world of the reader, which is an underlying premise and problem in the text, most explicitly thematized in the farewell discourses (chs. 13–17) and the gospel ending (chs. 20–21). In light of this, the Gospel may be seen as an etiology of this absence, explaining its prehistory, its causes, and the remedies for it (for example the presence of the Paraclete). As a whole, the text itself is a substitute presence, arranging a meeting between the reader and story-world characters in the process of reading. Jesus arrives when reading begins (ch. 1) and departs at the story's close (chs. 20–21). Accordingly, the Johannine recognition scenes must be seen as functions of exposition. Their form changes as they in the beginning serve to establish the presence of the divine actor in the text (chs. 1–4), then become an illustration of the ambiguity of his presence (chs. 5–19), while they finally confirm Jesus' true identity, reach beyond the story-world, and reinterpret his direct absence and the reader's situation of nonseeing (chs. 20–21).⁶² The present study views the Johannine recognition scenes from the point of view of this overall narrative pattern and proceeds according to it.

The book consists of four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one is a presentation of anagnorisis in both theoretical and historical perspective, which serves to lay out the complex of questions and problems that determines the approach. The presentation takes Aristotle's *Poetics* as its point of departure and establishes a first relation between anagnorisis and the Gospel of John by discussing the general character of the Gospel's plot. More narrative programs appear in the story, but the epistemological plot concerning Jesus' identity seems to stand in the foreground. The recognition scene is an important formal element in this plot, and it embodies the interdependence between the cogni-

that process and result mean for the rhetorical construction, historical makeup, and readerly possibilities of their presumed audiences" (idem, "Homer in the New Testament?" 256). The present study contributes to the ongoing development of this kind of form criticism by focusing on the latter aspect of readerly possibilities in relation to the recognition scenes.

⁶² The appendix in John 21 is included in the present reading, since it contains the final recognition scene of the Gospel as it occurs in the ancient manuscripts. For historical questions of origin and expositional problems in the chapter, see Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John* (2 vols.; AB 29–29a; New York: Doubleday, 1966–1970), 2:1077–1082; B.R. Gaventa, "The Archive of Excess: John 21 and the Problem of Narrative Closure," in *Exploring the Gospel of John: in Honor of D. Moody Smith* (eds. R. Alan Culpepper and C. Clifton Black; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 240–252.

tive dimension (knowledge, veridiction) and the pragmatic dimension (acts, events, and existents) in the story-world (A.J. Greimas). The following analysis of anagnorisis runs in two stages, one theoretical and one historical. This procedure is not at all accidental, but constitutes an attempt to make explicit some theoretical presuppositions concerning the general phenomenon of recognition in literary discourse, before turning toward the historically embedded recognition scenes of ancient literature. In other words, instead of merely collecting ancient literary examples and pretending that the inductivism of such an approach protects against theoretical prejudices, I want to make explicit and face some of the basic theoretical problems relating to recognition in literature from the outset. Although such an approach has its problems, the alleged alternative of direct historical inquiry separate from theory seems much less convincing.⁶³ Therefore, I first develop a general and elementary semiotic theory of aspects of recognition that seem particularly relevant when facing Johannine material. The main observations regard the dual appearance of the recognized (camouflage and mark), the three basic modes of displaying the mark of true identity: *telling*, *showing*, and *whispering*, as well as the important distinction between recognition as identification and as social recognition, respectively. Next, chapter one moves from general poetics to literary history, thus presenting the specific, historical understanding of anagnorisis in the present study. Anagnorisis is not any kind of discovery or realization in literature but a type-scene or a microgenre inhabiting ancient epic, narrative, and drama; and it is defined on the basis of its recurring, constituent elements.

The following chapters consist of readings in Johannine recognition scenes in inter- and intratextual context, interwoven by thematic discussions. The first of these chapters, “Chapter Two: Anagnorisis and Arrival (John 1–4),” begins by discussing how the prologue sets the conditions of recognition in the narrative. Next, it is shown that the very first scenes in the Gospel (the triptych in 1:19–28, 29–34, 35–51) consti-

⁶³ Max Weber presents a similar point. If the historian shuns formulating theoretical categories, he says, “so ist die Folge regelmäßig entweder, daß er, bewußt oder unbewußt, andere ähnliche ohne sprachliche formulierung und logische Bearbeitung verwendet, oder daß er im Gebiet des unbestimmt ‘Empfundnen’ stecken bleibt”; idem, “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (ed. Johannes Winckelmann; 3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1968), 195. Weber, however, also emphasizes that theory must not force history upon a Procrustean bed of predefined ideal types (*ibid.*).

tute a remodeling of narratives known from earlier, Christian tradition, now in the form of recognition scenes. Subsequently, the Johannine *sēmeia* are discussed in their capacity as Jesus' visible tokens of identity. The final section of chapter two shows that Jesus' encounter with the Samaritan woman at the well (4:4–42) plays on recognition-scene conventions and does not merely awake expectations of an imminent courtship, as is the normal assumption in present-day research. The recognition scenes of this part of the Gospel (chs. 1–4) introduce the problem of recognition at Jesus' arrival in the story-world; they share a common syntagmatic pattern that concludes when recognizers bring new recognizers into Jesus' presence. Moreover, these type-scenes turn out successfully.

In the third chapter, "Recognition in Conflict (John 5–19)," it becomes clear that the Johannine recognition scene is not a static entity but plays a formative role in the development of the plot. Thus, in the anagnorises of John 5–19, the ambiguity of the Jesus-sign comes more to the foreground, as observers often fail to recognize his true identity (see John 5 and 9). This evokes an extensive debate in the Gospel concerning the underlying criteria of recognition. In this context, I shall discuss the role of the "I am" sayings in light of their formulaic use in the contemporary type-scene. In the final two sections of the chapter, the recognition scenes of the "hour" are discussed (John 13–19) as well as the underlying sub-narrative concerning God's own recognition of Jesus.

The fourth chapter, "Recognition and Departure (John 20–21)," investigates how the Johannine recognition scene in the postresurrection apparitions changes its character, as it now serves to thematize not the presence of Jesus before story-world observers, but his departure and his absence. I shall show how the whole chapter, consisting of a series of recognitions, prepares the ground for the final saying concerning the blessedness of those who believe without having seen (20:29). This new situation makes it relevant to summarize how the Gospel works with the reader's role as recognizer. As a whole, the study both investigates the *Dass* and the *Was* of Fourth Gospel anagnorisis: On a formal level, the study demonstratest that John regularly employs and transforms the anagnorisis type-scene; on an ideological level, it shows the way in which the scene, as an important piece in the Johannine puzzle of microgenres, conveys the messages of the Gospel. The results of the inquiry are summarized in the final conclusion, where I shall also suggest some perspectives for further study.

CHAPTER ONE

ANAGNORISIS IN A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Anagnorisis in Aristotle's Poetics

The recognition scene belongs to the category of literary devices that never seem to lose their grip on storytellers and their audiences alike. Archaic epics and myths, folk-literature, Shakespearean drama, and modern-day Hollywood cinema all bear witness to its enduring fame.¹ When, for instance, characters like the impostor, the trickster, the make-believer, the metamorph, the apparent stranger, the reflective observer, or the hero in disguise enter the stage, the plot inevitably becomes a masquerade where suspense centers on the cognitive play of semblance and truth. True identities hide behind the *persona*; and the situation evokes an unbearable tension of *tremor* and *fascinans*, which does not find release until the riddle is unmasked in front of the audience. In the *Poetics*, which forms the basis for any theorizing on the subject, as for many other aspects of narratology and theory of drama and literature in general, Aristotle gave a possible explanation for the popularity of anagnorisis by characterizing it as one of the strongest means of bringing about emotional affect in tragedy (ψυχᾶγωγεῖ; 1450a31–34). Recognition is not merely a reflection of the narrator's attempt to excite the audience, however; it also serves as a vehicle for dealing with epistemological dilemmas that are principal elements in certain types of plot. Thus Aristotle, in his analysis of the tragedy, defines the phenomenon first and foremost as a motion from ignorance to knowledge (ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή; 1452a29–30), the knowledge

¹ A fascinating insight into the great variety of recognitions in folk-literature across cultures is presented in Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature: A Classification of Narrative Elements in Folktales, Ballads, Myths, Fables, Mediaeval Romances, Exempla, Fabliaux, Jest-Books, and Local Legends* (rev. and enl. ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 370–391.

relating to an object (a person, a fact, or a condition) of positive (“euphoric”) or negative (“dysphoric”) value to the recognizer.²

Aristotle was probably not the first to use the concept of anagnorisis as a *terminus technicus* in poetics, but rather engaged in an existing debate on the nature of tragedy that included the type-scene in question. Nevertheless, the *Poetics* is practically the only surviving metaliterary discussion of anagnorisis from Antiquity.³ Aristotle expounds the notion with some detail, and it becomes one of the main topics in his discussion at the moment where he seeks to establish an analytical distinction between two types of plots (μύθοι): the simple (ἅπλοιοι) and the complex (πεπλεγμένοι; 1452a11–22). The distinction between two plot types relates to how they construct the turning point of fortunes (μετάβασις) between the complication (δέσις) and the denouement (λύσις) in the narrative trajectory (1455b23–28). In tragedies of simple plot, the turning point appears devoid of anagnorisis and *peripeteia* (περιπέτεια; lit., “reversal,” see below), whereas the occurrence of one or both elements brings about a complex plot. Aristotle most values complex tragedies, especially when they contain both anagnorisis and *peripeteia*, and he mentions Sophocles’ *Oedipus tyrannus* as his ideal model (1452a31–33). Before going further into Aristotle’s discussion of anagnorisis, we need to examine his concept of *peripeteia*, since it seems closely related to anagnorisis and gives us a more precise understanding of the character of the complex plot. First, it must be clear that *peripeteia* in the Aristotelian sense is not, as opposed to a most widely held understanding of the term, simply reversal in the sense that it designates the locus where prosperity is turned into misfortune or vice versa. As we have seen, Aristotle already reserved the term *metabasis* to designate the turning point in the story, and such change of fortune is not confined to

² The latter statement concerning the value of the recognition object more or less represents the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s addition to his core definition, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὀρισμένων (1452a30–31). For an alternative understanding, see John MacFarlane, “Aristotle’s Definition of Anagnorisis,” *AJP* 121 (2000): 367–383. The terms “euphoric” and “dysphoric” are used in the Greimasian sense as so-called “thymic categories” describing two opposite modes of value relation between a subject and an object, the neutral term being “aphoric.” See the relevant entries in Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtés, *Sémiotique: Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage* (Langue, Linguistique, Communication; Paris: Hachette, 1979). The terms seem particularly applicable to the study of anagnorisis since they, besides their technical Greimasian meaning, quite precisely describe the reaction of the recognizer (euphoric or dysphoric, seldom aphoric).

³ See N.J. Richardson, “Recognition Scenes,” 219–235; Cave, *Recognitions*, 47–54.

the complex plot alone, since even simple plots (in order to be plots) contain *metabasis*.⁴ This leaves us with the problem of positively defining *peripeteia*, which is a quite difficult task considering the conciseness of Aristotle's exposition. Among exegetes of the *Poetics*, broad agreement prevails on the fact that *peripeteia* constitutes a specific kind of *metabasis*, but from here on the case becomes controversial and various opinions have emerged. The suggestions for defining *peripeteia* range from a position regarding it as an element of particular suddenness or unexpectedness (J. Vahlen), over a point of view that sees it as fatal change that goes against the intentions of the actors (F.L. Lucas), to a standpoint considering it to be a moment of realization not among the actors, but in the audience (Gerald F. Else).⁵ While the latter option can be excluded inasmuch as the *Poetics* does not concern itself with "reader response" in a modern sense, the first suggestions are lacking in precision. The crux of the problem centers on Aristotle's definition of *peripeteia* in *Poetics* 11, where he describes it as a change of events to the opposite "as already stated" (καθ' ἄπερ εἴρεται; 1452a23). As Stephen Halliwell notes in the latest Loeb edition, this phrase probably refers back to παρὰ τὴν δόξαν in *Poet.* 9 (1452a4).⁶ Therefore, it seems more accurate to render the specific kind of fortune transformation called *peripeteia* as a change of fortune contrary to appearance (*doxa*), rather than as change against intentions or expectations. *Peripeteia* surely contradicts the actors' expectations, but in a particular manner, namely by turning their understanding of their own fate upside down.⁷ Thus, *peripeteia* sheds light on Aristotle's concept of recognition by showing that anagnorisis is not an exclusively cognitive event, but a fateful moment determining the fortune of the recognizer. Accordingly, anagnorisis has its strongest impact

⁴ See Cave, *Recognitions*, 30. Gerald Prince confuses *metabasis* and *peripeteia* by inaccurately defining the latter as "[t]he inversion ... from one state of affairs to the opposite"; idem, *Dictionary of Narratology*, 70. A similar misconception has also entered Johannine exegesis, for example in F.R.M. Hitchcock, where the term is understood as merely "a reversal of fortunes"; idem, "Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?" 315. See also Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, 131–138.

⁵ Johannes Vahlen, *Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1914), 34–35; F.L. Lucas, *Tragedy in Relation to Aristotle's Poetics* (London: Hogarth, 1953), 91–97; Gerald F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 345–348.

⁶ Aristotle, *Poetics* (trans. Stephen Halliwell; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 65, note c.

⁷ Cave rightly states that "at the peripeteia, the hidden level shifts to the surface"; idem, *Recognitions*, 32.

when appearing in company with *peripeteia*. This is important to bear in mind when studying Johannine recognitions. Anagnorisis and *peripeteia* are both epistemological devices in tragedy that turn around the relationship between mere appearance and true reality, revealing that what seemed to be was truly only semblance and deceit. They are tragedy's most effective emotional devices, and so one now understands in what sense *Oedipus tyrannus* becomes Aristotle's model tragedy of complexity, as Oedipus, by recognizing the murder victim as his father and his mistress as his mother (anagnorisis), faces a situation where his fate is reversed *para tēn doxan* (*peripeteia*).⁸

Let us now return to Aristotle's characterization of anagnorisis, which he expounds in larger detail than his presentation of *peripeteia*. To begin with, he notes that even though anagnorisis does not always have human actors as its object—one may recognize a lifeless or unconscious object, for example—recognition between persons is most integral to the plot. Regarding such anagnorises, he distinguishes between mutual recognitions (where both characters are recognizers and become recognized) and unilateral ones (*Poet.* 11; 1452b5). In *Poetics* 16, a further taxonomy of anagnorisis types (εἶδη) is developed.⁹ The need for such a system apparently originates in the question of how anagnorisis comes about—a question that the *Poetics* is thorough enough not to evade and one that also engages the Gospel of John, in regard to both its practice of recognition scene writing and its epistemological reflections. In terms of terminology, the Aristotelian taxonomy shows awareness, though not very explicitly articulated, of the fact that recognition is a process that bears resemblance to the proceedings in a forensic court of justice (see 1452a35–36). Both represent typical situations where proof, testimony, evidence, or testing is required in order to reveal the true identity of a certain individual. And so they are both processes of cognition that examine the relationship between (1) the present object (e.g., the accused, the returning hero) and (2) a recalled and thus absent-in-past narrative (e.g., a charge, a life story, a claim). The epistemological verdict both in a trial and in anagnorisis is the result of identification

⁸ Aristotle's seemingly contradictory devaluation of *Oedipus tyrannus* in *Poet.* 14 (1454a4) has understandably puzzled commentators.

⁹ Some scholars regard *Poetics* 16 as an appendix or even an interpolation; see Cave, *Recognitions*, 37–40, 242–255. This source-critical question is of no relevance as long as we use the *Poetics* as a starting place for a contemporary literary theory of recognition and not as a text that has directly influenced the Gospel of John.

procedures relating these two elements: “This person (1) is the one (2).” By requiring testimony and evidence, recognition relies on signs; and, accordingly, the question of how anagnorisis comes about is basically a question of semiotics or how signs signify. The taxonomy in *Poet.* 16, as a consequence, leads off by mentioning anagnorisis by means of signs/tokens (διὰ τῶν σημείων; 1454b20) as a specific category of recognition.

Before displaying the mentioned taxonomy, I must introduce it by stating that a closer look at the anagnorisis types in *Poet.* 16 shows that they primarily deal with recognition of persons as in *Poet.* 11. This is quite fortunate for our purposes, since the recognitions in the Fourth Gospel are also first of all personal. As indicated below, the types are divided according to the means of recognition. Moreover, one should notice that the taxonomy of the four types is not a mere categorization, but also implies an aesthetic hierarchy, in the sense that it first presents the types that are least artistic (ἀτεχνοτάτης; 1454b19), while value increases as we move through the list. The sequence and numbering of *Poet.* 16 (1454b18–1455a12) is as follows:

- 1) Anagnorisis by means of tokens (διὰ τῶν σημείων)
 - a) congenital (τὰ σύμφυτα; for example, a birthmark)
 - b) acquired (τὰ ἐπίκτητα)
 - α) bodily (τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι; for example, scars)
 - β) external (τὰ ἐκτός; for example, necklaces)
- 2) Anagnorisis contrived by the poet (πεποιημέναι ὑπο τοῦ ποιητοῦ; i.e., when the author enforces unmotivated recognition)
- 3) Anagnorisis through memory (διὰ μνήμης; i.e., through the recognized person’s memory, the identity being revealed by his or her knowledge)
- 4) Anagnorisis by reasoning (ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ; i.e., by logical inference)

These four categories form the basis of the typology in *Poet.* 16, but the text subsequently adds two more types to the hierarchy, although they are not systematically numbered as the four types above. First, there is anagnorisis by false reasoning (ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ; 1455a15; cf. 1460a19) and second, recognition proceeding from the events themselves (ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων; 1455a16–17). The latter type is explicitly considered the best of all types (βελτίστη), including the four above ones, and once again *Oedipus tyrannus* is singled out as the play that embodies the best kind of recognition.

The hierarchy of recognition types in *Poet.* 16 is evidently problematic with its overlapping categories not always belonging to the same analytical level, and, accordingly, it gives rise to critical questions of the following kind: Is anagnorisis contrived by the poet (2) excluded from being, at the same time, anagnorisis by tokens (1)? Is the recognized person's telltale knowledge (cf. 3; διὰ μνήμης) necessarily a separate mode of recognition, or does it rather participate in the first category as a kind of acquired token (1)? Do not all kinds of anagnorisis involve some kind of logical reasoning (4)? What kinds of recognition does the poet not invent (2)? The list of critical questions is expandable, but the problems still stand, as the text provides us with very little help to solve them.¹⁰ Yet, however inconsistent the taxonomy may be from one point of view, it seems to be governed by more consequence as one addresses the underlying criteria for arranging the hierarchy normatively. As to this, the important part played by logical reasoning is striking. This is illustrated by the fact that anagnorisis by syllogism is regarded as being the second-best type (next to recognition from the events themselves), whereas paralogistic anagnorisis is considered even poorer than recognition by tokens. Unfortunately, the discussion of paralogisms in recognition is rather obscure, as it appears in the shape of a very brief synopsis of the events in a lost tragedy called *Odysseus the False Messenger* (1455a12–15). Nevertheless, one understands that it has to do with founding the concluding propositions of anagnorisis on erroneous premises. Thus, in *Poet.* 16 questions of logic assume a particular status in recognition, as if the text is warning against the fact that recognitions may rely on erratic signs and illogical narrative seduction. Moreover, the text seems to guard itself against the unreserved, high appraisal of anagnorisis in *Poet.* 10–11. Reliability according to the rules of logic, and not the epistemological reevaluation of fortune (*peripeteia*), now becomes an important criterion for deciding what is greater and lesser in the hierarchy of recognition types: The less logical or probable the recognition appears, the lower it is placed in the hierarchy. This introduction of logic into poetics may be accused of insensitivity to the fact that literature has a many-sided rhetorical ability to produce “suspension of disbelief.” Moreover, it seems to isolate anagnorisis from the social interactions and negotiations of the characters, which was clearly the matrix of anagnorisis in *Poet.* 10–11. Finally, it is a significant symp-

¹⁰ For a similar critique, see B. Perrin's still valuable article, “Recognition Scenes in Greek Literature,” *AJP* 30 (1909): 371–404.

tom of the intrinsic ambiguity in anagnorisis: In a flashing moment, anagnorisis puts a stop to a process of sign-production and sign-reading (semiosis), which is, in principle, unstoppable.

The Embarrassments of Recognition

Anagnorisis has given rise to highly diverse evaluations among theorists of literature. As we have seen, Aristotle, in his discussion of the phenomenon in the *Poetics*, appears as one of the apologists of anagnorisis (at least in *Poet.* 10–11). In Aristotle's perspective, the recognition scene conveys epistemological complexity to tragedies whose outline would otherwise be simple. Yet, however important the concept of anagnorisis may be in Aristotle, modern literary criticism has either relegated it to its peripheries or transformed it beyond recognition.¹¹ In contrast, other key terms in the *Poetics* such as *mimēsis*, *katharsis*, *hamartia*, and *peripeteia* have all gone through a ramified *Wirkungsgeschichte* in modern literary theory, raising still relevant questions concerning the relation between literature and "reality" (*mimēsis*), the *why* of reading (*katharsis*), and the existential dimension of literature (*hamartia* and *peripeteia*). But classical anagnorisis has only to a limited extent been the object of study in modern literary criticism, suffering from a reputation as an artificial, unfounded, and thus suspicious literary device designed by the unskilled narrator in order to produce the required denouement in a story long gone out of hand.¹² Such criticism aimed against anagnorisis as a mere emergency solution and an unsuitable and contrived *deus ex machina* is to some extent provoked by the *Poetics* itself (see above). Despite Aristotle's great appreciation of the complex tragedy with its emphasis on

¹¹ Terence Cave's *Recognitions* is an impressive attempt to remedy this deficiency.

¹² See Terence Cave, "Recognition and the Reader," *Comparative Criticism* 2 (1980), 49; idem, *Recognitions*, 1, 53–54. George E. Duckworth's assessment of Roman comedy may serve as an illustration: "The conventional recognition scene was, at best, a rather mechanical device which in most comedies of mistaken identity...solved the difficulties of the characters and brought the comedy to an end"; idem, *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 160. Northrop Frye's employment of anagnorisis in his typology of the archetypal myths of narrative is a conspicuous exception in modern literary criticism. The present study, however, does not make use of his grand theory of the inherent "visions" in modes of storytelling. See idem, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); idem, *The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 127–157.

the epistemological game of truth and pretence, the evaluation in *Poet.* 16 on closer examination fails to displace a certain uneasiness in relation to anagnorisis. According to Eustathius, the twelfth-century scholiast on Homer, Aristotle is even supposed to have criticized the bath scene of the *Odyssey* by framing the question: Is everyone who has a scar, consequently, Odysseus?¹³ Although this citation hardly goes back to Aristotle, it expresses the same discomfort that also seems to dominate the above taxonomy of anagnorisis types, which, apart from being an analysis of the means of recognition, betrays how shaky the foundations of recognition are. Thus, by introducing value judgments into the scheme, *Poet.* 16 is not just establishing an aesthetic norm concerning fair and foul in tragedy, but also creates a loophole of escape from arbitrary tokens and paralogisms toward the apparently safer haven of flawless logic.

One understands the discomfort the recognition scene comes to evoke—perhaps not so much because of its possibly dubious aesthetic character, but because anagnorisis brings to the surface the question of the epistemological status of events and claims in narrative. Anagnorisis reveals the epistemological ambiguity—or the complexity, to render Aristotle's term—of these events and claims, whereas this dimension is not addressed in simple narratives in spite of the fact that it underlies any discourse. This complex reality corresponds to the semiotic insight that the signifier that challenges the addressee of a recognition does not automatically reveal its signified. As a signification process, recognition is entwined with the same intrinsic problem as religious claims, since the sign is able to lie. Accordingly, any recognition may be doubted and is a potential object of parody, as performed in the intertextual play between the diverse versions of Orestes' homecoming in classical drama. In Aeschylus (*Cho.* 168–245), the identification of Orestes takes place at his sister Electra's observation of the following three tokens: a lock of hair resembling her own on Agamemnon's tomb, footprints by the grave fitting hers, and finally, Orestes' robe with the significant border that Electra once wove for him in sisterly love. In Euripides' later drama *Electra* on the same incident, however, Electra scorns the old pedagogue who once rescued Orestes for believing these tokens (487–595). How could Orestes, she asks, still fit in clothes made for him many years ago by a little girl who probably was too young even to use

¹³ Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homerī Iliadem et Odysseam* 1873, 29–30. See N.J. Richardson, "Recognition Scenes," 230.

a loom? How would Orestes be able to set footprints on rocky ground, and if so, would they not be larger than Electra's? Finally, how can a boy's and a girl's hair seem alike? As she states, "You may find many matching birds of the same feather not bred in the same nest, old man, nor matched in blood" (530–531 [Vermeule]).¹⁴ Electra needs more evidence in order to believe, and the accumulation of signs—endless in principle—leads toward a sense of *aporia* or embarrassment.¹⁵ This is also the case in the *Odyssey*. Hard-hearted Penelope is not convinced at once, but sets Odysseus' identity on trial by submitting him to the test of the bow (*Od.* 21.404–423) and by testing his knowledge about the characteristic features of their marriage bed (*Od.* 23.173–229; cf. the σῆμα in 23.202). Only the end of the Homeric narrative seems able to bring the infinite semiosis to some kind of a closure. Nevertheless, the reader could still easily imagine the *Odyssey* reopened and turned into a story of an impostor like Arnaud du Tilh, the real-life figure from sixteenth-century France who pretended to be the disappeared Martin Guerre and was, in fact, acknowledged by Guerre's wife until the real Martin Guerre showed up years after. Du Tilh eventually was hanged.¹⁶ A similar clue was certainly not unthinkable in Antiquity, judging from Plautus' play *Amphitruo* and the promising title of the abovementioned lost tragedy *Odysseus the False Messenger* (Ὀδυσσεύς ὁ ψευδάγγελος; *Poet.* 1455a13; cf. *Od.* 16.204; 23.215–216). In terms of epistemology, anagnorisis has two sides: It is a moment of revelation, but at the same time a source of epistemological embarrassment. As we shall see, this is a challenge that the Fourth Gospel explores (mainly in chs. 5–19) and seeks to overcome (chs. 20–21).

¹⁴ A third version of the recognition occurs in Sophocles, *El.* 1098–1363. See F. Solmsen, *Electra and Orestes: Three Recognitions in Greek Tragedy* (Mededelingen der Koninklijke nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, nieuwe Reeks, Deel 30, No. 2; Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1967); Theodore A. Tarkow, "The Scar of Orestes: Observations on a Euripidean Innovation," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 124 (1981): 143–153.

¹⁵ According to *Poet.* 16, one of the disadvantages of recognitions by means of tokens is that the author uses them δι' ἀπορίαν (1454b20).

¹⁶ Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

Anagnorisis and the Cognitive Dimension of John's Gospel

I have now introduced the Aristotelian understanding of anagnorisis in order to give insight into an ancient *etic* reflection on recognition. I have also given a small foretaste of its inherent game of discovery and cognitive resistance. In the present section and the one that follows, I shall undertake the task of rethinking relevant aspects of Aristotle's "formalist" theory in light of modern semiotic narratology. Regarding this, it is relevant to recall how Aristotle, in his taxonomy of recognition types, designated "recognition by means of signs" (διὰ τῶν σημείων) as a particular subcategory of recognition scenes. As has already emerged from the previous pages, this designation not only applies to this specific type of recognition, but also portrays recognition *per se* in its capacity as semiotic process. The recognition scene is a decoding process concerning a certain sign: the person whose identity is at stake. Semiotic theory or the question of how signs signify, therefore, seems highly relevant in this context.

Now, semiotics is many things, not least after the revival and ramification of "the science of signs" that took place in the twentieth century, from Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce onward.¹⁷ A particular strand in this web of semiotic theories, however, seems particularly helpful when studying recognition in narrative discourse. This strand, being an offshoot of Saussureian-Hjelmslevian linguistics as well as an heir of Russian formalism (Vladimir Propp), had its formative years in the nineteen-sixties and seventies and became known as the Paris School of Semiotics. The French-Lithuanian scholar of linguistics and literature Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917–1992) was its most prominent advocate.¹⁸ The grand ambition of the "school" was to work out a general and coherent grammar of the production of meaning in language. This endeavor culminated in the semiotic encyclopedia *Sémiotique: dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage* from 1979. Ironically, the work came out just as deconstructive and poststructuralist understandings of the production of meaning began to dominate in leading intellectual milieus of the time, and ever since, the use of Greimasian

¹⁷ Saussure and Peirce represent the two major traditions in twentieth-century semiotics: the linguistic and the phenomenological.

¹⁸ See Paul Perron and Frank Collins, eds. *Paris School Semiotics* (2 vols. Semiotic Crossroads 2–3. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1989); Daniel Patte, *The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas's Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis* (SemeiaSt; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).

semiotics, also in Biblical studies, has been marked by a certain aura of discomfort concerning the universalistic pretensions of the theory. As a consequence, some sort of apology has often attended the various applications of Greimas.¹⁹ The need for such defense, however, often seems to be due to the fact that interpreters often fail to see that the narrative grammar of Greimas is a grammar of *basic* meaning structures in narrative and on no account pretends to describe the actual figurativizations of these structures in particular, historical acts of language. The “achronism” of the theory thus only pertains to fundamental semiotic and narrative structures, while the historical embeddedness of texts in specific socio-rhetorical matrices is never denied, though this aspect of text-production appears beyond the scope of the theory. For the same reason, Greimas’ theory gives no answers concerning the form and ideology of literary genres in their historical contexts.²⁰ Such questions of literary history must be studied separately (see pp. 55–71). Therefore, I do not seek to apply Greimasian narratology to John in order to see if the theory (or John) “fits,” but my interest in aspects of the theory pertains to its pragmatic value as a helpful background horizon of inquiry, since it raises relevant questions concerning the emplotment of the Gospel and its use of anagnorisis as a general literary phenomenon. Greimas is useful for our construction of a theory of recognition in literature, but when turning toward anagnorisis as a historical genre other methods must be taken into use.

Greimas’ theory of narrative is perhaps most famous for its so-called model of actants or roles, which has proved to be a valuable tool for examining the interacting forces in the plots of narratives. The model has also served as an inspiration to Johannine exegetes, though not always leading to satisfactory results, as I shall show below in order to better point out where Greimas may in fact prove helpful. When dealing with anagnorisis, however, the actantial model is not the first feature in Greimas that catches the eye. Of particular interest is rather the fundamental, analytical distinction between the pragmatic (event-related) and the cognitive dimension in the story-world, which Greimas

¹⁹ See, e.g., Mark W.G. Stibbe, “‘Return to Sender’: A Structuralist Approach to John’s Gospel,” *BibInt* 1 (1993), 205: “[Q]uite apart from the new directions in deconstruction, there is still work to be done using the various methods associated with structuralist narratology.” See also “Return to Sender,” 190.

²⁰ Idem, “Structure and History,” in *Structuralism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A Collection of Essays* (ed. and trans. Alfred M. Johnson Jr.; Pittsburg: Pickwick, 1979), 57–72.

together with Joseph Courtés presented in its most elaborate form in the 1976 article “The Cognitive Dimension of Narrative Discourse.”²¹ The distinction between the pragmatic and the cognitive dimension is crucial, not least in the reading of religious narratives, but has not yet received the attention in Johannine exegesis that it deserves.²² It will form the basis for our developing of a semio-narrative understanding of anagnorisis, for which Greimas and Courtés in fact set the scene themselves, since they present their distinction as a rediscovery of the Aristotelian differentiation between simple and complex *mythoi*, the latter ones containing the cognitive elements of anagnorisis, *peripeteia* or both.²³

According to Greimas, every meaningful act of communication (*énonciation*) is a transmission of information (the utterance [*énoncé*]), between an enunciator and an enunciatee. The nature of such content may naturally vary widely, and since this study has a New Testament gospel as its subject, it serves our purposes to concentrate on the kinds of content that lay out a story-world, i.e., narratives. A narrative is defined as an utterance (*énoncé*) that conveys some sort of transformation between (at least) two different states—for example from a state of happiness


²¹ Eidem, “The Cognitive Dimension of Narrative Discourse,” *NLH* 8 (1976): 433–447.

²² In my view, this is partly due to the great influence that Seymour Chatman’s narratology has had and still exerts on literary studies of the Fourth Gospel, both in terms of method and theoretical terminology. Chatman does not develop a clear distinction between the events and states in the story (the pragmatic dimension), on the one hand, and the characters’ knowledge and evaluation of these pragmatic phenomena on the other (the cognitive dimension). His division between events (process statements, “does”) and existents (stasis statements, “is”) is no parallel, since they both appear on the same pragmatic level. See idem, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 19, 26, 32, 267, et passim. For studies that do apply the Greimasian distinction to John’s Gospel, see Jesper Tang Nielsen, “Korset i den kognitive dimension,” in *Lidelsens former og figurer* (eds. Bodil Ejrnæs and Lone Fatum; FBE 12; Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2002), 161–187; idem, “Korsets kognitive dimension: En studie i Johannesevangeliets forståelse af Jesu død” (PhD diss.; University of Aarhus, 2003); Kasper Bro Larsen, “Viden og erkendelse i Johannesevangeliet,” *DTT* 66 (2003): 81–106; idem, “Narrative Docetism: Christology and Storytelling in the Gospel of John,” in *The Gospel of John and Christian Theology* (eds. Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008).

²³ A.J. Greimas, *Maupassant: La sémiotique du texte. Exercices pratiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), 75–76, 154–156; Greimas and Courtés, “Cognitive Dimension,” 439. It is regrettable that Terence Cave does not assign adequate attention to the Propp-Greimas tradition in his study of recognition in the history of poetics. For a brief mention, see Cave, *Recognitions*, 200.

to disaster or vice versa (cf. Aristotle's *metabasis*). This point needs no illustration, but in order to be able to profile the cognitive dimension later on, let us first imagine a very concise, but nevertheless paradigmatic narrative: "A prince searched for a princess to marry, but in vain. Yet, one stormy night a princess knocked on the gate. The prince and the princess immediately fell in love; and, eventually, they were married and lived happily ever after." In these short statements we have the transformational motion required to be dealing with a narrative: The prince, in need of an object of value (a princess), undertakes the role of the subject-of-doing by embarking on a quest. By the irony of fate, however, his state of deficiency does not come to an end until the object of value herself takes over the prince's active doing by arriving at the door, this leading to their final conjunction. Having ascertained that the above utterance is a narrative, we may further notice that the course of events consists of an exchange of somatic value objects transforming the actors' states of being from unmarried to married. The story is void of epistemological motifs and thus, speaking with Aristotle, constitutes a simple *mythos*. The events and states of being ("existents" in Chatman's terminology), exclusively appear in the dimension of the narrative that Greimas characterized as horizontal, eventual, or pragmatic.²⁴ Yet, an interesting shift emerges, if we install another actant in the narrative: the *Observer*. Focus now moves from the events themselves to the epistemological evaluation of them. Accordingly, the observer (for instance embodied in the prince's mother) may ask for signs that indicate whether the princess is a *real* princess or an impostor in disguise. Our operation (which is in fact not ours, since the story is coming very close to Hans Christian Andersen's *The Princess and the Pea*) has now accentuated the vertical or cognitive dimension in the story-world. The story has become complex and two-dimensional, revealing that the events and existents of the pragmatic dimension may be ambiguous and express a deception: an act or state that is not what it seems to be. This epistemological play between seeming and true being, according to Greimas, logically creates four cognitive positions or so-called "veridictory modalities" when projected on the semiotic square. These cog-

²⁴ Greimas and Courtés, "The Cognitive Dimension," 436; eidem, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Pragmatique," 288. To prevent any misunderstanding, let me emphasize that the pragmatic dimension does not relate to the pragmatic use that a given reader may make of the text, but to the level of events and existents *within* the story-world.



nitive positions of truth, delusion, secrecy, and falsehood, respectively, are illustrated in the diagram above.²⁵

The diagram illustrates the fact that the events and existents in two-dimensional stories may occur contrary to their true being. A character may appear in the veridictory mode of delusion, seeming to be a hero whereas he is really not (the impostor, the *alazōn*), or in the secret mode by not appearing like a hero though this is in fact what he is (the disguised, the *eirōn*).²⁶ This diffusion of what seems and what is, which is only latently present in one-dimensional story-worlds, comes forth when the story establishes a distance between the events/existents and the characters' knowledge about them. Such a distance comes about when the producer of the narrative chooses to distribute knowledge unevenly by attributing it to certain characters and depriving others of it (partially or totally), thus creating diverse levels of knowledge in the story-world. Whereas the princess knew that she was a real princess, her future mother-in-law did not at first—and this state of not knowing is, naturally, the precondition for her ability to come to know. Now, it is important to notice that the knowledge thematized in the cognitive dimension pertains to events and existents in the pragmatic dimension. While one can easily imagine a story-world with no cognitive

²⁵ Greimas and Courtés, “The Cognitive Dimension,” 440; eadem, *Sémiotique*, s.vv. “Cognitif,” “Veridictories (modalités),” 40–42; 419. The diagram shows that a secret is something that is, but does not appear (“Being,” “Not Appearing”), a lie/delusion is something that is not, though it appears (“Not Being,” “Appearing”), etc.

²⁶ The relation between appearance and being in anagnorisis is more complicated than this, as we shall see in the next section.

thematics—in the above story, before the observer was introduced, we just did—it is certainly harder to picture a cognitive narrative lacking a pragmatic dimension. The pragmatic dimension of events and existents is rather the necessary designatum of the epistemological activities in the cognitive dimension: What the mother-in-law wants to ensure is the girl's pragmatic state of being a princess. The pragmatic level is thus (narrato)logically prior to the cognitive. This, however, does not imply that the cognitive dimension is unable to affect the pragmatic events—this was even hinted at in the Aristotelian concept of *peripeteia*. When cognitive activities appear in narrative, new knowledge often leads to new acts (e.g., Oedipus blinding himself, or the wedding in the above fairy tale). According to Greimas, however, a given narrative may accentuate the cognitive dimension to such an extent that the pragmatic dimension becomes nothing but the pretext for cognitive activities.²⁷ This statement is presumably too categorical by its diminishing of the significance of the pragmatic events, but it points at a tendency in, for example, court room dramas, detective novels, swindler tales, or *film noir*, as well as narratives where anagnorisis constitutes a recurring plot device. In such discourses, focus lies on the characters' knowledge and the acquisition thereof, though the pragmatic phenomena are certainly not ignored. Thus, it seems proper to characterize such plots as epistemological plots.

Is the plot of John's gospel narrative of an epistemological kind? The question is a complex issue that first demands a clarification of what is meant by the narratological term "plot." In the present context, plot is understood as the governing structures of desire in narrative, equivalent to the Greimasian term "narrative program."²⁸ Narrative programs are the incentives in the story, which drive characters toward the acquisition (or destruction) of desired objects, whether pragmatic or cognitive. Thus, there is seldom a single plot in narrative, but a complex of narrative programs and counter-programs that mutually create the dynamics and tensions of the story. Nevertheless, some narrative programs—e.g., the hero's main task—may be of such importance that they qualify as plots in an overriding sense. Returning to the Gospel of John, one

²⁷ Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Cognitif," 40: "À la limite, d'ailleurs, la dimension pragmatique peut n'être, dans un discours donné, que le prétexte d'activités cognitives...." For a discussion of this assessment in relation to the classical question of (naïve) docetism in John, see Kasper Bro Larsen, "Narrative Docetism."

²⁸ Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Programme narratif," 297–298.

may now ask whether we can detect such an overarching narrative program that reduces other programs to auxiliary narrative programs or microplots. If we take a look at contemporary literary readings of the Gospel, a divide between two separate understandings of the plot seems to have emerged. On the one hand, scholars like Fernando F. Segovia and Stibbe (in certain publications) hold the opinion that the plot in John is first and foremost a journey.²⁹ Jesus is sent to the earth by the Father—expressed by the text's frequent use of mission verbs like πέμπω (e.g., 4:34; 5:23–24; 7:33; 12:44–45; 13:20) and ἀποστέλλω (e.g., 3:17, 34; 5:38; 7:29; 11:42; 17:3, 8, 18, 21, 23, 25)—in order to convey life upon the world; and just as the story opens with Jesus' descent, it comes to a close with his ascent, symbolically recounted in the lifting up of his body on the cross. Using the Greimasian terminology of analysis, which was presented above, we may say that these approaches assign a particular status to the pragmatic dimension of the narrative. Both the journey as a movement in space and the conveyance of the value object of life are pragmatic phenomena. Such an understanding of the Gospel's plot definitely has an eye for the Johannine use of the journey motif common in ancient narrative, but its critics have not failed to point out its neglects—and rightfully so, in my opinion. Andrew T. Lincoln, in his discussion of the lawsuit motif in John, is very clear in his criticism:

[T]his reading of the plot is...in danger of giving the journey itself too great a prominence. It is what this cosmic journey is for, its purpose, that makes the difference to the major actions in the plot.³⁰

Lincoln here joins forces with Culpepper, who underlines that the “plot of the gospel is propelled by conflict between belief and unbelief as responses to Jesus.”³¹ These latter authors, once again in the terminology of Greimas, locate the plot in the cognitive dimension relating to the knowledge and understanding of the story characters. As the

²⁹ Fernando F. Segovia, “The Journey(s) of the Word of God: A Reading of the Plot of the Fourth Gospel,” *Semeia* 53 (1991): 23–54; Mark W.G. Stibbe, “Return to Sender.” See also Adele Reinhartz, *The Word in the World: The Cosmological Tale in the Fourth Gospel* (SBLMS 45; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 16–28.

³⁰ Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 161.

³¹ Idem, *Anatomy*, 97; cf. idem, “The Plot of John's Story,” 352; idem, *Gospel and Letters of John*, 68. Jan A. du Rand similarly states that “[t]he identity of Jesus as the Son of God...offers the central line around which the plot of John's Gospel is entangled”; see idem, “Plot and Point of View in the Gospel of John,” in *A South African Perspective on the New Testament: Essays by South African New Testament Scholars Presented to Bruce Manning Metzger during his Visit to South Africa in 1985* (eds. J.H. Petzer and P.J. Hartin; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 162.

above scholars are more or less aware, however, it is misleading to construct the relationship between the two conceptions of John's plot as an absolute either-or. An exclusivistic reading is in danger of concealing the fact that stories may contain more than one major narrative program, as well as it fails to differentiate between the two simultaneously appearing dimensions (the pragmatic and the cognitive) in the story-world. Yet, acknowledging the presence of both dimensions at the same time is crucial to an appropriate understanding of John. This may be illustrated by the well-known statement by the Johannine Jesus (or the narrator—it is not quite clear) in John 3:16, which is often regarded as paradigmatic to the whole story: "For God so loved the world that he gave (ἔδωκεν) his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life." Here, both pragmatic issues (the sending of Jesus and the gift of eternal life) and cognitive matters (belief) interconnect.³² One may, of course, argue that the journey is the prime plot, claiming that there would be no encounter between Jesus and the world, no belief challenge, as it were, had Jesus not been sent on a mission; but this should not lead one to ignore that the claimed mission appearing in the pragmatic dimension is in fact the very subject of the cognitive questions of veridiction: Is Jesus at all an emissary or does he speak of his own accord? Thus, in John 3:16, there are three narrative programs in play: the Father's sending of the Son (1, a pragmatic event), and the belief in Jesus as the sent Son (2, a cognitive event), which is the precondition for gaining eternal life (3, a pragmatic event). In this narrative process, the cognitive program (2) appears as an auxiliary plot,³³ forming the transition between the sending of Jesus (1) and the reception of life (3), but note: In the Gospel as a whole, the auxiliary plot is so much emphasized that it takes up a superposition. It seems that John puts significantly more energy into the cognitive question of belief than into the pragmatic programs. The story-world is emblematically presented in 3:16 in the sense that belief is the primary "act" that is

³² In the light of the following verse, I take ἔδωκεν as referring to God's sending of Jesus, though it may also allude to Jesus' death and bear a meaning similar to παραδίδοναι in some statements in the Pauline tradition ("deliver," "surrender," Rom 4:25; 8:32; Gal 2:20; Eph 5:25). The same interconnection between cognitive and pragmatic programs is explicit in passages like John 5:24 and 12:44. In 17:3 the two dimensions interestingly merge as knowledge of God is equated with eternal life: "And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent."

³³ See Nielsen, "Korsets kognitive dimension," 150.

called for in the present, while the sending and eternal life are pragmatic phenomena of the past and the future, if not in a temporal sense, at any rate in a logical sense as the prerequisite and the consequence of belief. At the end of the Gospel, the narrator accordingly describes the overall purpose of the narrative as the promotion or confirmation of belief in Jesus as the Messiah that brings life (20:31). Thus, among the narrative programs that make up the story, the epistemological plot concerning the acquisition of belief seems to be not the only plot but, paradoxically, an auxiliary plot that has come to the front of the scene, thereby constituting the Gospel's A-plot.³⁴ In this plot, the cognitive question concerning Jesus' true identity is thematized in various ways, for example in the forensic language (the trial motif) and the language of glorification, whereas this study focuses on its formal articulation in the recognition scenes. I thus tend to agree with Culpepper and James L. Resseguie that anagnorisis cannot be characterized as the plot itself. Yet, whereas they describe anagnorisis as an important "plot element" or a "plot motif," respectively, I understand it as a type-scene, which serves a crucial function in both John's epistemological plot and his exposition of the narrative.³⁵

Having located anagnorisis in the cognitive dimension of narrative, it is now suitable to assess the relevance of the abovementioned actantial model with regard to John's Gospel, since it plays a certain role in the determination of the plot of the story in Johannine scholarship.³⁶ The actantial model depicts a map of the polemical relations between *dramatis personae* in a narrative program—whether persons, other beings, or objects—by defining six roles (actants) that narrative universes logically presuppose: The *Subject* seeks to obtain the *Object*, which comes from the *Sender* and is bound for the *Receiver*. The *Subject* is challenged in its enterprise by the *Opponent*, but has the support of the *Helper*.³⁷ It is not

³⁴ By A-plot, I understand a plot that dominates the narrative though it may not be the primary plot in a logical sense.


³⁵ Culpepper, "The Plot of John's Story," 349; *Gospel and Letters of John*, 64; and Resseguie, *The Strange Gospel*, 170.

³⁶ See, e.g., Stibbe, "Return to Sender"; D.F. Tolmie, *Jesus' Farewell to the Disciples: John 13:1–17:26 in Narratological Perspective* (BIS 12. Leiden: Brill, 1995), 141, 186; Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 159–169.

³⁷ In order to prevent any misunderstandings, I should point out that more than one actor in the story may represent the same actant—e.g., if the *Object* of the hero's quest is both the princess and half the kingdom. Conversely, the same actor may occupy more actants as in *The Princess and the Pea* when the prince, seeking a princess for himself, is both the *Subject* and the *Receiver*. The actantial model is normally illustrated in a

always a simple task to identify the actors that hold the roles of actants in a given narrative—not least in a story like the Gospel of John, considering its widely recognized elements of predetermination that have a tendency to turn the opponents into impotent puppets or even into helpers ironically ignorant of their role in the plot. Confining ourselves to the pragmatic programs in John 3:16, however, we may define God as the *Sender*, who sends Jesus (the *Subject*) in order to make possible the conveyance of eternal life (the *Object*) to the world or “everyone who believes” (the *Receiver*), while the actants of the *Helper* and the *Opponent* remain unmentioned. Stibbe, in his 1993 article “Return to Sender: A Structuralist Approach to John’s Gospel,” subjected the Gospel to an actantial analysis of this kind and came up with a comparable result regarding the distribution of the roles.³⁸ Stibbe also tried to apply the model to, for example, John the Baptist’s task of being a witness to Jesus’ true identity—an act that we may place on the cognitive level of the story on the basis of what has been said above.³⁹ But this is where the model reveals its limitations, for the model is one-dimensional, displaying only the pragmatic relation between the actants, whereas it does not question their veridictory status (truth, secrecy, or delusion). In terms of the model, we may, for instance, place God or the Father in the role of the *Sender* of Jesus as in 3:16a; but this does not take into account the Gospel’s crucial discussion of whether God is the real *Sender* or if that part in fact ought to be assigned to a demon or to Jesus himself as some voices in the story-world claim, thereby regarding Jesus as the devil’s advocate or as appointed by no one but himself (see, e.g., 5:18, 31; 7:14–20, 28; 8:13; 8:48–59; 10:20–21; 19:7). By simply defining God as the *Sender*, one in fact evades the core epistemological

diagram like the following; cf. A.J. Greimas, *Sémantique structurale: recherché de méthode* (Langue et langage; Paris: Larousse, 1966), 180:



³⁸ Idem, “Return to Sender,” 196. Stibbe takes Jesus, not the world, as the *Receiver*. The confusion seems to emerge from Stibbe’s failure to see that Jesus, by receiving his mission, does not become the *Receiver* of benefits but the *Subject*. The believing world, however, is the *Receiver* of the gift of life. For a similar criticism, see D.F. Tolmie, *Jesus’ Farewell to the Disciples*, 141, n. 140; Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 164–165.

³⁹ Idem, “Return to Sender,” 201–202.

game of truth and pretence in the A-plot. What is particularly missing in the actantial model is thus the cognitive actant of the *Observer*, who interprets other actors by attributing certain identities to them.⁴⁰ Disregarding the observer in an epistemological plot like John's, however, is particularly fatal since this very actant appears in a large number of actors from John the Baptist onward; cf. Culpepper's list of recognizers/nonrecognizers on pp. 13–14.⁴¹ The actantial relation between *Observer* and *Observed* is played out again and again in John's narrative, and in this respect the observer functions as the implied reader's deputy in the story-world. The reader is an overarching observer, even in one-dimensional narrative, but John copies this position into the story-world, thus constantly thematizing its cognitive dimension. When the observer and the observed of the story-world meet, complicated questions of identity rise to the surface, and the observer must decide: Is Jesus God's heavenly messenger, or is he really a self-appointed pretender? Before discussing John's presentation of the problem, we need to consider some further general conditions of communication in literary games of recognition.

The Semiotics of Recognition

The Dual Appearance of the Observed

Religious figurative art is entangled with an intrinsic problem of representation: the problem of how to depict the sacred in a visible form. The problem arises from the circumstance that the sacred has no form of its own and, as a consequence, is bound to put on a figurative form heterogeneous to itself. The history of art abounds in attempts to illus-

⁴⁰ Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Observateur," 259–260. Whereas Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, 72 uses the idiomatic designations *recognizer* and *recognized* for the two main actants in recognition scenes, I shall speak of the *observer* and the *observed* in order not to anticipate the outcome of the individual scenes. Another important cognitive actant is the *Informant*, who provides the observer with information necessary to perform cognitive judgments. See *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Informateur," 188.

⁴¹ Greimas' actantial model describes well the pragmatic dimension of narrative but does not paint a comprehensive picture of plot relation in complex *mythoi*. For this reason, Tolmie and Lincoln are not convincing in their attempts to correct Stibbe's use of the model by suggesting cognitive phenomena like revelation, testimony, or the divine lawsuit as the *Object* in the model. See Tolmie, *Jesus' Farewell to the Disciples*, 141, 186; Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 163.

trate the invisible, and in the Christian tradition, it is not uncommon to see the divine portrayed in the shape of an aged, venerable man. Yet, the nature of such a representation inevitably raises the question concerning the viewer's capability of knowing that the piece of art is not simply a portrait of an old man, but actually an attempt to depict the sacred. How does the observer distinguish between a picture of an old man that in fact shows an old man, and a picture of the same figure thought to represent the divine? On the face of it, it is impossible since they appear the same.

Ancient art displays a comparable dilemma of representation when portraying persons who have been subjected to a change of shape beyond recognition, the transformed person likewise appearing in heteromorphed shape. One example relates to the legend of Actaeon's death, most famously described in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid (*Metam.* 3.138–252). The story recounts how this keen hunter one day meets his fate by coming upon Diana bathing. The goddess spots him, blushes with shame, and punishes him by turning him into a stag. Eventually, he is chased down and killed by his own hounds. The scene of Actaeon torn by the hounds was a quite popular motif in ancient Greco-Roman art, but in view of the fact that Actaeon had been transformed into a stag, the artist had to take certain measures in order to ensure that the viewer would see more than simply some stag being attacked by dogs. This problem centers on the painter's means of enabling the observer to penetrate the surface and realize that the stag is really Actaeon. The artistic answer to the problem was to render the complete change incomplete, Actaeon appearing with only the head or the antlers of a stag on his otherwise human body.⁴² It is not surprising that this problem concerning the display of identities that dwell in alien forms is often handled in a quite similar manner in religious iconography. A sacred person may be portrayed with his or her conventional paraphernalia (e.g., a thunderbolt, an owl, or a trident), with blue skin as in Hindu art, or with a nimbus or an aureole as a coded mark of the sacred, a kind of recognition token, that enables the observer to discern the holy person from the profane.⁴³ This method of letting the viewer get a glimpse

⁴² H.J. Rose, "Divine Disguisings," *HTR* 49 (1956), 64. Rose also calls attention to another example from Antiquity showing Ampelos in the shape of half a man, half a vine.

⁴³ One of the Medieval Latin terms describing the halo encircling the head of the holy person was "gloriola," which is quite remarkable when we recall that the Gospel of John also surrounds Jesus with "gloria" (δόξα) as a token of divinity (see pp. 79–84).


of what is behind the disguise should grab our attention, since it says something crucial about the semiotics of secrecy and delusion, which did not come out clearly in Greimas' veridictory modalities (p. 38). For when Diana made Actaeon appear in the full guise of a stag, Actaeon was positioned in the mode of delusion, seeming to be what he was not (a stag); and his true identity (as Actaeon) consequently occurred in the mode of secrecy, a being that did not appear. As viewers, however, we were not invited into the cognitive game concerning his hidden identity until somebody or something told us that his appearance was in fact a delusion. The painting, therefore, had to expose at least a glimpse of the secret to the observer; otherwise, the camouflage would be too perfect, and the only thing seen by the viewer would be some stag and the dogs attacking it.⁴⁴ The example above illustrates two main points. First, we realize that the modes of secrecy and delusion are not autonomous modalities, but depend on each other, since a secret is not just a concealment of appearance but also implies the display of a delusive mask; on the other hand, the delusion not only consists of fabricating a false appearance but also of hiding the true one. Secrecy and delusion are thus performed by mutual assistance.⁴⁵ This point relates to a second and equally important observation: As the Actaeon motif clearly shows, the true identity of a depicted person appearing in the mode of disguise is not communicable if the manifestation of disguise is not supplemented by another, additional manifestation. The object of observation (the *observed*), in other words, has to appear dually, the one manifestation being what we shall call the camouflage, the other manifestation consisting of the so-called recognition token or the mark.⁴⁶ We may illustrate the dual appearance or the two signifiers of the observed one in the following way:⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Curiously, however, the hounds in the depiction of Actaeon seem to have been struck with some kind of blindness. Although Actaeon's human features can be seen, the dogs do not notice them. To the dogs, one must assume, the secret of Actaeon's identity remains a pure secret.

⁴⁵ Regarding delusion or deception, Claude Bremond puts the problem in a similar way: "Deception consists of several actions carried on simultaneously: the dissimulation of what is, the simulation of what is not, and the substitution of what is not for what is in order to create a semblance of truth to which the dupe reacts as if it were real"; idem, "The Logic of Narrative Possibilities," *NLH* 11 (1980), 399. See also Per Aage Brandt, "Om noget og hvad deraf følger...: Nye bemærkninger om veridiktionen," *Almen Semiotik* 9–10 (1995), 124.

⁴⁶ See Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Marque," 222–223.

⁴⁷ In the illustration, "Signifier 1" and "Signifier 2" are abstract, neutral terms. One



From this illustration, one sees that the cognitive challenge that meets the observer in a recognition situation does not simply come down to finding the true identity behind the disguise, as has often been the semiotic model underlying the interpretation of the Jesus-sign in Johannine scholarship in the wake of Bultmann. Instead, we are dealing with a detection of which one of two manifestations refers to the observed one's true identity and which one does not. Such dual appearance is the prerequisite for anagnorisis.⁴⁸ If the mark had been present without camouflage, unquestionable truth would have taken the place of the cognitive game. Alternatively, if a supplementary appearance (the mark) besides the camouflage was not visible to the observers in the story-world, recognition would not be possible, as for example in the legendary tale of the king, who wanted to avoid being recognized by anyone and never was, and thus appeared among his

of them, however, represents a false identity, whereas the other points to the observed's true identity. To indicate this, they are also called "camouflage" and "the mark," respectively, though story-world observers, before the moment of recognition, do not know which one is which.

⁴⁸ The interaction between the two appearances is expressed paradigmatically in the description of Penelope's bewilderment when contemplating Odysseus' two "appearances": "At one moment (ἄλλοτε) she looked him full in the face (ἐνὸςπαδίδως), but then (ἄλλοτε) again directly (χρoῖ), she was misled by his shabby clothes and failed to recognize him" (*Od.* 23.94–95 [Butler]). It appears as if she is watching a puzzle picture like the Wittgensteinian duck-rabbit; see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914–1916. Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 501; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 520.

soldiers in perfect disguise in order to test their loyalty. In such a story, however, the additional appearance of the mark is not totally absent, but appears to the observing reader, exclusively—the reader knowing about the disguised one's true royal identity. Thus, in order for the game of seeming and being to work as a dynamic plot device that creates events of coming-to-know in a story-world like John's, the object of recognition is bound to appear bimorphically even to the narrated observers; otherwise, recognition scenes become unfeasible.

How to Display the Recognition Mark: Showing, Telling, and Whispering

As we have now seen, any recognition of a person in disguise depends on the appearance of an alternative manifestation (signifier 2 beside signifier 1). The alternative manifestation represents a piece of information, a glimmer of otherness that suggests that things are not what they seem. It reveals true identity, and in what follows we shall call it “the mark” or “the token.” The observer may, of course, miss, ignore, or misinterpret the mark, but if it is not there at all, recognition of secret identities is impossible, unless we want to reckon with recognitions that happen through some sort of introspection or inspiration *ex nihilo*. When using “the mark” as the term that stands for the revealing piece of information, I imply a broad definition of this cognitive actant. The mark is not just a telltale scar, but represents *pars pro toto* any piece of information that challenges the observers' first identity judgments based on the camouflage and enables them to realize the true ontology of the narrative by means of, for example, a test, a revelation of knowledge given away by the observed, or a claim of identity. The discipline of making typologies of such marks is at least as old as the *Poetics*, and the reception history of this work contains several attempts to improve the Aristotelian taxonomy, which, as we saw in the previous section, is not very consistent at all.⁴⁹ The following suggestions, summarized in the diagram that concludes this section, may be taken as a limited attempt to contribute to this endeavor, a contribution that aims at developing more precision in the questions concerning recogni-

⁴⁹ One interesting suggestion comes from the renaissance commentator Lodovico Castelvetro, whose typology was built upon a basic differentiation between recognition by means of (a) physical marks, (b) actions, and (c) spoken words, respectively. His analysis is presented in tabular form in Barry B. Adams, *Coming-to-Know: Recognition and the Complex Plot in Shakespeare* (Studies in Shakespeare 10; New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 53.

tion that we shall direct toward the Fourth Gospel. The typology that I present distinguishes between the possible means of communicating the mark as well as the timing of the moment of communication in a given course of events. Three different modes, which are not mutually exclusive, seem to be fundamental.

The first mode is the mode of *showing* by means of nonlinguistic signs. The incognito character shows his or her true identity by removing (parts of) the disguise before the very eyes of the observers. So, a certain bodily feature, a skill, a token, or a quality connected with the true identity of its bearer comes into view. The act of *showing* performed by the personal object of recognition corresponds to the *seeing* of the observers, whether they believe or not.⁵⁰ This mode of revealing the information of the mark is in fact the only mode available in the iconic, nonverbal semiotics of figurative painting, as we saw in the depiction of Actaeon's death. Here, true identity is merely communicable by means of *showing*, as in the case of the halo that signifies holiness in Christian art. On Byzantine icons depicting Jesus, however, one often notices that the piece of information given by the halo is supplemented by a somehow redundant message in a different communication mode: the abbreviations IC and XC (Ἰησοῦς, Χριστός; Jesus, Christ), which function as a kind of name label on either side of the head of the portrayed person. This exemplifies the second mode of mark-communication, in which identity is revealed through linguistic *telling*.⁵¹ In narratives, *telling* appears when the person in disguise or other actors, without showing any direct, visible proof, in words claim that the observed character is really not the one that the disguise suggests. This verbal *telling* matches the *hearing* of the observers, whether they believe or not.⁵²

⁵⁰ I would like to stress the latter point. *Seeing* on this theoretical level does not necessarily imply that one has seen in a true, Johannine sense. See pp. 150–163.

⁵¹ René Magritte's famous painting "La Trahison des images" ("The Treachery of Images," 1929) shows a pipe, while the text to match ("Ceci n'est pas une pipe") claims that it is in fact not. As in the case of the icon, the picture tries to reproduce a hidden being (a non-pipe) behind the semblance but presents the mark not by means of *showing* (as in the cases of the gloriolate or Actaeon's human features), but by the attached text's *telling*. Yet, in contrast to the icon that tells positively who the portrayed person is (IC and XC), Magritte's *telling* is of a negative kind, since it only says what the piece of art does not represent.

⁵² Readers familiar with the concepts of *telling* and *showing* from narratology, where the terms often refer to the two modes of storytelling *diēgēsis* (recounting) and *mimēsis* (enacting) in Plato, should be aware that I am employing the terms in a quite different sense as designating linguistic signification (*telling*) and nonlinguistic signification

Now, it is important that we remember that the *telling* and the *showing* in a story-world are *told telling* and *told showing*. The narrator performs an act of *telling*, which in one sense means that the mode of displaying true identities in narratives is never anything but *telling*.⁵³ Yet, if we enter the story-world, leaving the narrator out of view for a moment, true identities are not only claimed but also displayed, and thus not only *telling* but also *showing* takes place. But however useful the distinction between these two modes of communication may be, it does not account for the fact that the mark never appears in a narrative vacuum but in the course of a process in time. It is therefore highly relevant to consider at what moment in the process the mark is revealed. This leads us to the third mode of communication—which I, for want of a single, precise term, have chosen to coin *whispering*. *Whispering* describes the act of letting selected observers know in advance, so that the recognition does not happen on the basis of what is told or shown during or after the encounter with the observed, but comes about by virtue of information presented *prior to* the observed person's entry on stage.⁵⁴ The communicative mode of *whispering*, privileging certain observers with preknowledge, is employed most frequently in the relation between implied author and audience. In a theatrical performance, for example, the dramatist may want the spectators to witness the impostor putting on his disguise of royalty in the wings of the theater—hidden from the other actors—in order that the spectators may recognize him as a fraud when he later enters the stage appearing as a king. In Aristophanes' *Frogs*, for example, Dionysus and his slave Xanthias take turns dressing up like Heracles with a club and a lion skin, which creates great comic confusion in the underworld (460–673). The audience of the play, however, has been warned beforehand and knows the true identity of the two pretenders (22, 45–48). In the prologue of Plautus' *Amphitruo*, Mer-

(*showing*). Since a clear consensus concerning the understanding of the terms has not been reached, I allow myself to contribute to the ongoing discussion of their application.

⁵³ See Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse* (trans. Jane E. Lewin; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 163–164.

⁵⁴ *Whispering*, in other words, does not necessarily involve “speech in a lowered voice,” but describes recognitions where the mark is given away “in advance” to some of the observers who, as a consequence, are not scandalized at the disguise when brought face to face with it. I have not been able to trace a more apt term that fully covers this phenomenon of *displaying-the-mark-in-advance-to-select-observers*. The “aside” is not the same, since its primary function is to weaken the dramatic illusion in the audience, not to tip off the observers.

cury certainly ensures that the audience is able to distinguish impostors from true characters:

To make it easier for you to tell us apart I shall always wear this little plume on my hat: yes, and as for my father [Jupiter] he will have a little gold tassel hanging from his: Amphytrion will not have this mark. They are marks that none of the household here will be able to see, but you will. (Plautus, *Amph.* 142–147; cf. 19, 53, 115–130 [Nixon])

Such *whispering* may also take place within the story-world in the internal relation between actors. By the time Telemachus has recognized his father now appearing in his own guise, father and son join to plot the revenge on Penelope’s suitors. Odysseus tells his son, as a part of the plan, that he will be entering the city “in the likeness of a woeful and aged beggar” (*Od.* 16.273 [Murray]). Odysseus thus *whispers* a piece of information to Telemachus in advance, thereby providing him with the cognitive qualifications required in order to identify the apparent beggar who later arrives. Thus the *whispering* of the speaker corresponds with a *precognition* in the observer’s point of view. The following diagram illustrates the relation between the three modes of displaying the mark and the placement of the display in the course of events.

Modes of Displaying the Mark	Modes of Timing the Display of the Mark ⁵⁵
1. <i>Showing</i> 2. <i>Telling</i>	“a posteriori,” i.e., after the entry of the observed
3. <i>Whispering</i>	“a priori,” i.e., prior to the entry of the observed

Aspects of Recognition: Identification and Social Recognition


We have now discussed two fundamental characteristics of recognition: the dual appearance of the recognized object and the three modes of communicating the necessary piece of information called the mark. Yet, however clarifying the above analysis may be, it does not depart

⁵⁵ The terms “a priori” and “a posteriori” in the diagram indicate that while *telling* and *showing* are performed after the observed’s appearance in a given recognition, *whispering* is performed beforehand, albeit not a priori in a strict Kantian sense of the phrase. A more detailed diagram would show four modes: 1) A posteriori *showing*, 2) a posteriori *telling*, 3) a priori *showing*, and 4) a priori *telling*. For reasons of terminological economy, however, I have chosen the above solution.

from the disadvantageous tendency to reduce anagnorisis to a matter of mere cognitive identification: a discovery of the singular term or proper name fitting the object. This is, of course, an indispensable aspect of recognition, but it should not be overemphasized, as *Poet.* 16 is inclined to do. Recognition of personal characters in narrative cannot be restricted to the manufacture of logical verdicts since it also implies an exposure of the social relation between the recognizer and the recognized (e.g., slave and master, sister and brother, lovers, and enemies). The moment of recognition seldom consists of an acquisition of information that is pragmatically worth- or useless, but rather has an impact on the narrative situation, this coming to light in the recognizer's reaction (see pp. 69–71 below). Accordingly, when recognizers burst into tears of joy or sorrow, the tears indicate that the recognized object carries a certain value in the narrative program of the recognizer. Aristotle, in his definition of anagnorisis as coming-to-know in *Poet.* 11, alludes to this circumstance by adding that the new knowledge acquired in recognition has the quality of “leading to friendship or to enmity, and involving matters which bear on prosperity or adversity” (*Poet.* 1452a30–31 [Halliwell]; see p. 26, n. 2). On the basis of this observation, it seems productive to distinguish between two propositional aspects in anagnorisis: (a) the epistemological proposition concerning the singular identity (proper name) of the recognized and (b) the social proposition concerning his or her thematic role of a certain kind and status.⁵⁶ If we consider Eurycleia's verdict “You are Odysseus” (*Od.* 19.474) in isolation, it constitutes a sheer identification (a) in which the anonymous pronoun in her presence (the “You”) is identified with a principally singular name (“Odysseus”); but seen in context, her delight involves an acknowledgment (b) of his thematic role as the returning master, who is expected to restore peace and order. While the one aspect, (a) “recognition as identification,” claims that x answers to the name of y, the other aspect, (b) “recognition as social recognition,” adds that x or y holds the role of z. This role is, as a rule, invested with value by other actors; and in the case of Odysseus, his role is to the benefit of Eurycleia—hence her happiness. To the suitors, however, it is ominous.⁵⁷ The illustration

⁵⁶ See Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.vv. “Rôle” and “Thématique,” 318–319 and 393; Ole Davidsen, *The Narrative Jesus: A Semiotic Reading of Mark's Gospel* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1993), 43–44, 199–200. Like the verb “to recognize” in English, the Greek verb ἀναγινώσκω carries the double meaning indicated above, describing both the act of identifying as well as of acknowledging social roles.

⁵⁷ The American philosopher Kenneth M. Sayre operates with another, yet not



is a map of this semiotic situation, which lies behind the two propositional aspects of recognition.⁵⁸

The distinction between “recognition as identification” and “recognition as social recognition”—which the German language has an ear for by holding two distinct terms for it: (*Wieder*)*erkennung* and *Anerkennung*—is of great importance in view of the fact that recognition scenes place a different emphasis on the two aspects, often accentuating the one aspect at the expense of the other. In ancient drama and narrative, recognition scenes often focus on the process of identification while the thematic role of the recognized is presupposed and not an object of testing, though of course it may be reconfirmed in the course of the scene. Taking Eurycleia as an example once again, she does not doubt

as useful, distinction between so-called “missing description” and “missing-object” types of cognition. The “missing description” type is an act of identification where the problem of identity arises with the *presence* of an unknown object—e.g., a person missing a description or a designation, such as a proper name (Who is this?). In the “missing object” type, on the other hand, the *absence* of the object or person creates the problem, the description or role being available beforehand. The search in this latter type thus applies to the person who fits a given description (Who did this?); see Kenneth M. Sayre, *Recognition: A Study in the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 113–118.

⁵⁸ In the diagram I introduce the distinction between denotation (denotative signified) and connotation (connotative signified) in processes of signification, which is highly debated in linguistics and semiotics since it relates to the question of how sign systems slow down infinite semiosis by means of semiotic habits in order to stabilize meaning and communication. The reason for applying the terms in this context is that they indicate that both “recognition as identification,” involving the denotative signified, and “recognition as social recognition,” involving a connotative signified, are notations relating to the same pronoun (signifier) in the text.

that Odysseus, whether present or absent, is her master, and her cry of surprise thus pertains to the recognition of his proper noun identity. Her recognition is not primarily an act of social recognition—otherwise, she would have cried, “You are my master!”—although we should not forget that she in fact finishes her line with the following words of acknowledgment: “...and I did not know you, until I had handled all the body of my master (ἀνάκτωρ)” (*Od.* 19.474–475 [Murray]).⁵⁹ In the *Oedipus tyrannus*, as an example of a recognition that emphasizes the social aspect, observers know that the central character is Oedipus, the king of Thebes, so instead recognition regards the one who fits the thematic role of being king Laius’ murderer (e.g., Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 102; 231–232; 264; 268).⁶⁰

The game between identification and social recognition in anagnorisis is an interesting and quite delicate one, not least in the Gospel of John. Without yet having subjected the recognition scenes in the Gospel to a systematic study, we may expect that anagnorises in this context are very much concerned with the element of social recognition as the text continuously deals with the question of Jesus’ right to assume the various thematic roles on display—e.g., *Logos*, the Son, the Christ, Rabbi/Teacher, Son of Man, prophet, and God.⁶¹ The game of recognition in John, however, is certainly more richly faceted than this, and in order to determine this fact in a more precise manner, we shall now examine the moves and elements of the recognition scene in ancient Jewish and, first and foremost, Greco-Roman literature, where it occurs most regularly. In other words, we shall now move from a general,

⁵⁹ Cf. Han, “Recognition in the *Odyssey*,” 53–55. At some level, even pure identifications of human beings contain an element of social acknowledgment. When we do not recognize an old acquaintance, who presents him- or herself to us, the embarrassment of the situation comes from the fact that the very lack of identification in itself brings dishonor on the persons involved.

⁶⁰ Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Tauris* shows a remarkable awareness of the difference between the two aspects of recognition. When Iphigenia asks for Orestes’ name, he calls himself Δυστυχής (“Unfortunate”; *Iph. taur.* 500). Iphigenia, however, is not satisfied by his answer, since she was asking not for a description of his thematic role but for his proper name. In the case of Oedipus, for example, and maybe even of Jesus (Luke 1:31), proper name and description of thematic role interplay (*nomen est omen*); see Jo-Ann A. Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 171.

⁶¹ A systematic overview of the christological titles attributed to Jesus in John is displayed in Norman R. Petersen, *The Gospel of John and the Sociology of Light: Language and Characterization in the Fourth Gospel* (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1993), 58–59.

theoretical level concerning the semiotics of recognition to a description of the design of the recognition scene in the historical, literary context of the Fourth Gospel.

Anagnorisis as a Type-Scene in Ancient Literature

Aristotle had plenty of literary examples to draw on in his discussion not only of tragedy and of epic in general but of anagnorisis in particular; and, as already mentioned in the introduction, stories of recognition appeared most frequently in the narrative and dramatic literature of the ancient, Mediterranean world. According to Aristotle, the *Odyssey* is conspicuous among the epics in this respect. It is a complex story of recognition through and through—although recognition scenes, in fact, govern only the second half of the work—whereas the *Iliad* makes up a simple *mythos* (*Poet.* 1459b15).⁶² The *Odyssey* seems to be, if not the mother of anagnorisis, then the earliest surviving work in ancient Greek literature, in which the type-scene is the mainspring of the narrative.

Greek classical tragedy is, in its reception history, often associated with fatal, dysphoric, self-recognition, as in the *Oedipus tyrannus*; but such recognition does not dominate in tragedy. Recognition is more often euphoric discovery, perhaps mutual discoveries, of the true identity of long-lost friends or relatives. The briefly mentioned dramas about Orestes and Electra, brother and sister, are typical examples. The two siblings become the objects of each other's recognition when Orestes, Agamemnon's son who secretly survived when his mother and her lover killed Agamemnon, finally returns to Argos in order to avenge his father's death (Aeschylus, *Cho.* 165–263; Sophocles, *El.* 1098–1231; Euripides, *El.* 549–604). In New Comedy of early Hellenism (Menander), this same reciprocal, euphoric anagnorisis prevails, with a vast exploitation of the motif of the lost child returning home, as the penultimate device bringing forth the happy ending (e.g., Menander, *Perikeiromenē* 774–827). This is also the case among Menander's heirs in the Roman Comedy of the third and second century BCE (especially Plautus and Terence), where, once again, recognition does not convey the *ekplectic* discovery of tragic events but sweeps away mistaken identities, confusion, and error in order to finally solve the problems of the

⁶² The same may also be said about Virgil's *Aeneide*. Yet, see, e.g., the recognition scenes in Homer, *Iliad* 22.437–476; Virgil, *Aen.* 1.494–636.

characters.⁶³ Recognitions in Seneca's tragedies from the first century CE, however, to a great extent rework the dysphoric anagnorises of classical tragedy (cf., e.g., Seneca, *Hercules furens* 1192–1200 and Euripides, *Hercules furens* 1131–1172). In Greek romance of the first four centuries CE, recognitions again belong to the euphoric kind, though the motif of severance is transferred to the scene of a larger-scale Mediterranean world of eros and adventure. Suspense is often intensified by letting one of the lovers presume that the beloved one is dead (the *Scheintod* motif), this serving as a prelude to the final transition toward recognition and sexual (re)union.⁶⁴

In the Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, and the literature of Second Temple Judaism, recognition scenes also occur.⁶⁵ We find recognition in the narrative of Judah and Tamar, for example, where Judah recognizes the signet that his daughter-in-law, Tamar, received in pledge when she, disguised as a temple prostitute, agreed to sleep with him (Gen 38:26). Thereby, he not only realizes that the prostitute was actually Tamar, but he also accepts that the child she is bearing is his. A well-known example of recognition and reunion between separated relatives is found at the end of the Joseph-novella, when Joseph reveals himself to his brothers (Gen 42–45). The scene constitutes the turning point toward the family reconciliation, though actually the recognition is played down as the brothers believe him right away—no tokens required. Earlier in the patriarchal succession narrative, there is a failed recognition scene, when Jacob and Rebekah trick the old, blind Isaac into blessing Jacob instead of Esau (Gen 27). Also the pericopes about heavenly messengers that appear as human beings and encounter human actors are interesting in the context of a reading of the Gospel of John. Such celestial beings may either be recognized as divine at once (Gen 18:1–5) or asked for tokens (Judg 6:11–24; 13:3–23), or they may eventually reveal their own identity after a prolonged sequence in the mode of disguise

⁶³ See Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, 139–176.

⁶⁴ See Tomas Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 1, 13, 36, 163; B.P. Reardon, *The Form of Greek Romance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 105, 175. A comprehensive collection of ancient Greek romances in English translation appears in Reardon, ed., *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

⁶⁵ See Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading* (Indiana Literary Biblical Series; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 176–179, 309–322; Piero Boitani, *The Bible and its Rewritings* (trans. Anita Weston; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1–57; James M. Kugel, *The God of Old: Inside the Lost World of the Bible* (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 5–36.

(Tob 5–12, climax in 12:6–22).⁶⁶ The most well-known recognition scene in the New Testament is probably the appearance story of the walk to Emmaus in Luke 24:13–35, where the scales fall from the eyes of the disciples as Jesus breaks the bread in front of them.⁶⁷ The setup of the story with a “secret follower motif” is very similar to the one in Tobit. In later noncanonical Christian literature, anagnorisis seems to experience a renaissance when romance elements to a higher degree enter into the literature of the early church. Particularly interesting is in this context the first genuine Christian novel, the *Pseudo-Clementines*, the Latin version passing by the name of *Recognitiones*.⁶⁸ A most striking feature in all ancient examples of the employment of anagnorisis is that the recognition always pertains to the characters in the narrated story-world.⁶⁹ Narrated characters recognize, while readers are positioned on a superior level of knowledge being able to monitor the characters’ epistemological struggles. The reader is only involved in the recognition as a metaobserver.⁷⁰

Let us now turn toward the typical syntax or the move structure of the ancient recognition scene.⁷¹ In light of the fact that the considerations in the previous sections may apply to various types of epistemological plotting and not exclusively to the recognition scene, we need to state more precisely what we understand by the latter, hav-

⁶⁶ Sherryll S. Mleynek, going beyond the actual type-scene, presents another example by regarding the myth of Adam and Eve in the garden as “the *locus classicus* of *anagnorisis* in Western literature.” Idem, *Knowledge and Mortality: Anagnorisis in Genesis and Narrative Fiction* (American University Studies, Series III, Comparative Literature 56; New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 2.

⁶⁷ See Geoffrey Nuttall, *The Moment of Recognition: Luke as Story-Teller* (Ethel M. Wood Lecture, 1978; London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1978).

⁶⁸ On recognition in ancient Christian noncanonical literature, see Pascal Boulhol, *ANAGNORISMOS: La scène de reconnaissance dans l’hagiographie antique et médiévale* (Aix-en-Provence: L’Université de Provence, 1996); Dennis R. MacDonald, *Christianizing Homer*, 211–248.

⁶⁹ A possible exception might be the recognition of the shepherds in Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 1110–1185.

⁷⁰ This does not exclude, however, that the process of reading is itself an acquisition of knowledge and, in a certain way, calls forth an event of anagnorisis in the reader on the discourse level (see pp. 213–217). When Diana Culbertson claims that the audience experiences recognition in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus*, she seems to be applying a similarly broad and metaphorical understanding of the phenomenon. Eadem, *The Poetics of Revelation*, 50–54.

⁷¹ The phrase “type-scene” was first worked out by Walter Arend on Homeric material in idem, *Die typischen Szenen bei Homer* (Problemata: Forschungen zur klassischen Philologie 7; Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1933). Arend, however, did not work with the recognition type-scene.

ing already referred to it as a specific microgenre or type-scene. In other words, the change in perspective from paradigmatic to syntagmatic issues reintroduces the complex problem of genre to our discussion. We need to ask how one recognizes a recognition scene when faced with one, if we want to avoid the pitfall of sheer “impressionism,” which has been inclined to trap previous approaches to the subject. Neither Hitchcock nor Stibbe nor Culpepper are very explicit about the basis for including certain Johannine pericopes under the category of the recognition scene and excluding others, though they, of course, quote the classical Aristotelian definition.⁷² Aristotle, however, is not of much help in regard to the recognition scene as a microgenre. He does refer to anagnorisis and *peripeteia* as “components of plot” (τοῦ μύθου μέρη; *Poet.* 1450a33 [Halliwell]), and he discusses the forms of anagnorisis (εἶδη; 1454b19; cf. 1447a7) in relation to logic and probability, but in general, anagnorisis is not treated as a genre with specific sequential features, as is the case with the forms of oratory in the *Rhetoric* (γέννη, εἶδη; *Rhet.* 1.3.1–3, 1358a43–1358b9). True, there is a discussion in the *Poetics* concerning the question of whether recognition generates most sensation when located before or after the pivotal pragmatic act of the plot, and this discussion naturally has something to do with narrative sequencing; but the topic of this discussion is the means for producing *ekplēxis*, not the definition of genre (*Poet.* 1453b13–1454a15).⁷³ Now, definitions are a question of pragmatics. On one hand, it is not warrantable to speak of recognition scenes whenever identity is thematized in a narrative discourse. If so, the Gospel of John with its centering on the recognition of identity would contain recognitions to an extent that would simply empty the meaning of the concept or metaphorize it beyond recognition. On the other hand, a common core definition of

⁷² Culpepper does, in all fairness, have a section in *Gospel and Letters of John* in which he, besides quoting Aristotle, mentions half a dozen examples of ancient recognition scenes and discusses some of their features; idem “Anagnorisis as a Type-scene,” in *Gospel and Letters*, 72–77. He does not, however, paint a picture with the systematic details necessary for the present investigation.

⁷³ To round this off: Aristotle concludes that anagnorisis is most thrilling when the epistemological turn appears right at the moment where the protagonist is on the verge of performing the tragic act, thus preventing it from happening (cf., e.g., Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 866; Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 10.7.1–10.16.10). This viewpoint in Aristotle is not totally consistent with his otherwise high esteem of *Oedipus tyrannus*. Oedipus does not realize what he is about to do but what he has already done, just as Agave in the *Bacchae*, who suddenly understands that she, in a state of Dionysian ecstasy, has killed her own son Pentheus (Euripides, *Bacch.* 1280–1296).

the recognition scene may say too little about the diverse dramatic and epic scenes that served as illustrations in Aristotle, and it certainly does not become less problematic when including other examples that were not accessible to him. Moreover, a too-strict definition of the scene may very well erect an insurmountable barrier between what is reckoned among the anagnorises and what is not, with the undesirable effects of, on one hand, concealing recognition motifs that are present outside recognition scenes proper and, on the other, reducing scenes defined as recognition scenes to nothing more than that. Although anagnorisis may be an enriching analytical tool when applied to the Gospel of John, it does not represent the ultimate key that opens every hitherto impassable door of interpretation. These problems notwithstanding, I understand the recognition scene to be a type-scene whose overall *telos* is the recognition of a hidden truth, and which typically evolves in five steps or moves that I shall describe below (pp. 63–71).⁷⁴ The moves appear as stock devices in the scene, and are likely to have formed the expectations of the ancient reader acquainted with the dramatic, epic, and novelistic modes of recognition-telling. When undertaking this task, however, there is a danger of getting lost in the great variety of narrative possibilities that this type-scene has to offer. As an act of communication, the recognition scene, of course, serves diverse plot purposes, depending on the narrator's general allocation of knowledge in the economy of the story, so not all these functions are equally relevant to our study. Therefore, we shall confine ourselves to recognition scenes that pertain to the recognition of personal characters in narrative and drama, such scenes being the most relevant in the context of the Fourth Gospel.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ The term “move” in this context is used to designate the minimal narrative units (in some narratologies: kernels, nuclei, narremes) that altogether make up the recognition scene as function, to use Vladimir Propp's term; see idem, *Morphology of the Folktale* (trans. Laurence Scott; ed. Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson; Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics 10; Bloomington, Indiana: 1958); trans. of *Morfologija skazki* (Leningrad, 1928). Moves are, to be more precise, the syntagmatic steps within a certain function, the trajectory elements of a type-scene. In some narratologies, this minimal narrative unit is called a “motif,” but “move” seems preferable, since “motif” in general has become detached from its etymology of motion (lat., *motivus*, from *moveo*) and is now understood as an indistinct designation of regularly repeated ideas, subjects, or patterns in literature, film, and art. See Prince, *Dictionary of Narratology*, s.v. “Motif,” 55.

⁷⁵ Although the modes of exposition are different in the examples from narrative and drama, respectively, the story structure of the scenes appears to be the same, for which reason they are comparable.

The *Odyssey*, with its abundance of examples, is an obvious point of departure when drawing a map of the narrative moves in the recognition scene, and some attempts have naturally been performed on the matter already.⁷⁶ Most helpful is a recent article by Peter Gainsford, inspired by Proppian morphological analysis, in which he tries to develop the syntax of the type-scene of recognition as it appears in the *Odyssey*, books 13–24. Gainsford divides up the type-scene (in Propp's terms: the function) into moves and comes up with the following result (the moves indicated by Roman numerals serving as merely framing moves):⁷⁷

- I. Boundary marking start of scene.
- II. Hospitality scene motif (meal, bath).
 - 1. Testing. Odysseus tests the addressee's loyalty (see *πειράζω* in, e.g., 24.216).
 - 2. Deception. Odysseus deceives the addressee by claiming a false identity.
 - 3. Foretelling. The disguised Odysseus foretells his homecoming, as if he were not Odysseus himself.
 - 4. Recognition. Odysseus is identified in accordance with or against his will. Reaction and Reunion.
- III. Boundary marking end of scene.

It is important to notice that Gainsford does not claim that all recognition scenes in the *Odyssey* (he estimates a number of fifteen scenes in the second half of the epic) contain every move. There are examples of scenes void of (1) testing (e.g., *Od.* 13.253–286, 14.185–408, 23.1–38), (2) deceit (e.g., 19.317–507, 21.188–229, 23.85–246), (3) foretelling (13.187–371, 19.317–507, 23.85–246), as well as (4) recognition (e.g., 14.1–173, 19.252–316); and he also notes that moves 3 and 4 are mutually

⁷⁶ Cf. Emlyn-Jones, "The Reunion," 6–7; Gainsford, "Formal Analysis," 41–59; for more examples, see 42, n. 1. See also the work in Latin by Paul Hoffmann, *De anagnorismo* (Wrocław: A. Favorke, 1910).

⁷⁷ Gainsford, "Formal Analysis," 42–44; cf. idem, "Cognition and Type-Scenes: The *Aoidos* at Work," in *Homer, Tragedy and Beyond: Essays in Honour of P.E. Easterling* (eds. Felix Budelman and Pantelis Michelakis; London: Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, 2001), 3–21. Gainsford, in fact, further breaks down the moves into motifs—e.g., the motif of giving the evidence, which appears within the move of recognition (move 4). Such motifs should of course not be overlooked, but in the following presentation of Gainsford's analysis it is sufficient to remain on the level of the basic moves.

exclusive so that the individual recognition scene only displays one of them: Either the disguised Odysseus is not recognized and thus gets the chance to predict his future return (3. *Foretelling*), or he is given away and does not foretell (4. *Recognition*). This is all quite straightforward, but a few comments need to be made on the heuristic value of the model. First, one may ask if the motif of hospitality is better considered an integral part of the move of testing (1. *Testing*) to which Odysseus subjects the observers. After all, their treatment of the stranger together with the conversation reveal their stance in the conflict. Second, and more importantly, it is possible that a more profound understanding of the function of recognition would emerge, if other moves, which are presupposed but not always set out explicitly in the scene, were involved in the analysis. For instance, no recognition scene is possible without at least an implied “move” of first knowledge, in which the observer for the first time obtains information about the object that is now recognized in the scene.⁷⁸ Such a move is often referred to—for example in the famous reciprocal recognition scene between Iphigenia and her brother Orestes in the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides, where Iphigenia recalls her first knowledge of Orestes as a baby in his nurse’s arms (Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 835–836). Likewise, a “move” of separation is implied in recognition: a subnarrative concerning the spatiotemporal disjunction between the initial cognition and the re-cognition, for example an account of a journey of some sort. This move is often thematized before the moment of recognition as the observer mourns the absence of the loved one (e.g., *Od.* 24.280–301; Aeschylus, *Cho.* 135–139; Sophocles, *El.* 1126–1173; Euripides, *El.* 111–213; *Iph. taur.* 1–66), but it may also be found in the self-presentation of the observed one (e.g., *Od.* 16.188–189; 21.201–208), or after the recognition proper along with the reaction of the observer as in the abovementioned scene with Iphigenia and Orestes (*Iph. taur.* 869–874; cf. e.g., Euripides, *Helena* 625–805; Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe* 4.24; 4.35). Third and finally, we must not forget that Gainsford’s model is based on readings in the *Odyssey*, exclusively, and does not pretend to cover recognition scenes in other ancient sources, which also reduces its utility value in relation to the recognitions in the Gospel of John. For instance, Odysseus not only keeps a “Messianic secret” somewhat parallel to the cagey Markan Jesus but also fabricates cover-up stories in order to be able to take Penelope’s

⁷⁸ Cf. the discussion of *ana*-gnorisis in Plato, *Theaetetus* 193c, where Socrates seems to refer to Aeschylus, *Cho.* 205–211.

suitors by surprise (see e.g., *Od.* 13.190–193; 16.301–307; 19.482–490; 21.228–229; 23.29–31), while John's Jesus is seldom reluctant to disclose his marks of divinity, though his identity is certainly not always perceived by the observers.⁷⁹ True, Jesus wears the camouflage of the flesh, but unlike Odysseus, he does not need it in order to postpone the pivotal ὥρα of the narrative, which has rather been appointed in advance (7:30; 8:20; 13:1; 16:4; 17:1), and its function is therefore not that of deception (cf. Gainsford's second move).⁸⁰ The danger of giving away one's identity and the advantage of keeping it to oneself, which is a common motif in recognition scenes, not least in the *Odyssey*, does not come to the fore in John's narrative. As John makes Jesus claim in front of Annas, the high priest, "I have spoken openly [παρρησία] to the world;...I have said nothing in secret [ἐν κρυπτῷ]" (18:20; cf. 7:4).⁸¹ As a consequence of the fact that Jesus does not try to withhold his identity, the move of foretelling also becomes irrelevant in the sense defined by Gainsford, as Jesus never denies that he is the Messiah by referring to the advent of someone else, who really is (yet, on 9:35, see pp. 157–158).

In the light of the above, it is clear that there are some very significant differences between the way recognitions are told in the *Odyssey* and in the Fourth Gospel. Therefore, Gainsford's model, however illuminating in regard to the Homeric material, is partially off target as a generator of questions concerning the composition of Johannine anagnorises. It sharpens our awareness of what such a scene may have contained in ancient narrative, but it is not recommended to elevate it to a general level concerning the ancient recognition scene *per se*. As already stated, no simple model can be drawn up if we want to do justice to the

⁷⁹ An exception to Jesus' general will to reveal is the enigmatic statement in 2:24 (cf. 11:54) if taken in a certain way; see E. Stauffer, "Agnostos Christos: Joh. ii. 24 und die Eschatologie des Vierten Evangeliums," in *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology* (eds. W.D. Davies and D. Daube; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 281–299. On the recognitions of Odysseus and Mark's Jesus, see Dennis R. MacDonald, "Secrecy and Recognition in the *Odyssey* and Mark: Where Wrede Went Wrong," in *Ancient Fiction and Early Christian Narrative* (eds. Ronald F. Hock et al.; SBLSymS 6; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 139–153; idem, *The Homeric Epics*, 44–54.

⁸⁰ This is not to say that there is no elusiveness in John's Jesus, but let us for the moment put aside the question of why Jesus is at all wearing the camouflage of σάρξ if his intention is really to reveal his identity. For further discussion, see pp. 79–84.

⁸¹ This saying of Jesus seemingly contradicts the fact that he has just been speaking "cryptically" to his disciples in chs. 13–17. The import is rather that Jesus claims not to have tried to hold back his true identity. Again, in the passage in 7:10 it says that Jesus comes to Jerusalem "in secret," but this is contradicted a little later in v. 26, where he is said to be speaking "openly."

many variations that derive from the diverse roles that anagnorisis takes up in plots. This is why the following attempt to form a list of typical moves in the recognition scene does not make up an absolute outline of the course of the scene, but rather highlights significant moves that, *nota bene*, not always appear in the same order, just as one of them can be absent from a given scene without altering its overall *telos* of anagnorisis.

The Meeting

The recognition scene opens with the arrangement of a meeting between the observer and the observed. In diegetic narrative, this placement of the two actants in a common setting necessary for their interaction is indicated by spatiotemporal markers whereas in dramatic texts, the bringing together of the two may be left to the theatrical performance of the play.⁸² Not all anagnorises, however, take place in the presence of the recognized, though that is typically the case. In some examples, the recognized is absent, the recognizer being informed about the true identity of the recognized not by direct observation, but by some informant's *whispering* (*Od.* 23; Longus, *Daphn.*, 4.19–21; Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, 7.15–16; Xenophon Ephesius, *Ephesiaca* 5.13.1).⁸³ The message awakens a need for personal inspection and physical contact, and thus the recognizer goes—or even runs—to meet the recognized in a second recognition scene now performed in the mutual presence of the partakers. The recognition between two present actors may, as noticed by Aristotle, be either one-sided or mutual (as in e.g., *Od.* 13; Sophocles, *El.*; Euripides, *Ion*; *Iph. taur.*). In mutual recognitions one of the actors often unwittingly gives away his or her identity, thinking that the other one is a stranger. This leads to recognition and self-disclosure on the other part (e.g., Sophocles, *El.* 1174–1223; Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 769–776).

The locale of the scene in the geography mapped out by the narrative depends on the nature of the knowledge that the scene displays. Often the scene takes place in a secluded setting, which initially has the effect of cutting off irrelevant distractions to the actantial game between

⁸² Or the dramatist may let one of the actors introduce the entering persons on stage (cf., e.g., Euripides, *El.* 549; *Iph. taur.* 456, 466, 724).

⁸³ More examples of recognition scenes “*altera persona absente*” are displayed in Hoffmann, *De anagnorismo*, 31–35.

the observer and the observed. What is more significant, however, is the circumstance, that this kind of setting makes the attained knowledge exclusive and enables the narrator to place recognition scenes even early on in the story, which is often seen in plots where identities are kept secret from the majority of the actors until the final settlement. This is characteristic of most of the recognition scenes in the *Odyssey* (cf. also Aeschylus, *Cho.* 1–305; Sophocles, *El.* 1174–1223; Euripides, *El.* 54–56, 357–431; *Hel.* 528–645; *Iph. taur.* 723–841). The already-mentioned hospitality motif, which is often found in the opening of the scene, generally belongs to recognition scenes of this private kind. In contrast to such anagnorises, another type of recognition scene takes place in a public, forensic-like setting. Here information is not withheld from outsiders but becomes evident to anyone in principle; and since the scene unties the knot of secrecy in such an open manner by leaving no one in the dark, it is often situated at the very end of the story (Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 10.7.1–10.16.10; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.13.3), even if it occasionally stretches backward, covering large parts of the story (Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*, *passim*). In fact, the recognition scene has no standard length—not even within the *Odyssey*.⁸⁴

The Move of Cognitive Resistance

After the observer and the observed have gathered, the move of cognitive resistance is a virtually omnipresent feature in the recognition scenes, often representing the recognizer's first reaction to a claim or token presented. In fact, without this move of *agnoia*, the recognition scene becomes a mere reunion scene with only faintly articulated, cognitive implications, as in Biblical examples like the reunion of Joseph and his brothers in Gen 42–45, which has already been mentioned, and the return of the prodigal son in Luke 15:11–32, where the father instantly identifies the son approaching in the distance.⁸⁵ Such imme-

⁸⁴ See Gainsford, "Formal Analysis," 50.

⁸⁵ Both of these Biblical narratives certainly deal with recognition in the sense of acknowledgment of social relations (brothers, father and sons). I am merely trying to point out the fact that these stories do not thematize the process of identification and the obstructions lying on its way. Non-Biblical examples of reunions that do not thematize recognition may be those between Polyneices and his mother, Jocasta, in Euripides, *Phoenician Maidens*, 303–442 and between the two lovers Charikleia and Theagenes in Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 2.6. For an elaboration of the above point, see Hermann Walter, "Die Wiedererkennungsszenen in Homers *Odyssee*: Überlegungen zur Wirkungsweise des Anagnorismos," *Res Publica Litterarum. Studies in the Classical Tradition* 15 (1992), 64–65.

mediate recognitions, however, are significant exceptions that often aim to emphasize the actors' close relationship—so close that recognition becomes unnecessary or as easy as falling off a log. This is very clear in Xenophon Ephesius' *Ephesiaca*, where the lovers during their separation repeatedly escape recognition by the strangers they meet until the story becomes quite a different one in the minimalist recognition scene of their final reunion:

When they saw each other, they recognized each other at once [ἐνθὺς ἀνεγνώρισαν], for that was their fervent desire. They embraced each other and fell to the ground. A host of different emotions took hold of them at once—joy, grief, fear, memory of past events, and anxiety of the future. (5.13.3 [Anderson]; cf. Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7)

Yet, since recognition represents an ontological *Umwertung* of the observer's perspective of things, it typically does not come about as easy as in this example but meets resistance from the challenged "world-view." This move of resistance contains various motifs. In the first instance, resistance means delay of recognition, which is the main device of suspense in recognition scenes. The observer's sense that the dawning truth is too good or too horrible to be true postpones the recognition and starts off the cognitive process. The observer enters a state of being in two minds (δίφροντις; Aeschylus, *Cho.* 196), which may find expression in various utterances of doubt: distrustful questions and expressions of inner deliberation (Aeschylus, *Cho.* 194–200, 220–224; Sophocles, *El.* 1202; Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 3.18.4), suggestions of alternative identifications (*Od.* 16.178–200; Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 345–349), counter arguments (Euripides, *El.* 508–545), the conjecture that it is all just a dream (Euripides, *Hel.* 569–570), or sheer rejection (*Od.* 23.10–24). This phase of the recognition scene, where the knowledge of the observer has not yet reached the superior level of the reader, is also the locus of the ironic statements, which we have become used to associating with the concept of tragic irony, though they are not at all confined to recognition in the tragedies.⁸⁶ The observer, still lacking true insight, speaks the truth unawares or voices an illusion soon to be

⁸⁶ In the *Ephesiaca*, for example, there is a peculiar, ironic recognition where an observer, who came to know Anthia, the heroine, by her cover identity as an Egyptian woman, recognizes her in the market as such. The reader, however, knows that the recognition is only a semblance since it relates to her false identity (Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.9.5; cf. *Od.* 21.398–403).

broken, while the already informed audience grasps the *double entendre* in the duplex structure of irony (see, e.g., Euripides, *Ion* 237–451).⁸⁷

The move of cognitive resistance in some cases makes up the conclusion of the recognition scene, which thus does not move forward and remains a nonrecognition (an *an-anagnorisis*; e.g., *Od.* 14; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 4.3.6).⁸⁸ Typically, however, the phase of cognitive resistance is extended and the cognitive moment deferred by a teleological process of, on one hand, defensive arguments produced by the observed one (e.g., *Od.* 19.221–248; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.12.4), and on the other, some sort of interrogation or search for indications conducted by the observer (e.g., *Od.* 3.71; 8.536–586; Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 1009–1050; Euripides, *Bacch.* 1200–1279; *Hel.* 528–645; *Iph. taur.* 466–575). The design of this dialogue, of course, depends on whom the narrator confers the initiative upon, i.e., whether emphasis is laid on the observed one's self-disclosure ("I am..."; cf. e.g., *Od.* 9.19; 13.299–300; Euripides, *Hel.* 568; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.11–15) or the observer's discovery of things, the latter being most one-sidedly the case when the observed one seeks to escape identification.⁸⁹ In either scenario, however, the situation obtains similarities with trial proceedings leading to some sort of verdict through argumentation and demonstration, which is most elaborately thematized in the final scenes of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* (10.13–14).

The Move of Displaying the Token

The presentation of the recognition token, which is an example of *showing* (cf. the above modes of displaying information, pp. 48–51), constitutes a typical turning point in the recognition scene, whether it initiates the cognitive process, thus leading to the move of resistance, or brings

⁸⁷ Tragic irony in anagnorisis is most heavily exploited in tragedies, where recognition pertains to the discovery of the fatal consequences of past acts that cannot be undone (Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 105, 135–146, 248, 261–262, 266–275, 576, 743; Euripides, *Bacch.* 1200–1279).

⁸⁸ In spite of the fact that recognition in such scenes never happens, it is correct when Gainsford maintains that "the idea of recognition is always the teleological focus of the scene"; idem, "Formal Analysis," 45.

⁸⁹ See Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, 73. In tragedy, this exchange of information often rises to a crescendo by means of stichomythia or ping-pong dialogue where alternating lines or half-lines are spoken by alternating characters (see, e.g., Aeschylus, *Cho.* 214–224; Sophocles, *El.* 1176–1226; Euripides *El.* 555–582; *Ion* 264–368, 517–562, 1406–1426; *Iph. taur.* 805–821).

it to an end as a conclusive piece of evidence. In Aristotle, the token is called σημεῖον (*Poet.* 1454b20; 1455a19), but this term seldom echoes in narrative and drama, where other designations dominate.⁹⁰ Homer speaks of σῆμα (e.g., *Od.* 21.217; 23.73, 110, 203, 225; 24.329), while new comedy and romance generally employs the term γνώρισμα (Menander, *Epitrepontes* 303, 331, 341; *Perik.* 816; Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 1.3; 4.21, et passim; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 2.31; 4.8; 4.15; 9.24; 10.13; 10.14, et passim). In roman comedy *crepundia* (“children’s playthings”) often occurs as a metonymical expression of the tokens (e.g., Plautus, *Cistellaria* 635, 656, 664, 709 et passim; *Rudens* 1154) along with *signum* (e.g., Plautus, *Rud.* 1110, 1181; Terence, *Eunuchus* 767). Finally, we occasionally come upon σύμβολον (Euripides, *El.* 577; *Ion* 1386) or εὐξύμβολον (Aeschylus, *Cho.* 170), as well as τεκμήριον (*Cho.* 205) in the Greek tragedies. Thus, it is unwarranted to point out a single, widely acknowledged *terminus technicus* describing the recognition token in ancient Greco-Roman literature.⁹¹ But the texts agree on the circumstance that the token is in itself mute and does not convey the necessary information, unless it is coded by a subnarrative that connects the token with a specific individual. Such coding is performed exemplarily at the very moment of Eurycleia’s discovery in *Od.* 19.392–466, where Homer inserts a long, analeptic intercalation that virtually brings narrative time to a halt, in order to describe how Odysseus once acquired his scar during a boar hunt. In other recognition scenes, the code of the token may not be as easy to decipher by observers or even by the observed as it was to Eurycleia, and so a witness, who holds the piece of knowledge that will make the puzzle fall into place, may be called in. In the case of abandoned children, often a servant to the family or a foster parent is able to identify the tokens or tell the story (Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 924–1046; 1123–1185; Euripides, *El.* 285–287; 563–576; Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 10.12–15), but also human beings possessing divine knowledge testify (Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 284–462, cf. 556) as well as gods *ex machina* serving as ultimate witnesses (e.g., Athena in Euripides, *Ion* 1553–1605). Such oral testimony complements the tokens and functions likewise. But they display the mark of true identity by means of *telling*.

⁹⁰ Except perhaps in, e.g., Sophocles, *El.* 887; *Oed. tyr.* 1058. Σημεῖον is a development of σῆμα, which is the Homeric designation (see below).

⁹¹ For a more comprehensive presentation of the terminology, see Alfred Hähle, *GNÖRISMATA*, (Tübingen: H. Laupp Jr., 1929), 131–140. Hähle, however, does not discuss the two last-mentioned terms.

The literature in our field of vision abounds in examples of tokens. We are certainly not only talking about scars, but also of signet rings, footprints, pieces of cloth, locks of hair, necklaces, birthmarks, knives and swords, bands with inscriptions, cloaks, ornaments, toys, amulets, holy twigs, etc.⁹² The display of the tokens may give rise to a test of the observed one's knowledge (διὰ μνήμης) concerning the particularities of the tokens, as when Ion's mother Creusa, in minute detail, is able to describe everything hidden in the basket in which she once abandoned him as a baby (Euripides, *Ion* 1395–1438; cf. Menander, *Perik.* 789–827).⁹³ More often, however, the mere fact that the observed is in possession of the token is sufficient proof, and an example of this appears if we look at the same Euripidean two-way recognition scene from Creusa's point of view. When she sees Ion with her basket in hand, she recognizes him as her son right away. As we have already touched upon (pp. 32–33), however, tokens may be a forgery or stolen items that need to be tested, accumulated, and held up against other pieces of evidence in order to produce their intended effect of persuasion. Recognition scenes often engage in this discussion when producing tokens of identity (e.g., the Electra-Orestes cycle; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 9–10); and the *sêmeia* of the Gospel of John are, as we shall see, no exception to this circumstance (see pp. 112–124).

The Moment of Recognition

The exact pivotal moment of revelation where cognitive resistance is thrown overboard seems to be tabooed, somehow, in the recognition scene. Of course the reader witnesses the observer's subsequent reaction of belief, but the moment itself often remains an *arrēton*. This is, of course, quite natural in the dramas since they lack a narrating voice and thus have to communicate the cognitive change through direct speech, the recognition itself taking place between the lines, but also narrative proper often refrains from representing the moment diegetically. Instead, characters may mention the cognitive transition in prospect or retrospect.⁹⁴ When doing so, they never use the substan-

⁹² For further examples and references, see the list in Hähnle, *GNÖRISMATA*, 141–144.

⁹³ Other examples of recognition by virtue of the recognized's knowledge, albeit not attended by tokens, are *Od.* 23.173–204; 24.336–344; Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 1032; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.10.11.

⁹⁴ This has to do with the fact that recognition, as a cognitive act, is invisible. Out-

tival term ἀναγνώσις, and only a few times ἀναγνωρισμός (Menander, *Epitrepontes* 1121) or *cognitio* occur (Terence, *Hecyra* 831; *Eun.* 921). Rather, recognition is (in Greek literature) commonly described with the verb γι(γ)νώσκω (*Od.* 13.312; 19.392, 468, 475) and occasionally with compounds like ἐπιγι(γ)νώσκω (*Od.* 24.217 as opposed to ἀγνοέω in the following line; cf. 23.95) and ἀναγι(γ)νώσκω (*Od.* 4.250; 19.250; 21.205; 23.206).⁹⁵

The new knowledge acquired in the recognition is basically an establishment of an appositive connection between the observed one and a certain proper name or a social, thematic role (see pp. 51–55). In the literature, this may be expressed implicitly in a simple exclamation of such an appellation, for example “Odysseus!” (*Od.* 23.209; cf. Euripides, *Hel.* 625; Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 8.1.8, Plautus, *Curculio* 657–658), or it may be presented explicitly in some sort of “confessional” statement: “You are...!” (*Od.* 3.122; 19.474).⁹⁶ This statement aligns the observer’s vision with the overall ontology of the narrative.

Attendant Reactions and Physical (Re-)Union

The reaction of the observer is not confined to the epistemological supposition above, but it also involves a communication of the awe and amazement (*ekplēxis*) that observers find themselves thrown into. This gives occasion to various, more or less stereotypical, descriptions of the symptoms of emotion (most typically shown by both actants) like for example tearful eyes,⁹⁷ chaos of emotions,⁹⁸ and inability to find words.⁹⁹ The motif of emotional reaction is occasionally downplayed, for example in the discreet wagging of the tail by Odysseus’ dog (*Od.* 17.301–303),

siders cannot see whether one has recognized unless one shows secondary symptoms thereof; see Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 51.

⁹⁵ The examples are copious; therefore, only references to the *Odyssey* are given. For more references, see William S. Anderson, “Resistance to Recognition and ‘Privileged Recognition’ in Terence,” *CJ* 98 (2002): 1.

⁹⁶ A third-person formulation is also possible: “This is Leukippe, isn’t it?” (Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 3.18.1 [Winkler]; cf. *Od.* 4.157). Regarding the types of acclamatory propositions in the New Testament, see Klaus Berger, *Formgeschichte des Neuen Testaments* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1984), 233–236.

⁹⁷ *Od.* 16.213–219; 21.222–225; 23.207–208; 23.231–240; 24.345–350; Sophocles, *El.* 1226–1231; Euripides, *Hel.* 633; *Iph. taur.* 831; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7.5.

⁹⁸ *Od.* 19.471–472; Euripides, *Iph. taur.* 831; Terence, *Andria* 937–938; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.13.3; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7.3; 10.13.1; 10.14.2.

⁹⁹ Euripides, *Hel.* 630–631; *Iph. taur.* 839–840; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7.4; 10.13.1.

whereas the romance, as indicated by the following example, is much more elaborate when dealing with this motif, with which it seems to have an open love affair:

They both cried out at the same time: “Chaereas!” “Callirhoe!” They fell into each other’s arms, swooned, and fell to the ground....[T]hey were like people plunged deep in a well who could scarcely hear a voice calling from above. Slowly they came to themselves; then, when they saw each other and embraced, they were overcome again; and this happened a second time and a third time. All they could say was: “You are in my arms—if you really are Callirhoe!” “If you really are Chaereas!” (Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.1.8–10 [Reardon])

This quotation reveals another motif belonging to the move of reactions to recognition: the need for physical contact. This motif of tactility is as ubiquitous as the expression or description of feelings and it appears in the form of, for example, holding hands, falling at each other’s feet, and embracing.¹⁰⁰ In ancient art this exact moment of the scene was often chosen for illustration.¹⁰¹ A third motif, which must be mentioned in this connection, is the observer’s expression of the momentous pragmatic consequences connected to the new cognitive order that is coming into being. As we have already seen in the theoretical discussion, anagnorisis implies a new social situation that transforms the setup of the actors’ narrative programs by having these programs played out on new terms. Recognizers never hesitate to realize this; and in dysphoric recognitions it often finds expression in tragic self-knowledge concerning the fact that the protagonist has lost former glory by becoming his or her own opponent (e.g., Sophocles, *Ajax* 333–595; *Oed. tyr.* 1184–1185; Euripides, *Bacch.* 1641; *Herc. fur.* 1131–1172; Seneca, *Herc. fur.* 1192–1200; *Phaedra* 1154–1280). In the euphoric scenes, on the contrary, we hear about secret hopes for the future that recognition has turned into realistic expectations (e.g., Aeschylus, *Cho.* 235–263; Euripides, *El.* 596–604). Such expressions of expectations are potential plans of action, and so they constitute the occasion for the narrator to make a change of scene

¹⁰⁰ *Od.* 16.213–219; 19.474–475; 21.222–225; 23.207–208; 23.231–240; 24.345–350; Sophocles, *El.* 1226–1231; Euripides, *El.* 576; *Hel.* 624, 634–635; *Iph. taur.* 795; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.10.11; 5.13.3; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7.3; 10.16.1; Plautus, *Poenulus* 1258–1275; *Rud.* 1175.

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., two sculptures from the Early Roman Imperial Period showing Electra and Orestes in embrace in *Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae* (eds. H.C. Ackerman and J.-R. Gisler; 8 vols.; Zürich: Artemis, 1981–1997), 7.1:71, 7.2:51 (Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples, inv. no. 6006; Museo Nazionale, Rome, inv. no. 8604).

and bring the story closer to the realization of the plan, thus revealing how events taking place in the cognitive dimension of the story may have an impact on the pragmatic level of the narrative.

Summary

Before beginning our reading of Johannine recognition scenes, let us recapitulate the results of the present chapter in terms of theory and comparative literary history. The recognition scene of ancient literature participates in general semiotic conditions of knowledge, of which I have described three relevant aspects: (1) The question of recognition arises when a person appears ambivalently, i.e., with at least two contradicting modes of appearance (camouflage and mark). To state it simply, if there is only one mode of appearance the person's identity is either never called into question (the total mark), or it cannot be disclosed (the total camouflage). (2) The mark that reveals a person's true identity can be communicated in acts of linguistic *telling*, non-linguistic *showing*, or *whispering*, i.e., confidential information that is transmitted before the arrival of the person in question. (3) Recognition finds expression in ontological propositions ("The person x is y"). Regarding this, any act of recognition articulates at least one of the following two aspects: identification, i.e., when a person is identified by proper name; and social recognition, i.e., when recognition places the recognized person (and the recognizer) in a certain social position by means of a thematic role.

In their capacity as cognitive moments, ancient literary anagnorises share in the mentioned epistemological conditions, but they also appear in the form of type-scenes with a narrative structure and an ideological emphasis of their own. According to the set-up of these recognition type-scenes, the potential goal is always anagnorisis, though individual scenes do not always reach the culmination due to the force of cognitive resistance or embarrassment in the plot of the narrative in question. Yet, the typical trajectory of the scene runs through five "moves": the meeting, cognitive resistance, the display of the token, the moment of recognition, and, finally, the attendant reactions and physical (re)union. Moreover, the recognition type-scene of ancient narrative and drama is not only a formal category that describes literary conventions of ancient storytelling. It is also a carrier of ideology and a medium of ideology-making, giving expression to relational and social understandings of

identity in terms of honor. In light of this, the ancient recognition scene has three main functions: (1) It is the primary narrative device, in which hidden identities come to light; (2) it negotiates social roles and thematizes social expulsion and integration; (3) it culminates in an event of instantaneous presence which eliminates the distance between recognizer and recognized. As I shall demonstrate in the following, the Fourth Gospel makes use of all three functions in its application of the recognition type-scene to the story of Jesus.

CHAPTER TWO

ANAGNORISIS AND ARRIVAL (JOHN 1–4)

Anagnorisis within the Matrix of John's Narrative

In the first chapter of this study, we affirmed that even though the epistemological plot in John (belief vs. unbelief) is subordinate to the pragmatic plot (life vs. death), it constitutes the most conspicuous plot in the narrative (the A-plot), appearing in its cognitive dimension (see pp. 34–44). Yet, in order to be able to understand the recognition scenes properly, i.e., how they work in the overall narrative and how they relate to contemporary generic conventions, we must also take into account the way John creates a setting for them. Recognition scenes are embedded in plots—whether we think of the *Odyssey*, the dramas, or the Fourth Gospel—and cannot be analyzed without regard to the internal literary matrix that they appear within. As to John's setting up of such a mold, the prologue plays a most prominent role. The prologue describes Jesus' arrival in the discourse and prepares the reader for anagnorisis before the story descends into the story-world proper. It creates the story's economy of knowledge by identifying Jesus as the Gospel's main object of recognition, setting him out on a journey, and defining his true identity as well as his mode of manifestation. The prologue, moreover, points at what type of recognition John is going to produce and advocate for. Below, we shall examine how the prologue stages the recognition scenes of the Gospel. As a result, we shall be able to place anagnorisis in John on a typological map together with other recognitions of ancient literature.

Prologue and Prejudice: Prefatory Whisperings

Even though the prologue of the Fourth Gospel (John 1:1–18) is made up of words describing the Word, interpreters seem to have a preference for metaphors of music when trying to describe its essence. Bultmann, for example, considered it an introduction “im Sinn einer Ouverture”; and in its present context, whether it is an original compo-

sition of the evangelist or an example of creative adaptation, it certainly has a function of foreshadowing, similar to the role of musical openings.¹ The prologue, however, not only introduces a number of imagery motifs recurring later on in the Gospel, but also sets the stage of its basic cognitive conflict concerning the recognition of Jesus. As often occurs in ancient drama, the prologue addresses the audience or readers at a moment where story-world observers have not yet begun to interact. It situates the addressee on a superior level of knowledge, as has been pointed out by many interpreters.² The prologue constitutes an act of *whispering*, by which the reader is given advance knowledge about the main character, who will appear later in the story (1:29). John takes the readers aside in order to confide to them the right understanding of Jesus, thus enabling them to precognize the ideal *telos* of the subsequent individual encounters between Jesus and story-world observers. This also gives readers the ability to judge the outcome of such encounters according to an axis of recognition/nonrecognition. The prologue is designed to make the implied reader prejudiced in favor of Jesus, but it *whispers* more than this. We shall consider first the aspect concerning Jesus' identity and second, his mode of appearance.

The Prologue's Web of Identity Relations

An early introduction of the protagonist's name was customary in ancient *bioi*, and the *incipit* of the Gospel of Mark forms an illustrative example: "The beginning of the good news of Jesus Christ, the son of God" (Mark 1:1; cf. Matt 1:1).³ It is noteworthy, however, that John's prologue does not give away the name of Jesus all at once. John

¹ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 1. Raymond E. Brown, being one among many, speaks of the prologue as a hymn; see idem, *Gospel According to John*, 18–23; cf. Jan A. Du Rand, "Reading the Fourth Gospel as a Symphony," in "What is John?" *Literary and Social Readings of the Fourth Gospel* (ed. Fernando F. Segovia; vol. 2; SBLSymS 7; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 5–18.

² See, e.g., Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 18–20; Stibbe, *John*, 22–23; Francis J. Moloney, *The Gospel of John*, (SP 4; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1998), 34; Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 17–26. Note also George E. Duckworth's reference to Plautus: "It is frequently stated that most of Plautus' comedies in which the speaker of the prologue gives the presuppositions of the plot are plays which end with the recognition of identity. Since the true identity of one or more of the characters is not known to the other actors, the audience, learning the facts of the case, can appreciate the irony inherent in the situation and can understand the errors of the characters"; idem, *The Nature of Roman Comedy*, 212–213; yet, see also 218–223.

³ On ancient narrative openings in relation to the gospels, see Dennis E. Smith,

rather delays the moment of identification by first putting together an enigmatic web of identity relations, to which he attaches new links successively, until he finally displays the fixed point of orientation in v. 17, where the proper name Jesus (Christ) eventually puts things into their right place.⁴ As we have seen, recognition is the affirmation of identity relations between pronouns, proper names, and thematic roles (pp. 51–55); and the same elements constitute the joints of the prologue's web. Let us watch how this joining is carried out, step by step.

Vv. 1–5. As has already been said, the prologue does not set off by pointing out the main character by his proper name. Rather, it begins with another joint in the web, i.e., with the *Logos*, which was in the beginning, thus making necessary a transition of identity in order to end up with the stabilization of things in v. 17. Now, *Logos* is a thematic role with connotations that must be studied in their historical context, whether one finds the most obvious parallels in, for example, Jewish wisdom literature, in stoicism, or in Philo.⁵ Whatever *Hintergrund* one regards most plausible, however, the expository function of *Logos* remains the same in respect to the prologue's method of unfolding Jesus' identity. In this respect, it is important to notice that *Logos* functions as a *shifter* in Roman Jakobson's sense, i.e., a term whose reference (i.e., the one who holds the role of *Logos*), is determinable only with respect to the situation of its enunciation.⁶ Thematic roles, such as the *Logos*, as well as pronouns are paradigmatic examples of shifters, in the sense that they are anonymous terms that are able to represent an infinite number of individuals, in principle, until they are being related to a singular term that incarnates them, as it were. Thus, a pronoun like "he" and the thematic role of "father," for example, may apply to an uncountable number of male persons while, on the other hand, a singular determination like "the author of *The Princess and the Pea*" or the proper name Hans Christian Andersen does not. Now, the enigmatic character of the prologue—and the myriads of interpreta-

"Narrative Beginnings in Ancient Literature and Theory," *Semeia* 52 (1990), 3–4; Burridge, *What Are the Gospels?* 189, 216.

⁴ For a socio-linguistic reading of the prologue's creation of new synonyms, see Norman R. Petersen, *The Gospel of John and the Sociology of Light*, 8–22.

⁵ For a recent survey of the ideological contexts that have been suggested for John, and in particular for the prologue and the *Logos* concept, see Frey, "Kontext des vierten Evangeliums," 3–45.

⁶ Roman Jakobson, "Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb," in *Selected Writing II: Word and Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 130–147.

tions it has given rise to, for that matter—are to a great extent due to its employment of shifter language that continuously postpones the appearance of a singular connector. Not only does the first statement of identity in the text conjoin one shifter (λόγος, v. 1c) with another (θεός, v. 1c), but polysemic, pronominal language, in fact, dominates the entire text.⁷ Οὗτος is introduced in v. 2 and appears fifteen times in various forms in the course of the prologue until it, characteristically, ceases to appear in v. 17.⁸ A pronoun, according to the literal meaning of the term, presupposes a noun for which it stands; and of course οὗτος refers back to *Logos* when the passage in vv. 2–4 describes οὗτος as being with God in the beginning (v. 2), as God’s instrument of creation (v. 3), and as a reservoir of life (v. 4); but still, the noun, to which the shifter pronoun refers, is itself a shifter.⁹ Vv. 4–5 add even more pieces to this puzzle of *signifiants flottants* by linking up οὗτος with ζωή and τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, thus establishing further identity relations in the web.

Vv. 6–9. The next section of the prologue, concerning John the Baptist, is perhaps an insertion placed by the evangelist in the original hymn.¹⁰ In the course of the prologue as it appears in the final redaction, however, it constitutes a temporary change from shifter language to proper name language (see ὄνομα in v. 6). In regard to the formal aspect, v. 6 in fact has much more in common with the headings of the Matthean and Markan Gospels than has the first verse of the prologue. John the Baptist is named (Ἰωάννης), but the naming has the negative function of indicating that he stands outside the web of identity relations, not being the unifying object of recognition. He is not the light, but bears witness to the light. Having named the Baptist in v. 6, the text quickly turns back to the realm of pronomina. In v. 7a, οὗτος now refers to John the Baptist (“He came as a witness to testify to the light”), but in 7b the reference again becomes ambiguous (“so that all might believe through him [δι’ αὐτοῦ]”). Is the mentioned mediator of belief

⁷ As is well known, θεός in v. 1c lacks the definite article; this clearly supports that it functions as a thematic role as distinct from a proper name.

⁸ The occurrences in vv. 6b and 7a are not included in the number of fifteen, since they clearly refer to John the Baptist.

⁹ The fact that English translations disagree on whether to translate οὗτος in v. 2 in a personal manner (“he” NRSV) or impersonally (“the same” KJV), illustrates its status of being a shifter.

¹⁰ Various scholars have advocated for this. See, for example, Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 29–31.

John the Baptist, the light, the *Logos*, or Jesus? It is the inconstant nature of pronominal language that raises the question.¹¹

Vv. 10–13. A new type of shifter is introduced in v. 10: the verb with an implicit subject (ἦν).¹² This confronts the reader with problems similar to the above ones. Although the preceding statement in v. 9 makes it most obvious to relate the verb to τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, thus suggesting a rendering of the sentence in 10a as “The true light was in the world,” the pronoun in v. 10c (αὐτὸν) changes the picture by referring to the subject in the masculine and thereby ruling out τὸ φῶς. By now the text has excluded John the Baptist as a possible signified, but v. 10 shows that the shifters are still kept open. Thus, the use of implicit subject verbs continues to dominate this section of the prologue (vv. 11–12).¹³

Vv. 14–18. The text now explicitly takes up the *Logos* again in order to describe its incarnation. But also new joints are added to the web that connects οὗτος to various thematic roles: μονογενοῦς (v. 14), ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος (pronounced by John the Baptist, v. 15), μονογενὴς θεός/υἱός, and ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς (v. 18).¹⁴ The passage in

¹¹ Classic commentaries assume or assert that δι’ αὐτοῦ refers to the Baptist; cf., e.g., Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 31; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:8–9; C.K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text* (2nd ed; London: SPCK, 1985), 160; Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium* (4 vols; HTKNT 4; Freiburg, Germany: Herder, 1965–1984), 1:228. But the fact that the statement that follows in v. 8 suddenly employs another pronoun (ἐκεῖνος), which is unambiguously aimed at the Baptist, may be a sign of a shift in reference and might indicate that δι’ αὐτοῦ does not apply to the Baptist as ἐκεῖνος does; see Friedrich Blass et al., *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (16th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), § 291.1.3. Besides, on the basis of the Gospel as a whole, one might say that it is a more likely claim that “all” (πάντες) may come to believe through Jesus’ testimony than through the Baptist’s (see πάντες in v. 16; cf. 12:32). Whatever is most plausible, the dilemma once again illustrates the ambiguity of pronominal language.

¹² Bultmann also takes the verb in v. 9 (ἦν) as having an implicit subject with reference to *Logos*; see idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 30, n. 6. The translation of the KJV reflects the same understanding in contrast to the NRSV, for example, which takes τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν as the subject, not as the complement.

¹³ Elsewhere in the prologue, implicit subject verbs in the third-person singular are only used when following a verb with an explicit subject. In these instances the subject is relatively easy to determine (vv. 14–15). It is yet another element of suspense in the prologue when the text in v. 12 speaks about believing “in his name” (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ), since the proper name at this point has not yet been revealed. For a discussion of possible interpretations of this phrase, see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:11.

¹⁴ Whether one reads μονογενὴς θεός or μονογενὴς υἱός depends on the manuscript variations; both readings are possible in relation to the Gospel’s general understanding of Jesus. Even more thematic roles than the abovementioned ones may be deduced


v. 17, however, marks a turning point as the many shifters are finally anchored in Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, who in return obtains meaning from the thematic roles that are attributed to him.¹⁵ The use of a new, pronoun (ἐκεῖνος) in relation to Jesus in v. 18, shows that the shifters have now found a place of rest, and it moreover emphasizes that Jesus alone is the one entitled to incarnate the divine thematic roles.¹⁶

In conclusion, we have now seen how the prologue builds, step by step, a relation of floating pronouns and thematic roles that it eventually connects with the proper name Jesus. In a sense, the reader falls victim to a kind of recognition, though not a recognition type-scene proper, where a cluster of predicates is finally joined with the “missing object” (see p. 52, n. 57). Although John is not a narrator that holds back information in order to delude his reader in the modern sense, he establishes a moment of anagnorisis in v. 17, when the first-time reader finally recognizes the solid reference point that holds together the web of pronouns and thematic roles. This personally experienced recognition serves as a model of interpretation when the reader is to observe story-world observers. As we have seen previously, recognitions may contain an element of both identification and acknowledgment of social place. The prologue contains both aspects and creates the semi-otic association between the Jesus-name and the divine roles, thus giving readers the key to understanding the recognitions they are about to witness and conveying upon Jesus the authority to further develop his

from the various verbs in the prologue describing the actions and experiences of the subject in question—e.g., its role as God’s exegete; cf. ἐξηγήσατο in v. 18. The aim of the present discussion, however, is not to give a comprehensive account of thematic roles in the prologue, but to show how they interrelate in the course of the exposition. For this reason, we are focusing on the thematic roles that appear in nominal and not in verbal form.

¹⁵ In this section two other proper names appear: John (the Baptist, v. 15) and Moses (v. 17). While John has already been excluded from being identified with the *Logos* and its appositions, Moses’ ties to the *Logos* are loosened by means of the Baptist’s announcement in v. 15 saying that the οὗτος of which he speaks, appears *after* the Baptist. Thus, Moses seems to perform a similar function of testifying as the Baptist (cf. 1:45; 5:39–47; 10:34–36; 15:25).

¹⁶ According to Bultmann, John’s use of the hymn was basically an act of application by insertion of proper names. Consequently, Bultmann’s reconstruction of the original hymn is primarily a “de-onomatized” version of the prologue in its present state, where all passages mentioning John the Baptist, Moses, and Jesus are removed. See idem, “Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs zum Johannes-Evangelium,” in *EUCHARISTÉION: Studien zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments* (ed. H. Schmidt; 2 vols; FRLANT 19/36; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1923), 2:4.



thematic roles. The matrix of identity relations that the prologue ends up with may be illustrated by one of the diagrams previously presented (see p. 53). As one sees, the reader is given the means to see behind the οὗτος-signifier that obstructs the vision of story-world observers.

The Logos Changes its Guise

The prologue not only *whispers* about Jesus' true being (his thematic role as God), as we saw in the previous section, but also gives the reader advance knowledge of his mode of appearing. This is important. We are given a preview of the *Logos* before it enters the story *in medias res*, and we are watching it changing its exterior behind the scene, just as in the example from theater previously given (p. 50).¹⁷ The *Logos* becomes flesh (σὰρξ), but since this does not mean that it desists from being the *Logos*, we must be dealing with a metamorphosis, a change of appearance, not of being or identity.¹⁸ Jesus is therefore a story character in

¹⁷ On the same phenomenon in the prologue of the *Bacchae*, see Helene P. Foley, *Ritual Irony: Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 246–254.

¹⁸ According to Pamela E. Kinlaw's fine study, the idea of metamorphosis in both ancient Greco-Roman and Jewish literature "entails a change in form and, therefore, in appearance, not a change in substance"; idem, *The Christ is Jesus: Metamorphosis, Possession, and Johannine Christology* (AcB 18; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), 29; cf. 26–29; 39. Yet, Kinlaw understands the Gospel's Christology in terms of permanent divine possession, whereas I argue that the prologue and the emissary motif of the Gospel indicate that Jesus is a divine metamorph. Synoptic transfiguration narratives also recount the metamorphosis of Christ (cf. μετεμορφώθη, Mark 9:2; Matt 17:2); but instead of introducing Jesus by leading him from the divine realm to the mundane as in John's

disguise of the same kind as, for example, Odysseus at his return to Ithaca. This disguise is what triggers the plot of recognition, and if the implied author had not constructed such a secret, as we have witnessed him doing in another way in the previous section, there would be no plot of epistemology. Yet, when comparing Jesus to Odysseus, there is a significant difference between them in the fact that whereas the former is a trickster, the latter is a revealer (see p. 62). Since the Gospel of John is a story about revelation, it may therefore appear as an inexpedient hindrance when the narrator puts up a shield of *σάοξ* on Jesus, thus obstructing recognition and resulting in Jesus having his appearance against him, so to speak. According to John, however, the transformation of the *Logos* is a necessary element in the communication process.¹⁹ This point already emerges from the prologue, especially vv. 5 and 9–10. The text in v. 5 describes the light of creation that shines in the dark and how darkness failed in the face of the light. Now, the verb (*κατέλαβεν*) that describes this failure has several connotations and may be translated either in a pragmatic sense, “overcome,” “take hold of” (cf. 12:35), or as a verb of cognition/acknowledgment, “comprehend,” “understand.”²⁰ When taking into account that the prologue basically is a description of the lines of divine communication that reach their climax in Jesus’ interpretation of the invisible God (v. 18), and when relating v. 5 to the parallel in vv. 9–10, the latter understanding seems to fit better into the prologue as a whole. Thus, v. 5 does not first and foremost depict a cosmic battle of power, but concerns the inability of the sinister world to mentally grasp the preexistent light of the divine *Logos*.²¹

prologue of reverse “transfiguration,” the Synoptics present a glimpse of Jesus’ divine appearance at the center of the narrative. From a reader perspective, one may say that John has no “need” for a transfiguration story of the synoptic kind because of what the prologue has already shown.

¹⁹ Ernst Käsemann made this point (addressing Bultmann), “Die Verhüllung eines Gottwesens in Niedrigkeit mag paradox erscheinen, ist es aber nicht wirklich. Sie ist letztlich Kommunikationsmöglichkeit zwischen dem Ungleichen und darum voneinander Getrennten, also etwas sehr Zweckmäßiges und so durchaus rational Begreifliches”; idem, *Jesus letzter Wille nach Johannes 17* (2nd, unrev. ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967), 27–28.

²⁰ Cf. the double meaning of “to grasp”; and in German, “fassen,” “greifen/begreifen.” See also λαμβάνω in v. 12.

²¹ A valuable discussion of possible translations appears in Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:8.

As already indicated, I understand the statement in vv. 9-10 as a parallel to v. 5, rephrasing how the incarnation is a concession to the limited cognitive apparatus of the human *kosmos*. These verses speak of the light in the world that, in spite of the fact that it enlightens human beings, was not recognized by the world. Many commentators understand these statements as regarding the ministry and fate of the earthly Jesus. For example, the very fact that the account follows the section on John the Baptist in vv. 6-8 may indicate this—that is, if the prologue runs in perfect chronological order.²² According to Bultmann, however, the original *Vorlage*, which did not contain the section on the Baptist, was referring to a preexistent divine being in vv. 9-10, and Rudolf Schnackenburg has suggested that this understanding, to some extent, survives in the final redaction.²³ In other words, v. 9 (Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν... ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον) is an analepsis, which does not refer to *Logos*' embodiment in Jesus, but to its preexistent presence in the *kosmos* (as in vv. 1-5 in contrast to 3:19). If so, the point of transition from preexistence to incarnation does not take place in v. 9, but appears later on in the prologue; and since vv. 11-13 (and certainly v. 14) are very difficult to get hold of if not referring to the incarnate Jesus, one may suggest that v. 11 (εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν...) is taken as the locus of transition. This again means that the preceding verses (9-10) must be dealing not with the activity of the λόγος ἔνσαρκος but the *Logos* between Adam and John the Baptist, as it were.²⁴ Describing the epistemological situation prior to the earthly Jesus, the text in v. 10 thus states, "He was in the world, and the world came into being through him, but the world did not recognize (ἔγνω) him" (my translation). The *Logos* was, in other words, present in the *kosmos* prior to Jesus' appearance, which the world, however, was unable to comprehend. This is the claim of vv. 5, 9-10, and 18a. The metamorphosis of the *Logos* into carnal form is therefore, from this perspective, a change in the divine communication strategy caused by the world's failure to see. Apparently, σάϝξ is a form of manifestation more easily comprehensible

²² See, for example, Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:28-29. In support of this interpretation, Brown also states that vv. 9-13 are echoed in later descriptions of the earthly Jesus in the Gospel.

²³ Bultmann, "Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund," 24; Rudolf Schnackenburg, "Logos-Hymnus und johanneischer Prolog," *BZ* 1 (1957), 86-88.

²⁴ Schnackenburg reads verses 9-10 in terms of *Logos*' works in the history of Israel; "Logos-Hymnus," 86-88.

by human beings, themselves being σάϱξ, than the anonymous light of the λόγος ἁσαρκος (cf. 3:6; 6:62–63). It constitutes the *Logos*’ new attempt to make its divine existence recognizable by the world.²⁵

Having showed that the σάϱξ of the divine *Logos* is a medium of communication on the one hand, it remains an enigma how the man appearing in σάϱξ may be taken as divine. The transformation of the *Logos* once again raises the Actaeon problem concerning how to represent a metamorph, and as already shown, this is only possible by means of a dual appearance (see pp. 44–48). While σάϱξ brings Jesus in contact with human beings, another part of him discloses his divine identity. In contrast to this point of view, Bultmann claimed that John’s Jesus wears no gloriolae, so to speak, but that God rather becomes manifest in Jesus “als einem Menschen, an dem nichts Außerordentliches wahrnehmbar ist....”²⁶ According to Bultmann, the passage in 1:14a—“And the word became flesh”—is a paradox that describes the absolute *Menschwerdung* of the *Logos*. But such total *kenōsis*, where the subject leaves behind every single divine attribute, renders recognition impossible. In the eyes of the observers, a perfect disguise, i.e., a disguise that covers a person completely, is never conceived of as anything but a true manifestation; no occasion for “suspicion” is given, unless the camouflage contains at least a minor incompleteness where a contradiction protrudes. Accordingly, Jesus’ mode of appearance in the Fourth Gospel is not unlike the divine manifestations in ancient Greek literature as described by Jean-Pierre Vernant:

²⁵ Jesus’ saying in 4:48, “Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe,” is another example of the Gospel’s thematization of how the means of revelation have to correspond to the recipients’ noetic capacity—whether the saying is taken as a reproach or not. For a more philosophically explicit formulation of the “like is known by like”-principle in the context of Jewish theological epistemology, see Philo, *De somniis* 1.232; cf. 1.231–237 [Yonge]: “Accordingly, to the incorporeal souls which are occupied in his service, it is natural for him to appear as he is, conversing with them as a friend with his friends; but to those souls which are still in the body he must appear in the resemblance of the angels, though without changing his nature (for he is unchangeable), but merely implanting in those who behold him an idea of his having another form, so that they fancy that it is his image, not an imitation of him, but the very archetypal appearance itself.”

²⁶ Idem, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (NTGr; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1953), 397. See also the following characteristic quotations from Bultmann, “In der Tat fehlt ja der Gestalt Jesu bei Joh jede Anschaulichkeit...”, *Theologie*, 388; “Aber das ist die Paradoxie...daß die δόξα nicht neben der σάϱξ oder durch sie, als durch ein Transparent, hindurch zu sehen ist, sonder nirgends anders als in der σάϱξ... wenn er

As well-camouflaged as a god may be in the skin of a mortal, there is something “off,” something in the otherness of the divine presence that remains strange and disconcerting even when the god is in disguise.²⁷

In the Fourth Gospel, this otherness is Jesus’ δόξα, which appears for the first time as the “we”-voice of the prologue confesses to having seen it (1:14b). In order that observers may see more than a human, Jesus presents his δόξα as an appearance in addition to his σάϑξ. This fact that the metamorphosis is not a hundred-percent change creates a test, which is closely related to the purpose of Jesus’ mission.²⁸ This test is what the Gospel calls *krisis* (3:19; 5:27; 12:31). The observers in the story-world encountering Jesus do not know which one of his two appearances it is that refers to his true being; and so his incarnation in the form of a hybrid not only serves the purpose of revealing God, but it is also a reconnaissance mission that exposes the nature of the observers’ orientation toward God. Jesus seeks to reveal his δόξα (2:11; 11:4), which he has from the Father (1:14; 8:50, 54; 12:43; 17:1, 24), but when, for example, this takes place as a healing that violates the Sabbath, his opponents understand the miracle not as the mark of Jesus’ divine identity, but as a camouflage that hides that he is simply a sinful man, “not from God” (9:16a). In Jesus’ view, however, such judgment is κατὰ τὴν σάρκα (8:15a) in contrast to the judgment of those who believe him, i.e., those who see the δόξα as the appearance that describes him best (1:14; 11:40; 12:41; 17:24). Accordingly, when observers are in two minds about Jesus’ identity, it is not because he is a paradox (full metamorphosis), but because he is a hybrid (partial metamorphosis). Jesus is thus no paradox in the proper sense of the word. True, in his σάϑξ he appears contrary (para-) to his true essence, but σάϑξ is only one aspect of his dual appearance.²⁹


die δόξα sehen will”; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 41. According to Bultmann, this lack of the recognition mark reflects the Johannine understanding of belief as a subjective existential decision.

²⁷ Idem, “Mortals and Immortals: The Body of the Divine,” in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays of J.-P. Vernant* (ed. Froma I. Zeitlin; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 43. See also Dieter Zeller, “Die Menschwerdung des Sohnes Gottes im Neuen Testament und die antike Religionsgeschichte,” in *Menschwerdung Gottes—Vergöttlichung von Menschen* (ed. Dieter Zeller; NTOA 7; Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag, 1988), 159–163.

²⁸ Metamorphosis seems to have the faculty of dividing the audience; cf., e.g., Euripides, *Bacch.* 278–357; John 9:8–9 (see pp. 153–156).

²⁹ Thus it is not quite right simply to equate σάϑξ with the signifier and δόξα with

Before we turn to another basic condition for recognition in John, I shall sum up the preceding considerations. The prologue does not confine itself to revealing the true identity of Jesus but also whispers the mode of his appearance in the reader's ear. The appearance is double and thus ambiguous, but the reader is not confused, since she or he knows which one of the two signifiers is only the camouflage and which one is the mark of his true being. The following illustration shows the reader's knowledge on this point.




the absent signified as when Werner Kelber (along with Bultmann) states, "In less traditional terms, the σάρξ/δόξα ('flesh/glory') dichotomy articulates the problematics of contingency and transparency, and of the signifier versus the signified"; idem "The Birth of a Beginning: John 1:1–18," in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 221; cf. for example, Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 44. See also a similar statement in Dorothy A. Lee: "In theological terms, this means that σάρξ and δόξα/πνεῦμα stand not in a dualistic relationship, in the terms of Hellenistic (Platonic) philosophy, but rather relate to each other as symbol to reality"; idem, *The Symbolic Narratives of the Fourth Gospel: The Interplay of Form and Meaning* (JSNTSup 95; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 231, cf. 15–24. In my understanding, however, the δόξα is rather the second signifier of the duplex Jesus, "the manifestation of God's presence and power," as described in C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of John*, 207. But since δόξα, according to John, is the true signifier (the mark), it of course also describes Jesus' true divine identity.

Recognizing a Stranger: Comparing Jesus with Odysseus

Having looked at the prologue's way of setting the scene for recognition, we shall now turn toward another important condition for the Johannine recognition scenes that separates them from the majority of anagnorises in the *Odyssey* and ancient recognition literature. This considers the fact that, whereas Odysseus and Jesus are alike when it comes to their appearance in (partial) disguise, they do not share the same relation to the observers they encounter. Odysseus is a familiar person (though at first taken to be someone else), coming home to be recognized in his homeland, while Jesus leaves home and becomes a stranger seeking to obtain recognition in foreign space, "I came from the Father and have come into the world; again, I am leaving the world and am going to the Father" (16:28). As is shown in the diagram below, Odysseus and Jesus are both travelers on a journey, but whereas the recognition of Odysseus takes place at the end of it in domestic space, Jesus meets his potential recognizers at the destination, before returning home. Unlike Odysseus, Jesus is an agent, who is sent (a *ṣāliḥ*), and he is to be identified by observers who have never seen him before.³⁰ This contrast between Jesus and Odysseus has to be modified in three ways. First, John 1:11 explains that there is in fact a relationship between Jesus and the observers prior to the incarnation, in terms of creation or previous salvation history, "He came to what was his own [τὰ ἴδια], and his own people [οἱ ἱδιοὶ] did not accept him." The world is not strange to Jesus, but in the eyes of the world he is an alien. Second, in John 20-21 Jesus is recognized by those who do know him already. Third, a few recognitions in the *Odyssey* do in fact take place abroad as most of the examples in John, for instance in the course of the encounter between Odysseus and the Phaeacians in book 7.³¹ These modifications, however, do not change the general picture as described above and depicted below. Therefore, Stibbe's comparison is not quite right when he asserts that "[t]he Johannine Jesus, like Odysseus and Dionysus, is a stranger who comes to his own people but is not recognized or

³⁰ See Jan-A. Böhner, *Der Gesandte und sein Weg im 4. Evangelium* (WUNT 2/2; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1977); A.E. Harvey, "Christ as Agent," in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird* (eds. L.D. Hurst and N.T. Wright; Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 239-250; Marianne Meye Thompson, *The God of the Gospel of John* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 126-130.

³¹ See Perrin, "Recognition Scenes," 374; Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition*, 92.



acknowledged (Jn 1.10–11).³² Whereas Odysseus and Dionysus in the *Bacchae* are only apparent strangers returning home, Jesus is a stranger, because his home (οἰκία; 14:2) is with the Father, his stay in the world is only temporary (1:14, ἐσκήνωσεν; lit., “put up a tent”), and his observers have never met him in person. This circumstance certainly complicates the recognition process and radically changes the conditions for recognition.

Jesus is recognized at the destination of his odyssey, but this change of location does not in itself alter the conditions of recognition. There are several examples in Greco-Roman literature of recognitions taking place on locations outside the *patria* of the one who is being recognized, but since the recognizers in such cases are also expatriates coming from the same place as the recognized, we are dealing with a mere translocation of the conventional recognition scene of reunion, not of a change of noetic conditions. This is, for example, the case in Chariton’s romance as the lovers recognize each other on the island of Aradus off the Phoenician coast, before defeating the enemies and turning their faces toward hometown Syracuse (Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.1.8; cf. also the anagnorises in, e.g., Gen 42–45; Euripides, *Hel.*; *Iph. taur.*; Longus, *Daphn.*). In spite of the circumstance that the event of recognition is situated in alien territory, the lovers are not at all total strangers (though

³² Stibbe, *John*, 160; cf. idem, *John as Storyteller*, 134.

they may not realize this at first), and thus the hero's situation is quite different from Jesus'. What creates the difficult epistemological situation in John is that Jesus is the only heavenly figure on earth (3:31b). He is on his own at the point of destination.

We might find a closer parallel to the Johannine constellation when turning toward those recognitions in ancient literature, where observer and observed have in fact previously met, but since the observer is incapable of remembering this move of the first cognition (it was too long ago, for example), the recognition cannot take place through immediate recollection. The typical examples are of course children who have been separated from their relatives in an early age, this making them unable to immediately recognize their loved ones later on in life (e.g., Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*, passim; Euripides, *El.* 283-284; *Iph. taur.* 837-841). Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, is one example. He does not remember the looks of his father and accordingly has to take Odysseus at his word, though he at first believes his father to be a god on the grounds that only gods are able to change their shape the way Odysseus changes from an old beggar to a vigorous man (*Od.* 16.173-219). Observers like Telemachus have no experience of scars or other tokens of identity themselves and accordingly they have to rely on either the observed one's own claims (*telling*), on a *telling* performed by witnesses who have in fact seen the observer before—the summons of witnesses is, no surprise, a typical feature in this type of recognitions (for example, Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*)—or on a sort of *showing* where the observer interprets an identity token not in relation to his or her own memory (like Eurycleia), but by what is the "common knowledge" about the observed one (disseminating in, for example, stories, rumors, and letters). In the latter case, the elimination of disbelief depends on whether the observer appears according to the expectations that "culture" has conveyed to the observer. This situation reveals some of the problems of recognitions in John. As mentioned, the observers themselves generally have no previous experience of Jesus to relate to when confronted with him, and so, when he claims that he is the Son sent by the Father, his identity is judged from the way he lives up to the expectations attached to a heavenly emissary in Jewish tradition as John reconstructs it. The discussion of the adequacy of the expectations becomes crucial, and while there are many recognition scenes in the Gospel, there is also an intense discussion concerning the criteria of recognition (chs. 3; 5; 7-10, especially). The fact that Jesus is a stranger does not mean that observers meet him without

presuppositions, but these presuppositions are of a different kind than in conventional recognitions. According to the Johannine ideology of identity, recognizing Jesus is not to identify him in relation to the observers' first view of him, but to "receive him" (cf. ἔλαβον in 1:12), i.e., to acknowledge his claim to thematic roles—roles that are a part of cultural ideology and that are subject to alteration when Jesus assumes them and creates new ones as in the "I am" sayings, for example (see pp. 148–150).

To sum up, John's prologue *whispers* important clues in the reader's ears. Before sending the reader off to witness Jesus' encounters with story-world observers, the main character is introduced by name, identity, and appearance. True recognition is seen as an act of acknowledgment, not merely as proper name identification; and recognition of Jesus is moreover described as a peripeteic event with positive pragmatic consequences for the recognizer: "But to all who received [ἔλαβον] him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God" (1:12). Thus, in John—as opposed to Sophocles' *Oed. tyr.* and Euripides, *Bacch.*, for example—recognizers are never tragic characters, whereas those who fail to recognize certainly are. Finally, the prologue locates the story-world recognitions at the destination point in the V-story, where the heavenly stranger sojourns only temporarily (1:14). When comparing this matrix for the Johannine recognition type-scenes with representative recognition stories in ancient literature (see the diagram below), John's narrative has many features in common with other material. But the fact that Jesus as the observed one is a real stranger to the observers is an element that John develops in a unique manner. Although we may find examples of recognition between strangers in the *Odyssey*, the dramas, and the romances, they are sporadic and remain subordinate to those recognitions that have to do with homecoming and reunion. This feature, together with the abovementioned ones, constitutes a general economy in the story that sets the general conditions for the scenes that are enacted.³³

³³ The various categories presented in the left column below are the most important ones in the present study. It would also be possible to include other typological categories, e.g., recognition in private/in public and recognition of persons/things.

Kinds of Recognition
in Ancient Literature

	The Gospel of John (chs. 1-19)	The Gospel of John (chs. 20-21, see pp. 185-213)	The <i>Odyssey</i> ; Euripides, <i>Iph. taur.</i> ; the Electra-Orestes cycle, the lovers in the romances	Euripides, <i>Bacch.</i> (Agave's recognition of her dead son, Pentheus)	Sophocles, <i>Oed. tyr.</i>	The abandoned child's self-recognition in, e.g., Euripides, <i>Ion</i>	The parents' and relatives' recognition of the abandoned child in, for example, the Joseph-novella and the romances.
Self-recognition ³⁴					×	×	
Recognition of another character	×	×	×	×			×
Euphoric recognition	×	×	×			×	×
Dysphoric recognition				×	×		
Identification of proper name		×	×	×			×
Recognition of thematic role	×	×			×	×	×
Recognition of a familiar person		×	×	×	×	×	×
Recognition of a stranger	×						

Establishing Jesus' Presence in the Story-World (1:19-51)

As was apparent in the above presentation of previous approaches to recognition in John, Stibbe and Culpepper pointed out a large number of recognition/nonrecognition episodes in the Gospel narrative. In fact, about every encounter between Jesus and worldly observers was regarded as an anagnorisis challenge. As long as one operates with a very broad concept of anagnorisis, there is no reason to object to this (considering the epistemological plotting of the narrative), but though the listing of such episodes illustrates the importance of the cognitive dimension in John's narrative, it does not contribute very much to our understanding of how the text employs the anagnorisis type-scene. We shall now examine a considerable number of Fourth

³⁴ Any kind of recognition implies some kind of self-recognition, but this category is confined to recognitions where the primary object is the recognizer's own identity.

Gospel episodes in order to be able to present comprehensive documentation of the fact that anagnorisis permeates the plot not only as a metaphoric trope concerning epistemological questions but as a type-scene reflecting contemporary genre conventions. Concerning this form-critical assessment, some of the scenes that we are going to study have already been labelled as “quest stories,” “inquiry stories,” and “rejection stories” by John Painter on the basis of Robert C. Tannehill’s classification of the synoptic pronouncement stories.³⁵ These literary forms contain some cognitive motifs parallel to those in the recognition type-scene, but in contrast to Tannehill and Painter’s stories of quest, rejection, and inquiry, which are modern categories based on synoptic material, anagnorisis enjoys the advantage of being a type-scene acknowledged by ancient authors within the broad literary environment of early Christian literature. It thus formed part of the ancient reader’s horizon of literary expectations.³⁶

What has been said about the prologue, that it introduces the Gospel’s basic plot themes of identity and epistemology, holds true for the first chapter of the Gospel as a whole. The question of Jesus’ origin, indicating his true identity, is in the foreground (see 1:1–18, 38, 46). As soon as the prologue ends, however, the reader witnesses a cognitive fall into the story-world, where most actors do not possess the knowledge that was confided to the reader in the beginning. The reader is now watching observers in the story-world as they try to break through to the reader’s level of knowledge, often in vain, however. Saying that readers are “watching” is of course a metaphor. Whereas *seeing* implies presence, readers are situated in a secondary position where immediate perception is given up in exchange for superior knowledge. Story-world observers, conversely, often lack the necessary knowledge while they hold the presence of Jesus. This asymmetry is one of the basic problems

³⁵ Painter, *The Quest for the Messiah: The History, Literature and Theology of the Johannine Community* (2nd ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1993); cf. Tannehill, “Introduction: The Pronouncement Story and its Types,” *Semeia* 20 (1981): 1–13; “Varieties of Synoptic Pronouncement Stories,” *Semeia* 20 (1981): 101–119. Tannehill’s pronouncement stories correspond to the *apophthegmata* in Bultmann. Recognitions in John may (e.g., ch. 20) or may not (e.g., 4:4–42) conclude with a pronouncement by Jesus.

³⁶ Tannehill concedes: “Although there is an important group of quest stories in the Synoptic Gospels, it has been difficult to find quest stories elsewhere”; idem, “Introduction,” 9 and “Varieties of Synoptic Pronouncement Stories,” 111. Also Lee’s outline of the pattern of the “symbolic narratives” in John contains moves that may be compared with those of the ancient recognition scene. See eadem, *Symbolic Narratives*, 11–15.

with which the Gospel of John struggles. The farewell discourses in chs. 13–17 and the apparition scenes in chs. 20–21, for example, pervasively thematize problems concerning Jesus' departure and absence and the question of how to maintain the communication between the heavenly and the mundane world, which was established in the course of the story. At the present moment of the narrative, however, the object of the story is not to come to terms with Jesus' absence but to establish his presence. The reader's experience of Jesus' presence is evoked by the verbs of *seeing* that surround Jesus in the chapter. As we have already noticed, the narrating voice in the prologue confessed having seen (ἐθεασάμεθα) the glory of the incarnate one (1:14); and now, in the course of the chapter, story-world observers are enabled to perform such a *seeing* as Jesus enters the stage (cf. vv. 29, 32, 34, 36, 39, 42, 46, 50–51). The chapter reaches a peak when this condition of presence is finally exemplified in the promise to Nathanael, "You will see [ὄψῃ] greater things than these" (1:50). With its emphasis on visual aspects of perception, the first chapter thus creates a semblance of presence in the reader. In Jesus' promise of *seeing*, addressed to Nathanael, the implied author invites the reader to witness what the story will now unfold.³⁷

The first encounter scenes in the Gospel (1:19–51) may be designated as recognition type-scenes that serve the abovementioned purpose of creating a sense of presence—one of the three major functions of anagnorisis in ancient narrative. Moreover, the scenes collect witnesses and construct a space in which Jesus and his *doxa* can be perceived. The scenes take place during four days that are clearly separated by τῇ ἐπαύριον ("the next day," vv. 29, 35, 43; cf. 2:1).³⁸ During these days we witness the accounts of John the Baptist's preaching (vv. 19–28), of Jesus' meeting with the Baptist (vv. 29–34), and of the calling of the first disciples (vv. 35–51); and while all accounts have parallels in the Synoptics, it is remarkable that every single one of them undergoes generic change when appearing in John: they have become recognition scenes.³⁹ Yet, in the first scene of the Gospel, it is not Jesus but rather John the Baptist whose identity is being established.

³⁷ See Derek Tovey, "The Fourth Gospel as a Display Text," in idem, *Narrative Art and Act in the Fourth Gospel* (JSNTSup 151; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 193–201.

³⁸ The chronology may bear symbolic meaning as proposed in Thomas Barrosse, "The Seven Days of the New Creation in St. John's Gospel," *CBQ* 23 (1959): 507–516.

³⁹ The main parallels are the pericopes describing the Baptist's activity in Mark

John the Baptist: Recognizing the Wrong Man (1:19–28)

There are several traces in the New Testament indicating that the kerygma of the early church often found expression in narratives where the ministry of John the Baptist made up a preamble to the actual Jesus-story (e.g., Mark 1:2–13 pars.; Acts 10:37–38; 13:24–25; 19:4). As we have already seen in the prologue (1:6–8, 15–16), the Gospel of John is no exception to the rule, but this being said, it is also characteristic that the Fourth Evangelist in his portrait of the Baptist is quite careful not to rank him too high in the hierarchy—a fact that has often been noticed by scholars.⁴⁰ The text is very consistent in its preclusion of John the Baptist from the thematic roles that, in the eyes of the evangelist, rightfully belong to Jesus; and the redundant emphasis is particularly striking as the prologue twice with identical wording states that the Baptist was only a witness and not the light himself (ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός, vv. 7–8).⁴¹ This demarcation of the Baptist's role continues in the present section that describes the Baptist's testimony to the envoys sent to him by the authorities in Jerusalem. The scene provides the transition between the prologue and Jesus' own entry on stage in his encounter with the Baptist in vv. 29–34, and it constitutes a recognition scene with John the Baptist in the role of the observed. These verses are thus our first illustration of the fact that anagnorisis is so common in John that it pertains not only to the recognition of Jesus but also to secondary characters.⁴²

As soon as the prologue ends and the present scene takes its beginning in its capacity as “the testimony given by John [the Baptist]” (1:19a), it is remarkable that the problem concerning the determination of identities immediately rises to the surface of the text. A group of priestly and Levite emissaries are sent by the *Ioudaioi* in Jerusalem to John the Baptist across the Jordan in order to direct to him their ques-

1:1–8; Matt 3:1–12; Luke 3:1–20; the baptism of Jesus in Mark 1:9–11; Matt 3:13–17; Luke 3:21–22; and the calling of the first disciples in Mark 1:16–20; Matt 4:18–22; Luke 5:1–11.

⁴⁰ Not least by Bultmann in idem, “Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund,” 1–26.

⁴¹ Cf. the two occurrences of ὁμολόγησεν in v. 20 and of οὐκ ἦδεν αὐτόν in vv. 31–33.

⁴² The present scene is not identified as a recognition scene in Stibbe, *John*; Culpepper, “The Plot of John's Story”; idem, *Gospel and Letters*. Although Culpepper and Stibbe do not explicitly say so, they justifiably focus on recognitions relating to Jesus' identity. When studying the type-scene as such, however, we cannot ignore recognition scenes like the present one (cf. 9:8–9, 18–23; 13:18–30; 18:15–18, 25–27).

tion, “Who are you?” (οὐ τίς εἶ; 1:19b). The phrase is the fundamental question of identification and is often found in recognition scenes in various forms like when Electra asks Orestes, τίς δ’ εἶ σὺ (Euripides, *El.* 765), ἐκεῖνος εἶ σὺ (580), or ἦ γὰρ σὺ κεῖνος (Sophocles, *El.* 1222).⁴³ John not only turns the question into the first lines spoken by the characters of the Johannine story-world that we have now entered, but also rephrases it twice in v. 22 (τίς εἶ; τί λέγεις περὶ σεαυτοῦ). The question as being directed to the Baptist has no parallels in the Synoptic Gospels and is a particular Johannine way of including the Baptist in the quest for the determination of identities.⁴⁴ The question, moreover, at once situates the plot of the pericope in the cognitive dimension and places those characters, which have departed on a quest for an answer (cf. ἀπόκρισιν, v. 22), in the role of observers—or substitute observers, to be more precise, as they represent the final observers in Jerusalem.⁴⁵ John the Baptist is in this scene, as already mentioned, the observed, whereas his role as index finger or informant to Jesus is more clearly emphasized when Jesus in the following scene takes up the role of the observed. It is exactly the aim of the present scene to substantiate this change of role: The determination of John the Baptist’s identity only has an auxiliary function to the determination of Jesus’ identity. If anyone thinks that the Baptist is the one whose identity is primarily at stake, they are trying to recognize the wrong man.

The scene opens with the arrangement of the meeting between the emissaries (substitute observers) and John the Baptist (the observed), and it ends with the temporal marker τῇ ἐπαύριον (“the next day”) in v. 29. Within this frame, the scene develops in two stages. In the first stage (vv. 19–23), the Baptist himself is in focus, while the critical question in v. 25 concerning his self-identification gives him the chance to move the center of attention to the one who comes after him (vv. 25–28). The first stage evolves in a process of elimination similar to the one we have been witnessing in the prologue’s portrayal of the Baptist in v. 8: Via negative identifications (οὐκ εἰμὶ; vv. 20–22), a positive one is reached in v. 23. John the Baptist is not the Messiah, nor Elijah, nor “the Prophet,” but a voice calling on his listeners to prepare the way of

⁴³ See also, e.g., Menander, *Epit.* 861: τί[ς δ’ εἶ] σὺ; *Perik.* 827: τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.

⁴⁴ See Painter, *The Quest*, 171.

⁴⁵ It is not quite clear who these Jerusalemite observers are. In v. 24, the manuscripts differ on whether the term Pharisees applies to the emissaries or the Jerusalemite senders. Whatever is the original reading, it forms part of John’s introductory naming of the antagonist groups of the narrative.

the Lord (cf. Isa 40:3).⁴⁶ The envoys, who in the present recognition are only interested in the Baptist's thematic role, not in his proper name, are the ones who take the initiative in this procedure. As in some of the Greco-Roman examples (cf. p. 65), the recognition process is made up of the observers' persistent suggestions of various identifications that in the end prove to be false (the Messiah, Elijah, "the Prophet"). Yet, since the observers' attempts to describe the Baptist are not apt, the Baptist discloses his true identity and identifies himself as an eschatological forerunner by quoting the words of Isaiah (καθὼς εἶπεν Ἡσαΐας ὁ προφήτης; v. 23).⁴⁷ The text does not claim that Isaiah had previously performed the identification between this role and the Baptist as when the text later says that Isaiah had seen Jesus' glory (12:41). The Baptist is no preexistent being, so what Isaiah did was only to define the role, not to point him out. The actual identification of the Baptist is performed by the Baptist himself. It is a self-identification by means of *telling*, and the activity of baptism represents a shown token (yet, see 10:41). This token, it appears, is quite controversial.

In vv. 24–28 we enter the second stage of the scene where "the move of cognitive resistance" takes place. The emissaries express surprise at the fact that John performs baptisms when not claiming to occupy any of the three roles that they had presented to him (v. 25).⁴⁸ The reaction of the Baptist is to divert their attention from him toward another, still anonymous figure, and his answer accordingly goes as if they had been saying: "If you are not the Messiah, then who is it?" The Baptist

⁴⁶ In comparison, Matthew states that John the Baptist was in fact both Elijah and more than a prophet (Matt 11:7–19; cf. Mark 1:2; Luke 7:26–27).

⁴⁷ As we know from ancient sources, other Jewish groups and individuals also understood themselves as being eschatological preparers of God's way; cf., e.g., 1QS VIII 12–15.

⁴⁸ It has often bewildered commentators why the delegates ask this question since it was not a prevalent expectation in Second Temple Judaism that the activities of the eschatological figures would include baptism; see, e.g., D. Moody Smith, *John* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1999), 68. Brown understands the question differently: "[I]f John the Baptist does not claim any recognizable eschatological role, why is he performing an eschatological action like baptizing?" idem, *Gospel According to John*, 51. Another solution may be that though the question appears as a past disagreement between the religiopolitical authorities and John the Baptist, it must really be understood in a later context of conflict between followers of the Baptist and of Jesus, respectively. The question makes good sense if reflecting the argument of communities following the Baptist: His baptismal activities indicate that the Baptist (and not Jesus) must have been the Messiah. Thus, it makes up a good example of the Gospel's mode of intervening in later conflicts by assigning them to the time of Jesus; cf. J. Louis Martyn's concept of "two-level drama"; idem, *History and Theology*, 40.

seeks to transfer the role of the observed to an anonymous figure in their midst (cf. μέσος ὑμῶν, v. 26), whereby he himself becomes an informant or, in the terminology of the Gospel, a witness (cf. μαρτυρία; v. 19): “Among you stands one whom you do not know” (v. 26b).⁴⁹ The Baptist’s way of avoiding being miscast by the observers is comparable to the move of foretelling (“the one who is coming after me,” v. 27a), which often appears in the recognition scenes of the *Odyssey* (cf. p. 60). Yet, whereas the incognito Odysseus foretells his own coming in order to delay the observers’ recognition, the Baptist does not foretell in order to put up a camouflage but as a means of evading false recognition and pushing the thematic roles onto the one who comes after him and whose sandal thongs he is not worthy to untie (v. 27). The Baptist professes that Jesus stands among them or in their midst (μέσος ὑμῶν ἔσθηκεν; v. 26) without them knowing him.⁵⁰ Does this mean that Jesus is standing by in the present scene, or is he merely being depicted as one of the Jews? The diversity in the ancient manuscripts concerning the tense of the verb seems to reflect this ambiguity, but $\mathfrak{P}^{66}$, A, C, and the majority of the manuscripts read ἔσθηκεν thus apparently describing Jesus as a spectator to the dialogue, who has not yet made himself known.⁵¹ This means that the present recognition scene is not a private one with only the observers and the observed present but one that takes place in front of an audience in which Jesus hides. John the Baptist

⁴⁹ A witness is (in a general forensic sense) a kind of informant giving information in support of one of two conflicting interpretations of a lawsuit matter. Others (the observers), however, are to pronounce the judgment. In John, testimony also regards information supporting cognitive judgments, but the terminology concerning “witness” and “testimony” (μαρτύς; μαρτυρία; μαρτυρέω) is not neutral and only relates to characters who speak in support of Jesus’ divine identity. Accordingly, Johannine witnesses are not only informants but also observers performing a cognitive judgment. See Johannes Beutler, *Martyria: Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Zeugnisthema bei Johannes* (FTS 10; Frankfurt am Main: Joseph Knecht, 1972); Allison A. Trites, *The New Testament Concept of Witness* (SNTSMS 31; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78–124.

⁵⁰ Some interpreters refer this to the Jewish idea of the Messiah incognito, who is present in the people though hidden from mortal eyes; cf. 7:27; Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho* 8.4; 49.1; 110.1 (PG 6:492, 581, 729). See, e.g., Erik Sjöberg, *Der Verborgene Menschensohn in den Evangelien* (Acta reg. societatis humaniorum litterarum lundensis 53; Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955), 41–98, 202–213; Stauffer, “Agnostos Christos,” 281–299; Marinus de Jonge, *Jesus: Stranger from Heaven and Son of God. Jesus Christ and the Christians in Johannine Perspective* (ed. and trans. John E. Steely; SBLSPS 11; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 85–90.

⁵¹ This is, if we understand ὑμῶν in v. 26 as describing the audience, not the Jewish people as a whole.

does not yet single Jesus out—maybe he is not able to do so up till now (cf. vv. 31–33)—but lets him have his thematic roles in pronominal disguise (ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε, v. 26). At this point, the scene breaks off and leaves further identification work to the following scene (vv. 29–34).

When reading the encounter between John the Baptist and the envoys from Jerusalem as a recognition scene, we are able to retrieve important recognition moves and motifs from the text: Questions concerning identity (vv. 19, 22), suggestions of identity (vv. 21, 25), self-identification (v. 23), cognitive resistance (v. 25), and a transformation of the conventional move of foretelling so that it does not serve the function of deceiving but participates in the Baptist's pointing away from himself (vv. 26–27). One might, however, find missing some sort of reaction on the observers' behalf. The text does not reveal whether the priests and Levites did or did not acknowledge that the Baptist was not the Messiah but only a voice in the desert, or whether they subscribed to a third point of view. The fact that the Baptist is later put in jail is an indication of some sort of reaction, but in John's version of the story we do not know who arrested him (3:24). Since the Evangelist's general view is that John the Baptist is inferior to Jesus, there seems to be little interest in giving the former too much attention.⁵² This first recognition scene of the Gospel thus has the role of securing the identity of John the Baptist, which was already being defined in the prologue, in order to pave the way for the following entry and recognition of the protagonist.

Jesus and John the Baptist: From Baptismal Scene to Recognition Scene (1:29–34)

As already mentioned in the introduction to the preceding scene, the story of Jesus' ministry as told by the early Christian movement often began with the story of the activities of John the Baptist. This probably reflects the fact that these two historical figures had been at least in some kind of mutual contact, but this historical circumstance only forms a distant background for the New Testament interpretations of this relationship.⁵³ Early Christianities agreed on constructing John the

⁵² Other reasons for not reporting any reaction may be that the emissaries are only substitute observers. Moreover, John downplays objections to the claims stated in the text in the first four chapters. See Painter, *The Quest*, 164–165, n. 9.

⁵³ For an overview of ancient literary images of John the Baptist, see Josef Ernst, *Johannes der Täufer: Interpretation—Geschichte—Wirkungsgeschichte* (BZNW 53; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989).

Baptist as Jesus' immediate precursor who voluntarily effaced himself at the moment when Jesus stood forward, but agreement on this point did not prevent diversity from prevailing in the various representations of this succession story. The synoptic tradition depicts John's baptism of Jesus as the very moment where Jesus is being delegated the role as God's eschatological mouthpiece. The baptism of Jesus takes him out of anonymity when the spirit is bestowed upon him and a heavenly voice proclaims: "You are my Son, the Beloved; with you I am well pleased" (Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22; cf. Matt 3:17).⁵⁴ In Mark, nothing indicates that Jesus was holding the rank of God's own son prior to this election, while Matthew and Luke's report of Jesus' miraculous birth may express that he was God's son ever since he was born, though he did not possess the Spirit until he was baptized. This becomes clear when we notice that all three of the Synoptics emphasize that Jesus' first move after the baptism took place under the guidance of the Spirit that he had just received (Mark 1:12; Matt 4:1; Luke 4:1).⁵⁵ According to the synoptic tradition the baptism is thus a decisive moment in which the protagonist acquires the competence (πνεῦμα) that takes him to another level of performance. In other traditions, however, the succession from the Baptist to Jesus does not take place with the above *rite de passage* since the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist is not even mentioned (Acts 10:37-38; 13:24-25). This is also the case in John's Gospel. The fourth evangelist designs the encounter between Jesus and the Baptist, not as a baptismal scene taking place first and foremost in the pragmatic dimension of the narrative, but as a recognition scene revolving around cognitive issues. Jesus assumes the role of the observed, and the scene thus illustrates the change in the casting of roles that took place in the previous scene.

The boundaries marking the beginning and the end of the scene are easily defined since they are indicated by the two instances of τῇ ἐπαύριον appearing in vv. 29 and 35, respectively. The course of the

⁵⁴ The fact that Mark (and Luke) phrase the statement in the second person ("You are...") reflects that it is a piece of information given to Jesus, a kind of assignment. Accordingly, the phrase is held in the third person later in the transfiguration story ("This is..." Mark 9:7 pars.), it being directed toward new addressees: the disciples present on the mountain.

⁵⁵ When the Synoptics say that the Spirit descends "on him" (NRSV; εἰς αὐτόν in Mark 1:10; ἐπ' αὐτόν in Matt 3:16; Luke 3:22), the meaning is not very far from the version in the Gospel of the Ebionites more clearly saying that the Spirit entered into him (εἰσελθούσης εἰς αὐτόν; Epiphanius, *Panarion* 30.13.7-8 [PG 41:429]). One may also notice the statement in Luke 4:1 saying that Jesus was now "full of the Holy Spirit [πλήρης πνεύματος ἁγίου]."

scene is chiasmic in the sense that it moves from a christological claim through an explanatory statement to a new claim as shown below:

- a¹: vv. 29–31 John the Baptist's first claim: Jesus (οὗτος) is the Lamb of God.
 b: vv. 32–33 The basis of the recognition: The mark of the Spirit.
 a²: v. 34 John the Baptist's second claim: Jesus (οὗτος) is the Son of God.


a¹: vv. 29–31. The scene opens by describing how John the Baptist “on the next day” sees Jesus approaching him. This at once leads to his first recognition statement identifying the unknown one as the *agnus dei*. The Baptist's first word (ἴδε, “Behold!”) introduces the language of *seeing* along with Jesus' entry, but it also presupposes an audience though the narrator does not explicate whom the Baptist is talking to. Yet, there are some hints in the text. Since the Baptist in v. 30 reminds the audience what he had told them about Jesus in the previous scene (v. 27) and since he now provides the answer to the emissaries' question of why he is baptizing though he is not the Messiah (v. 31; cf. v. 25), the text seems to imply that the audience is still the envoys from Jerusalem. All the way through the present scene, however, they remain passive and silent.⁵⁶ The information that the Baptist gives his audience in the course of the scene does not give away every aspect of Jesus' identity. Although thematic roles are being presented, Jesus is still only a οὗτος to them, since the proper name is only revealed to the reader (v. 29).

When the Baptist ascribes the thematic role of the Lamb of God to the man approaching him, he also puts into practice the transfer of the actant of the observed to Jesus, which was prepared for in the second half of the previous scene. The actantial role of the Baptist, however, is not quite set and fluctuates in the course of the pericope. In some sense he is of course an observer, who sees (βλέπει, v. 29; cf. vv. 31–33) but his primary role is one of the informant, who by means of *telling* gives the anonymous audience the information needed in order to recognize the still anonymous man as the Lamb of God. But the Baptist's role changes in the next part of the scene.

b: vv. 32–33. John the Baptist now tells his audience a very brief, autobiographical narrative describing how he was given the competence to recognize Jesus. John recalls that he saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove and resting upon Jesus. But as he adds, he would

⁵⁶ This again has to do with the fact that in the progression of the narrative the antagonists are not significant until ch. 5.

not have been able to recognize Jesus if God had not notified him of the Spirit's capacity as an identification mark of "the one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit" (v. 33). These verses constitute a flashback recognition scene within the pericope (an analeptic, second-order or hypodiegetic recognition) produced by the Baptist in retrospect. Vis-à-vis his audience (the first-order narrative), he acts as an informant who is legitimizing his privileged cognitive position by telling them how he acquired this status in the course of a previous recognition scene (the second-order narrative), where he was not the informant, but the recognizing observer himself. We may illustrate the relation between the two narrative levels of the pericope in the following manner. One should notice the difference in the actant constellations between the first-order and the second-order narrative.



The second-order recognition scene that John the Baptist describes has some interesting features. First, we must notice the emphasis on John's preliminary state of *agnoia*. The phrase "I myself did not know him" (οὐκ ᾔδειν αὐτόν) is repeated twice in vv. 31–32, and the statement warns the reader against thinking that Jesus was in some way dependent on John the Baptist.⁵⁷ There is more to the statement than this, however, because by emphasizing the lack of the move of the first cognition it also illustrates the general condition of recognition in John, where Jesus is not a returning Odysseus but a stranger, who brings with him recognition tokens from afar. For the Baptist as observer to be able to see that Jesus is more than his camouflage—in the present scene he is

⁵⁷ Also the subjunctive phrase, ἐφ' ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς etc., in God's words to John the Baptist in v. 33, which ought to be rendered "He on whom you *may* see..." (my emphasis), underlines the Baptist's claim of not having met Jesus earlier.

called “a man” (ἄνθρωπος; v. 30)—Jesus has to present a recognition token, embodied in the Spirit, which even Bultmann in his commentary called an “Erkennungszeichen.”⁵⁸ The Spirit’s function is thus cognitive, and it has no pragmatic purposes whatsoever in relation to Jesus. The Spirit does not enter into Jesus, conveying competences upon him that he did not have beforehand, but stays upon him as a sign—this is how we must understand the Johannine employment of ἐπ’ αὐτόν in vv. 30, 32 in contrast to the use in Matt 3:16; Luke 3:22. It does not enable him to baptize with the Holy Spirit, but identifies him as the one who has the capacity to baptize in this manner (v. 33). This depiction of the Spirit and the absence of any mentioning of Jesus’ baptism by John the Baptist are a consequence of the Christology of the prologue, which the Baptist repeats in the present scene: “...he was before me” (v. 30). The fact that Jesus, according to the Fourth Gospel, was the *Logos* from the beginning of time implies that his relation to the heavenly world does not need to be initiated or strengthened but rather to be recognized. Since it makes no sense to initiate Jesus into a status that he already possesses, the baptismal scene becomes a first encounter between Jesus and John, focusing on recognition.⁵⁹ On this basis we may, in the terminology of Aristotle, classify the token of the Spirit presented to John the Baptist, not as an acquired one, but as a kind of congenital token (cf. σύμφυτα, *Poet.* 1454b21), which Jesus possessed since the *archē* of his existence (cf. 17:5). The rhetorical force of the congenital token—e.g., a birthmark—lies in the fact that it cannot, in contrast to acquired tokens, be transferred to other individuals as a means of fraud, but firmly sticks to its carrier. The token is not handed over to Jesus in the second-order narrative, but what takes place is an act of cognitive *showing* of the mark. The Baptist’s ability to decode the sign, however, depends on God’s previous *whispering* (see pp. 50–51). Before Jesus

⁵⁸ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 63, 64, n. 8. James Muilenburg called it a “heavenly token” in idem, “Literary Form in the Fourth Gospel,” in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 76.

⁵⁹ Even in the Synoptics, the first encounter between Jesus and John the Baptist contained a cognitive aspect, at least in the Matthean version where the heavenly voice is not speaking to Jesus but to the audience (“This is my Son...” [Matt 3:17]). On the function of the Spirit in John’s version, see Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 64, n. 8: “Die Verleihung des Geistes an Jesus ist der Tradition entnommen und hat in der Interpretation des Evglsten ihre Bedeutung nicht mehr für Jesus, sondern für den Täufer als Erkennungszeichen....” Andrew T. Lincoln disagrees when stating that the event “qualifies Jesus to Baptize others with the Spirit”; idem, *Truth on Trial: The Lawsuit Motif in the Fourth Gospel* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson), 63. See also Kinlaw, *Christ is Jesus*, 126–135.

encountered the Baptist, God informed him how to distinguish Jesus from other characters in the crowd (cf. v. 26). In the subnarrative, God himself is the informant, and this circumstance in fact eliminates the move of cognitive resistance as is also the case when the *deus ex machina* appears in ancient drama (e.g., Euripides, *Ion* 1553-1605; Plautus, *Amph.* 1131-1143). Since God tells the Baptist what to look for in advance, just as the narrator did to the reader in the prologue, the appearance of the token becomes not a sign of confusion but a confirmation of the information received beforehand. Thus, in Jesus' first appearance, the recognition structure of *whispering*, which was set out in the prologue when the narrator primed the reader, is copied into the story-world. The Baptist recognizes Jesus by means of *whispering* comparable to the prologue's mode of speaking. John the Baptist not only becomes the ideal witness to Jesus by having access to the same kind of information as the reader, but the pericope also becomes a first thematization of the circumstance that recognition of Jesus may only be possible on the basis of an already established relation with the heavenly world.

*a*²: v. 34. Returning to the first-order narrative, John the Baptist finally reactualizes his position of being the informant, which was latently present while he was telling the story of his recognition of Jesus.⁶⁰ The role as informant was in the previous second-order narrative occupied by God, so the Baptist has now gained in authority; and his return to the role as informant or testifier gives us occasion for dividing up the recognition scene according to his roles—a division of the scene that is parallel to the above claim-basis-claim outline of the pericope (see p. 98):

- a*¹: vv. 29-31 John the Baptist as informant (witness).
- b*: vv. 32-33 John the Baptist as observer/recognizer.
- a*²: v. 34 John the Baptist as informant (witness).

In v. 34, the Baptist concludes the scene by ascribing to Jesus the new thematic role of the Son of God: "And I myself have seen [ἐώρακα] and have testified [μεμαρτύρηκα] that this is the Son of God." He regards this claim as an act of testimony (μεμαρτύρηκα); and as the text by this refers back to the narrator's presentation of the Baptist in v. 19 (αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Ἰωάννου), it constitutes the climax of his testimony so far. In his statement, John the Baptist moreover refers to

⁶⁰ Since the second-order narrative is told to the Baptist's audience in the first-order narrative, it of course forms part of his communication with them.

his experience in the previous verses by indicating that he himself has seen the divine identity of Jesus behind his *άνη* disguise (ἑώρακα). This mark of divinity, however, that he has *seen* himself by being subjected to *showing*, can only be passed on to his audience by an act of *telling* to which the *hearing* of the audience corresponds. Yet, the audience only sees the man, not his token of divinity. This tension between the Baptist's own and his audience's mode of perception, which is a basic issue in the Gospel as a whole (see 20:29), is also thematized throughout this recognition scene. The scene begins when the Baptist sees (βλέπει) Jesus, and it unfolds with him mentioning in the subnarrative that he had previously identified Jesus by seeing the Spirit (ἴδης, v. 33). Finally, the ἑώρακα of the concluding verse is presented. John the Baptist's audience, on the other hand, must be content with his *telling* (λέγει, v. 29; μεταρτύθηκα, v. 34), though he in one case tries to convey his own mode of cognition to his audience: "Behold [ἴδε] the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world" (1:29b; my translation). Thus, the tension between belief by means of hearing and seeing is thematized at this early point of the narrative.

As in the previous recognition scene, this scene does not include any information on the reaction of the audience to the Baptist's claims in the first-order narrative. When reading the pericope as the story of how the Baptist came to recognize Jesus, however, it becomes clear that the first-level narrative (the Baptist's testimony) constitutes his reaction to his recognition of Jesus in the second-level narrative. From this point of view we may break up the scene and reconstruct the sequential order of the Baptist's recognition process in the following manner.⁶¹

<i>John 1:29–34</i>	<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>
1. The phase of agnoia (οὐκ ᾔδειν αὐτον; vv. 31, 33)	—
2. God's whispering to the Baptist (ὁ πέμψας με ... εἶπεν; v. 33)	The move of displaying the token
3. The showing of the mark of the Spirit and the Baptist's seeing (cf. τεθέαμαι, ἴδης, ἑώρακα; vv. 32–34)	The meeting The move of displaying the token

⁶¹ Culpepper performs a similar reconstruction of John 1:19–34 in his study of narrative time in John; idem, *Anatomy*, 54–70. In Culpepper, however, focus is on how the narrative presents the underlying story (*fabula*) by means of, e.g., analepses and prolepses.

*John 1:29–34**The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene*

4. The Baptist's reaction finding expression in telling (λέγει, ἔμαρτύρησεν, μεμαρτύρηκα; the first-order narrative as a whole, vv. 29–34)

Attendant reactions and physical (re)union

In relation to what we might expect on the basis of the type-scene, three things leap to the eye. First, although there is a phase of not-yet-knowing, there is no move of cognitive resistance (see pp. 64–66). This of course forms part of the characterization of the Baptist, but it also illustrates the importance of *whispering* in Johannine recognition. By means of *whispering*, the reader as well as story actors are given a semiotic habit that enables observers to decode the Jesus sign when it appears. Second, the moment of recognition is not mentioned explicitly. Third, we should notice the nature of the Baptist's reaction. We do not hear of any perplexity, physical embrace, and certainly not of stupendous dumbness, because his reaction is to raise his voice and tell what he has seen. As we shall experience in the course of the present reading of Johannine recognition scenes, this mode of reaction is most typical and is even called for by Jesus (see 20:17). In accordance with John the Baptist as model, the recognizing observer must become an informant in order to create new observers. In the following group of recognition scenes (1:35–51), we shall see other examples of how recognition of Jesus as the stranger from heaven is attended by the spreading of the rumor.

*Jesus and the Disciples:**Call Narratives in the Form of Recognition Scenes (1:35–51)*

The following encounters between Jesus and his first disciples are often classified as call narratives in analogy with the synoptic pericopes that describe Jesus' calling of his first disciples (Mark 1:16–20; Matt 4:18–22).⁶² The fact that Jesus in the present verses meets his disciples for the first time, as well as the circumstance that the scenes are located in

⁶² For example, Bultmann called the verses in John a *Jüngerberufungsgeschichte* and placed them in the category of biographical apophthegms; see idem, *Geschichte*, 337 and *Evangelium des Johannes*, 68. Attridge identifies them as *chreiai* that end with striking pronouncements, “elaborate *chreiai* perhaps, but classical *chreiai*”; idem, “Genre Bending,” 11.

the beginning of the Gospel right after the meeting between Jesus and the Baptist, encourage this analogy. But though the present scenes contain some parallel *Traditionsgut*, they are also essentially different from their synoptic counterparts. The latter are focused on the disciples' obedience and have Jesus as the one who takes the initiative, while the Johannine scenes are dealing with cognitive questions of identification with Jesus both as actor and re-actor.⁶³ The synoptic structure of (1) description of setting, (2) calling, and (3) obedient response is present in vv. 35–37, but Ferdinand Hahn rightly notices that “[d]er Evangelist hat diese Nachfolgegeschichten erweitert und sich dabei noch anderer Gattungselemente bedient.”⁶⁴ Yet, Hahn is not very elaborate about what such other genre elements being employed in the text might be.⁶⁵ John Painter applied the category of the “quest story” to the scenes in John 1:19–51 on the basis of similar observations; and in spite of the critical remarks that I have already made about this enterprise, one must say that the designation is quite well fitted for what is going on in the verses that we are now discussing.⁶⁶ The scenes are characterized by heavy use of seek-and-find language: “What are you looking for?” (v. 38), “He first found his brother Simon and said to him: ‘We have found the Messiah’” (v. 41), and “Philip found Nathanael and said to him: We have found...” (v. 45).⁶⁷

Although “quest story” is not at all an unsuitable description, I shall argue that the present list of encounters is better seen as a chain of recognition scenes that further thematize issues that have already been raised in the previous scene, in particular the dichotomy between *showing/seeing* and *telling/hearing*. The text is a *catena* of minor encounter sto-

⁶³ There are two call statements pronounced by Jesus in vv. 35–51. The first one is a response to a question about where Jesus is staying: “Come and see” (v. 39). In the second one, “Follow me” (v. 43), Jesus is the active part, but Philip’s reaction is not to submit to the call in the way told by the Synoptics, since Philip goes and tells Nathanael instead. The two disciples of the Baptist are said to follow Jesus (vv. 37, 39)—as a response not to Jesus’ previous call but to the Baptist’s identification: “Look, here is the Lamb of God!” (v. 36).

⁶⁴ Idem, “Die Jüngerberufung Joh 1,35–51,” in *Neues Testament und Kirche* (ed. Joachim Gnllka; Freiburg, Germany: Herder, 1974), 179.

⁶⁵ He takes the naming of Peter as a parallel to Matt 16:18a and the final Jesus saying in vv. 50–51 as an apophthegmatic element; “Die Jüngerberufung,” 179–180.

⁶⁶ Painter, *The Quest*, 182–185.

⁶⁷ The first example, “What are you looking for?” (v. 38), constitutes Jesus’ first words in the Fourth Gospel. Seek-and-find language is common in epistemological discourse, for example in wisdom literature as well as in the recognition scenes of Greco-Roman literature; see, e.g., Menander, *Perik.* 787; Plautus, *Cist.* 706–707, 760; *Curc.* 609.

ries that are linked together by the spatial movements of Jesus and the disciples, who give wings to the rumor of Christ.⁶⁸ These movements imply a shift in absence and presence between the observer and the observed, so that new recognitions may take place. As shown below, a parallel pattern seems to repeat itself with τῇ ἐπαύριον (“the next day”) in v. 43 marking the point that separates the two doublets and introduces the second example of the pattern. The recognition chain consists of four concise recognition scenes (1 and 2, 1¹ and 2¹) where recognizers stand face to face with Jesus. These four scenes are connected by six transitory links of movements in space (a–c, a¹–c¹) that enable the narrator to let new actors into the actant of the observer.

The Recognition Catena of John 1:35–51

Section One (1:35–42)	Section Two (1:43–51)
a. “The next day” Jesus goes to the Baptist and the Baptist’s two disciples (vv. 35–36a)	a ¹ . “The next day” Jesus goes to Galilee and meets Philip (v. 43a) ⁶⁹
1. Jesus and the Baptist’s two disciples (vv. 36b–40)	1 ¹ . Jesus and Philip (vv. 43b–44)
b. Andrew, one of the two disciples, informs his brother Simon (v. 41)	b ¹ . Philip informs Nathanael (vv. 45–46)
c. Andrew brings Simon to Jesus (v. 42a)	c ¹ . Nathanael goes to Jesus (v. 47a)
2. Jesus and Simon Peter (v. 42)	2 ¹ . Jesus and Nathanael (vv. 47–51)

This pattern sequence may be described on a more abstract level as follows: Jesus moves toward the observer (a, a¹), Jesus is recognized by the observer (1, 1¹), the observer goes off to inform a new, potential

⁶⁸ Hahn calls the series a “Kettenreaktion” of testimonies which is momentarily interrupted in v. 43 as my outline of the text shows; idem, “Die Jüngerberufung,” 175–176.

⁶⁹ The subject of the verbs in v. 43 is implicit, and one therefore cannot be sure that the one going to Galilee is Jesus and not one of the mentioned disciples. When comparing with the parallel in a (vv. 35–36a), the former possibility seems to be the most obvious. Painter, however, argues that the subject is Andrew or Peter, which then makes the parallelism less perfect; cf. idem, *The Quest*, 182. In contrast, Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 72 and Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:81 endorse the present interpretation. Brown’s division of the text, moreover, resembles the present one; cf. *Gospel According to John*, 1:84–85.

observer (b, b¹), the new observer goes to meet Jesus (c, c¹), and the new observer recognizes Jesus (2, 2¹).⁷⁰ In the present reading of the scenes of vv. 35–51, I shall take my point of departure in this sequence, reading vv. 35–42 and vv. 43–51 in parallel. Thus, instead of going through the text from beginning to end, we shall deal with the individual moves of the doublet *catena* one by one.

Jesus moves toward the observer (a, a¹). In both a (vv. 35–36) and a¹ (v. 43a) Jesus is the one who starts the cognitive chain reaction. His approach makes him come into view so that recognition may take place in the presence of both the observer and the observed, as in the typical anagnorisis scene.

Jesus is recognized by the observer (1, 1¹). In the first recognition scene (1; vv. 36b–40), John the Baptist repeats his identification of Jesus as the Lamb of God and points him out. The Baptist recognizes Jesus not only by seeing him, but by “in-sight,” as the phrase ἐμβλέψας may indicate (v. 36). He is able to penetrate Jesus’ superficial appearance and does not identify him κατὰ τὴν σάρκα as Jesus’ adversaries do in 8:15.⁷¹ In contrast to the previous testimony by John the Baptist (vv. 29–34), this time at least a part of the audience receives mention: two of the Baptist’s disciples (including Andrew), who from now on choose to follow Jesus. They are the observers in the first recognition. They acknowledge Jesus by the title of Rabbi and submit to his call, “Come and see” (ὄψεσθε, v. 39).

The corresponding recognition scene in the second doublet is Jesus’ encounter with Philip (1¹; vv. 43b–44). As in the parallel recognition (1), Jesus calls the observer to follow (v. 39), but in the case of Philip, no cognitive or attendant reaction is described in the verses depicting the actual encounter. The fact that Philip recognizes Jesus, however, comes into view in the subsequent verses when he goes to tell Nathanael what he has seen (b¹; vv. 45–46). The recognition is not confessed in front of Jesus, but in the presence of a new, potential observer.

⁷⁰ I must concede that the text does not explicitly mention that Simon Peter recognizes Jesus in v. 42 (2). Yet, since this encounter stands parallel to Nathanael’s recognition in vv. 47–51 (2¹), there is no reason not to imply recognition here as well (see further below). When looking at the two doublets from the above semi-abstract level, this is the only irregularity in the otherwise consequent parallelism.

⁷¹ The verb ἐμβλέπω only occurs one more time in John, and that is in the present pericope (v. 42) where it also has to do with identification, i.e., Jesus’ recognition of Peter.

The observer informs a new, potential observer (b, b'). It is noticeable that in both the case of Andrew in the first doublet (b, v. 41) and of Philip in the second one (b¹, vv. 45–46) their response to what they have seen consists of spreading the message so that new recognizers may come into being. The reaction matches John the Baptist's when he was testifying on the basis of his experience (v. 34), and this model of reaction expressed by testimony is now further developed. The new observers (Simon Peter in the first doublet, Nathanael in the second), who receive the message of Andrew and Philip, however, have not yet seen Jesus and have only the words of the first recognizers to depend on. Andrew tells that he has met the Messiah, whereas Philip describes Jesus as the one “about whom Moses in the law and also the prophets wrote” (v. 45).⁷² The new observers are thus given privileged foreknowledge, which they may question as in Nathanael's case—“Can anything good come out of Nazareth?” (v. 46a)⁷³—but since they in the absence of Jesus receive the christological tidings by means of *telling*, they are induced to arrange a meeting with Jesus in order to turn their *hearing* into *seeing*: “Come and see” (ἴδε; v. 46). This movement is parallel to the one being played out in recognition scenes in Greco-Roman literature, where the observer is, to begin with, absent from the observed. When messages are delivered by some informant in the absence of the observed, the scene tends toward *seeing*, both in order to put an end to cognitive resistance and with the purpose of eliminating physical distance. The scene works out on a spatial axis the circumstance that recognition is closely linked with (re)union and the (re)establishing of common bonds. As an example of the movement from earwitnessing to eyewitnessing, one may call attention to Eurycleia's report to Penelope at the end of the *Odyssey*:

Then the old woman went up to the upper chamber, laughing aloud, to tell [ἑρέουσα] her mistress that her dear husband was in the house. Her knees moved nimbly, but her feet were tottering; and she stood above her lady's head, and spoke to her, and said [ἔειπεν]: “Awake, Penelope, dear child, that with your own eyes you may see [ἰδῆαι ὀφθαλμοῖσι τεοῖσι] what you long for all your days. Odysseus is here, and has come home” (*Od.* 23.1–7 [Murray])⁷⁴

⁷² He also performs a proper-name identification: “Jesus son of Joseph from Nazareth” (v. 45).

⁷³ The statement in v. 46a represents Nathanael's move of cognitive resistance.

⁷⁴ Penelope's move from *hearing* Eurycleia's message to *seeing* Odysseus for herself takes place a little later in book 23 (*Od.* 23.80–372).

The new observer goes to meet Jesus (c, c'). The short statements in vv. 42a (c) and 47a (c') serve the function of turning the potential recognition in absence into an actual recognition in presence. In contrast to the recognition episodes 1 (the Baptist's disciples as observers) and 1¹ (Philip as observer), Jesus is not the active part but is approached by the new observers, Simon (2) and Nathanael (2¹).

The new observer recognizes Jesus (2, 2¹). The scene is now set for the climactic recognition of the two doublets where the absentees, i.e., respectively Simon (2, v. 42) and Nathanael (2¹, v. 47–51), are given the opportunity to know from personal experience. Surprisingly, however, the recognition scenes with Simon and Nathanael turn around the cast for a moment, so that Jesus becomes the observer recognizing them. To Peter he says: "You are Simon son of John. You are to be called Cephas" (v. 42), while Nathanael is being called "an Israelite in whom there is no deceit" (v. 47). Yet, recognition—at least in the Nathanael incident—also goes the other way around so that Jesus is again the object of recognition. There are plenty of examples of such mutual recognitions in the ancient dramas and romances (see p. 63), and here we have the first Johannine ones. In mutual recognitions, both actors are in a state of *agnoia* (e.g., Aeschylus, *Cho.*, Sophocles, *El.* Euripides, *Iph. taur.*), and one actor is often recognized when betraying his or her identity by revealing some sort of knowledge concerning the counterpart. This is the type of recognition that Aristotle called διὰ μνήμης (*Poet.* 1454b37, see p. 29). The recognition of Jesus by Nathanael is recognition of this same kind. Nathanael recognizes Jesus when realizing that Jesus has no *agnoia* and is able to identify Nathanael on the basis of extraordinary knowledge, which is one of Jesus' most projected characteristics in John (cf., e.g., 2:24; 16:30; 18:4). Jesus is able to recognize actors whom he has not met before and thus escapes the need for the move of the first cognition as he acquires knowledge clairvoyantly. It is the apparent lack of the first cognition that leads Nathanael to ask: "Where did you get to know me?" (πόθεν με γινώσκεις; v. 48). Judging from Nathanael's reaction, however, he is soon convinced that Jesus by knowing that he was "under the fig tree" possesses knowledge that is not accessible to any man. Jesus' recognition of Nathanael thus calls forth Nathanael's recognition of Jesus.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Sjöberg, *Der Verborgene Menschensohn*, 203: "Nathanael weiss zunächst nichts von einer übermenschlichen Würde Jesu, erkennt sie aber sogleich durch das Zeichen seines wunderbaren Wissens (1,48f.)." Jesus' omniscience also gives raise to recognitions διὰ

Jesus' omniscience changes the conditions of the mutual recognition. It creates an asymmetry that we do not find in the two-way recognitions of Greco-Roman literature, where the two actors are equally ignorant to begin with, else the recognition is no longer bilateral. Jesus, however, though participating in a mutual recognition, does not experience a process of coming-to-know, as does Nathanael, since Jesus' omniscience precludes further realization. His recognition of others rather serves as a revelation of his own identity. Mutual recognition in John also has another function. Although only some of the other type-scenes in John play out such recognition (4:16–19; 20:16), the two-way exchange of social recognition is essential in John as it underlines that recognition is not only a new perception of Jesus but also establishes a community between Jesus and his disciples. In the shepherd discourse in John 10, Jesus expresses this mutuality in the paradigmatic statement, "I know my own and my own know me" (10:14). So, when Jesus calls his sheep "by name [κατ' ὄνομα]" (10:3; cf. 20:16), as in the naming of Simon Peter (Cephas) in v. 42, he is acknowledging Peter as being one of his own.

Nathanael confesses his new insight with the σὺ εἶ formula (v. 49; cf. *Od.* 3.122; 19.474) and performs a *Steigerung* when he takes the Rabbi title given to Jesus by the Baptist's disciples in v. 38 to a higher level: "Rabbi, you are [σὺ εἶ] the Son of God! You are [σὺ...εἶ] the King of Israel!" If we turn to the parallel recognition episode featuring Peter in 2 (v. 42), only Jesus' recognition of Peter is mentioned explicitly, but the scene seems to be a torso reaching out for its missing part: the reverse recognition. In the present context, Peter is not said to have confessed his belief the way Nathanael does it, but the fact that Peter in the course of the narrative follows Jesus, confesses his faith (6:69), and becomes a key figure among the disciples, even in the Fourth Gospel with its preference for the Beloved Disciple, shows that Peter's process of recognition took its beginning at this point. Thus, Jesus' encounter with Peter, which concludes the first section in the recognition (2), seems to imply a reciprocal recognition like the one between Jesus and Nathanael that concludes the second and final section (2¹).

Jesus' meeting with Nathanael is narrated more elaborately than his meeting with Peter. He does not merely identify Nathanael but reveals his particular insight; and the pericope ends with a saying by

μνήμης in 4:16–19; 16:30; 20:16. On the various symbolic interpretations of Nathanael's stay under the fig tree, see Hahn, "Die Jüngerberufung," 187–189.

Jesus like in the *chreiai*, “Do you believe because I told you that I saw you under the fig tree? You [sing.] will see greater things than these....you [plur.] will see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man” (vv. 50–51). It is not unusual that Johannine recognition scenes end with a Jesus-saying that evaluates the recognition/nonrecognition that has just taken place (1:50–51; 9:41; 20:17, 29) or directs the audience toward new action or modes of recognition (1:50–51; 20:17, 21–22, 29).⁷⁶ In this context, it is important to recall the observation we made together with Brant that anagnorisis not only functions as an element in the characterization of the observer, but also plays a role in the exposition of the narrative (see pp. 16–17). From this point of view, we may say that the story-world observers are not primarily *typoi* that represent a range of attitudes toward Jesus—if we leave their embeddedness in the narrative discourse out of account, however, they may be taken as such—but they embody various phases in the reader’s process of observing Jesus. Although John’s story is episodic, meaning that the observers appearing in line are met with basically the same cognitive challenge to recognize Jesus in his capacity as God’s agent, the episodes take place in various phases in the implied author’s communication with the reader. At the present point, we are standing at the Gospel entrance where readers are being introduced to the presence of Jesus in the story-world. From this perspective, Jesus’ saying to Nathanael is not a reproach judging his recognition as being insufficient in some sort of way, and neither is it a general epistemological precept that elevates the perceptive mode of *seeing* (eyewitnessing) to a level of indispensability; but it points the reader, whose access to Jesus goes through secondary testimony, toward the direct *seeing* that is enabled by Jesus’ presence in the Gospel. This orientation toward the reader becomes clear when we notice how Jesus’ promise to Nathanael suddenly changes into the second person plural (ὁμῖν, ὁψεσθε; v. 51) in spite of the fact that the only one present in the scene besides Jesus is Nathanael (see v. 47). Jesus may, of course, be talking to Nathanael as representing a larger group of story-world characters, but Jesus’ promise functions as a direct address to the reader

⁷⁶ This may be said to function equivalently with the conversation going on after the moment of recognition in Greco-Roman literature. There, it often deals with what the recognizer and the recognized are going to do now that their relationship has been established. In John, Jesus of course has a particular authority to express such conclusions.

as *voyeur*, just as when the narrator talks to the reader as a second-person plural addressee (19:35; 20:31). The climax of the *catena* thus concludes with *seeing*. In fact, both doublets in the recognition *catena* play out a structure that tends toward *seeing*:

<i>Seeing</i> (a, a ¹ , 1, 1 ¹)	Jesus is present	The first observer sees Jesus
<i>Telling</i> (b, b ¹)	Jesus is absent	The first observer tells the second observer
<i>Hearing</i> (b, b ¹)	Jesus is absent	The second observer hears the first observer
<i>Seeing</i> (c, c ¹ , 2, 2 ¹)	Jesus is present	The second observer sees Jesus

In the course of this pattern, observers that have only heard of Jesus are directed toward him. This happens to John the Baptist in the previous pericope (vv. 29–34) and to Simon and Nathanael in the present one. This mode of narrating the recognition scene fits the overall purpose of the chapter, which is to establish Jesus' presence and bring him into sight.⁷⁷ At the end of the story when Jesus leaves the story-world, however, the pattern is altered so that *hearing* about Jesus in his absence is being emphasized. Thus, just as the story begins with a series of recognition scenes, we shall later see how it concludes with a recognition *catena* that deals with a situation where *seeing* is no longer possible (20:11–29, see pp. 196–211).

As soon as the prologue ends, the first chapter of John's Gospel recounts some of the traditional key stages that constitute the beginning of the Jesus story. It is remarkable, however, that these stories, though they are dealing with traditional material, to such a great extent deal with the motif of presence (*seeing*) and questions of identification. Since the recognition scene was the primary type-scene thematizing such questions in ancient fiction literature, it is natural to ask, as has been done in the present reading, how John 1:19–51 plays against genre expectations. I shall not repeat the generic observations made already, but would like to stress that such recognition scenes are not automatic patterns, but appear in a narrative context and serve a function in the reading process. In vv. 19–28, John the Baptist was in focus. His

⁷⁷ *Seeing* is a more complex phenomenon in John, as will be dealt with in the reading of ch. 9 (see pp. 150–163); but in the first chapter, emphasis is put on *seeing* as the perceptive mode given by Jesus' presence. For further discussion, see Craig R. Koester, "Hearing, Seeing, and Believing in the Gospel of John," *Bib* 70 (1989): 327–348; Robert Kysar, *John: The Maverick Gospel* (rev. ed.; Louisville, Ky.: John Knox, 1993), 78–96.

identity as a secondary figure was established in order to put Jesus in the role of the observed. The Baptist's own recognition of Jesus, and not his baptism of Jesus, was reported in vv. 29–34, where he was presented as the ideal recognizer (observer) and witness (informant). The management of recognition by means of *whispering* seems to recur in the sense that the prologue's way of revealing the identity of Jesus is copied to the story-world level. As the reader was being informed in advance in the prologue, John the Baptist, Simon Peter, and Nathanael are also given a key to acknowledging Jesus' true identity before he actually appears to them.

Sēmeia as Sēmata: Tokens of Jesus' Divine Doxa

The first chapter of the Gospel forms an introduction to its thematic center concerning the identity and identification of Jesus. With regard to this, John the Baptist takes up a prominent position in the chapter as the first witness to Jesus in the story-world. Testifying, however, in its capacity as a mode of *telling* is not the only way for the Gospel to conduct its case, and so the thematization of *showing/seeing* emerges little by little in John 1, until it reaches its climax in the promise of *seeing* beyond what has taken place so far (1:51). Accordingly, John 2 begins with the story of the wedding at Cana, and though it may not be the total fulfillment of what was promised in 1:51, it introduces a new mode of displaying Jesus' divine glory, namely by means of his wondrous signs (σημεῖα; 2:11).⁷⁸ John thus seems to be using a dual method similar to Charikleia, the heroine in the *Aethiopica*:

In every case that comes to trial, sire, two types of evidence are recognized as most conclusive: documentary proof and corroboration of witnesses. Both types I shall adduce to demonstrate that I am your daughter. (Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.12.4 [Morgan])⁷⁹

In the present section, we shall discuss the signs in their capacity as a kind of “documentary proof” or recognition tokens (*sēmata*) that are

⁷⁸ In 1:19 we have entered the part of the Gospel that various scholars since C.H. Dodd have called “The Book of Signs” (John 1:19–12:50); see idem, *Interpretation*, 297.

⁷⁹ Πᾶσα δίκη καὶ κρίσις, ὃ βασιλεῦ, δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀποδείξεις οἶδε, τὰς τε ἐγγράφους πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ μαρτύρων βεβαιώσεις· ἄμφω σοι τοῦ θυγάτηρ ὑμετέρα εἶναι παρέξομαι.

intended to reveal Jesus' identity.⁸⁰ It is important to notice, however, even if the Johannine signs are semiotic acts and accordingly participate in a narrative sequence, they do not qualify as recognition type-scenes, on the whole. In fact, scholarship has shown that not only do the signs depart from the *Gattung* of the synoptic miracle stories, but also they cannot be put into one, single generic form either.⁸¹ At the end of this section, I shall nevertheless point out some *sēmeia* narratives that contain certain recognition scene features and later we shall deal with those that are recognition type-scenes (see pp. 145–148, 150–163). For the present moment, however, we shall discuss the signs in their capacity as narratives that represent and cultivate a particular move in anagnorisis: the move of displaying the token of identity (see pp. 66–68).

The fact that the Fourth Gospel calls Jesus' miracles signs (σημεῖα) and not mighty works (δυνάμεις), as in the Synoptic Gospels, is only one of the notable differences between John and the Synoptics regarding the literary reworking of traditions concerning the miracles attributed to Jesus. As is often noticed, John is not as extensively concerned with the miraculous deeds of Jesus as are his predecessors. Although he at the end of his work reports that Jesus performed "many other signs" that have not been passed on in the preceding story (20:30; cf. 2:23; 3:2; 4:45; 7:4; 12:37), his account seems to contain only seven miraculous incidents: The wedding at Cana (2:1–11), the healing of the official's son (4:46–54), the healing of the man at the pool of Bethzatha (5:1–18), the feeding of the five thousand (6:1–15), the walk on the water (6:16–21), the healing of the man born blind (9:1–12), and the raising of Lazarus (11:28–44).⁸² In his account of these incidents, John shows

⁸⁰ As is well-known, Bultmann vigorously opposed such an understanding of the signs (on the basis of 4:48, for example) rejecting that they function as "Ausweis" or "Legitimation"; Bultmann, *Theologie*, 391; cf. idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 152–153. Bultmann was right in emphasizing that the signs are subject to interpretation and questioning (Bultmann, *Theologie*, 391; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 161), but this limitation in the communication process is not due to the signs, according to John, but to the nature of the *seeing* of the receivers (cf. 5:36; 9; 10:25b; 11:15; 12:37; 14:11). This is shown in subsequent studies like Wolfgang J. Bittner, *Jesu Zeichen im Johannesevangelium* (WUNT 2/26; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987); Loren L. Johns and Douglas B. Miller, "The Signs as Witnesses in the Fourth Gospel: Reexamining the Evidence," *CBQ* 56 (1994): 519–535; Willis Hedley Salier, *The Rhetorical Impact of the Semeia in the Gospel of John* (WUNT 2/186; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004).

⁸¹ See Beutler, "Literarische Gattungen," 2545–2547; Attridge, "Genre Bending," 9.

⁸² Four of these are explicitly called σημεῖα (2:11; 4:54; 6:14; 12:18). There has been some discussion on whether the number of seven is significant and on how to do the counting. Besides, the death and resurrection of Jesus may be reckoned as an

restraint regarding the emotional response of the audience but is often significantly elaborate when it comes down to the interpretation of the miracles as semiotic acts—i.e., as σημεῖα. Most signs are introduced or succeeded or even both by monologues or dialogues that discuss what has often been called the act's symbolic meaning.⁸³ For example, the feeding of the five thousand reveals that Jesus is the bread of life (6:35, 51), the healing of the man born blind shows that his coming to the world establishes a *krisis* between those who see and those who do not (9:39), and the raising of Lazarus reflects that Jesus himself is the resurrection and the life (11:25). Qua *sēmeia*, Jesus' healings do not at all appear as pure pragmatic actions for the benefit of the patient, nor as the eschatological vanguard's first engagement leading to the daybreak of the kingdom of God, as in the synoptic tradition, but first and foremost as occasions for revelatory communication directed toward the observers: "This illness does not lead to death; rather it is for God's glory [ὑπερ τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ], so that the Son of God may be glorified [δοξασῇ] through it" (11:4; cf. 11:15; 9:3).⁸⁴ This quotation also illustrates what is the ultimate *designatum* of the signs, which is in fact given as early as in the conclusion of the wine miracle: "Jesus did this, the first of his signs...and he revealed his glory [ἐφανερώσεν τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ]" (2:11). The signs are exposures of that mark of Jesus' true divine identity, which the we-voice of the prologue claimed to have seen (δόξα; 1:14), and in this capacity the signs participate in the recognition process of the Gospel. The signs are of course much more than this,

additional and climactic sign, though the exact term is not used in this context; see, e.g., R.H. Lightfoot, *St. John's Gospel: A Commentary* (ed. C.F. Evans; rev. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 336 and Salier, *Rhetorical Impact of the Sēmeia*, 155–170. This may be deduced from Jesus' saying in 2:19, for example, when he speaks of himself as a new temple raised within three days as an answer to the question about what sign (σημεῖον) he is going to reveal (2:18). Moreover, the phrase "many other signs" (occurring in 20:30 right after the risen Jesus' appearance to Thomas) may indicate that the preceding apparitions are signs. For the sake of completeness, one should also mention the miraculous catch of fish in 21:1–14, though it probably belongs to a secondary redaction of the text.

⁸³ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 79; *Theologie*, 391; Dodd, *Interpretation*, 141–143; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:526; Koester, *Symbolism*, 79–140. The signs in 2:1–12; 4:46–54 and 6:16–21 are not attended by discussions concerning their symbolism.

⁸⁴ Characteristically, the Marcan motif of miracles without audience (Mark 5:40; 7:33; 8:23) is absent in John; see Bultmann, *Geschichte*, 239. Since Jesus' acts in John are *sēmeia*, performing them without observers would be absurd. On the other hand, one cannot say that the miracle stories in the synoptic tradition are noncommunicative acts, but in John there is an extended emphasis on the cognitive aspect of the miracles.

since they facet the aura of predicates surrounding Jesus by rewriting the Jewish universe of symbols through him.⁸⁵ In the present approach, however, we shall bracket the extensive symbolic content of the signs, in order to focus on their capacity as recognition tokens, since John clearly displays awareness of the fact that the act of *showing* a sign is not enough in itself if nobody sees it, and sees it for what it really is (cf. 6:26-27).⁸⁶

As stated in Karl Heinrich Rengstorff's article in the *TWNT*, the basic meaning of σημεῖον is an "optisches Zeichen, an dem man jemand oder etwas erkennt...."⁸⁷ In regard to John's use of the term σημεῖον, it has its forerunners in earlier Judeo-Christian tradition. The Synoptic Gospels occasionally employed the term as a designation of acts that serve as demonstrative proofs—e.g., in the pericope where Jesus rejects the Pharisee's demand for signs, though he in the Q version promises the single sign of Jonah (Matt 12:38-42 par.; 16:1-4 par.; cf. 1 Cor 1:22). Such use of *sēmeia* in connection with mighty deeds seems to have its origin in the Septuagint, where the Deuteronomic formula regarding the "signs and wonders" of God (ὅτις ἡμῶν; Deut 4:34; 6:22; 7:19; 26:8; 29:3; 34:11) was rendered into Greek as σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα, a phrase that reappears in the New Testament and once in John (4:48; cf. Mark 13:22 par.; Acts 2:19, 22, 43; 4:30; 5:12; 6:8; 7:36; 14:3; 15:12).⁸⁸ Thus, the juxtaposition of "signs and wonders" in the Septuagint created a blend of the semantic field of the two terms and paved the way for John to use the term "sign" when speaking of "wonders," whether this is an invention of an earlier *Semeia-Quelle* or not.⁸⁹

Describing the immediate background of John's employment of *sēmeia* terminology is not the same as accounting for the potential meanings of the term within the Gospel. In a literary work like the Fourth Gospel consisting of a number of recognition scenes, it is obvious to take the sign as recognition token. In this connection, it is quite remark-

⁸⁵ For a study of symbolism in the *sēmeia*, see Koester, *Symbolism*, 79-140.

⁸⁶ The fact that a sign is only a sign if *taken* as a sign also belongs to the common knowledge of modern semiotics; see Eco, *Theory of Semiotics*, 7.

⁸⁷ Idem, "σημεῖον," *TWNT* 7:199-268.

⁸⁸ In the Corpus Paulinum, δυνάμεις, σημεῖα, and τέρατα on some occasions appear within the same semantic field (Rom 15:19; 2 Cor 12:12; cf. Heb 2:4). In Mark 16:20 and Acts 8:6, miracles are called σημεῖα as in John.

⁸⁹ For further reading on the meaning of the term *sēmeia* in ancient sources, see, e.g., Rengstorff, "σημεῖον"; R. Formesyn, "Le sèmeion johannique et le sèmeion hellénistique." *ETL* 38 (1962): 856-894; Bittner, *Jesu Zeichen*, 17-87; Salier, *Rhetorical Impact of the Semeia*, 18-45.

able that the Johannine terminology regarding Jesus' miracles is comparable to the one being used by Aristotle when describing the type of recognition that takes place by means of tokens (διὰ τῶν σημείων; *Poet.* 1454b20). Recognition scenes in Greco-Roman literature, however, used a variety of terms when speaking of this identity mark (see p. 67), and the exact same term (σημεῖον) only appears on occasions. Homer uses the earlier, but equivalent σῆμα (e.g., *Od.* 23.188, 206, 225; 24.329, 346), and among the classical tragedians, there are a couple of uncertain examples of σημείον as token (Sophocles, *El.* 886; *Oed. tyr.* 1058), while in Roman comedy, *signum* is sometimes used (see, e.g., Plautus, *Amph.* 145–146; *Rud.* 1110, 1181; *Vidularia* frg. xiv; Terence, *Eun.* 767). *Sēmeion* is one out of many terms used for the token of the ancient recognition scene, but its significance lies not so much in the terminology as in its function.⁹⁰ The Johannine sign works in the same manner as a recognition token by being a visible, nonlinguistic demonstration of identity. In a recent study on the signs in John, Willis Hedley Salier has argued for reading the *sēmeia* as proofs “being embedded in the context of an extended trial metaphor that is predominant in the Gospel’s narrative.”⁹¹ This is a valuable way of understanding the function of the *sēmeia* within the context of John’s epistemological plot, but I suggest that describing them as recognition tokens is even more precise. This has to do with the fact that pieces of evidence in a trial focus on the question of guilt,⁹² whereas the primary function of the signs in John is to display the identity of the yet unidentified one, which is also what the *sēmata* of the recognition scene do. True, the Johannine *sēmeia* become proofs of Jesus’ innocence (of the charges that he is a blasphemer and a lawbreaker), when the forensic aspect comes up in the subsequent interpretation of the signs (cf., e.g., 5:10–46; 9:13–34); but first the signs display his identity, being acts of *showing*. They are his visible tokens of divinity, they appear for the first time before the cognitive conflict has commenced (2:1–11), and the forensic aspect appears only when this display of identity collides with the world-view of the *Ioudaioi*.

⁹⁰ As Aristotle says in the *Rhetoric*, “Necessary signs are called *tekmēria*; those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name” (*Rhet.* 1.2.16 [Freese]).

⁹¹ Salier, *Rhetorical Impact of the Sēmeia*, 172. Likewise, he asserts that “the σημεία narratives are a collection of cumulative proofs in the trial conducted with respect to the reader”; *ibid.*

⁹² Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.3.5: “The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust [τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον].”

Having said that the term *sēmeion* in the sense of identity token is infrequent in Greco-Roman recognition scenes, it does occur in this particular sense in the Book of Tobit, a piece of Jewish, novelistic literature, which may shed some light on the Johannine use. The old, righteous Jew by the name of Tobit sends off his son Tobias from Nineveh in order to get back some money that has been deposited with Gabael, their relative in Media. Tobias, however, points out that there is a problem:

I will do everything that you have commanded me, father; but how can I obtain the money from him, since he does not know me and I do not know him? What evidence am I to give him so that he will recognize and trust me [τί σημεῖον δῶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιγνῶ με καὶ πιστεύσῃ μοι], and give me the money? (Tob 5:1-2; LXX [Ⲅ])

In relation to the Johannine story of recognition, this incident is not only illuminating because of the σημεῖον terminology. I shall mention the most important aspects. First, the recognition plot in Tobit has a structure comparable to John's, since anagnorisis takes place not at the time of homecoming but abroad. Like the Johannine Jesus, Tobias is an emissary, a *šālīah*, who is previously unknown by the observers at the destination (though they know his father). Second, it reveals that the envoy needs some kind of ID (*sēmeion*) in order to be able to fulfill the mission—the ultimate goal of which is the transfer of value objects (in John, the giving of life; in Tobit, the recovering of money). Tobit must mark his son in a way that makes Gabael believe the son's claim of identity, though these two have never met before, and Tobit thus gives his son one half of a torn bond document, the corresponding half being stored with the money in Gabael's possession (Tob 5:3). The document functions as an index sign that connects Tobias (and his companion Raphael) with Tobit, since Gabael knows that Tobit is holding the matching part. And it works: When Gabael eventually sees the *sēmeion*, there is no doubt in his mind and he hands over the money to Tobias (Tob 9). When Gabael meets Tobias, Tobias' identity as the son of Tobit is further confirmed by an iconic likeness: "Blessed be God, for I see in Tobias the very image [εἶδον] of my cousin Tobit" (Tob 9:6 [Ⲅ]). Also, the Johannine signs are tokens that serve to establish the indexical relation between the sent one and the sender.⁹³ This is done

⁹³ The terms icon and index are used in the Peircean sense. See Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (eds. Charles Hartshorne et al.; 8 vols; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958-1965), 2:247-249; 254-264, 274-307.

by pointing at the iconic relation between Jesus' works and God's. In Jewish tradition, God manifested himself through his works; and when Jesus performs acts of healing (4:46–54; 5:1–18; 9:1–12; cf. e.g., 2 Kgs 20), procures bread from heaven (6:1–15; cf. Exod 16), and creates life (11:28–44; cf., e.g., Gen 1–2), he is imitating his father: “[F]or whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise” (5:20; cf. 5:17–24).⁹⁴ Nobody has seen the Father, except the Son who has been learning by watching, so to speak. The Father has shown the Son what to do (δείκνυσιν, δείξει; 5:20), and the Son is now showing (ἐφ’ανέρωσεν, 2:11; δεικνύεις, 2:18) what he has seen himself (βλέπη, 5:19; cf. 3:32).⁹⁵ Jesus does not generally speak of his mission and his deeds as *sēmeia* but as *ergon/erga*, and the claim that Jesus is doing his Father's work is often expressed in statements using this terminology.⁹⁶ Whereas the *Ioudaioi* do the works of their diabolic father (8:41–44), Jesus is doing the works of God the Father: “My Father is still working, and I also am working” (5:17). The fact that the term *sēmeion* is more frequently used by the narrator and by observers than by Jesus may be an indication of their cognitive and demonstrative function. The term emphasizes the interpretative aspect of the miracles—the fact that the message they signify may be ignored (6:26) or misinterpreted (e.g., 5:18; 9:16a).⁹⁷ This circumstance reveals an important point on which the story of recognition in John's Gospel departs from Tobit, because in John the recognition tokens become highly ambiguous, especially in chs. 5–12. This epistemological circumstance seemed to be one of the reasons for *Poet.* 16 to disparage recognitions by means of signs in general (see pp. 29–33); and although

⁹⁴ The *καθὼς*-formula is the Gospel's main way of expressing this iconic relation (“like father, like son”; cf., e.g., 5:30; 8:28; 12:50; 15:9–10). For an overview of John's use of *καθὼς* in his description of the relation between the Father and the Son, see Olivier de Dinechin, “*KATHŌS*: La Similitude dans l'Évangile selon Saint Jean,” *RSR* 58 (1970), 199.

⁹⁵ In John, the only character whose manifestations are called *sēmeia* is Jesus, and the term is never used about his sayings, though the cognate verb *σημαίνω* appears in relation to some of his predictions (12:33; 18:32; 21:19). Thus, a *sēmeion* is something which is *done* by Jesus (ποιέω, cf. 2:11; 3:2; 4:54; 6:14, 30; 7:31; 9:16; 11:47; 12:18, 37; 20:30).

⁹⁶ See 5:20, 36; 7:21; 9:3–4; 10:25, 32, 37; 14:10–12; 15:24; 17:4. In 4:48; 6:26, however, Jesus is referring to his acts as *sēmeia*.

⁹⁷ See Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:529: “The term ‘work’ expresses more the divine perspective on what is accomplished, and so is a fitting description for Jesus himself to apply to the miracles. The term ‘sign’ expresses the human psychological viewpoint, and is a fitting description for others to apply to the miracles of Jesus.”

it was a common assumption in Antiquity that “miracle proves deity,”⁹⁸ the Johannine signs do not stand alone, but are subjected to a process of controversy (cf. Salier above). The signs speak, but when clashing with the expectations of the observers, they cannot speak for themselves. This means that they, on the one hand, become symbolic signs that can only be properly understood by those who have received the ability to see (cf. John 9), whereas they, on the other hand, engage in a process of persuasion directed toward outsiders (cf. 10:25, 38). This awareness concerning the questionable credibility of the tokens is also present in the recognition scenes of Greco-Roman literature. Before Charikleia in the *Aethiopica* claims to be the Ethiopian crown princess, she states:

“The recognition tokens [τὰ γνωρίσματα],” replied Charikleia, “are tokens only to those who know them or to those who laid them beside me. For those who do not know them or do not recognize every item, they are mere precious trinkets, which might well bring their bearer under suspicion of being a thief or a robber.” (9.24.7 [Morgan])

Later, as she presents the tokens to her father, king Hydaspes, he speaks along the same lines:

Indeed, how can we be sure that this is she, that the child did not perish after being abandoned, that someone did not chance upon the tokens of recognition [τοῖς δὲ γνωρίσμασιν] and has not made use of the gifts of fortune by bestowing them on this girl and using her as a kind of mask, so exploiting my desire for a child and imposing upon us a false and supposititious line of succession, clouding the light of truth with this band? (10.13.5 [Morgan])

Such questions destabilize the demonstrative force of the tokens (cf. the doubts of Euripidean *Electra*, pp. 32–33; Menander, *Epitir.* 293–352, 499–504; Plautus, *Rud.* 1138–1140). Credibility is questioned within the move of postponement and cognitive resistance and as a consequence something has to be done to stop the semiosis. In the *Aethiopica*, a solution to the problem is given by virtue of the fact that Charikleia fortunately has a distinctive birthmark, which she could not have stolen from somebody else (10.15).⁹⁹ Such accumulation of tokens is a quite com-

⁹⁸ A statement by A.D. Nock quoted from H.S. Versnel, “What Did Ancient Man See When He Saw a God? Some Reflections on Graeco-Roman Epiphany,” in *Effigies Dei: Essays on the History of Religions* (ed. Dirk van der Plas; SHR 51; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 52, cf. 54.

⁹⁹ This final token belongs to Aristotle’s category of congenital *sēmeia* (*Poet.* 1454b21). Incidentally, at least modern readers cannot help suspecting that Charikleia’s father, Hydaspes, has been wearing the horns of a cuckold from the very beginning when

mon feature in the recognition scenes. The observed one may present three or four of them (e.g., *Od.*; Aeschylus, *Cho.*; Sophocles, *El.*; Euripides, *El.*; *Ion*; Plautus, *Rud.*), and though the tokens do not necessarily change in quality, the mere quantity may finally convince the observer (Euripides, *El.* 577). In relation to the Fourth Gospel, it is quite interesting that in the abovementioned texts the tokens are occasionally kept in numeric order, as when Aeschylus' Electra discovers Orestes' footprints as "a second sign [δεύτερον τεκμήριον]" (*Cho.* 205 [Lattimore]; cf. δεύτερον σημεῖον in John 4:54), or when *Ion*, anxious to hear his found-again mother's description of the final item in the basket, says: "I long to know the third [τὸ δὲ τρίτον]" (Euripides, *Ion* 1432 [Willets]; cf. Menander, *Perik.* 771). In Johannine studies, the numbering of the *semeia* in 2:11 ("the first of his signs") and 4:54 ("second sign") has attracted attention as one of the main arguments for the much disputed signs-source hypothesis. The argument says that when the Gospel alludes to other miracles in the interval between these two stories (2:23; 3:2; 4:45), the numbered sign narratives must come from an earlier source, where 4:46–54 was in fact the second sign, which it is no longer in the present form of the Gospel.¹⁰⁰ Whether this is correct or not, the numbering, as incomplete as it may be, serves to identify the *semeia* as particular, individual events in a series, as is also sometimes the case with the recognition *semata*, and this point may also serve as an indication to their function as a set of tokens. The notion also found in John, that more tokens can be added in order to further substantiate identity, is a *topos* in the recognition scenes. Eurycleia tells Penelope of Odysseus' scar as "a clear proof besides [σῆμα ἀριφραδὲς ἄλλο τι]" (*Od.* 23.73 [Murray]) and in the *Aethiopica*, Charikleia's exposure of her band creates the need for "other tokens [ἑτέρα...γνωρίσματα]" (10.14.2 [Morgan]), while she is finally identified by "abundant evidence [πολλαῖς ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι]" (10.16.4 [Morgan]). At the end of the Gospel, John's narrating

he says the following: "[H]ow could we, Ethiopians both, produce, contrary to all probability, a white daughter?" (10.14.5 [Morgan]). The *Aethiopica*, however, seems to be content with the answer, saying that Hydaspes' wife, Persinna, was visualizing the picture of Andromeda while having intercourse with her husband, thus absorbing Andromeda's looks and passing them on to Charikleia.

¹⁰⁰ Bultmann, *Johannesevangelium*, 78, 151, 154; Fortna, *Gospel of Signs*, 34–36, 43–44. Karel Hanhart gives an alternative explanation by taking 4:54 as an indication of a particular correspondence between the wedding in Cana (2:1–11) and the healing of the official's son (4:46–54) and not as an exact numbering; idem, "The Structure of John I 35 – IV 54," in *Studies in John: Presented to Professor J.N. Sevenster on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday* (NovTSup 24; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 29.

voice takes part in this process of token-accumulation by declaring that Jesus did “many other signs [πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα σημεία]” in addition to the tokens of identity and presence that were presented in the preceding story (20:30). The Johannine *semeia* thus share a number of common features with the *semata* of the recognition scenes. They are identity tokens, bound to create suspicion, in spite of the fact that their purpose is to reveal, and in the course of their presentation they build toward a climax. Their function as the heavenly emissaries’ visible credentials is equivalent to the cognitive role of the *semata*, and so they represent the ultimate presence of Jesus’ *doxa* in the story-world. At the same time, some of the sign-narratives also qualify as recognition type-scenes proper.

According to Culpepper’s outline of the Johannine plot, all *semeia* (except the wedding in Cana) may be described as either recognitions or nonrecognitions (see pp. 13–14). Yet, from a generic point of view, this is not obvious. In their capacity as tokens of Jesus’ *doxa*, all signs of course participate in a cognitive process, but only the ones in 5:1–18, 6:16–21, and 9:1–41 employ and transform the type-scene conventions in an elaborate and clearly detectable manner.¹⁰¹ As to the other *semeia*, there are different reasons for not giving them particular attention in the present study. The introductory and programmatic sign of the wedding in Cana reduces the cognitive game between observer and observed to a minimum, though it concludes with a comment by the narrator saying that the disciples came to believe in him as he revealed his *doxa* (2:11). The healing of the official’s son in 4:46–54 corresponds to the first sign, both of them taking place in Cana, and rounds off the first part of the Gospel (chs. 1–4) by showing how gentiles would respond to Jesus in the same positive manner as the Samaritans (4:39–42), both groups being outsiders in relation to Jerusalemite Judaism, before Jesus ventures into the lion’s den in ch. 5. As in the first sign, cognitive resistance is insignificant, and the narrator once again concludes by

¹⁰¹ In a forthcoming article (“Cognition in John”), Culpepper develops his reading of the Johannine signs as recognition scenes on the basis of the results of my doctoral dissertation (“Recognizing the Stranger: *Anagnōrīsis* in the Gospel of John,” [PhD diss.; University of Aarhus, 2006]). The article explains the progressive development of the signs in terms of *showing* and *telling* in a new and convincing manner, but as Culpepper includes all Johannine signs in the reading, the type-scene category loses some of its significance in terms of genre. For this reason, I have chosen to leave out some of the signs in the present discussion of type-scenes—though Culpepper may be right in considering the feeding of the multitude in 6:1–15 a recognition type-scene.

describing the observer's belief.¹⁰² In chapter 6, the feeding of the five thousand (6:1–13) is misunderstood by the audience (6:14–15, 25–26), and on this background a lengthy, homiletic dialogue develops in the synagogue of Capernaum (6:25–59). Questions of identity also occur: The *Ioudaioi* ask whether he is not “Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?” (6:42), thus only comprehending his proper name identity, instead of his divine role as the bread from heaven and “the Holy One of God,” as Peter finally confesses (6:69). In spite of these recognition motifs, the yardstick of the recognition type-scene can hardly be applied to the text due to its clearly midrashic elements. Neither does the raising of Lazarus, which is a *typos* of Jesus' own resurrection, appeal to a reading in the light of the type-scene (11:1–45). The pericope serves an important part in the story, since it takes Jesus to Judea for the last time (11:7), anticipates his own death and resurrection, and brings about the temple authorities' final decision concerning his destiny (11:45–55). As to recognition scene features, the scene is extraordinary since the essential moment of recognition (11:27) appears before the actual display of the *sēmeion* (11:38–44). In an actual recognition type-scene, however, this would render the presentation of tokens unnecessary. The governing suspense of the pericope is not one of recognition in the story-world, but rather seems to focus on the delay of Jesus' arrival and the miracle that concludes the scene (11:6, 21, 32).¹⁰³

Finally, the brief pericope describing Jesus' appearance to his disciples on the Sea of Galilee needs mention (6:16–21), because this sign may be read as a recognition scene comparable to the ones taking place after the resurrection.¹⁰⁴ As in the type-scenes of John 20, the scene is not a first encounter, and it thus qualifies as a true re-cognition in the same sense as for example most of the anagnorises in the *Odyssey*. This situation creates the pericope's central problem of interpretation.

The pericope in 6:16–21 has parallels in two of the Synoptic Gospels (Matt 14:22–33; Mark 6:45–52). As in Mark and Matt, it succeeds the feeding miracle, but in the Johannine version it also becomes a transition between the feeding of the five thousand (6:1–15) and the discourse on the bread of life occasioned by the miracle (6:22–59). Moreover, John

¹⁰² This interpretation follows Bittner's reading of 4:48 in idem, *Jesu Zeichen*, 122–135.

¹⁰³ Yet in vv. 45–46, contrasting reactions to the miracle are described. Their primary function is to lead towards the plot to kill Jesus.

¹⁰⁴ See C.H. Dodd, “The Appearances of the Risen Christ: An Essay in Form-Criticism of the Gospels,” in *Studies in the Gospels: Essays in Memory of R.H. Lightfoot* (ed. D.E. Nineham; Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), 23–24.

tells the story with more economy than his predecessors. We do not hear of Peter's attempt at walking on water (Matt 14:28-31), nor of the disciples' reaction in the form of either hard-heartedness (Mark 6:52) or of a confession of Jesus as the Son of God (Matt 14:33).¹⁰⁵ Instead, Jesus' appearance miraculously takes the boat to land by a sudden move (v. 21)—a motif not present in Mark and Matt. The pericope is taken from tradition, but since important motifs in the synoptic accounts are absent, the narrative seems to be pinning everything down to Jesus' self-revelation in the ἐγὼ εἰμι words in v. 20 (Mark 6:50; Matt 14:27).¹⁰⁶ The interpretation of this statement is the *crux* of the story; and commentators differ on whether it conveys an epiphany of the divine "I Am" (cf., e.g., Exod 3:14; 12:12; Isa 45:5-8, 18-22),¹⁰⁷ or if Jesus, since the phrase also appears in the Marcan and Matthean versions, is merely identifying himself as Jesus, in order to calm down the frightened disciples (in Mark 6:49 and Matt 14:26 the disciples believe the approaching figure to be a *phantasma*).¹⁰⁸ Is Jesus, in other words, revealing his thematic role or merely his proper name identity? Gail R. O'Day has adduced good arguments for reading the text as an epiphany on the basis of the pericope itself, but her reading may also be confirmed by John's overall concept of recognition as not only identification, but primarily social acknowledgment.¹⁰⁹ As we shall see in the arrest scene (18:1-12), Jesus also there identifies himself twice as "Jesus of Nazareth" (vv. 4, 7) by saying ἐγὼ εἰμι (vv. 5, 6, 8); and though this could again be taken as a pure proper name identification, the reaction of the soldiers show that John is turning, even this traditional transition scene in the Jesus-story, into an epiphany. In fact, ἐγὼ εἰμι only once in the Gospel appears as

¹⁰⁵ Francis J. Moloney, however, understands the disciples' willingness (ἡθέλον, v. 21) to take (λαβεῖν, v. 21; cf. 1:12-13) Jesus into the boat as an act of acknowledgment. See idem, *Gospel of John*, 204.

¹⁰⁶ As to its conciseness, the pericope may reflect an early, less-developed form of the story, as proposed in Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:254. For a comparative study of the three accounts, see John Paul Heil, *Jesus Walking on the Sea: Meaning and Gospel Functions of Matt 14:22-33, Mark 6:45-52 and John 6:15b-21* (AnBib 87; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1981).

¹⁰⁷ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 159; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:254; Peder Borgen, "John 6: Tradition, Interpretation and Composition," in *Critical Readings of John 6* (ed. R. Alan Culpepper; BIS 22; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 97; Gail R. O'Day, "John 6:15-21: Jesus Walking on Water as Narrative Embodiment of Johannine Christology," in *Critical Readings of John 6* (ed. Culpepper), 152-157.

¹⁰⁸ C.K. Barrett, *Gospel according to St John*, 281; Painter, *The Quest*, 266-267. A mediating position is held by Heil, *Jesus Walking on the Sea*, 80.

¹⁰⁹ O'Day, "John 6:15-21," 149-159.

a self-identification without regard to thematic role; and, characteristically, it is not Jesus but the man born blind who utters it in that particular case (9:9). Although there are no clear references to the walking on the sea in the rest of John 6, the pericope has the function of contrasting Jesus' close relation to his disciples, whom he approaches (ἐγγύς τοῦ πλοίου γινόμενον; 6:19b), with his attitude to the crowd from which he withdraws (ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ ὄρος αὐτὸς μόνος; 6:15b). This contrast is intensified in the course of the chapter as a wedge is driven between even the disciples (6:60–71).¹¹⁰

After this presentation of the *sēmeia* as recognition tokens and a brief discussion of 6:16–21, we shall now take a step backward to Jesus' encounter with the Samaritan woman at the well in John 4. The pericope makes up the first recognition type-scene after those in John 1. The nocturnal meeting between Jesus and Nicodemus in 3:1–21 is not a recognition type-scene in a generic sense, since the dialogue soon becomes a monologue (vv. 11–21)—as if it forgets that Nicodemus (the observer) was ever present at all.¹¹¹

Jesus and the Samaritan Woman (4:4–42): Betrothal and Recognition

According to a very dominant consensus in contemporary Johannine studies, the meeting between Jesus and the Samaritan woman is modeled upon the betrothal scene of the Hebrew Bible—the classical tale of the encounter between the patriarch or the lawgiver and his future bride at the well, for example the first meetings between Isaac and Rebekah, Jacob and Rachel, and Moses and Zipporah (Gen 24; 29; Exod 2; cf. Ruth 2:1–23; 1 Sam 9:11–14).¹¹² In the following reading of the story in 4:4–42, I shall not question the fact that the scene interacts with the erotically colored betrothal scenes of Jewish tradition—in this respect the references to Jacob, for example, are unmistakable

¹¹⁰ Cf. Peter Borgen, "John 6," 97: "The crowd misjudged the meaning of the feeding miracle, while the disciples had an authentic and epiphanic encounter with Jesus."

¹¹¹ Attridge, complying with C.H. Dodd, characterizes ch. 3 as "perhaps one of the strongest comparisons with the dialog quests of the *Corpus Hermeticum*"; idem, "Genre Bending," 9, cf. Dodd, *Interpretation*, 10–53, 303–311.

¹¹² See, e.g., Jerome H. Neyrey, "Jacob Traditions," 419–437; Lyle Eslinger, "The Wooing," 166–168; Jocelyn McWhirter, *The Bridegroom Messiah and the People of God: Marriage in the Fourth Gospel* (SNTSMS 138; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7–8, 58–76. For a study of betrothal scenes in the Hebrew Bible, see Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 47–62.

(vv. 5-6, 12)—but I shall show how the Johannine working out of the rendezvous to a greater extent connects with recognition-scene conventions, since its basic themes are quite different in character from those of the betrothal scenes mentioned. As we shall see, this change of reading matrix enables us to make good sense of certain aspects of the scene—aspects that otherwise stand in the way of a coherent reading of the text.

The betrothal scenes in the Hebrew Bible scarcely dealt with questions of cognition and were not complex in the Aristotelian sense. Although of course identifications would take place between the two characters at the well (Gen 24:24; 29:10), this knowledge was never explicitly modalized by some sort of trickery, elusiveness, or cognitive resistance, and such scenes were therefore much more focused on the pragmatic exchange of gifts: the marriage that ensured God's ongoing blessing of the people.¹¹³ In John 4:4-42, however, the "betrothal scene" does not lead to a beautiful, consummate marriage between Jesus and the Samaritan woman (at least not on a literal level); and according to Lyle Eslinger's important study, this circumstance is designed to disappoint those expectations that the pericope had at first created in the reader, thus conveying upon the reader the same sense of estrangement as is experienced by the Samaritan woman when meeting Jesus.¹¹⁴ The pericope's break with betrothal scene standards, however, seems to be more fundamental than this, since it has to do with the whole dimensionality of the narrative. From an early point on, it is balanced toward cognitive questions. The pericope departs from the examples from the Hebrew Bible by building up a cognitive *telos* overshadowing the pragmatic goal of the marriage; and in this, the pericope has much more

¹¹³ McWhirter regards Jacob's self-identification in Gen 29:12 as the turning point of the betrothal scene, thus pointing at a cognitive element in this particular betrothal scene; see eadem, *The Bridegroom Messiah*, 72-73. In my view the total absence of cognitive resistance reduces the cognitive aspect to a minor motif.

¹¹⁴ Eslinger, "The Wooing," 167, 181. In contrast, Jeffrey Lloyd Staley claims that the reader is not estranged. The scene rather creates an "intimate fellowship" with the implied author, as the implied reader and author, both being insiders, are on the same footing and both understand the irony of the story; idem, *The Prints First Kiss: A Rhetorical Investigation of the Implied Reader in the Fourth Gospel* (SBLDS 82; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 102; cf. 98-103. While both of these commentators notice the absence of the marriage in the scene, J.H. Neyrey suggests that the type-scene does in fact imply some kind of spiritual or symbolic marriage between Jesus and the Samaritan people, Jesus being the woman's new, true bridegroom replacing her former "husbands," cf. 2:1-11; 3:29 (idem, "Jacob Traditions," 426).

in common with a recognition scene.¹¹⁵ Motifs from the betrothal and recognition type-scenes seem to blend, but regarding the basic dimensionality of the story, the latter seems to be the generic host. In the following, we shall see how the scene interacts with the recognition scene conventions, and the first step in this analysis is to divide up the text in sections displaying the recognition moves of the text. The course of the scene is quite similar to the Odysseyan type-scene as laid out by Peter Gainsford (see p. 60), since recognition is postponed and the moves of hospitality and foretelling are employed, yet in a distinctive manner:

<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>		<i>Corresponding Moves in John 4:4–42</i>
The Observed and the Observer	Jesus and the Sam. Woman	Jesus and the Samaritans
1. The meeting (often with a hospitality motif)	1. The meeting at the well (vv. 4–7a)	1. Jesus and the Samaritans meet (v. 40)
2. The move of cognitive resistance (occasionally with a motif of foretelling)	2. The dialogue about water: Postponing recognition and hospitality (vv. 7b–15). Motif of foretelling (vv. 20–25)	—
3. Displaying the token of recognition	3. Jesus reveals his extraordinary knowledge (vv. 16–18). Jesus reveals his Messianic identity (v. 26)	3. The woman's testimony (vv. 27–30; cf. 39, 42), Jesus' own words (v. 42).
4. The moment of recognition	4. Partial recognition: Jesus is a prophet (v. 19). “The Messiah?” (v. 29)	4. The Samaritans recognize Jesus as the saviour of the world (vv. 39–42)
5. Attendant reactions and physical (re)union	5. The woman's testimony to the Samaritans (vv. 27–30; cf. 39, 42)	5. The Samaritans invite Jesus to stay (hospitality motif; vv. 39–42)

The meeting at the well (vv. 4–7a). In 2:13–3:36 John describes Jesus' first appearances in Jerusalem, and since Jesus according to 4:1–3, 43–54 is on his way to Galilee, the present scene constitutes a geographical transition situating Jesus in Samaria on his so-called second ministry

¹¹⁵ This is certainly not to say that recognition scenes are void of pragmatic events. On the contrary, recognition leads to new conditions of life. Like the whole Fourth Gospel, however, John 4:4–42 is very much concerned with cognitive change as a precondition for pragmatic change (see pp. 41–42).

tour. As a stranger, he arrives on the outskirts of the town of Sychar, and tired from the journey he takes a rest at the well in the midday heat (v. 6; cf. Gen 29:7). From the analepsis in v. 8, we understand that Jesus has been left alone by the disciples, who have gone to town to buy some food. Therefore, when the Samaritan woman comes to draw water at the well (v. 7a) and an observer-observed relation is established between her and the one who appears in the guise of a tired wanderer, though he is really much more than that, we may say that we are dealing with a recognition scene of the kind that takes place in isolation, at least in the beginning. By describing the place as “Jacob’s well” close to “the plot of ground that Jacob has given to his son Joseph” (vv. 5-6; cf. Gen 48:22; Josh 24:32), the text quite quickly informs the reader which intertextual relations it wants to cultivate. Yet, when it comes to the literature of the ancient world, the betrothal scene did certainly not have the exclusive rights to the motif of the stranger who meets a woman at the well. As Steve Reece has shown on the Homeric material, the meeting between the stranger and “the maiden at the well” was one of the recurring introductory elements of what he calls “the hospitality scene”—a designation that describes scenes containing motifs of welcoming and entertainment, some of them also belonging to the recognition type-scene, as they culminate in a form of anagnorisis.¹¹⁶ On the motif of “the maiden at the well” he states:

This motif must have had its basis in historical reality; the town well was one of the few places in archaic Greece where a young man might encounter an unmarried maiden. It is often the site of abduction, both in Greek myth and in art. But the motif is not restricted to the Greek world; it is a universal tale that knows no geographical bounds.¹¹⁷

The well was a liminal place (just as Samaria is liminal space in the Gospel narrative), where strangers could approach a foreign town and ask for information, without exposing themselves to the potential dangers inside the city, and where flirting and wooing could take place in the periphery of civic order. Reece lists four examples of “the maiden

¹¹⁶ The label “hospitality scene,” which is not found in ancient poetics or rhetoric, stresses the aspect of social interaction (acknowledgment) in such recognition scenes.

¹¹⁷ Steve Reece, *The Stranger’s Welcome: Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene* (Michigan Monographs in Classical Antiquity; Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 12-13. In a note, Reece refers to the abovementioned examples of “the maiden at the well” from the Hebrew Bible. Incidentally, Bultmann mentions a Buddhist example; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 131.

at the well” from the *Odyssey*; scenes in which Odysseus and his retinue approach a new location on their journey, and I shall quote a couple of passages to give a first impression of the motif:

But when he was about to enter the lovely city, then the goddess, flashing-eyed Athene, met him in the guise of a young maiden carrying a pitcher, and she stood before him.... (*Od.* 7.18–21; cf. 6.110–332 [Murray])

And in front of the city they met a girl drawing water, the stalwart daughter of Laestrygonian Antiphates, who had come down to the fair-flowing spring Artacia, from which they carried water to the town. (*Od.* 10.105–108; cf. 15.415–484 [Murray])

In the examples above, the maiden functions as an informant who leads the strangers to the ruler of the city (cf. 1 Sam 9:11–13). The ruler now acts as the host in the hospitality scene and provides a bath, a meal, or a feast for the guests. In the course of the scene, an interrogation and a revelation of identity may take place as in the first example, which leads to Odysseus’ long dialogue with Alcinous, the lord of the Phaeacians (*Od.* 7.236–297; 8.548–12.453).¹¹⁸ Yet, “the maiden at the well” may also form a more integrative part in the recognition, when the maiden is not only an informant but also an observer herself, who meets a stranger, the stranger pretending to be someone other than who he or she really is. In the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* 91–291, Demeter decides to leave the gods’ assembly in order to search for her daughter Persephone; and wandering among men she is not recognized until she reveals herself, since she hides her beauty, takes the form of an old woman, and claims that she is a refugee from Crete—yes, even pretend Cretans lie. When arriving in Eleusis, where she ends up pronouncing her self-revelation (εἶμι δὲ Δημήτηρ, 268), the following happens:

She had sat down at the roadside, sick at heart, at the Maiden’s Well [Παρθενίῳ φρέατι], from where the people of the community used to draw water;...The daughters of Keleos the Eleusinid caught sight of her as they came to draw water and carry it in bronze pails to their father’s dear house...They did not recognize her, for gods are hard for mortals to see, but stood close to her and spoke winged words: “Who are you, old woman, of those born long ago? Where are you from?....” (*Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 98–99, 105–107, 111–113 [West])

“The maiden at the well” also appears in one of the recognition scenes of ancient drama. When Orestes returns from his exile in Euripides’

¹¹⁸ Reece, *The Stranger’s Welcome*, 26–28.

Electra and first sees Electra (before recognizing her), he utters the following line:

Quick now! I see some sort of serving girl approach with a jar of fountain water on her shaven head—it looks heavy for her. Sit down here, let us question the slave girl. Pylades, perhaps at last we shall hear the news we hoped for when we crossed into this land. (Euripides, *El.* 107–111; cf. 54–63 [Vermeule])

When Orestes and his friend Pylades encounter Electra, Orestes at first holds back his true identity, though he himself has recognized the serving-maid as Electra by overhearing her expressions of distress; and when her husband (a peasant representing her social comedown) arrives, the motif of hospitality appears together with him since the guests are offered the best from his humble home (357–431).

As emerges from these examples, the well is not just the locus of betrothal but also constitutes a typical scenario of incognito characters and evokes reader expectations concerning the search for true identities and anagnorisis. In John 4:4–42, as in the above examples, the stranger and the girl enter into a conversation that raises the question about whom they are being confronted with. Moreover, the encounter gives rise to a hospitality motif played out between the dialogue partners. This takes place in the following phase of cognitive resistance.

The dialogue about water: Postponing recognition and hospitality (vv. 7b–15). Jesus' first words to the woman, "Give me a drink" (v. 7b), reproduces Eliezer's question to Rebekah in Gen 24:17 (cf. 24:14, 43); and like in Genesis it is a request for hospitality. As we have seen previously, the hospitality motif is not just the main theme in the lengthy hospitality scenes in Homer as detected by Reece, but it is also a common opening move in the proper recognition scenes in the *Odyssey* where it constitutes a part of the initial testing to which the observed stranger subjects the observer.¹¹⁹ In the present dialogue, the Samaritan woman replies reluctantly to Jesus' request and does not offer him water, reminding him that a Jew should not be asking a Samaritan for water, since, as the narrator explains, they do not share things in common (συγγεῶνται v. 9). Yet, unlike in Homer, it is not the loyalty or the moral status of the woman that is being tested—her conduct of life is revealed later

¹¹⁹ See p. 60 and Gainsford, "Formal Analysis," 44–47; Sheila Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition*, 91–117. Gainsford's examples of hospitality motifs in the recognition scenes of the second half of the *Odyssey* are as follows: Book 14, passim; 15.301–302; 16.41–45, 49–55, 57–59 et al.; 19.96–105, 317–356; 20.190–194; 24.297–301.

on in vv. 16–18—but Jesus is rather trying her level of understanding: Does she recognize that he, by his question, sets up a reversed relation between them by assigning to him the role of the recipient and depicting her as the giver, when he is really the giver of water that quenches all thirst? The woman’s answer not only shows that this is beyond her comprehension, but also indicates that she is breaking the recognition type-scene conventions of hospitality in order to preserve the conventions of social behavior. Thus the story, to begin with, displaces the hospitality motif.¹²⁰ In contrast, ancient literature abounds in stories of pious human beings who unknowingly entertain divine guests in disguise, thereby revealing their own true nature for which they eventually receive a deserved reward.¹²¹ Abraham, for example, treated the three “men” by the oaks of Mamre and was given a son (only the implied author and reader know that the men represent the Lord; cf. Gen 18:1); the poor but noble couple Philemon and Baucis experienced that their simple cottage was transformed into a temple as repayment for their overwhelming hospitality toward Jupiter and Mercury, who came to them as disguised visitors (Ovid, *Metam.* 8.611–724). Turning to the New Testament, the motif appears in a most magnificent manner in Jesus’ judgment discourse in Matt 25:31–46: “[F]or I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me...” (Matt 25:35).¹²² The hospitality move in the recognition between Jesus and the Samaritan woman, however, does not continue in the direction that may have been expected on the basis of many other recognition scenes; it breaks off when Jesus in his second line changes the agenda from the question of the woman’s hospitality toward recognition: “If you knew [ἤδεις] the gift of God, and who it is that is saying to you, ‘Give me a drink,’ you would have asked him, and he would have given you living water” (v. 10). Jesus demonstrates that she is in a state of *agnoia* since she is neither able to understand what she really needs—the living water

¹²⁰ Such hesitancy also appears in Euripides, *El.* 405–419 and in some of the Odyssean hospitality scenes (*Od.* 4.26–29; 7.153–154). See Reece, *The Stranger’s Welcome*, 18–19.

¹²¹ See Andrew Arterbury’s study, *Entertaining Angels: Early Christian Hospitality in its Mediterranean Setting* (NTM 8; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2005).

¹²² Cf. Heb 13:2, “Do not neglect to show hospitality to strangers, for by doing that some have entertained angels without knowing it.” See also Chariton, *Chaer.*, 2.3.5–6: “Have you not even heard what Homer teaches us? ‘Of in the guise of strangers from distant lands the gods watch human insolence and righteousness.’” Chariton quotes from Homer, *Il.* 17.485.

of eternal life (v. 14)—nor to recognize the one who is able to provide it.¹²³ From this point on, the game of double entendre, irony, and misunderstanding escalates as in the previous dialogue with Nicodemus in 3:1–21.¹²⁴ But whereas the subject of that pericope primarily was the concept of rebirth “from above,” the present dialogue, as the reader soon discovers, creates a play on the various meanings of the term “water” (ὕδωρ; passim in vv. 7–15); and later on, when the woman is away, the discussion opens on the subject of “food” (βρῶμα; vv. 32, 34). The language of the whole pericope is concerned with the aliments that human beings need to subsist. This relates to the hospitality motif, because the act of giving or withholding these means of sustenance is ultimately a judgment over the recipient’s right to exist or not. As to the understanding of the aliments, the pericope establishes a veritable clash between two paradigms of understanding that we—by evoking a Reitzensteinian typology—may call a religion-of-blessing and a religion-of-salvation point of view, respectively. The Samaritan woman questions Jesus from the point of view of blessing, i.e., within an understanding that sees Jesus as one who is able to comply with her immediate physical needs, while Jesus’ answers are situated on a religion-of-salvation level by presenting him as the one who gives metaphorical nutrition (“water,” “food,” in ch. 6: “bread”) in order to produce or sustain metaphorical, eternal life. This of course creates a lot of talk at cross purposes, since the woman is not able to comprehend Jesus’ perspective, and even at the end of the present section of the dialogue, she still thinks that they are conversing about water that puts an end to her laborious task of getting the daily water (v. 15).¹²⁵

¹²³ The fact that this structure of desire also points the other way, from Jesus toward the woman (“Give me a drink,” v. 7), has been studied from a deconstructive point of view in Stephen D. Moore, *Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 43–64.

¹²⁴ The extensive use of irony and misunderstanding in John is a recurring object of study in Johannine exegesis. Important contributions include Herbert Leroy, *Rätsel und Missverständnis: Ein Beitrag zur Formgeschichte des Johannesevangeliums* (BBB 30; Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1968); George W. MacRae, “Theology and Irony in the Fourth Gospel,” in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 103–113; Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 152–180; Paul D. Duke, *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985); Gail R. O’Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative Mode and Theological Claim* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).

¹²⁵ The game between these two levels of understanding is a perfect example of the Gospel’s general focus on the cognitive dimension. The giving of life is the *telos* of the pragmatic plot of the story, but both this chapter and the Gospel as a whole center on the auxiliary plot of understanding in the cognitive dimension (see pp. 41–42).

The riddle concerning Jesus' identity remains unsolved during the major part of the scene. Jesus does not give away his identity right away, but postpones the recognition by speaking of himself in the third person in the shape of anonymous pronouns (τίς, αὐτον; v. 10). Jesus' *telling* is elusive, as in the dialogue with Nicodemus, and it does not reveal him the way it did in the recognitions of ch. 1. In this, the recognition scene becomes more Odysseyan than some Johannine scenes in the sense that the observed does not rip away the veil at once. There are even close parallels to the above recognition scenes in the *Hymn to Demeter* and Euripides' *Electra*. When Orestes and Pylades catch sight of the girl with the pitcher, they hear her complaining of her fate and thus recognize her as Electra. But when approaching her they avoid telling her who they are, since they want to know her true intentions concerning the planning of revenge against the mother. In Electra's eyes, they are strangers (ξένοι; 216, 283, 303, 332 et al.), so she does not understand that Orestes is really talking about himself in the third person when he says that her brother has sent him to give her signs of life (228). And Orestes certainly does not hesitate to subject her to irony, as for example when he rejoices over her plans: "O, I wish Orestes could stand here and listen" (282 [Vermeule]). When John establishes a comparable setting of irony, his text certainly obeys the demands of the type-scene, since it delays recognition and produces an aesthetic effect of suspense, but one might be tempted to ask whether genre conventions are not at the present working against John's overall purpose of revealing Jesus' identity. In other words, why is Jesus acting somewhat like a deceiving Orestes or Odysseus by withholding his true identity? Why does he not rip off the disguise at once in order to show her his tokens of divinity? The question relates to the problem concerning why Jesus as a literary figure is wearing a disguise at all (see pp. 79–84).¹²⁶ In the prologue we saw that Jesus' *sarx* is a necessary communication medium, which at the same time runs the risk of overshadowing the *doxa* that it wants to communicate. This circumstance, however, does not prevent Jesus from revealing his true identity in the "I am" sayings, for example, so the

¹²⁶ I am discussing the question of Jesus' hidden and exposed identity in relation to John's mode of literary exposition. The question may of course in another sense relate to the historical development of the early Jesus movement as in William Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien: Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verständnis des Markusevangeliums* (4th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969 [1st ed., 1901]); cf. Mark W.G. Stibbe, "The Elusive Christ: A New Reading of the Fourth Gospel," in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 244–245.

question remains why Jesus, in the present scene (and in the preceding dialogue with Nicodemus), speaks cryptically. The question may be answered with some reference to the function of secrecy in the recognition type-scene. The phase of *agnoia*, where the observed often plays around with the observer, does not merely serve the purpose of thrilling the reader, but also functions as a kind of test. The returned protagonist tests the loyalty of the recognizer, in order to detect if it is safe to make oneself known. In John, such tests are of a different kind since the main events in the course of the story are not dependent on whether people recognize Jesus, but on the predetermined timing of “the hour.” This means that Jesus is not in the same way taking a dangerous risk by giving away his identity.¹²⁷ The test, in other words, does not seem to work on an isolated story-world level but functions as a message to the implied reader.¹²⁸ By testing the woman’s knowledge, John also tests the reader’s and amplifies the difference between their two knowledge levels. While the woman is victimized and fails the test (at least at first), the implied reader, at her expense, is seduced into passing the test by reactivating the *whispering* that sounded in the prologue. In the progression of the Gospel, this serves to cement the reader’s position before facing the cognitive resistance that accumulates from ch. 5 and on. Once again, recognition is not merely a means of characterization but a function on the discourse level; and in the eyes of the reader, Jesus is not gambling with his role as revealer when acting elusively, but confirms the reader’s sense of being on a level of knowledge superior to the story actors.

The Samaritan woman’s quest for Jesus’ identity is a search for social, thematic roles that suit him. In the present dialogic part of the pericope, we understand that she sees Jesus as a Jew (v. 9), she calls him “Sir” (κύριε; vv. 11, 15), and she accepts that he is the one who can give living water, though she does not really understand what it is (v. 15). By her question in v. 12, the woman moreover tries to determine Jesus’ appropriate place in her social status hierarchy: “Are you greater [μὴ σὺ μείζων εἶ] than our ancestor Jacob...?”¹²⁹ The reader knows that Jesus is greater than Jacob—and even greater than Moses (1:17)—but the μὴ-particle that begins the question suggests that she is expecting a

¹²⁷ This may be one of the important points that separate John’s general story economy from Mark’s; see MacDonald, “Secrecy and Recognitions.”

¹²⁸ See Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 180; Staley, *The Print’s First Kiss*, 98–103.

¹²⁹ For a close parallel, see Electra’s question in Sophocles, *El.* 1202 (Greene), “You haven’t come as, in some way, our kinsman? [σὺ δὴ ποθ’ ἡμῖν ξυγγενὴς ἦχαις ποθέν].”

negative answer, hinting at the possibility that Jesus might be an *alazōn* who pretends to be more than he really is. She does not see that he is in fact an *eirōn* who appears as a tired wanderer though he is “the Saviour of the world” (v. 42), and who is holding back his real identity in order to reveal her (and the reader’s) level of understanding. The woman’s question belongs to the motif of suggesting alternative (but wrong) identities, which we have previously identified as a recurring element in the move of cognitive resistance in the recognition scene (p. 65).

Jesus reveals his extraordinary knowledge (vv. 16–18). The dialogue about water is interrupted abruptly by Jesus in v. 16, and the water motif of the scene evaporates from this moment on. As long as the scene is regarded as a courtship scene, Jesus’ statement, “Go, call you husband and come back” (v. 16), stands as an unmotivated change of topic and a contradiction to the whole setup. Many more or less psychologizing or allegorizing explanations have been suggested,¹³⁰ but from the point of view of anagnorisis, the change introduces a conventional move in the recognition process, which is the display of the mark. We are witnessing a change in communication strategy toward gradual unveiling. As in the incident with Nathanael in 1:47–51, Jesus lets his identity show through his omniscience (cf. the Aristotelian recognition διὰ μνήμης), as he brings to light that her answer, “I have no husband,” is quite an understatement, since she has had five men and now has one who is really not her husband. Jesus, as in his request for water, once again asks the “wrong” question. This time it leads to recognition, albeit not her recognition of Jesus, in the first instance, but his recognition of her.

Partial recognition: Jesus is a prophet (v. 19). The motif of foretelling (vv. 20–25). As in the Nathanael episode, Jesus’ capture of the observer role and his recognition of the other character create a mutual recognition. The woman’s response, however, is not the same as Nathanael’s. When he met Jesus, he was in possession of preconceived information about Jesus as the fulfillment of Scripture (*whispering*; 1:45), which was confirmed when he met Jesus and confessed him as the Son of God and the King of Israel (1:49). The woman, on the other hand, begins from scratch in

¹³⁰ For examples, see the references in O’Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel*, 66, n. 45; cf. 131. O’Day and Eugene Botha see the break as a device intended to surprise the reader; O’Day, *Revelation*, 66–74; Eugene Botha, “John 4.16: A Difficult Text Speech Act Theoretically Revisited,” *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 182–192. Botha’s attempt takes the break in v. 16 as a kind of speech act teaser that evokes the curiosity of the implied reader.

her search for the stranger's identity. Her recognition of Jesus transfers upon him the thematic role of prophet: "Sir, I see that you are a prophet" (v. 19)—a title that already appeared in 1:21, 25 (cf. 4:44; 6:14; 7:40, 52; 9:17), where John the Baptist refused to apply it to himself. In the woman's answer, however, she is not speaking of "the prophet," but more vaguely of "a prophet" (προφήτης). Without Nathanael's (or the Baptist's) foreknowledge she only realizes that the stranger has access to divine knowledge.¹³¹ Having given him this status, she consequently seeks more information from him by presenting to him the dilemma that the Samaritans worship on "this mountain" (Gerizim), while the Jews claim that Jerusalem is the right place of worship (v. 20). She thus introduces another marker of the boundary between Samaritans and Jews, just as she had done by her words of surprise at Jesus' first approach to her. In the beginning of the scene, Jesus relativized ethnic and sexual modes of segregation (v. 7; cf. v. 27); and he now outdoes an important locative distinction, since in the perspective of the Gospel both antipoles in the distinction (Gerizim and Jerusalem) belong to the same negative side of the Gospel's overriding dichotomy between the heavenly and the earthly or spirit and flesh, to use some of the binary terms from the Nicodemus dialogue (3:1-21). True worship is *a-topian*, not bound to particular locations, but takes place "in spirit and truth" (vv. 23-24).¹³² Jesus' words concerning true worship lead to the moment of foretelling in the recognition process. As we remember, the disguised Odysseus would often keep his identity secret to his observers, by pretending to be an acquaintance of Odysseus who knows Odysseus' plans of return. Such foretelling in recognition scenes is of course only possible as long as the observer is still in the dark regarding the identity of the observed one. In the present scene, we are still in that phase of the process, since cognitive resistance keeps outbidding the woman's

¹³¹ Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:171.

¹³² The terms "locative" and "*a-topian*" take inspiration from Jonathan Z. Smith's history-of-religions approach to ancient, Mediterranean religion; see idem, *Map is not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions* (SJLA 23; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), xi-xv, 67-207; idem, "Hellenistic Religions," in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (eds. Mortimer J. Adler et al.; 30 vols; 15th ed; London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974), 8:749-751 and idem, *Drudgery Divine*, 121-142. I find the term "*a-topian*" less liable to misunderstanding than Smith's own choice of word ("utopian"). On the Fourth Gospel's construction of ethnic space, see Tod D. Swanson, "To Prepare a Place: Johannine Christianity and the Collapse of Ethnic Territory," in *John and Postcolonialism: Travel, Space, and Power* (eds. Musa W. Dube and Jeffrey L. Staley; Bible and Postcolonialism 7; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 11-31.

partial recognition in v. 19. Yet, it is important to notice that Jesus, in spite of his hesitation to reveal himself, is not a trickster who wants to avoid her becoming aware of who he is. John cannot set aside his view of Jesus as a revealer, and as a consequence of this, the conventional move of foretelling is not put into the mouth of the observed as in the *Odyssey*, but is bound to be pronounced by the observer, the woman: “I know that Messiah is coming...When he comes, he will proclaim all things to us” (v. 25). In spite of Jesus’ previous statement that the hour is now here (καὶ νῦν ἔστιν; v. 23), she is still speaking in the mode of future expectation—another example of irony. Like the *Odyssey*an observers and Electra she is giving expression to hopes that she expects to be fulfilled at the arrival of the one who is, in fact, standing right in front of her. More is added to the irony as she does not sense her own hint at Jesus’ Messianic identity when she states that the Messiah shall proclaim everything. This is exactly what Jesus did for her when revealing her way of life in vv. 16–18; cf. 29.

Jesus reveals his Messianic identity (v. 26). In the course of the woman’s observation of Jesus, she realizes that there is something off, but she is not able to grasp what it is because she does not have the cognitive competence to really understand the marks presented. She is not given precognition through *whispering* like the reader, John the Baptist and Nathanael, and the *showing* of Jesus’ omniscience only takes her the first step of the way.¹³³ Jesus therefore turns toward directly *telling* her about his Messianic identity: “I am he [ἐγώ εἰμι], the one who is speaking to you” (v. 26). The potential for astonishment in such a statement, which is the standard self-revelatory expression in ancient anagnorises (see pp. 148–150), stems from the deictic shift that takes the absent, third-person Messiah into her presence. Only a moment before, she told Jesus a small narrative concerning the coming of the Messiah, and suddenly the Jesus-character or the present “I” is blended into this story.¹³⁴ Two basic themes of the recognition type-scene are manifest: the creation of presence and identity. Jesus conquers the Messianic role and is himself

¹³³ Scholars often point to the step-by-step character of the realization process in the pericope (e.g., Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, 79); with regard to this, it resembles Penelope’s gradual recognition of Odysseus (Emlyn-Jones, “The Reunion,” 2).

¹³⁴ See Greimas & Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. “Anaphore,” 15: “L’identité, mise en œuvre par la reconnaissance ou l’identification, est une relation anaphorique formelle entre deux termes, dont l’un est présent ou actuel, et dont l’autre est absent, ailleurs ou passé” On deictic shifts in narrative and theatrical discourse, see Davidsen, *The Narrative Jesus*, 179–183; Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 79–85.

semiotized by it. As in the recognition *catena* in 1:35-51, the reaction of the observer does not at first materialize in a confessional formula or some sort of confirmation of Jesus' claim, but finds expression in the observer's urge to leave the observed in order to spread the rumor.

The woman's testimony (vv. 27-30). The present section makes up a change of *dramatis personae* by bringing back the disciples to the scene and sending off the woman to call for the Samaritans in the town. The disciples are described as being astonished to see Jesus speaking to a woman, but it is also emphasized that they do not express their surprise—unlike Electra's husband in the Euripidean woman-at-the-well scene:

Hey there! Who are these strangers standing at our gates? What is the errand that could bring them to our rough courtyard? Are they demanding something from me? A nice woman should never stand in gossip with young men. (Euripides, *El.* 341-344 [Vermeule])

It is obvious that the disciples' silence is expressive, but what it indicates is not quite clear. It may be understood as an expression of their reverence toward their master,¹³⁵ but if we notice that the disciples are in fact reentering the scene in the role of observers, who try to make sense of the mutual observer-observed relation between the woman and Jesus, their silence may also be an expression of their effort to understand what is going on, which often appears to strike observers dumb (cf. Euripides, *Hel.* 630-631; *Iph. taur.* 839-840; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7).¹³⁶ If this is the reason for their silence, what they are facing in shock seems to be Jesus' independence from the social conventions between man and woman, Jew and Samaritan.¹³⁷

As the disciples arrive, the woman leaves for town and spreads the rumor of Jesus' prophetic powers: "Come and see a man who told me everything I have ever done! He cannot be the Messiah, can he [μήτι]?" (v. 29). Her testimony is a reaction to her partial recognition, as were the reactions of testimony in 1:35-51. It contains a host of information, and I shall call attention to a couple of relevant features. First, the woman is trying to communicate her own *seeing* in an act of *telling* that

¹³⁵ Schnackenburg, *Johannesevangelium*, 1:443.

¹³⁶ See O'Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel*, 74. Both the dumbness of recognition and of respect appears in 21:12: "Now none of the disciples dared to ask him, 'Who are you?' because they knew it was the Lord."

¹³⁷ Contrary to what one might expect from vv. 7-9, these verses do not mention that the woman is a Samaritan but simply state that the disciples, like Electra's husband, were stunned when seeing Jesus talking to a woman (μετά γυναίκος; v. 27).

invites the town dwellers to perform their own *seeing*, “Come and see [δεῦτε ἴδετε]...” In a slightly different form, she repeats Jesus’ call in 1:39 (ἔρχεσθε καὶ ὄψεσθε) and Philip’s in 1:46 (ἔρχου καὶ ἴδε), which in the latter case had the same function as in the present situation, i.e., to draw near the addressee so that the testimony may be confirmed. Second, the woman identifies the crucial elements that interrelate in the recognition process: the camouflage (“a man”), the mark that made her question that he was only a man (“who told me everything I have ever done”), and the possibly fitting thematic role revealed by the mark (“the Messiah”). Third, her testimony constitutes a kind of *whispering* in the ears of the Samaritans. Although her statement of acknowledgment is phrased in the form of a question (and maybe even a very guarded one since it begins with a μήτι-particle), she is giving the Samaritans a hint at Jesus’ possible identity. She is thus granting the Samaritans in town advance expectations and better conditions for recognition than she herself had been offered. Her testimony arouses the Samaritans’ interest, and it has the same effect as the testimonies of Andrew and Philip in 1:35–51: It creates new observers who approach Jesus in order to see for themselves.

Jesus and the Disciples (vv. 31–38). The next section describes a dialogue between Jesus and the Disciples in the space of time between the woman’s departure toward town and the Samaritans’ arrival at the well. It fills in the gap in story time and creates a sense of expectancy by keeping the reader waiting for the Samaritans. The dialogue begins in a similar manner as the dialogue with the woman, by placing Jesus in the receptive role for a brief moment in order to move him away from this position. Thus the disciples offer him food, but he answers: “I have food to eat that you do not know about” (v. 32). The disciples, like the woman, do not understand the profundity of the words—their status as insiders is not at all fixed—so Jesus has to explain that his food is to complete God’s will and work.¹³⁸ From v. 35 on, the subject diverts toward “sowing and harvest,” and the dialogue becomes a monologue. The sayings by Jesus, which have thematic parallels in the synoptic material (e.g., Matt 9:35; Luke 10:2), deal with the right moment for harvesting and the relation between sower and harvester, but they are difficult to interpret since they seem to mix together the situation of the disciples and the implied reader. The fact that the

¹³⁸ O’Day, *Revelation in the Fourth Gospel*, 80.

lines have been placed in the present context seems to be due to their associative resemblance with the other alimentary metaphors as well as the hospitality motif of the pericope. Moreover, the harvest illustrates what takes place in the following section when the Samaritans turn toward Jesus, letting him reap the Samaritan mission field.¹³⁹ Generally speaking, however, these verses seem to have little relation to both betrothal and recognition type-scene conventions.

The Samaritans invite Jesus to stay and recognize him as the saviour of the world (vv. 39-42). In the concluding verses 39-42, which make up the pericope's climactic moment of unreserved anagnorisis, the Samaritans from town have now become the observers encountering Jesus. As already noticed, this move establishes a pericope structure with a first and a second observer actant that is parallel to the one we encountered in the recognition *catena* in 1:35-51. Once again, the spatial movements of the actors create a situation where testimony to the absent Jesus is confirmed and recognized in his presence (cf. p. 111):

Jesus is present (vv. 4-27)	The Samaritan woman sees Jesus
Jesus is absent (vv. 28-30, 39)	The Samaritan woman tells the Samaritans
Jesus is absent (vv. 28-30, 39; cf. 42)	The Samaritans hear the Samaritan woman
Jesus is present (vv. 40-42; cf. v. 29)	The Samaritans come to see and hear Jesus himself

Now, we must note that in the present narrative Jesus does not *show* a visible identity token as in the *sēmeia*. Although the Samaritan woman in her capacity as informant encouraged the Samaritans to come and see (v. 29), the scene does not thematize the act of seeing but the hearing of words as a mode of perceiving Jesus' true identity. Verse 39 says that many of the town dwellers came to believe because of the woman's word (λόγος), while even more believed Jesus' own word (λόγος; v. 41); and eventually the Samaritans say to the woman: "It is no longer because of what you said [διὰ τὴν σὴν λαλίαν] that we believe, for we have heard for ourselves [αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀκηκόαμεν]" (v. 42). Along with commentators like Schnackenburg, I cannot subscribe to Bultmann's understanding of the final statement as a devaluation of human testi-

¹³⁹ For a balanced discussion of the verses, see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:181-184.

mony in contrast to the words of the revealer himself.¹⁴⁰ True, when the Samaritans state that they have now heard for themselves, it indicates that it is better to listen directly to the primary source; but the text hardly seeks to privilege the recognition of the primary “earwitnesses” to an extent that it disqualifies the reader’s conditions for recognizing Jesus. The reader has no direct access to Jesus’ words; and from this perspective, it seems that the text is trying to solve that problem by putting Jesus and the woman’s words into harmony, thus showing that testimonies to Jesus as the Messiah may be valid in spite of his absence. The fact that the woman’s testimony, as vague and derivative as it may be, was confirmed by Jesus’ words indicates that a legitimization of such testimony is at work. Jesus’ words may be more effective than the woman’s since he makes more people believe than she does (v. 41), but those who believe without having heard Jesus are not at all gullible believers of gossip. According to John, this applies to the situation of the Samaritans before encountering Jesus, but also to the reader (see 19:35; 21:24). Although readers lack the presence of Jesus, they are witnessing how Jesus’ true identity does not only come forth when *shown* in the *sēmeia*, but also in the mode of *telling*—the only mode available to the reader. In this respect, the pericope complements the *showings* that more or less surround it: the first *sēmeion* at the wedding in Cana (2:1–12; cf. 23) and the second one relating to the healing of the official’s son (4:43–54).

The Samaritans confess Jesus as the Savior of the world (v. 42), but it is remarkable that they do not know the name of the one they are encountering. Neither did the woman at the well. Jesus enters Samaria as the mysterious stranger and in a sense remains so throughout the story. In contrast to the type-scenes of Greco-Roman literature, where proper-name identification is often very essential, Jesus never reveals his proper name but remains a pronoun whose divine thematic role is eventually realized by the observers. Thus, the scene is a perfect illustration of the fact that Johannine recognitions are seldom interested in identifying the returning hero by a proper name, whereas the aspect of social recognition is of primary importance.¹⁴¹ The circumstance that the recognition scene in 4:4–42 focuses on this aspect is illustrated when

¹⁴⁰ See Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 148–149. Bultmann understands *λαλία* in a negative sense (“chatter,” “gossip”); but in Johannine context (see 8:43) the term is probably without such connotations (Schnackenburg, *Johannesevangelium*, 1:490, n. 1).

¹⁴¹ In the post-resurrection appearances, however, the proper-name identification of the risen one becomes an issue (see p. 89).

the Samaritans invite Jesus to stay with them (ἡρώτων αὐτὸν μέιναι παρ' αὐτοῖς; v. 40). What Sheila Murnaghan says with regard to the *Odyssey* is also true here: “[I]dentity is expressed in the acknowledging gestures of others.”¹⁴² With the Samaritans’ invitation, John arranges a celebration of the new relationship and the social role of Jesus, which has enabled them to share things in common. This inverts the initial situation as expressed by the woman in v. 9. Their gesture—whether or not we call it a spiritual marriage between the Messianic bridegroom and the Samaritans—rounds off the whole pericope by fulfilling the hospitality motif, which was interrupted at the well. In a sense, this makes the Samaritans the final observer actant in the story and reduces the woman to the role of an informant who did not quite understand her own message. The maidens who met Odysseus and Demeter by the well in the examples above were also such informants. They did not recognize the strange visitor themselves but led the guest to the city inhabitants who became recognizers of the guest they were entertaining. In the present pericope, however, hospitality is not shown until Jesus is recognized. In John, recognition seems to have ecclesiological consequences, as it creates a new community between its partakers.

A few words in conclusion: The encounter between Jesus and the Samaritans in many ways resembles a typical recognition scene, and when seen from this particular genre perspective, elements otherwise rendered difficult become a natural part of the narrative—for example the section regarding the woman’s marital relations (vv. 16–18), which belongs to the *dia mnēmēs* motif in anagnorisis. In John 4:4–42, conventional features of the recognition scene are employed, but also developed. The motif of foretelling is expressed by the observer and not the observed, and hospitality is postponed to the end of the scene. As we have seen, such generic transformations reflect the christological and ecclesiological ideology of the Gospel.

¹⁴² Murnaghan, *Disguise and Recognition*, 91.

CHAPTER THREE

RECOGNITION IN CONFLICT (JOHN 5–19)

With John 5 a new phase in the narrative begins. While the first four chapters introduced the stranger from heaven in the story-world without submitting him to significant opposition, and even had the Samaritans welcoming him (yet, see 2:24–25; 3:3–21), Jesus' dual appearance now gives rise to a pronounced schism among his observers (see the *σχίσμα* in 7:43; 9:16; 10:19).¹ The political and religious authorities in Jerusalem see Jesus as a threat, so a conflict commences.² Jesus is only recognized by the few. Jesus' appearance evokes a *krisis*, and this forensic motif pervades the present part of the Gospel.³ Jesus' first discourse (5:19–47) describes him as the one who judges between life and death (5:22, 26, 30; yet, 8:15), whereas chs. 5–19 conclude when he himself is sentenced to death (18:28–19:16a). In contrast to Pilate's judgment, however, Jesus' judgment is just (5:30) and true (8:16, contrary to judgment by human standards; cf. 7:24; 8:15), since the real peripeteic power of human destiny (5:24) lies in the recognition or nonrecognition of Jesus. From the point of view of anagnorisis, we have previously noticed that recognition scenes may establish trial scenarios when identity claims provoke embarrassment and thus lead to a questioning of their legitimacy (e.g., Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*; Euripides, *El.*; Heliodorus, *Aeth.*; see pp. 64–66). Instead of leading to immediate recognition, trial-like proceedings may come first. Although only some encounters in the following chapters are recognition type-scenes, they all thoroughly thematize the move of cognitive resistance, consisting of interrogations,

¹ Scholars generally agree on this shift in the narrative. See, e.g., Schnackenburg, *Johannesevangelium*, 2:1–7; Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 91; Stibbe, *John*, 75; Painter, *The Quest*, 213–214; Smith, *John*, 129.

² For expressions of opposition to Jesus in the chs. 5–12, see, e.g., 5:16–18; 6:41–42; 6:60–7:9; 7:12–13, 32, 44; 8:59; 10:31–39; 11:7–8, 45–57.

³ Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 57–138. Chapters 5 and 7–8 have a certain resemblance with ancient, judicial oratory, as Jesus' revelation of identity evokes accusations, defense, and counteraccusations (8:31–59). See Attridge, "Argumentation in John 5"; Neyrey, "Jesus the Judge"; Larsen, "Hvem er Manden?" Note, for example, judicial terms like *κατηγορέω* (5:45; 8:6); *κρίνω/κρίσις* (5:22, 24, 27, 29–30; 7:24, 51; 8:15–16, 26, 50); *μαρτυρέω/μαρτυρία* (5:31–32, 34, 36; 8:13–14, 17–18); *νόμος* (7:19, 23, 49, 51; 8:17).

suggestion of other identities applying to Jesus, disputes, and rejection. As the *sēmeia* correspond to the move of token-*showing*, the disputes in the present chapters may be taken as developments of the move of cognitive resistance in which recognition is discussed, postponed, and turned down.

Now, when recognition becomes an object of controversy its capacity as the conclusion of an enthymeme rises to the surface. When Eurycleia identifies Odysseus, the trajectory of reasoning is the following: (1) Odysseus is said to have a scar on his thigh (general premise), (2) this man has a scar on his thigh (specific premise), hence (3), this man is Odysseus (conclusion). Although Eurycleia may mistake one scar for another, her process of identification is relatively simple when comparing it to the social recognition of thematic roles. This primarily has to do with the different nature of the “scar” or the recognition token. In identifications like the above one, the token is an index sign, pointing toward its owner through physical contact; but in social recognition, anagnorisis relates to the conventional and symbolic coding of thematic roles—as, for example, “The Messiah”: The Messiah is someone who acts and speaks in such and such way and who refrains from doing or saying such and such things. This may also be expressed in an enthymeme: The Messiah does and says x (1), person y does and says x (2), person y is the Messiah (3).⁴ Story actors in John basically agree on what Jesus says and does (the second, specific premise), for even the antagonists say that he performs signs (10:33; 11:47) and that he makes himself equal to God (5:18; 10:33), but the disagreement pertains to how these sayings and doings correspond to the claimed thematic roles. The discussion of how to acknowledge Jesus’ divine recognition mark becomes a struggle over the first premise, i.e., the proper understanding of the christological roles. The accusers bring forth a whole set of arguments that are intended to contradict Jesus’ messianic claims. He is a Samaritan (8:48); he is from Galilee and not from Bethlehem (7:41–42); his native country is known, whereas the origin of the real Messiah is unknown (7:27); he has earthly parents and is not from heaven (6:42); he speaks of his departure, whereas the Messiah is supposed to remain

⁴ In the present context, it is not necessary to discuss the various Messianic ideas in Ancient Judaism. For a classic presentation, see Sigmund Mowinckel, *He that Cometh* (trans. G.W. Anderson; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959). For a more up-to-date study, see John J. Collins, *The Scepter and the Star: The Messiahs of the Dead Sea Scrolls and other Ancient Literature* (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1995).

forever (12:34); he testifies to himself (8:13), and first and foremost: He breaks the law (7:19–24). In all this, Jesus is not fit for the divine thematic roles, but is rather described as a sinner (9:24), possessed by a demon (8:48; 10:20), “out of his mind” (10:20), and a criminal (18:30). In defense, Jesus and other characters point to his signs/works, for example (5:36; 7:31; 9:33; 10:21, 25, 38). Jesus also claims that Scripture (5:31–47) and the Father himself testify in support of him (5:37).⁵ In the Jewish setting of the narrative, the primary authority to define the roles in question comes from Scripture, or the Torah in particular. Accordingly, the question of the recognition of Jesus becomes a legal matter: The law defines whether he is a criminal blasphemer or the very fulfillment of Scripture. The controversy centers on who has the law on their side.⁶ This becomes evident even in the first recognition in chs. 5–19. As the *Ioudaioi* do not understand their own law, according to John, their apparent recognition of Jesus becomes a caricature.

John 5:1–18: A Recognition Parody

The healing of the lame man by the pool of Bethzatha is one of the characteristic Johannine *sēmeia*, where the miracle concludes in a lengthy discourse by Jesus (5:19–47). The first, narrative part of the chapter (vv. 1–18) contains some of the hallmarks of the recognition scene. In the present reading, we shall confine ourselves to these verses, highlighting a single feature, namely the parodic nature of the scene.⁷

As already mentioned, the present scene opens the very part of the Gospel where Jesus is met with real opposition and severe cognitive resistance (chs. 5–19). Accordingly, the healed man and the *Ioudaioi* fail to recognize Jesus, as he takes the liberty of healing on a Sabbath. When Jesus arrives at the porticoes by the pool, the disabled man has no previous knowledge of him. In response to Jesus’ question if he wants to be made well, he answers, “Sir, I have no one to put me into

⁵ The stated examples are not exhaustive but illustrate the antagonism in John 5–19 and are taken from these chapters.

⁶ Severino Pancaro, *The Law in the Fourth Gospel: The Torah and the Gospel, Moses and Jesus, Judaism and Christianity According to John* (NovTSup 42; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 508–509. For further discussion, see pp. 173–180 below.

⁷ Lozada calls ch. 5 a failed anagnorisis but does not understand the term in the sense of type-scene. His reading is rather focused on judicial issues in the text; see, idem, *A Literary Reading of John 5*, 103–104, 122.

the pool when the water is stirred up” (v. 7). The man shows no signs of hope, and he does not mention the possibility that Jesus might be able to change his situation.⁸ Jesus heals him by his word, however, and thus shows him his *sēmeion* token. Yet, his powerful words are not perceived as a divine sign by the healed man, so he and Jesus separate when Jesus walks away because of the crowd (see v. 13). This separation gives reason to expect that the common pattern in the Johannine recognition scenes will reappear (see pp. 111, 139), and in some sense it does. The presence of Jesus (vv. 1–9) leads to his being absent (vv. 10–13, 15), until he appears on stage again (v. 14, 17).⁹ This time, however, the process of testifying (cf. Andrew, Philip, and the Samaritan woman) is not the generator of new observers coming to witness Jesus’ presence, since Jesus is the one who finds the man, for the second time, and addresses the *Ioudaioi* (ἐυρίσκει; v. 14; cf. 9:35). Prior to Jesus’ second meeting with the man, however, the healed man meets the *Ioudaioi* who warn him that he is violating the Sabbath by carrying his mat (v. 10). But as in the Gospel’s first recognition scene, where the envoys from Jerusalem were trying to determine John the Baptist’s role (1:19–28), they have the wrong man. This is expressed by the healed man as he pleads, “The man who made me well said to me, ‘Take up your mat and walk’” (v. 11). Whereas John the Baptist directed positive thematic roles away from himself toward Jesus, the healed man points away from himself by “testifying” to Jesus as the one who is the actual criminal. Were it not for Jesus, the healed man would never have become a lawbreaker. In the eyes of the *Ioudaioi* there is no doubt that a violation of the Sabbath is taking place (οὐκ ἔξεστιν, v. 10; cf. vv. 16, 18) and that someone, accordingly, is acting as lawbreaker; so their investigation is not a question of Jesus’ proper thematic role (which they think they have established already), but instead they ask, “Who is the man

⁸ Jesus’ extraordinary knowledge that enables him to know that the man has been sick for a long time is not used as an element of mutual recognition as in 1:43–51 and 4:16–19, but is a piece of information given to the implied reader exclusively: “When Jesus saw him lying there and knew that he had been there a long time...” (v. 6).

⁹ In the present scene the pattern appears twice within a few verses: Jesus’ presence (vv. 1–9), absence (vv. 10–13), presence (v. 14), absence (v. 15), narrator commentary (v. 16), presence (v. 17), narrator commentary (v. 18). For a similar division of the text, showing that the story focuses on only two characters at a time, see R. Alan Culpepper, “John 5:1–18: A Sample of Narrative Critical Commentary,” in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 200.

[τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος]...?” (v. 12).¹⁰ From a reader perspective, this question may give profound expression to the most important question of the whole Gospel—who is Jesus, in reality?—but from the point of view of the *Ioudaioi* this is merely a question of identifying and finding the lawbreaker. They have the description but miss the object; and so, after the healed man has met Jesus again and apparently has received the healer’s proper name, he returns to the *Ioudaioi*, and, like a Judas, he identifies the lawbreaker as Jesus (v. 15). The healed man reports the one who led him astray to the *Ioudaioi*, thus excusing his own breaking of the Sabbath, and the authorities now know for whom they have to watch out.

John 5:1–18 is a recognition parody. The parody, however, does not merely work in the sense that the scene is a nonrecognition where the reader witnesses how the *Ioudaioi* ironically formulate the Gospel’s main question without realizing the depths of their own statement (v. 12). In its capacity as type-scene, the irony is more subtle than this because the failure to recognize that Jesus is continuing his father’s work by means of the *sēmeia* (v. 17) is not depicted as a total ignorance but as a move from *agnoia* to an inadequate anagnorisis. The *Ioudaioi* do make a discovery, yet merely of Jesus’ proper-name identity. In this respect the scene bears close resemblance to the typical recognition scenes of the epics, dramas, and romances where full knowledge is acquired when the apparent stranger’s name is identified, as for example in the bath-scene in the *Odyssey* (see the diagram on p. 89). But John 5:1–18 ridicules this kind of recognition. Although the *Ioudaioi* get to know exactly as much as does Eurycleia, mere proper-name recognition is no recognition within the ideological frame of John’s Gospel. So, from the perspective of recognition type-scene conventions, John creates a failed anagnorisis by imitating a kind of anagnorisis that would be perfectly legitimate in other literary contexts. John 5 thus forms an inversion of John 4:4–42. While the Samaritans, who confessed Jesus as the savior of the world (4:42), never came to know Jesus by his proper name, the sick man at Bethzatha and the *Ioudaioi* understand that the name of the healer is Jesus, but they do not grasp his true role beyond that name (5:15).¹¹ As we shall see, the man born blind who appears in John 9

¹⁰ Ἄνθρωπος describes Jesus’ camouflage and maybe even does so in v. 7, “Sir, I have no one [ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἔχω]....” See Moloney, *Gospel of John*, 172–173.

¹¹ In the eyes of the Samaritans, Jesus is an anonymous character in 4:4–42. This turns focus toward the acknowledgment of his thematic role. On other functions of

combines the two positions. Like the disabled man in John 5, he also begins with a limited proper-name identification (9:11), but as the story evolves he rises to a higher level (9:17, 30–33, 38).

“I Am”: A Recognition Formula¹²

The fact that recognition in John is not about proper-name identification, primarily, but about social recognition of Jesus’ divine heritage contains an inherent problem, which the Gospel reveals awareness of: The recognition process may become a hostage of the conventional understanding of the thematic roles, as we have just witnessed in the nonrecognition scene in 5:1–18, so that the role expectations, and not Jesus himself, define his identity (see the first premise in the recognition enthymeme, p. 144). The determination of Jesus’ identity becomes a mere question of finding the one who fits a predefined idea, as when Andrew exclaims, “We have found the Messiah” (1:41). The ἐγὼ εἶμι sayings serve to meet this particular problem, preventing the roles from becoming epistemological straitjackets.

Scholars widely agree that the Johannine “I am” sayings echo the self-identifications of Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible (cf., e.g., Ex 3:14; Isa 43:25) and form part of Jesus’ presentation of his unity with the Father (10:30).¹³ Other possible religio-historical backgrounds have been suggested;¹⁴ but here we shall focus on the sayings’ function as a development of “the move of displaying the identity mark” in the contemporary recognition scene (see pp. 66–68). Whereas in the *sēmeia* this move is thematized by token-*showing*, the “I am” statements are events of token-*telling*. John uses it in this particular, self-identifying sense in some of his recognition type-scenes (1:20; 4:26; 9:9; 18:5, 6, 8; cf. Luke 24:36 [according to manuscript P], 39), thus employing a most common

anonymity with respect to story-world observers like the lame man in John 5, see David R. Beck, “The Narrative Function of Anonymity in Fourth Gospel Characterization,” *Semeia* 63 (1993): 143–158.

¹² Bultmann calls a particular kind of ἐγὼ εἶμι sayings “Rekognitionsformel”: 6:35, 41, 48, 51; 8:12; 10:7, 9, 11, 14; 15:1, 5; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 168. Since all ἐγὼ εἶμι sayings are displays of identity, we shall use Bultmann’s term as a synecdoche describing the sayings in toto.

¹³ See, in particular, the absolute uses of ἐγὼ εἶμι in 6:20; 8:24, 28; 13:19.

¹⁴ For a brief survey of suggested background texts, see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 1:535–538.

and pivotal literary device, which appears when identification comes about through self-disclosure instead of discovery.¹⁵ In the final recognition in the *Odyssey*, for example, Odysseus goes to see his father, Laertes, working in his vineyard. After testing his father, who expresses deep grief for the loss of his son, Odysseus eventually makes himself known: “That man am I, father, myself, standing here [χεῖνος μὲν τοι ὅδ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ, πάτερ]” (*Od.* 24.321 [Murray]).¹⁶ In this example, and the ones in the note below, the speaker assumes a previously defined identity. The observer first describes the observed by merits or by name, not yet sensing his or her presence, whereupon the observed assumes that identity by saying, “It is I.” This is a simple proposition, and this is also how ἐγὼ εἰμι works when appearing in the type-scenes in John. Jesus identifies himself as the mentioned Messiah to the Samaritan Woman (4:26), the man born blind reveals his identity to his neighbors (9:9), and Jesus admits to be Jesus of Nazareth (18:5, 6, 8).¹⁷ As early as in the first recognition scene of the Gospel, where John the Baptist is the observed (1:19–28), however, it is made clear that mere assumption of suggested thematic roles does not suffice. When the Baptist declines the Messiah title, he phrases the first recognition formula of the text in a negative way: ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμι (1:20; cf. 21; 3:28). Instead, he insists to present himself in the words of Isaiah: “I am the voice of one crying out in the wilderness [ἐγὼ φωνὴ βοῶντος ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ]” (1:23; cf. Isa 40:3 [LXX]). One may say that the Baptist exchanges a set of erroneous, predefined titles with a correct one, but it is important to notice that in this exchange he takes over the right to perform the identification from his interrogators. This shift also takes place with regard to Jesus, when John further develops the recognition formula outside the actual recognition type-scenes.

¹⁵ By way of comparison, Bühner understands the ἐγὼ εἰμι sayings as the typical self-presentation formula of emissaries and agents; cf. idem, *Der Gesandte und sein Weg*, 138–166.

¹⁶ See also *Od.* 9.19 (εἶμι Ὀδυσσεὺς Λαερτιάδης); 16.188 (πατὴρ τεός εἰμι); 21.207 (ὅδ’ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ); *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 268 (εἶμι δὲ Δημήτηρ); Aeschylus, *Cho.* 219 (ὅδ’ εἰμι); Sophocles, *El.* 1178 (τόδ’ ἔστ’ ἐκεῖνο—Electra speaking of herself in the third person; cf. John 9:37); Euripides, *Ion* 530 (πατὴρ σός εἰμι); *Orestes* 380 (ὅδ’ εἶμι Ὀρέστης); Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 7.7.2 (οὗτος ἐγὼ Καλάσις, οὗτος ἐγὼ πατὴρ ὁ ὑμέτερος); Plautus, *Amph.* 1134 (“sum Iuppiter”); *Cist.* 745 (“Ego sum illius mater”); *Rud.* 1174 (“ego sum Daemones”); Gen 45:3 (LXX; ἐγὼ εἰμι Ἰωσηφ). The classical Greek examples prefer the pronoun ὅδε or an implicit subject instead of ἐγὼ.

¹⁷ The two last-mentioned recognitions do not relate to divine thematic roles and are thus parallels to the above examples of identification from ancient literature. In the first recognition (4:4–42), Jesus assumes the role of the Messiah as defined by the woman (in contrast to 6:15).

In contrast to the ancient parallel scenes, where the formula has a pronoun or a proper name as predicate, if any, John extends the sayings with a predicate that describes Jesus' thematic roles in his own words—e.g., “I am the bread of life” (6:35), “I am the light of the world” (8:12), and “I am the way, and the truth, and the light” (14:6); cf. 6:41, 48, 51; 10:7, 9, 11, 14; 11:25; 15:1, 5. These sayings play on imagery from Jewish tradition, but at the same time they are innovations, since they are not personified thematic roles until they become attached to Jesus as story actor.¹⁸ They are Jesus' most explicit self-revelatory statements, but they do not pin him down to one, single title.¹⁹ They rather display various aspects of his identity, showing that he is not as easy to grasp as in simple, proper-name recognitions, and this diversity creates a sense of estrangement (cf. 10:24).²⁰ Accordingly, these sayings appear in the context of John 5–19, where the identification of Jesus becomes a serious problem, since the majority of observers do not believe him. To conclude: John uses the self-identification formula of the ancient anagnorisis scene in some of his own type-scenes. But, as we have seen with the move of cognitive resistance, he again takes up some of the individual moves of the scene, by using them outside their type-scene environment. The “I am” statements thus develop the move of displaying the token (by means of *telling*). Sides of Jesus' identity come forth as Jesus himself formulates the roles that observers must acknowledge.

John 9: Blindness and Insight

According to C.H. Dodd, John 9 is “one of the most brilliant passages in the gospel.”²¹ In regard to the topic of recognition it is also one of the most illuminating ones. One of the remarkable compositional features of the narrative of the healing of the man born blind—Jesus'

¹⁸ “The good shepherd” (10:11, 14) is an exception, since it is already a personal, thematic role before being identified with Jesus.

¹⁹ See Bühner, *Der Gesandte und sein Weg*, 180; David Mark Ball, *‘I Am’ in John’s Gospel: Literary Function, Background, and Theological Implications* (JSNTSup 124; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 50–51, 152.

²⁰ Cf. Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 170: “By describing himself with language that is highly egocentric and asocial, Jesus sets himself apart from familiar and socially intimate relationships and defies identification within the familial and political structures of his society.”

²¹ Quoted from James L. Resseguie, “John 9: A Literary-Critical Analysis,” in *The Gospel of John as Literature* (ed. Stibbe), 115.

sixth sign—is that Jesus, right after the healing, fades into the story's background where he remains for the greater part of the chapter. Jesus is, of course, the principal character and the one whose identity is at trial, as always in the Gospel, but he is not the one whose movements are being followed by the reader. In this respect John 9 is not unique, but it represents a further development of the Johannine recognition scene structure, which we have already seen in 1:35–51; 4:4–42; and 5:1–18, where Jesus' presence to primary observers is followed by a meeting between Jesus and secondary observers.²² In this respect, John 9 runs as follows:

Jesus is present (9:1–7a)	The first observer (the blind man) meets Jesus
Jesus is absent (9:7b–34)	The first observer informs a second observer (neighbors, Pharisees, <i>Ioudaioi</i>)
Jesus is present (9:35–41)	The second observer (Pharisees)—and the first observer—meet Jesus

This structure represents a conventional Johannine mode of recognition-telling, but John 9 reworks the pattern by extending the phase of Jesus' absence considerably. While in the previous scenes, this phase took up only a few verses (1:41, 45–46; 4:28–30, 39; 5:10–13, 15), it now fills two thirds of the scene (vv. 7b–34). So, in John 9 we are not following the movements of the observed, primarily, but of the observer who, as an apparent contradiction in terms, is blind to begin with (“a blind observer”) but receives sight in more than one sense as the story goes along. At the end of the chapter in v. 35, Jesus enters the stage again; but the fact that he has been absent in flesh all the way through vv. 7b–34 reveals that the focus in this pericope is not so much on the *showing* of the observed one as on the observer's ability to comprehend.²³

Having examined how the scene develops the recurring *presence-absence-presence* pattern by enlarging the phase of Jesus' absence, it is useful to point to another structure in the chapter. The chapter appears like a nest of Chinese boxes since more interdependent recognitions takes place. This makes the present reading of the chapter run accord-

²² Yet, in ch. 5 and the present chapter, which belong to the conflict phase of the narrative (chs. 5–19), Jesus has to establish the second meeting himself.

²³ John also lets the reader follow the spatial movement of the observer instead of the observed in the scene before Pilate in 18:28–19:16, where Pilate's movements in and out of the praetorium are described.

ing to the following outline, which seeks to describe how the object of recognition changes through the text.²⁴

The Sign	The healing of the man born blind (vv. 1–7)
Recognition of the second degree	The identification of the man born blind (vv. 8–23)
Recognition of the first degree	The Pharisees and the man born blind interpret the sign (vv. 24–34; see vv. 16–17) Jesus interprets the sign to the man born blind and the Pharisees (vv. 35–41)

The healing of the man born blind (vv. 1–7). As in John 5, the healing is situated in Jerusalem on a Sabbath. Jesus sees the man born blind, and his disciples ask him about the reason for his blindness: Did he himself or did his parents commit sin? (v. 2).²⁵ The question reflects conventional ideas in Judaism connecting man's fate with his conduct of life; and in 5:14b Jesus gives expression to a similar thought: "Do not sin more, so that nothing worse happens to you."²⁶ In the present context, however, we do not find a discussion of theological principles as in Luke 13:1–5, for example, but the disciples' question rather seems to function as an occasion for Jesus to reveal his relationship with God.²⁷ Jesus adopts a stance on the present, specific case by declaring that "he was born blind so that God's works might be revealed in him" (v. 3; cf. 11:4). According to the performer of the sign himself, the basic meaning of

²⁴ Alternatively, Martyn, *History and Theology*, 37 and Resseguie, "John 9," 115–122 divide the chapter into seven scenes according to the change of story actors, while Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 249–260 makes a form critical separation between *Heilungsgeschichte* (vv. 1–7), *Diskussion* (vv. 8–38), and *Streitgespräch* (vv. 39–41). When reading with recognition in focus, the present outline is more appropriate.

²⁵ Having asked this question, the disciples recede into the background and do not receive mention in the rest of the chapter. The man born blind, however, is characterized as a disciple in vv. 27–28.

²⁶ The circumstance that sin in John is not merely pragmatic transgression of the law but also lack of understanding on a cognitive level (cf. 8:24; 15:22, 24; 16:9) does not change the fact that this saying clearly links sin with ill fate. For a comprehensive discussion of the verse in its Johannine context, see Rainer Metzner, *Das Verständnis der Sünde im Johannesevangelium* (WUNT 122; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 34–61.

²⁷ See Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 251. This is not to diminish the importance of the concept of sin in ch. 9. Sin (ἁμαρτία) reappears as a subject of controversy and is imputed to Jesus, the Pharisees, as well as the man born blind by the various voices in the chapter (cf. vv. 16, 24–25, 31, 34, 41). And in the last verse of the chapter (v. 41), Jesus seems to answer the disciples' question in a kind of inclusio.

the *sēmeion* is to communicate that the one who acts is doing works that are in fact God's. The *sēmeion* is a shown token of divinity; but this does not necessarily mean that it is seen in the proper way. For this reason, interpretative dialogues are bound to begin as soon as the man, who is now able to see, appears in public.

The identification of the man born blind (vv. 8–23). There is no audience at the very moment where the miracle happens. The text says that when the man returns from the pool of Siloam, to which Jesus had sent him, the healing has already taken place (v. 7). Accordingly, the neighbors have problems recognizing him as he returns. The man has undergone a metamorphosis in secrecy, we may say. And since his eyes have been opened, he appears in semi-strange form. His open eyes now make up a kind of camouflage that renders him hard to recognize, and the first recognition challenge in the chapter thus pertains directly to the man who has gained his eyesight, and only indirectly to Jesus. In order to verify that a miracle by Jesus has in fact taken place, the healed man's identity has to be settled first—otherwise there would be no *sēmeion* to interpret. The man is on the one hand an informant who reports on the miracle and on its performer, but on the other hand, he himself also becomes an observed of the second degree, who himself has to be identified.

Such auxiliary recognition serving the main recognition also occurred in the Gospel's first recognition scene in 1:19–28. In that particular case, John the Baptist was the observed who insisted on his role as only an informant in the recognition of Jesus. In the recognition scenes of Greco-Roman literature, second-degree anagnorises are also found. In *Oedipus tyrannus*, as an example, there are three main informants—Teiresias (the blind seer), the Corinthian messenger, and Laius, the shepherd—who are in possession of information that Oedipus needs in order to piece together his pedigree. The latter two of them are subjected to recognitions concerning themselves since their identity has to be determined before reliability can be attached to their testimony (cf., Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 935, 1042–1043, 1110–1130; Terence, *Andr.* 904–956). Second-degree recognitions, in other words, serve a particular function in recognitions where the observer has not seen the primary observed before. This is the case with Oedipus, in the sense that he knows nothing about his own past as an exposed, newborn child. The observer is heavily dependent on witnesses and needs to test their reliability in a secondary recognition serving the primary one. This also takes place in the present scene.

As to the question of foreknowledge, the recognition of the man born blind is fundamentally different in character from the recognition of Jesus. The man is not a stranger, but a familiar person who returns from the pool, albeit in an altered shape. The epistemological challenge of the neighbors does not consist of relating their present perception with a coded token but with their own move of first knowledge. The text is explicit on this by stating that they had in fact seen him before (τὸ πρότερον; v. 8). The observers are bewildered when facing the man's new dual appearance: Is he the man born blind, or does he only resemble him (v. 8–9)? The man, however, identifies himself with the standard formula of self-identification in recognition (ἐγώ εἰμι; v. 9). The man's claim leads to some cognitive resistance, because if he is really the one that he claims to be, then, as they say, "how were your eyes opened?" (v. 10). The man's answer describes what happened to him, and in contrast to the healed man in chapter 5 (cf. 5:13), he is able to identify the one who healed him at once by proper name as the "man called Jesus" (v. 11). The first step in the man's recognition of Jesus is a determination of the denotative signified of the stranger.

The formerly blind man is now taken to the Pharisees and the *Ioudaioi* (v. 13; cf. v. 18). Nothing is stated about the reason for taking him there, but in the course of the story line it has the natural function of fueling the conflict with those who see themselves as the defenders of the Sabbath, a conflict that erupted at the first Sabbath healing in ch. 5 (cf. 9:14, 16). The Pharisees pose the same question to the man concerning his transformation as did the above observers, and the man tells them the story in a briefer version, not mentioning Jesus by name (vv. 15–16). This takes the story through a short pan from the second-degree recognition to the determination of Jesus' identity in vv. 16–17. In the absence of Jesus, a division (σχίσμα, v. 16b) begins regarding the coding of the miracle as a sign: Is its performer simply a man (ἄνθρωπος; v. 16a) not from God since he breaks the Sabbath, or does the very ability to execute the miracle constitute a sign that rules out that he is a sinful man (ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλός; v. 16b)? As pointed out previously, the *Ioudaioi* in 5:12 seemed to be interested in finding out only the proper-name identity of the one who violated the Sabbath (τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος). In the present scene, however, their question concerning Jesus, addressed to the healed man, is a search for the thematic role (τί σὺ λέγεις περὶ αὐτοῦ; v. 17). The formerly blind man's suggestion that Jesus is a prophet—the same title the Samaritan woman applied to him (4:19; cf. 6:14; 7:40)—constitutes a step forward


from recognition of the denotative signified (Jesus; v. 11) toward the coming-to-know of a connotative signified (prophet; v. 17).

The way out of the schism sought by the *Ioudaioi* is to put aside the question of Jesus' identity by reopening the question of the second-degree recognition in order to find out if the man born blind could in fact be a Martin Guerre character, as it were. This is done in vv. 18–23—in spite of the fact that this matter seemed to have been settled already in vv. 8–12. The *Ioudaioi*, who in contrast to the neighbors did not know the man before he gained sight, call in his parents as informants.²⁸ They are able to verify (οἶδαμεν; v. 20) his identity (οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς ἡμῶν; v. 20), and they confirm the fact that he was born blind (τυφλὸς ἐγεννήθη; v. 20), and that he now sees (νῦν βλέπει; v. 21). Yet, they cannot (or dare not) assist in the detection of how and by whom it happened. For the working out of this problem, they refer to their son. He is old enough to speak for himself (vv. 21, 23).

The entrance of the parents as informants of the second order makes it necessary to state more exactly the relation between the two recognitions of the chapter. An illustration like the one on the next page may clarify the hierarchy, if a little guidance is given on how to read it: The first-degree recognition/nonrecognition of Jesus is depicted on the upper half of the diagram, whereas the second degree recognition of the man born blind takes up the lower half. The horizontal arrows show the observer-observed relation in these recognitions, while the relation of testimony is illustrated by vertical arrows pointing from the informant to the object about whom the informant testifies.

As we see, Jesus and the man born blind on the right side of the diagram interrelate with other actors both on the horizontal and the vertical plane, which makes the two recognitions interconnect. When reading the illustration from the bottom right moving upward, we may say that the parents produce information so that their son born blind may be recognized by the observers on his left side. As soon as he is recognized, however, he himself becomes an informant transmitting knowledge about Jesus. An effect of the man's testimony is that Jesus grows to be an observed, whose observers are also placed on his left side. Jesus is, finally, God's informant when he claims that his *sēmeion* reveals God's works (9:3). This last link in the line of communication,

²⁸ Cf. Electra's need for the pedagogue, who brought up Orestes as an informant (Euripides, *El.* 285–287).



Jesus' relation to the Absent One, is the subject of the following controversy in vv. 24–34.

*The Pharisees and the man born blind interpret the sign (vv. 24–34).*²⁹ Since the man's identity is now established, and it has been confirmed that a miracle has in fact taken place, the story returns to the question of the implications of the sign in regard to the understanding of Jesus, which was shortly dealt with in vv. 16–17. The Pharisees again summon the man born blind, now in his capacity as informant and observer in the first-degree recognition. They urge him to give God the credit for the miracle (v. 24), which on the discourse level is highly ironic since that is exactly what he is doing by attributing it to Jesus (v. 11). On the story-world level, however, the man born blind first takes an agnostic or at least guarded stance, by avoiding a decision on whether Jesus is a sinner: "I do not know whether he is a sinner. One thing I do know, that though I was blind, now I see" (v. 25). The discussion arising between the man and the Pharisees goes along the lines already laid out in v. 16. They share the premises that the final source of a miracle such as the one experienced can (a) only be God (vv. 24, 31–33) and (b) not be a sinner (vv. 24, 31), so the question of whether Jesus is able to do God's works depends on whether he is a sinner.³⁰ The

²⁹ It is not quite clear whether the man's dialogue partners in the present passage are the Pharisees or the *Ioudaioi* in general. The expression "for the second time" (ἐκ δευτέρου, v. 24) renders it likely that it is the Pharisees (cf. v. 13).

³⁰ The idea, attested elsewhere in the New Testament, that miracles may also come

Pharisees say that they “know that this man is a sinner” (v. 24) on the basis that he (according to their *halakā*) does not observe the Sabbath (v. 16). On the other hand, the man claims that Jesus is not a sinner, for God only listens to “one who obeys his will” (v. 31), which is an echo of Jesus’ statements about himself in 4:34; 5:30; and 6:38–40. Thus the man’s conclusion, which resembles Nicodemus’ introductory remark in 3:2, is the following: “If this man were not from God, he could do nothing” (v. 33). The Pharisees are intimidated by his argumentation and reject it by reverting to the topic of sin from the disciples’ question in the first verses of the chapter. As we remember, Jesus claimed that the man was not blind because of sin committed; in contrast, the Pharisees, before throwing the man out, accuse him of being born “entirely in sins” (v. 34). The thematic role of “sinner” (ἁμαρτωλός) moves to and fro between the story actors, all the way through the chapter. Is the man born blind (vv. 2–3, 34), or is Jesus the sinner (vv. 24–25, 31)? According to John, the role is not properly placed until the long absent Jesus reenters on stage and turns the role toward the Pharisees.

Jesus interprets the sign to the man born blind and the Pharisees (vv. 35–41). When Jesus hears that the man has been driven out by the Pharisees, he finds him, and although this is Jesus’ first encounter with the man after his “metamorphosis,” Jesus (in contrast to the other characters) has no trouble recognizing him at all. In light of the previous recognition scenes, this maybe hints at the recurring structure of mutuality in Johannine anagnorisis: As Jesus saw the man in v. 1 (εἶδεν), the blind-born is now able to see him. Jesus addresses him straight out by asking him if he believes in the Son of Man (εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; v. 35).³¹ The question introduces yet another thematic role in the chapter and sets the scene for the climactic move of recognition. Jesus, however, does not reveal that the role belongs to him. He mentions the Son of Man in the third person, leading the man born blind to think that this is an absent character (v. 36).³² As in the dialogue with the Samaritan Woman in ch. 4, the observer is once again confronted with a quasi-

from false prophets, Pseudo-Christ, or *daimons* is not present here and is rejected in 10:21 (see Mark 13:22; 2 Thess 2:9; Rev 13:13–16; 16:14; 19:20).

³¹ Some manuscripts, but not the best ones, read “the Son of God”; (thus A, L, Θ, Ψ, in contrast to P^{66.75}, X, B, D, W).

³² This may reflect pre-Johannine traditions where the Son of Man is regarded a future character. In the Fourth Gospel, however, the Son of Man and his judgment are primarily present phenomena; see Francis J. Moloney, *The Johannine Son of Man* (2nd ed.; BSR 14; Roma: LAS, 1978), 215.

deception on Jesus' part, which forms the Johannine transformation of the move of foretelling known from, for example, the Homeric recognitions. Yet, whereas in 4:25, the observer (the woman) was the one referring to the Messiah as an absent third person that would appear in the future, the observed one (Jesus) is here the one who presents the move of foretelling. True, Jesus does not deceive the man by referring to the Son of Man in the future tense (as if he were not speaking of himself), but his elusive mode of third-person discourse has the same effect of postponement as the move of foretelling in Odysseyan recognitions. This is made clear by the man's subsequent bewilderment (v. 36).³³

Jesus reveals himself in v. 37, and once again the text reflects Jesus' expression in the conversation with the woman at the well (4:26), "You have seen [ἑώρακας] him, and the one speaking [ὁ λαλῶν] to you is he" (9:37).³⁴ The man's own reflections regarding the sign he had experienced led him to the conclusion that Jesus was a prophet (v. 17) and from God (v. 33), but he is not able to attribute the divine Son of Man title to Jesus on the basis of his experience alone. Jesus has to assist him in his interpretation by *telling* him what he *sees* as the above quotation shows. On the basis of Jesus' *telling* however, the man's reaction is without reservation, "Lord, I believe [πιστεύω, κύριε]" (v. 38a).³⁵ In contrast to most ancient recognizers, whose inner recognition experiences are either described by the omniscient narrator or simply shown by means

³³ The text does not state explicitly that the man, when found by Jesus, did in fact identify Jesus right away as the one who had healed him. After all, the formerly blind man had not seen him before, but only heard him. If the man did not identify Jesus, one may read the text in the sense that the reason for his question, "And who is he [The Son of Man], sir? Tell me, so that I may believe in him" (v. 36), is that he thinks that Jesus is not the healer but just a random man offering to lead him to the Son of Man who opened his eyes. Although this interpretation is possible and illustrates the vast thematization of recognition in John, I am inclined to follow Bultmann in reading vv. 35–41 as focusing on Jesus' true thematic role and not on the identification of the healer. On the other hand, the passage is not as unambiguous as Bultmann would claim: "Offenbar ist vorausgesetzt, daß der Geheilte Jesus bei der Begegnung erkennt. Wie das möglich ist, da er ihn doch vor der Heilung nicht hatte sehen können, darf man natürlich nicht fragen"; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 258, n. 8.

³⁴ In 4:26, the self-identification is held in the first person (ἐγώ εἰμι). For an example of self-identification in the third person, see Electra's answer to Orestes in Sophocles, *El.* 1178: τὸδ' ἔστ' ἐκεῖνο.

³⁵ Κύριος in the vocative should probably be taken in the confessional sense reflected by the above translation from the NRSV and not merely as a polite form of address ("Sir"), as in v. 36 and as when used by the Samaritan Woman (4:11, 15, 19). This has to do with the general *Steigerung* of thematic roles that seems to evolve in ch. 9 as a whole.

of secondary reactions (see p. 68), the man at once gives expression to his cognitive change—like Alcmene, Hercules' mother, in Seneca's *Hercules Otaeus*: “[A]gnosco, agnosco” (1946).

After anagnorisis comes the move of attendant reaction. We have previously seen how some Johannine recognition scenes present this move as the first observer's missionary activity toward secondary observers (1:35–51; 4:4–42), but in John 5 and 9 there is no “Come and see.” The *Ioudaioi* and the Pharisees do not hasten to become observers of Jesus, and they do not follow the first observer; but they meet Jesus in a manner less carefully arranged by the narrator (5:17; 9:40).³⁶ As we have seen above, however, John 9 (in contrast to John 5) does contain a testimony to Jesus by the healed character as a kind of attendant reaction (vv. 13–34). But since the man born blind's moment of recognition does not appear until now when he meets Jesus again, that testimony is not a proper move of attendant reaction. The reaction rather happens in v. 38, and it takes another, more conventional form as regards the type-scene genre: “And he worshiped [προσεκύνεσεν] him” (v. 38b). The verb προσεκυνέω and its cognates occurred frequently in the course of the discussion of worship “in spirit and truth” (4:20–24; cf. also 12:20). In the present context, however, the verb does not merely describe a mental act of worship (submission, acknowledgment), but probably also indicates a bodily gesture of reverence like for example genuflection or prostration.³⁷ Such bodily, emotional, or physical reaction attending recognition is also a common *topos* in the recognition scenes (see pp. 69–71); and in the present pericope, it has the effect of elucidating the man's attitude toward Jesus as the rightful owner of the divine thematic roles.³⁸ As in the recognition scene in

³⁶ The phrase οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες (9:40) seems to indicate not that the man born blind brought the Pharisees with him but that they were simply standing beside him. As Brown states, “Their presence seems a bit contrived in the setting picture in vs. 35.”

³⁷ Among the NT evangelists, Matthew most commonly uses the verb in this sense (Matt 2:2, 8, 11; 4:9; 8:2; 9:18; 14:33; 15:25; 20:20; 28:9); see Walter Bauer et al., eds., *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der frühchristlichen Literatur* (6th ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), s.v. “προσεκυνέω,” 1434–1436.

³⁸ A limited number of good text witnesses (e.g., $\mathfrak{P}^{75}$, $\aleph^*$) do not bring the passage in vv. 38–39a containing the man's confession and worship. According to Brown (*Gospel According to John*, 1:375, cf. 381), the passage contains “some non-Johannine peculiarities” that might indicate that we are dealing with an addition possibly stemming from the baptism-liturgical use of the text. Also, the fact that the attendant reaction of the recognizer is not typically Johannine might point in this direction. At the same time, however, it is hard to make good sense of the statements that follow without vv. 38–39a.

20:11–18, where Mary apparently reaches out for Jesus or holds on to him, the reaction follows the generic requirements regarding the culmination of the recognition scene. In ch. 20, however, Jesus reproaches Mary for doing so. If one reads this as a mark of character showing how Mary and the man born blind represent different faith attitudes, one misses the main point.³⁹ The Johannine recognition scenes are worked out in accordance to their role in the course of the exposition. Consequently, a conventional attendant reaction is appropriate in the present context of conflict, where it creates a contrast to the reserved stance of the Pharisees (v. 40); but in the new, expository context of John 20 the move has to be transformed so that John can make his point concerning Jesus' new mode of presence at the story's closure (see pp. 196–205).

The last three important verses of the chapter (vv. 39–41) were characterized by Bultmann as a *Streitgespräch*, on the basis of the fact that a number of Pharisees become Jesus' discussion partners in v. 40.⁴⁰ In recognition-scene terms, it constitutes a return to the move of cognitive resistance. In accordance with the location of the scene in the narrative's phase of conflict, the scene does not stop with conventional recognition and attendant reaction (vv. 35–38), but it concludes by regressing to the move of resistance embodied by the Pharisees. Jesus says that he has come to the world εἰς νόμιμα (v. 39a), and this "crisis" focuses on the concepts of sin (ἁμαρτία) and sight (cf. βλέπω, τυφλός). Jesus creates double meanings by stating that "those who do not see may see, and those who do see may become blind" (v. 39b; cf. 12:39–41; Isa 6:10). Seeing is both the somatic competence to receive information (blindness being the lack of such ability), and a metaphor of cognition that denotes the proper way of "seeing"—i.e., believing in Jesus' identity on the basis of his mark (the *sēmeion*) instead of the camouflage.⁴¹ This game on levels of seeing also presents itself in the type-scenes of Greco-Roman literature, often with relation to tragic characters. Oedipus puts out his own eyes when he "sees" the truth (Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.* 1270–1274), but he claims that the new, somatic blindness is nothing in comparison to the "blindness" of his mind before he physically blinded himself (1484). On the other hand, the mantic Teiresias is blind, but,

³⁹ Collins, "Representative Figures," 41–43, 122–124.

⁴⁰ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 258–260.

⁴¹ Below I shall contrast the terms "somatic seeing" and "cognitive 'seeing.'" There may be a certain connection between cognitive "seeing" and the use of the verbs ἐμβλέπω in 1:36, 42 (see p. 106). Θεωρέω, however, does not necessarily signify in-sight (cf., e.g., 20:14).


in spite of this, he “sees” the truth from the very beginning (370–375; 454). In the *Bacchae* Agave’s state of ecstasy prevents her from “seeing” that she is holding the head of her dead son in her hands. When she recognizes him, she perceives the event as a gain of sight (1279–1282). The saying of Jesus in v. 39 in a similar way plays on seeing and “seeing,” but in a more complicated manner since it works on both the story-world and the discourse level. Regarding the story-world, the saying seems to be an interpretation of the previous events put in motion by the miracle. The man born blind began with neither eyesight nor knowledge of Jesus, but he receives both somatic and cognitive sight as the story goes along. On the other hand, the Pharisees do not change; they are somatically seeing, but cognitively blind all the way through the story. Accordingly, when they ask, “Surely we are not blind, are we?” (v. 40), Jesus answers, “If you were blind, you would not have sin. But now that you say, ‘We see,’ your sin remains” (v. 41). The Pharisees’ question reflects a typical Johannine misunderstanding, but the answer is complex. In the first part of the reply, Jesus confirms the obvious fact that they are not somatically blind. These words at the same time answer the disciples’ question in vv. 2–3 concerning the blind man’s sin (cf. v. 34): Somatic blindness makes no one a sinner.⁴² Yet, the second part of the answer says that by neglecting the divine sign that has been shown, the Pharisees are caught in the cognitive “blindness” of sin. In other words, the Pharisees are the tragic characters of John 9. Whereas in tragedy, however, such characters, like Oedipus and Agave, realize their moral and cognitive error, even if too late (cf. ἀμαρτία in *Poet.* 13, 1452b28–1453a22), this is not the case with the Pharisees.⁴³ In John, the movement of coming-to-believe is always euphoric, whereas nonrecognition is in itself tragic.⁴⁴ Since nonrecognition is dysphoric (see 8:24; 16:9), the role of sinner is eventually given to those actors in John 9, who, having seen the sign, do not “see” its meaning (9:41; cf. 15:22).

⁴² Bultmann takes the first part of the answer as indicating that the Pharisees were not sinners, if they would admit their cognitive “blindness”; see idem, *Johannesevangelium*, 259, n. 3. In the above understanding, however, Jesus is talking about somatic seeing and blindness in the first part of the answer (cf. vv. 2–3, 34), whereas the leap back to the metaphorical level does not take place until the second half of Jesus’ reply. For a thorough discussion, see Metzner, *Das Verständnis der Sünde*, 91–102.

⁴³ For a balanced discussion of the Aristotelian notion of *hamartia* as both a moral and a noetic concept (cf. John’s use of the term), see T.C.W. Stinton, “*Hamartia* in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy,” *CQ* 25 (1975): 221–254.

⁴⁴ Exceptions may be the exposure of Judas as traitor (13:18–30) and Peter’s implied recognition of his own denial in 18:15–18, 25–27; cf. 12:42–43. See pp. 164–167, 170–173.

We may illustrate the relation of observer positions in the story-world in the following way. As one sees, the position on the right side is empty as yet:



When John separates seeing from “seeing” (cf. 5:36: “But I said to you that you have seen me and yet do not believe”), it is not merely an element in the characterization of story-world characters, but it also makes up an invitation to the reader. This appears when we consider the fact that seeing in John also bears a clear connotation of presence. The authority of the we-voice (1:14, 34; 3:11; 19:35; cf. 20:29) and of Jesus (3:32; 5:19; 6:46; 8:38) is constantly derived as coming from personal inspection, which implies that seeing has a superior status compared with secondary hearing.⁴⁵ The model reader of the Gospel, however, has no direct access to Jesus by means of seeing and is in this sense somatically blind, parallel to the man born blind before the miracle (see 20:29–31). On the discourse level, the distinction between seeing and “seeing” functions in order to turn the focus from

⁴⁵ Cf. Polybius, *Historiae* 12.27.1 [Paton]: “Nature has given us two instruments, as it were, by the aid of which we inform ourselves and inquire about everything. These are hearing and sight, and of the two sight is much more veracious according to Heraclitus. ‘The eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears,’ he says.” See also Loveday Alexander, “The Living Voice: Scepticism towards the Written Word in Early Christian and in Graeco-Roman Texts,” in *The Bible in Three Dimensions: Essays in Celebration of Forty Years of Biblical Studies in the University of Sheffield* (eds. David J.A. Clines et al.; JSOTSup 87; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 221–247.

the kind of seeing that depends on presence toward the insight of belief. The distinction shows that there is no necessary connection between being an eyewitness to Jesus (seeing) and believing his divinity-tokens (“seeing”; cf. 6:36; 12:37; 15:24), and this opens up the opposite possibility that the reader can “see” Jesus’ true identity without having encountered his physical presence. John 9 lays important foundations for such a positioning of the reader, but it does not explicitly put the reader into the position that was kept empty in the above diagram (somatic non-seeing, cognitive “seeing”). This, however, takes place in the anagnorises of ch. 20. In John 9, focus is still on the recognition conflict between blindness and *anablepsis* (cf. vv. 15, 18), and the conflict escalates in the following chapters, as Jesus’ hour of destiny approaches.

The Recognition Scenes of the Hour

After his entry into Jerusalem (12:12–19), Jesus says: “The hour has come for the Son of Man to be glorified” (12:23). From this point on, the story is propelled toward the passion and resurrection of Jesus. Some of the stations on Jesus’ way to the cross are recognition scenes, and they are the objects of the following discussion (John 13–19). Although we cannot agree with Hitchcock that Johannine recognition scenes are confined to the final part of the Gospel (see pp. 9–10), he is right in pointing out their special role in this phase of the story. These recognitions are not so much concerned with the discourse-level question of Jesus’ absence and presence, but are important in the development of the story. In order to end with the crucifixion, the traitor and Jesus, respectively, need to be identified (13:18–30; 18:1–12); and finally, Jesus must be convicted as holding the thematic role of a criminal (18:28–19:16). These recognition scenes rewrite recognition motifs that we also know from the synoptic tradition, but as we shall see, they receive a particular colouring in Johannine context.⁴⁶ Some of the recognition scenes of “the hour” do not have Jesus in

⁴⁶ In the following readings of recognition scenes with parallels in the Synoptics, we will have to treat the tradition-historical relation between them in an inadequate manner, since the genesis of Johannine traditions is not our primary interest. Regarding this, C.H. Dodd’s provocative classic on the issue, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), is still worth consulting. See also Anton Dauer, *Die Passionsgeschichte im Johannesevangelium: Eine traditionsgeschichtliche und theologische Untersuchung zu Joh. 18,1–19,30* (SANT 30; München: Kösel, 1972).

the role as the main observed (13:18–30; 18:15–18, 25–27), for which reason—presumably—previous approaches to anagnorisis in John have not noticed their recognition type-scene character. In the first one, Judas plays the role of the observed.

The Exposure of Judas as Traitor (13:18–30)

Jesus' foretelling of his betrayal at the last supper is reported in all of the canonical Gospels. In Mark and Matt it takes place right before the institution of the Lord's Supper (Mark 14:17–21; Matt 26:20–25), while in Luke and John, the foretelling is placed after the Eucharist (Luke 22:21–23) or after Jesus' washing of the disciples' feet (John 13:18–30).⁴⁷ John's version of the narrative appears in uninterrupted continuation of Jesus' interpretation of the footwashing, and the change of subject from the footwashing to the betrayal begins to take place in 13:18. John's account is significantly longer than the synoptic ones. Luke, on the other side of the spectrum, is quite laconic and spares only three verses on the event. In all four versions, however, the pericope contains the features of a recognition scene; and since Jesus first presents the thematic role of the traitor in anonymous form, it has the form of a conundrum: "[O]ne of you will betray me" (13:21; cf. Mark 14:18; Matt 26:21; Luke 22:21). This role is a shifter that leaves the disciples in a temporary state of *aporia* (ἀπορούμενοι; 13:22) and makes them search for a name to connect with the role—as when Oedipus seeks to identify the man behind the misery in Thebes. Their question to Jesus illustrates this: "Lord, who is it?" (13:25; cf. Mark 14:19; Matt 26:22; Luke 22:23).⁴⁸ Jesus' reaction is to code the role of the traitor more precisely in order to make identification possible. In John, such a recognition token is arranged by the following words of Jesus: "It is the one to whom I give this bread when I have dipped it in the dish"; and after this, the narrator reports that Jesus gives the piece of bread to "Judas son of

⁴⁷ By placing the disclosure of Judas before the institution of the Lord's Supper, Mark and Matt are maybe suggesting that Judas as an outsider was expelled before the meal, thus reflecting early Christian liturgical discipline. Luke, on the other hand, sharpens the point that Jesus was betrayed by one of his own by having Judas participate (Luke 22:21; see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke* (2 vols.; AB 28–28a; New York: Doubleday, 1970–1985), 2:1409. In John, the situation is not the same due to the absence of the Eucharist. On Judas' exit in relation to literary "exits" in ancient drama and symposia, see Parsenios, *Departure and Consolation*, 15–16, 112–122.

⁴⁸ In Mark and Matt, the question is phrased according to the motif of suggesting alternative identifications: "Surely, not I?" (Mark 14:19; cf. Matt 26:22, 25).

Simon Iscariot” (John 13:26; cf. 30).⁴⁹ In Matt, the identity of the traitor becomes known when Judas asks Jesus directly if he is the one and Jesus answers: “You have said so” (Matt 26:25). In contrast, Judas is not mentioned by name in Mark and Luke.

The fact that John’s version of this recognition scene is longer than the other three has to do, in particular, with the presence of specifically Johannine material (vv. 18–20, 23–25a, 27–30) that serves to stress Jesus’ sovereignty over the situation and the natural place of the event in the divine plan, as also in the Johannine version of the scene of Jesus’ arrest in the garden (18:1–12, see pp. 167–173). If we notice how the coding of the mark took place in the synoptic versions of the story, it was done by two kinds of *telling*: Either Jesus interpreted the mark in the *same* moment as he directed the disciples’ attention to it (the dipping of bread, the hand on the table; Mark 14:20; Luke 22:21), or he revealed the meaning of the mark *after* dipping the bread: “The one who has dipped (ὁ ἐμβάψας; aorist) his hand into the bowl with me will betray me” (Matt 26:23). One should notice that in the Synoptics there is no *whispering* in the sense that Jesus tells in advance that the one dipping the bread with him will be the traitor. The narratological reason for this is quite obvious; it is not hard to imagine what comical situation such a *whispering* would create: No one would dare to take a piece of bread for fear of dipping it with Jesus by accident and thus becoming the traitor. Nevertheless, as we have seen in other examples, the communication mode of *whispering*, which is closely related to Jesus’ omniscience, is very important to John. Accordingly, he lets Jesus code the mark *before* he gives Judas the bread: “It is the one to whom I give this piece of bread when I have dipped it in the dish” (v. 26a). Because of this *whispering*, probably, John’s token act cannot be the dipping of bread itself, but is Jesus’ proactive giving of the bread to the traitor without the latter’s participation in the symbolic act (v. 26b). Otherwise, the awkward situation mentioned above would in fact occur. Now, the importance of the *whispering* of Jesus in v. 26 becomes clear when we notice that this mode of displaying the recognition token is also the subject of the Johannine addition to the scene in vv. 18–19. As early as this moment of the scene, Jesus quotes Scripture, which he alleges is about to be fulfilled: “The one who ate my bread has

⁴⁹ In Matt 26:23 and Mark 14:20, Jesus does not offer the bread to the traitor but only dips it together with him; in Luke, no bread is mentioned, but Jesus says: “But see, the one who betrays me is with me, and his hand is on the table” (Luke 22:21).

lifted his heel against me” (v. 18; cf. Ps 41:9; Acts 1:16).⁵⁰ John, in other words, lets Jesus include the *whispering* of Scripture in his own *whispering*. Jesus not only marks the traitor in advance himself, but claims that the token belongs to a plan long laid down. The following saying by Jesus is most interesting in this connection: “I tell you this now, before it occurs [πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι], so that when it does occur [γένηται], you may believe that I am he [ἐγὼ εἰμι]” (v. 19; cf. v. 11). First, we notice that John, in this statement, turns the scene that I have until now described only as an identification of Judas—and that is exactly what it is in the synoptic tradition—into a question of the recognition of Jesus. What Jesus predicts will cause faith in him when it happens. The Greek text, however, does not state exactly which future occurrence will foster belief in Jesus as the ἐγὼ εἰμι.⁵¹ Is it Judas’ eating of the bread or his execution of the betrayal? Both of these suggestions may find support in the preceding Psalms quotation (v. 18). Or is it Jesus’ departure to the Father, his death, and resurrection as the similar statement in 14:29 seems to imply?⁵² When read in the light of v. 18, Bultmann is probably right that the statement contains an apologetic aspect and serves to explain how treason could appear in the Lord’s inner circle: Jesus (and Scripture) had in fact predicted it, so when it happened it did not contradict his divine identity, but confirmed it.⁵³

As in John 9, John manages to have two recognition processes running simultaneously in the course of the scene. On the one hand, the traitor is being exposed as in the Synoptics, but on the other, the prediction of the betrayal also becomes a test of Jesus’ extraordinary knowledge, which resembles the recognitions διὰ μνήμης that we have pre-

⁵⁰ There is possibly a slight allusion to the same passage from Psalms in Mark 14:18; see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:571. On the textual form behind the quotation, see Maarten J.J. Menken, “‘He Who Eats My Bread, Has Raised His Heel against Me’ (John 13:18),” in *Old Testament Quotations in the Fourth Gospel: Studies in Textual Form* (CBET 15; Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996), 123–138.

⁵¹ Another ambiguity in the text appears in the phrase “you may believe” (πιστεύετε; the aorist subjunctive) which displays the same text-critical problem as in 20:31. Codex Vaticanus (B) writes “you may continue to believe” (πιστεύητε; the present subjunctive)—a reading, however, that it does not share with other witnesses in the present case.

⁵² With reference to 8:28, Brown thinks that the event that awakes the disciples’ understanding is the resurrection; idem, *Gospel According to John*, 571. Moloney, however, suggests that it is the betrayal. The betrayal reveals that Jesus represents a God, who may even elect deceitful human beings; idem, *Gospel of John*, 380.

⁵³ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 365.

viously encountered (1:47–51; 4:16–19). As in the scene of Jesus' arrest (18:3–11), John lifts a traditional recognition scene to a new christological level above mere proper-name identification. In vv. 28–30 of the present scene, John also seizes the opportunity to repeat the motif of misunderstanding. Having shown that Judas is the traitor, Jesus says to him: "Do quickly what you are going to do" (v. 27)—once again Jesus' sovereignty is stressed—but "no one at the table" understands why he says this (v. 28). It seems that in spite of Jesus' explicit *showing* of the traitor's identity and plan, the disciples remain as much in the epistemological dark in this scene as in Mark and Luke, where Judas is not singled out directly. Unlike in Matthew, the disciples do not grasp the clear identification of the traitor.⁵⁴ Night prevails in more than one sense (v. 30).

Jesus' Arrest: From Discovery to Self-Disclosure (18:1–12)

Most of the incidents following the farewell discourses in John 13–17 and preceding the crucifixion and burial of Jesus (19:17–42) are recognition type-scenes.⁵⁵ As we have seen in ch. 1 and shall see in ch. 20, there is a tendency that John puts together the type-scenes in clusters. Whereas the recognition *catena* in ch. 1, however, was an introduction of Jesus and the proper decoding of his hybrid appearance, the present scenes take the recognition crisis to its peak.

The first scene in this context recounts Jesus' "arrest," which is also known from the synoptic tradition, though John gives it an alternative twist. The evangelists differ as regards the description of the geographical setting of the scene. In Mark and Matt it is played out at the location of Gethsemane at the Mount of Olives (Matt 26:36, cf. 30; Mark 14:32, cf. 26); Luke is less exact and merely says that Jesus and the disciples went "to the Mount of Olives" (Luke 22:39), whereas the setting has no particular name in John. John simply speaks of "a garden" (κῆπος) across the Kidron valley where Jesus often gathered his disciples (18:1, cf. 26). In all four canonical gospels, the scene has the same overrid-

⁵⁴ See Tolmie, *Jesus' Farewell*, 200. This lack of understanding maybe serves the apologetic purpose of explaining why the disciples did not try to stop Judas; see R. Alan Culpepper, "The Johannine *Hypodeigma*: A Reading of John 13," *Semeia* 53 (1991), 145.

⁵⁵ The high priest's questioning of Jesus (18:12–14, 19–24) is an exception.

ing, pragmatic function of getting Jesus captured so that he may be put on trial before the different authorities. In order that they get the right man, however, identification has to take place, and this endeavor holds the status of an auxiliary narrative program in the cognitive dimension of the scene. As to these basic circumstances, the four canonical gospels agree on the outline of story, but, once again, John highlights the cognitive dimension of the narrative. In the Synoptics, Judas plays the active part in the identification and acts as an informant who points out the suspect to the crowd. This pointing out is not done with a commonly understood gesture, but Judas performs a coded *showing* by giving Jesus a kiss that functions as a prearranged signal (σύσσημον, Mark 14:44; σήμεϊον, Matt 26:48): “The one I will kiss is the man.”⁵⁶ As an apparent sign of affection, the Judas kiss is thus a recognition token with an ironical twist. This also applies to Judas’ detection of Jesus by means of *telling*, “Rabbi” (Mark 14:45; cf. Matt 26:49). Judas, by his kiss and his address, puts up a semblance of respect, but the fact that this camouflage is utterly unconvincing either depicts him as a sly fox ridiculing Jesus, or as a tragic character who is not able to delude anyone but himself: “Judas, is it with a kiss that you are betraying the Son of Man?” (Luke 22:48; cf. Matt 26:50).⁵⁷

John’s report of the incident deviates from the synoptic accounts in remarkable ways. The recognition scene is not a pointing out or detection arranged by the observer, but Jesus rather takes charge of the situation by disclosing his own identity before anyone else is able to make a move. There is no Judas kiss, no greeting of the “Rabbi,” and as soon as Judas has entered the scene with a detachment of soldiers and some temple guards (v. 3), he no longer appears as a specific character in the scene and is absorbed in the group of antagonists, who are addressed by Jesus in the second person plural (v. 5b). This

⁵⁶ This statement uttered by Judas before the actual kiss is an act of *whispering*.

⁵⁷ Ironical gestures may also appear in the recognition scenes of Greco-Roman literature. When Electra meets her brother Orestes without recognizing him in Euripides’ rendering of the story, she is about to run away but is hindered by Orestes, who takes hold of her. She states that it is not for him to touch her, but he answers his sister: “There is no person I could touch with greater right” (Euripides, *El.* 224 [Vermeule]). Whereas the irony of the Judas kiss, however, is one of a camouflage that does not work, the Euripidean example is more “Johannine,” since the irony pertains to the observer’s lack of understanding. Orestes’ signs of affection are heartfelt and true, though not understood by Electra. In contrast, Judas’ kiss is false and is uncovered by Jesus.

change of initiative in John, whether the author knew the synoptic parallels or was using an independent tradition, has very much to do with his understanding of the story progression as predetermined by divine forces, as was also the case in the pointing out of the traitor in 13:18–30. This motif governs the scene with significant consequence. As God's representative, Jesus is the one who knows "the hour" and permits things to happen (2:4; 12:23, 27–28; 16:4, 32; 17:1). Accordingly, the narrator from the beginning of the scene reminds us of Jesus' omniscience (v. 4), and the scene concludes with Jesus insisting on being captured: "Am I not to drink the cup that the Father has given me?" (v. 11). The question seems polemically aimed at the tradition of Jesus' anxious prayer known from the Synoptics (Mark 14:32 pars.); but whereas in the Synoptics the scene of Jesus' arrest follows immediately after the agony scene in Gethsemane, John does not bring such a scene. As we know from the proclamation in 10:18, nobody takes Jesus' life; he rather gives it on his own accord.

Since Jesus' identity is not discovered by means of a token but disclosed by Jesus himself, the scene begins where many recognition scenes end, both within and outside the Fourth Gospel: The "I am" statement. Jesus twice asks whom the soldiers and guards are searching for (vv. 4, 7; cf. 1:38); and as they answer "Jesus of Nazareth" (vv. 5, 7), he states: "I am he" (ἐγὼ εἰμὶ; vv. 5; cf. 8). On one level this self-identification only gives rise to recognition of Jesus' proper-name identity as Jesus of Nazareth. In this respect, the guards—as the *Ioudaioi* in 5:12–13, 15—only recognize the denotative signified of the wanted one. This is of course of great importance in a court of trial, where the right individual must be in the dock, but it is of less relevance in the Gospel's presentation of Jesus' true identity. The "I am" saying, however, also in this case, discloses more than Jesus' name (cf. 6:20). This is illustrated by the fact that the guards and soldiers on the first "I am" saying step back and fall to the ground (ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω καὶ ἔπεσαν χαμαί; v. 6). This move not only depicts the conventional reaction of human beings in the presence of the divine (cf., e.g., Ezek 1:28; 44:4), but is also a parallel to the attendant reactions of the observers in recognition type-scenes, and it shows that ἐγὼ εἰμὶ is not merely a statement of name, but also of Jesus' divine thematic role related to the "I am" of the Hebrew Bible. But whereas such a reaction by the conventions of the genre would indicate recognition of the observed's superior status, no acknowledgment takes place here. The "I am" statement rather seems to have a pragmatic effect of its own that

makes the observers “collide” with Jesus’ divine *doxa*.⁵⁸ This, moreover, underlines that Jesus has the situation under control (cf. v. 11; 7:30, 44; 8:20).

The story of Jesus’ arrest in the gospels makes up an important transition in the passion narrative. In all four gospels the scene contains some highly dramatic events that illustrate attitudes of confrontation and non-resistance to the arrest. John is alone in naming the one who cuts off the ear of the high priest’s slave (Simon Peter; v. 10), while Jesus according to both Matthew, Luke, and John reproaches him, albeit on various grounds (Matt 26:52; Luke 22:51; John 18:11). All four gospels show symptoms of an apologetic attitude toward the critical question of how the Messiah could be captured by ordinary human beings. The Johannine answer is to give Jesus the initiative.⁵⁹

In conclusion, the story of Jesus’ arrest is a proper-name recognition scene, known from tradition, which John, in accordance with the ideological potentials of the type-scene and his overall purpose, expands into a recognition of Jesus’ divine thematic role.⁶⁰ In the Fourth Gospel, the arrest becomes an integral part of the revelatory mission of Jesus. His “I am” sayings reveal his divine identity; but as an element of irony, Judas’ group does not fall to the ground as a sign of veneration, which would be the conventional reaction in anagnorisis as we have seen in the *proskynēsis* of the man born blind (9:38), but they are rather forced down by the one who sets “the hour.” Thus, as in 5:1–18, the scene is only a successful recognition in regard to the proper-name identification of the suspect, but in terms of the more important acknowledgment of Jesus’ divine mark that appears behind the half-mask, it ends as a nonrecognition. As a consequence, the soldiers take Jesus away.

Peter’s Denial (18:15–18, 25–27)

Like the exposure of the traitor (13:18–30), Peter’s denial is a recognition scene, known from the synoptic tradition, in which Jesus does not occupy the role of the primary observed. In contrast to the preceding scenes, however, there are only minor, distinctly Johannine marks in

⁵⁸ See Jerome H. Neyrey, “Despising the Shame of the Cross: Honor and Shame in the Johannine Passion Narrative,” *Semeia* 68 (1994), 119–120. For examples of other interpretations of v. 6, see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:810–811, 818.

⁵⁹ In 18:36, the explanation is that Jesus’ kingdom is not of this world. If it were, the disciples would have resisted the arrest.

⁶⁰ Insofar as thematic roles are in play in the equivalent scene in the Synoptics, they

the story, and it seems to have its primary function within the level of characterization.⁶¹ By letting the scene take place simultaneously with the investigation of Jesus by Annas, it contrasts Peter with Jesus, putting even the former on trial; and by introducing the anonymous “other disciple” to the scene (18:15–16), even if he plays a humble part, it also prepares for the comparison between Peter and the “other disciple” in 20:2–4, 8.⁶² Although the scene only speaks indirectly about the recognition of Jesus, we shall deal with the scene briefly, since it—together with the exposure of Judas—makes up the Gospel’s only hints at dysphoric recognition comparable to the one experienced by Oedipus (cf. the diagram on p. 89).⁶³

Despite the many differences in detail between the various accounts of Peter’s denial, the basic story is the same in all Gospels: Peter denies his relationship to Jesus three times before the cock crows (once or twice), as was predicted by Jesus.⁶⁴ While Mark and Matthew, however, place the incident after the interrogation of Jesus by the high priest (Mark 14:66–72; Matt 26:69–75) and Luke has it before the trial (Luke 22:54–62), John’s arrangement of the material interweaves Peter’s denial and the first interrogation of Jesus (see v. 25). John does this by breaking the denial scene into two parts consisting of (1) the first denial (vv. 15–18) and (2) the second and third denial (vv. 25–27), which are separated by the trial in the high priest’s palace in vv. 19–24. This intercalation works as a contrasting juxtaposition of Jesus and Peter. While both are being questioned, Jesus denies nothing; Peter, however, denies everything.⁶⁵

are confined to the negative role expressed in the crowd’s attitude to Jesus as if he were “a bandit” (ληστής; Mark 14:48 pars.).

⁶¹ Bultmann, however, goes a bit too far when stating: “Er [John] hat die Verleugnungsgeschichte einfach nach der Tradition erzählt und mußte sie ja wegen 13³⁸ erzählen. Für sich genommen hat sie bei ihm keine sonderne Bedeutung...”; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 501.

⁶² That is, of course, if we equate the “other disciple” of 18:15–16 with the one in 20:2–4, 8. On this problem, see F. Neirynck, “The ‘Other Disciple’ in Jn 18,15–16,” *ETL* 51 (1975): 113–141. The identification is rejected in Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 499, n. 6.

⁶³ In the final version of the Gospel, however, the dysphoric character of the scene is not conclusive, since Peter’s threefold denial is atoned for in his triple confession in 21:15–19; see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:842.

⁶⁴ For an overview of the variations, see the helpful comparative chart in Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:838–839.

⁶⁵ Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:842.

In all four versions, a servant girl starts off the recognition process. In the Synoptics she claims that Peter was “with Jesus, the man from Nazareth” (Mark 14:67), “with Jesus the Galilean” (Matt 26:69), or “with him” (Luke 22:56; cf. John 18:26); but in John her statement appears in the form of a question, which more explicitly formulates the thematic role that is being suggested for Peter: “You are not also one of this man’s disciples [ἐκ τῶν μαθητῶν], are you?” (18:17).⁶⁶ In the Synoptics, Peter’s reply consists of denying that he understands her allegation or even knows Jesus (Mark 14:68, 71; Matt 26:70, 72, 74; Luke 22:57, 60), but since the suggestion of the girl in John describes him directly as a disciple, his answer comes out differently: “I am not [οὐκ εἰμι]” (18:17, 25; cf. Luke 22:58). Thus Peter reverses the typical self-identification formula of anagnorisis—he wants to stay incognito—and the fact that he is being juxtaposed with Jesus in John’s account of the story may suggest that Peter’s “I am not” statements are negative counterparts to Jesus’ self-revelatory “I am” statements in the preceding scene of his arrest (18:5, 8).⁶⁷ Because of Peter’s reluctance to give away his identity—he establishes the move of cognitive resistance himself—those who observe him never get to recognize him, but this nonrecognition of Peter by other actors is only the occasion of the primary event in the scene.

The turning point of the scene occurs when Jesus’ prediction in 13:38 comes true: The cock crows immediately after Peter’s third denial (v. 27). The synoptic accounts describe Peter’s reaction by adding that Peter remembered Jesus’ words (ἀνεμνήσθη, Mark 14:72; ἐμνήσθη, Matt 26:75; ὑπεμνήσθη, Luke 22:61) and wept. In these versions of the narrative, recognition is definitely not just a question of getting Peter identified as a follower of Jesus, but Peter is himself subjected to a tragic self-recognition like Oedipus. In retrospect Peter realizes that he was acting in the *agnoia* and *hamartia* of convenient forgetfulness until the cock-crow undeceived him and made him understand not only the truth of Jesus’ foretelling, but also his own failure. In light of the Fourth Gospel’s predilection for recognition scenes, however, it is surprising that John

⁶⁶ In contrast to the recognition of Judas in 13:18–30, the present cognitive quest is a “missing description” type of recognition (see p. 52, n. 57). The observed one (“you,” i.e., Peter) is defined from the beginning, and the quest pertains to a thematic role that fits him (“disciple”); in 13:18–30, however, the thematic role (“traitor”) was the starting point, and since the observed one was not singled out to begin with, the recognition was an identification of the one who embodied the role (Judas).

⁶⁷ See Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:824; Moloney, *Gospel of John*, 487; Maurits Sabbe, “The Denial of Peter in the Gospel of John,” *LS* 20 (1995), 236.

neither mentions any *anamnēsis* for Peter's part nor reminds the reader of Jesus' prediction. Instead, John lets the scene end in the following, most sudden manner: "[A]nd at that moment the cock crowed" (v. 27).⁶⁸ The synoptic versions may reflect a tendency to excuse Peter: When they say that he finally "remembered" (see above), they also imply that he had forgotten Jesus' warning. In John, on the other hand, there are no indications that Peter was unaware that he was doing exactly what had been foretold by Jesus, and neither does Peter show any signs of remorse. This may of course reflect a tendency in the Gospel to criticize Peter or at least to reduce his status—though the Gospel's secondary ending certainly rehabilitates him (21:15–19)—but whereas John leaves out the moment of self-recognition in the story-world he nevertheless reminds the reader that Jesus, by predicting the incident, is the one who knows all: a recollection διὰ μνήμης (13:38; cf. 4:25; 16:30).⁶⁹ In the Johannine account of Peter's denial, the tragic self-knowledge of Peter and his recognition of Jesus through the fulfillment of his words is not recounted explicitly, but John hands over to the reader the task to figure out the conclusion of the denial. The scene is recounted in a mode of understatement that presupposes consciousness of genre. When breaking off at the move of token-display (the cock-crow), the scene becomes a torso, lacking the final moment of recognition and attendant reactions. Unlike John's common practice of increasing the recognition-scene character of early Christian traditions, he downplays them in the present example. The final moves of the scene are for the reader to construct.

Jesus Judged by Pilate: By What Law? (18:28–19:16a)

The trial scene before Pilate is the third recognition scene in the series that begins when Jesus has finished his words of farewell in chs. 13–17. In the first scene of Jesus' arrest (18:1–12), Jesus revealed his "I Am" identity to Judas and the soldiers; but they only recognized his proper-name identity, thus disregarding the question of his thematic role. In the present scene, where Jesus is brought before Pilate's court,

⁶⁸ Sabbe sees John's omission of Peter's reaction as a reflection of the Gospel's theological, not psychological, focus; idem, "The Denial of Peter," 239; cf. Dauer, *Die Passionsgeschichte im Johannesevangelium*, 98.

⁶⁹ Cf. Jesus saying in 13:19: "I tell you this now, before it occurs, so that when it does occur, you may believe that I am he."

the situation is structurally inverted. Since the right man has now been caught, the question again relates to the determination of his thematic role. As in the previous controversies between Jesus and the *Ioudaioi*, questions concerning the criteria of recognition rise to the surface.

The scene is an example of the narrative technique of letting the reader follow the spatial movements of the observer and not of Jesus, which we have already encountered in the incident with the man born blind in ch. 9. Pilate restlessly goes in and out of the praetorium, Jesus being interrogated inside, the *Ioudaioi* standing outside in order to avoid ritual defilement at the Passover, as the narrator explains (18:28).⁷⁰ This way of narrating the interrogation before Pilate is unique to John, and in employing these two theaters of action (one inside and one outside the praetorium), John seems to merge the private recognition scene, which holds only two actors, and the public recognition scene with its judicial-forensic aspects (see pp. 63–64). Accordingly, when I describe the present scene as a recognition scene, it is not an attempt to set aside its character as a lawsuit where a legal accusation is being examined (see *κατηγορία*, 18:29). Trial scenes, however, have very much in common with recognition scenes since both tend toward a verdict of identity. Both setups deal with the cognitive dimension in narrative by using the same epistemological terminology.⁷¹ In practice, this means that recognition scenes may very well appear as forensic interrogations where true identity is being isolated step by step—as in, e.g., Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*, Euripides, *Bacch.*, and Heliodorus, *Aeth.*, as we shall see in more detail below.

According to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.3.5; 1.10.3), every judicial sentence is pronounced in relation to some kind of law (*νόμος*), whether written or unwritten, and the same may be said about the social recognition of thematic roles. A thematic role is an attribution of social status, from the most exalted to the lowliest, and it describes an individual who performs certain acts or speaks in a certain manner, as negotiated within a certain cultural context. According to the Pharisees, for example, Jesus does not fit the role of being “from God” because his doing violates the Sabbath (9:16; cf. 5:1–18). So, when people believe in him, it is

⁷⁰ See the markers of spatial movement in 18:28–29, 33, 38; 19:1, 4, 8, 13. For a chart showing the successive “insides” and “outsides,” see Charles Homer Giblin, “John’s Narration of the Hearing Before Pilate (John 18,28–19,16a),” *Bib* 67 (1986): 222.

⁷¹ It is quite striking that in Roman legal terminology the process of obtaining evidence and interrogating was called *cognitio*; see Christoph Paulus, “Cognitio,” *DNP* 3:59–60.

because they do not know the value system of the law (7:48–49). On the other hand, Jesus claims, for example, that since circumcision—an act of labor—is already being practiced on the Sabbath, healing on that same day is no violation against the law, and so it does not disqualify him (7:21–24). As can be seen from the Pharisees’ objection as well as Jesus’ counterargument, the boundaries of a thematic role are determined by comparing the actions and sayings of the individual character with a general set of values and role expectations (an unwritten “law”), which in the present example finds its justification in a written code (the law).⁷² The specific actions and words that are thought to fit a certain role, however, are only stable to the extent that the semiotic habit is not challenged. In John, the divine law (the *Torah*) is not called into question, but the “law” that governs the rejection of Jesus certainly is. Instead of simply abandoning the claim that Jesus is “from God,” which would be one solution to this cognitive dissonance, John seeks to adjust the “law” that defines the role.⁷³ The present recognition scene (or better: nonrecognition scene) centers on how contradicting “laws” bring along conflicting cognitive judgments about the role that truly describes Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, to quote Severino Pancaro, the trial before Pilate is “the ‘dénouement’ of the confrontation of Jesus with the Jews and ‘their’ Law.”⁷⁴ But, not to forget, also the emperor’s *Lex* is an actor in the game.

Some recognition scenes of Greco-Roman literature thematize the “law” that governs the social recognition of thematic role, but this is not always the case. This has to do with the fact that often, when the recognition forms part of a reunion, the thematic role is already fixed so that mere proper-name identity is the content of the anagnorisis. In other types of recognition, however, the proper name is secondary or maybe already known, for which reason the discovery relates to the role fitting the observed. In trial-like recognition scenes, e.g., in

⁷² In the following, “the law” (put in inverted commas) indicates the value and expectation system that defines a thematic role. Without inverted commas it refers to a written law, whether the Jewish *Torah* or the Roman *Lex*.

⁷³ Moreover, the overarching Johannine “law” that defines Jesus as the Son of God is claimed to be in accordance with the law (*Torah*); see Severino Pancaro, *The Law in the Fourth Gospel*, 508–509.

⁷⁴ Idem, *The Law*, 307. Likewise, Lincoln says that “the lawsuit motif builds to a climax...” in the present scene; idem, *Truth on Trial*, 123, cf. 137. According to Bart D. Ehrman, the Johannine contribution to the gospel traditions of the trial before Pilate is primarily a heightening of ironic tensions, reserving the ultimate ironies for the Jews; idem “Jesus’ Trial before Pilate: John 18:28–16:16,” *BTB* 13 (1983): 124–131.

Sophocles, *Oed. tyr.*, observers know that the observed one is Oedipus, but the observers (including Oedipus himself) do not know his real thematic role. To begin with, he is the respected sovereign of Thebes (e.g., *καταύνων*, 14), but when the examination of the witnesses finally reveals that he is unwittingly guilty of the crimes that have polluted the land and has thrown it into an unfortunate famine, his true thematic roles come forth: He is a patricide, and an incestuous, cursed man (1182–1185; 1337–1343). As said by the chorus in 863–910 (where motifs of law, justice, reward, and punishment are evoked), the “laws” (*νόμοι* 865) of *hybris* and *nemesis* are divine, eternal, and never fall into oblivion. These are the “laws” that ensure that Oedipus cannot keep his false, royal title, but undergoes a negative peripety, when justice is done and true thematic roles are determined.

Another example is Euripides’ *Bacchae*. George W. MacRae and Mark W.G. Stibbe have pointed out some striking similarities in terms of irony and *double entendre* between the present scene in John and the “trial” against Dionysus before Pentheus in *Bacch.* 432–518: An unacknowledged god is put on trial by a ruling figure of the city, though the one who is in the dock is in fact the real judge.⁷⁵ I would like to focus on another parallel phenomenon in the *Bacchae*, the differences notwithstanding, since it also contains a clash of mutually exclusive, normative legal systems. In the *Bacchae*, King Pentheus represents the long-established order that, in his eyes, is being threatened by the introduction of a new god in Thebes (215–262; 256; 467). According to Pentheus’ law-and-order perspective, the stranger coming to town (Dionysus) is not a god but a “charlatan magician” (*γόνης ἐπιδόξ*; 234 [Arrowsmith]) or a blasphemer (cf. the phrase *ὑβρεῖς ὑβρίζειν*; 247), and with words that resemble the accusation toward Jesus in John 18:30 (*κακὸν ποιῶν*), he regards the maenads as Dionysus’ co-criminals (*κακῶν συνεργοὺς*; 512). In the eyes of the opponent, however, it is strongly emphasized that the Bacchus-cult is neither unlawful mockery nor a sign of chaos. According to this “law,” represented by Dionysus, Pentheus is the one who holds the role of the law-breaker (890–897). He is the *ἄνομος* (993, 1014) and the *παράνομος* (997), who is being dressed up in the Bacchantes’ garb and humiliated (821–838, 912–917) and finally killed by his own mother who, not recognizing her son until it is too late, puts Dionysus’ revenge into effect. As we see, Dionysus

⁷⁵ MacRae, “Theology and Irony,” 103–113; Stibbe, *John as Storyteller*, 121–147.

is enforcing a new ideological value-system, according to which the holders of the thematic roles interchange. The king becomes a criminal, and the “blasphemer” a god.⁷⁶

Finally, Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica* needs to be mentioned. In this romance, the recognition is first and foremost the proper-name identification of Charikleia. When her parents recognize Charikleia, however, she is also installed in the role of Ethiopian crown princess. Now, because she arrived in her homeland as a prisoner of war, even as “the firstfruits of the war,” she must be sacrificed to the gods in thanks of victory according to the law of the land (10.7.1). This gives rise to a terrible dilemma. The girl holds two contradicting roles, “princess” and “the first prisoner of war,” and if the king does not want to commit sacrilege and jeopardize the fate of the society by breaking the law, he himself has to lead the sacrifice of his own daughter. As a second Agamemnon, he is willing to put aside his private interests for the sake of the common good (10.16), but, out of pity, the Ethiopian assembly demands a renegotiation of the law that defines the “first-prisoner-of-war” role (10.16–39). When a conclusion is finally reached, the priest Sisimithres stands forward and proclaims that Ethiopians will abolish human sacrifice forevermore (10.39; cf. 10.9.6–7). Thus by introducing a new law, the thematic role of “first prisoner of war” is reinterpreted, so that it no longer implies ritual murder, and Charikleia and her beloved Theagenes are saved.

Returning to John, we notice that a judicial recognition process is initiated when Pilate asks the accusers about the content of their accusation (v. 29). The answer reads: “If this man were not a criminal [κακὸν ποῦν], we would not have handed him over to you” (v. 30). The *Ioudaioi* ascribe the role of “criminal” to Jesus, a role that according to them is proven not only by his actions but also by what he has said about himself: “We have a law, and according to that law [κατὰ τὸν νόμον] he ought to die because he has claimed to be [ἐαυτὸν ἐποίησεν; lit., “he has made himself”] the Son of God” (19:7; cf. 5:18; 8:59; 10:30–33; 11:47–53). The *hybris*, by which Jesus acts and speaks, is incompatible with the role of “the Son of God.” According to the underlying law as

⁷⁶ In scholarship, the *Bacchae* is traditionally interpreted in two mutually exclusive ways. Either the play is an “apology” of the Dionysus cult, or it is a parody that reveals the fatal consequences of introducing new gods that overthrow ancient order. As one can see, the above rendering reflects the first understanding of the drama. For references to the discussion, see Helene P. Foley, *Ritual Irony: Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 205.

they understand it, such self-elevation is rather blasphemy (Lev 24:16), which only qualifies for the lowest possible social role (“criminal”) and must be met by the penalty of death. The annihilation of the blasphemer not only lets justice be done but also confirms the legal system of the *Ioudaioi* by expelling the voice that threatens it. This definition of the roles, however, is only valid within that particular “law” which Pilate, addressing the *Ioudaioi*, calls “your law” (18:31). According to the law that he represents he finds no case against him (18:38; 19:4, 6, 12), and this acquittal even appears after the potentially threatening thematic role of “the King of the Jews” has been introduced in 18:33. The social role system of the Jews, in other words, has no effect on him (to begin with); and the content of the accusations seems to be *adiaphora* in his identification of Jesus. When he presents Jesus to the *Ioudaioi*, investing him with the pseudo-regalia of the crown of thorns and the purple robe, and exclaims, “Here is your king!” (19:14), it is an act of mockery that dissociates him not only from Jesus, but also from the Jews and their thematic role system. He tries to stand outside its sphere, and according to the rules of his own law, he is only able to describe Jesus with a neutral masculine thematic role: “Here is the man [ὁ ἄνθρωπος]!” (19:5; cf. 18:29).⁷⁷ It is not until the *Ioudaioi* manage to convince him that the “King of the Jews” role also criminalizes Jesus according to the law of the Roman Caesar that he gives in to pressure. It happens when they say: “Everyone who claims to be a king sets himself against the emperor” (19:12). So when Pilate hands over Jesus to be crucified (19:16), he is at the same time accepting the accusers’ interpretation of Jesus, who is now regarded as a “criminal” according to both Jewish and imperial law. Pilate, however, is unable to judge Jesus by the implied author’s ideal “law.” Pilate cannot acknowledge Jesus’ true thematic roles but ends up imitating the nonrecognition of the *Ioudaioi*.⁷⁸ The “law” of the implied author, i.e., the value system by which Jesus is

⁷⁷ The *ecce homo* has been interpreted in multiple ways—from, e.g., an indication of pity, contempt, or awe to an unintentional proclamation of a christological title; see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:875–876. I understand the statement as presenting Jesus in a neutral (in Pilate’s point of view) thematic role that situates Jesus in the insignificant middle between the two extremes of “criminal” and “King of the Jews.” Pilate uses this same designation (ἄνθρωπος), when he first sees Jesus (18:19). In failing to see more than a man, however, Pilate is blind to anything but the camouflage of the incarnate one and does not see the truth (18:38).

⁷⁸ Yet, Pilate at a later point has a cross inscription written that reads “Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews” and refuses to follow the chief priests’ request that it be changed to “This man said, I am King of the Jews” (19:19–22). This makes Pilate’s

recognized in his proper divine roles, is the third “law” that competes for the power of interpretation in the text. This “law” is the hermeneutical key that was already given to the reader in the prologue, and in the present scene it is promulgated by Jesus, who calls it “the truth” (ἀλήθεια; 18:37–38): “Everyone who belongs to the truth listens to my voice” (18:37). Jesus is only properly recognized within the true “law,” whereas Pilate subscribes to another law: “What is truth?” (18:38).

Now, the negotiation concerning which “law” is going to be the valid one in judging Jesus is a struggle for power. No law works without a power that substantiates it. This is clearly thematized in the text. The *Ioudaioi* come to Pilate because they are unable to carry into effect the capital punishment that their law requires (18:31). Pilate ridicules their impotency, as already mentioned (19:14), and says to Jesus: “Do you not know that I have power [ἐξουσίαν ἔχω] to release you, and power [ἐξουσίαν ἔχω] to crucify you?” (19:10). This power, however, is undermined in two ways in the immediate context. First, he submits to the persuasion of the *Ioudaioi*, thus relativizing his own authority, and second, Jesus reminds Pilate that he would have no power over him unless it had been given him from above (ἄνωθεν; 19:11).⁷⁹ Although Pilate seems to be the one in power, he is ultimately in the service of a higher authority. Also, the repeated mention of kingship and kingdom in the scene is an example of power language (18:33, 37; 19:3, 14, 19, 21). Although Jesus does not give the impression of being in power, he is really a king (18:37) with a kingdom “not from this world” (18:36). This is recognized on the discourse level, since the reader already knows from Nathanael’s confession that Jesus is “the King of Israel” (1:49).⁸⁰ Thus, the scene displays three “laws” in competition. According to the “law” of the *Ioudaioi*, Jesus is a criminal. According to Roman “law,” he is first an innocent *anthrōpos*, but is sentenced as a criminal when the *Ioudaioi* succeed in creating an alliance between *Tōrah* and *Lex*.

stance difficult to grasp. He resembles a tragic figure who gives witness to Jesus without knowing it; see Lincoln, *Truth on Trial*, 137.

⁷⁹ The meaning of Pilate’s power “from above” is twofold: While the emperor on the one hand delegates power to Pilate, he is not able to sentence his judgment over Jesus, were it not God’s will.

⁸⁰ Maybe Jesus is even depicted as the true judge in the scene. Commentators often refer to the curious fact that ἐκάθισεν in 19:13 may be taken in a transitive sense, so that Pilate, instead of sitting on the judge’s bench (*bēma*) himself, is placing Jesus on it—as an act of further ridicule. Yet, without knowing it, Pilate reveals that Jesus is the judge above all; cf. the traditions reflected in Justin, *First Apology* 35.6 (PG 6:384–385); *Gospel of Peter* 7.

According to the “law” of the implied author, however, this alliance undermines the legitimacy of both systems. On the one hand, Pilate displays his weakness when submitting to the *Ioudaioi*; on the other, the *Ioudaioi* deconstruct their own system by saying, “We have no king but the emperor” (19:15)—thus accepting Roman rule—and by turning an obvious criminal, Barabbas (“a bandit [ληστής]”; 18:40), into a free man. In order to protect the worldly view that they share, however, Pilate and the *Ioudaioi* agree to eliminate the stranger from heaven. Their “laws” make them blind, and like Actaeon’s dogs they attack the one whose marks of identity they are unable to see.

Death as Arrival: God’s Recognition of Jesus

Crucifixion is an act of humiliation. In John’s understanding, however, it becomes the exaltation of Jesus (see ὑψόω; 3:14; 8:28; 12:32, 34). In terms of values of honor and shame, it is his glorification (δοξάζω; 7:39; 12:16, 23; 13:32; 17:19).⁸¹ This peripeteic revaluation is a key element in John’s understanding of the death and resurrection of Jesus, but it is not realized by the disciples until the recognition scenes of ch. 20, as we shall see in the following chapter (cf. 2:22; 8:28; 12:16, 13:19; 20:9). Within the framework of the Gospel’s overall journey-plot, Jesus’ crucifixion as elevation is also the point where his departure from the disciples begins, as is constantly repeated in the farewell discourses (13:33, 36; 14:2, 12; 16:5, 7, 10, et passim).⁸² Nevertheless, the journey may also be seen from the heavenly perspective, where Jesus’ death is not his departure but his homecoming in the Father’s bosom. This perspective, i.e., Jesus’ journey as seen from God’s point of view, is occasionally thematized in the narrative; and in the present section, we shall shortly present anagnorisis as seen “from above,” before returning to John’s recognition scenes proper.

⁸¹ See Neyrey, “Despising the Shame of the Cross.” On social display and recognition of honor and shame as pivotal values in the ancient, Mediterranean world, see Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (3rd, rev. and expanded ed.; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 27–57. Besides the δόξα/δοξάζω terminology in John, see also τιμή, τιμάω, ἀτιμάζω in 4:44; 5:23; 8:49; 12:26.

⁸² See Godfrey C. Nicholson, *Death as Departure: The Johannine Descent-Ascent Schema* (SBLDS 63; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983).

As pointed out in the illustration on p. 86, the recognition of Jesus by worldly observers is of a peculiar nature, as it is not performed at Jesus' return to the starting point of the journey, but at its destination. This displacement of the locus of recognition to alien space means that John's anagnorises not only differ from the recognitions in, e.g., the *Odyssey*, the Orestes-Electra cycle, and the romances, where recognition is closely connected to homecoming, but it also goes against the general narrative scheme as defined in the formalist and semio-structuralist tradition of narratology from Propp to Greimas. According to the narrative grammar of these theorists, the recognition scene belongs at the end of narratives—the *Odyssey* is a perfect example—when the protagonist, having performed the task assigned to him (*the decisive test*), returns in order to receive his reward (*the sanction*).⁸³ Yet, before the hero's performance can be justly sanctioned, the king who initially defined the mission has to make sure that the returning one is the proper hero and not a villain in disguise. Greimas calls this phase in narrative, where the sender recognizes the sent actor who is now returning, *the glorifying test*.⁸⁴ In light of the fact that observing characters in the recognition scenes in John are not identical with the sender (God, the Father), as in Propp and Greimas, it seems evident that the Gospel contains no glorifying test in the above sense.⁸⁵ But when changing the point of view, i.e., when reading the Gospel from the sender's heavenly perspective, a more conventional, "Odysseyan," narrative of recognition emerges. In this parallel recognition narrative, the observer is the Father, who sent his Son on a mission and now, at the Son's elevation on the cross, holds the ultimate power of recognition when passing judgment over

⁸³ See Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.vv. "Décisive (épreuve)," "Narratif (schéma)," "Sanction," 83, 244–247, 320.

⁸⁴ See Greimas and Courtés, *Sémiotique*, s.v. "Glorifiant (épreuve)," 166–167. In Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, an equivalent series of narrative functions is described. At the close of the fairy tale, the hero may return incognito (function O, 54), which forces him to prove his identity in a test (function M, 54–55). Often the stories show great creativity at this point, leading to the hero's recognition by means of the test and the marks that he has acquired in the previous fight (functions N and Q, 55–56).

⁸⁵ Instead, one could speak of "glorifying demonstrations" shown to the worldly observers, as has been proposed by Jesper Tang Nielsen in his dissertation on the cognitive function of Jesus' death and resurrection in John; see idem, "Korsets cognitive dimension," 21, 151–152. The term is a helpful development of Greimas on the basis of Johannine material, but probably should not be confined to the paschal events alone, since "glorifying demonstrations" take place throughout the Gospel whenever Jesus displays his *doxa*.

the Son at his homecoming (*the glorifying test*).⁸⁶ Taking the Father as the observer in this manner is no artificial operation motivated by a desire to align John's Gospel with conventional recognitions or story grammar, but appears as a recurring theme in the text. This aspect of recognition (God's recognition of Jesus), however, does not become manifest in the form of type-scenes—such a scene, we could imagine, would depict Jesus returning home in disguise knocking on heaven's door—but it runs as an underlying narrative that is being referred to in the course of Jesus' persuasion of worldly observers (for example when Jesus claims that the Father testifies to his identity, e.g. 5:37; 8:18). Now and again this narrative rises to the surface of the text, for example when the heavenly voice chooses to break into the realm of worldly discourse in order to confirm Jesus' identity (12:28; cf. 1:33), and, in particular, when Jesus communicates with the Father in the prayer in John 17 (cf. 11:41–42). This aspect of recognition in John is closely related to the Johannine glorification motif.

The motif of glorification (cf. δοξάζω) is very complex and has been subject to much discussion, mainly for two reasons.⁸⁷ First, the concept of Jesus' *doxa* in John appears as an amalgam, since its semantic field covers both the Greek idea of δόξα ("opinion," "reputation," "honor") and the Hebrew meaning of *kābôd* ("glory," i.e., the manifestation of God's presence). Second, the verb δοξάζω appears in various subject-object relations: Jesus, the Son, or the Son of Man glorifies God or the Father (13:31–32; 14:13; 17:1, 4); God is also glorified by the fruit-bearing believers (15:8), by himself (12:28), and by Peter's death (21:19). As for Jesus, he is glorified by his works (11:4), by the Spirit (16:14), in his disciples (17:10), and by God or the Father (13:31–32; 17:1, 5; presumably also in 7:39; 12:16). It is obvious that δοξάζω describes a relational act embedded in the social game of honor exchange. Glorification is an act of granting or ascribing honor and of recognizing thematic roles, i.e., roles that imply participation in the divine *doxa*.⁸⁸ In the present context, we shall limit ourselves to discussing aspects of God's glorification of Jesus, which has its climax at Jesus' death and resurrection, i.e., at

⁸⁶ From this perspective, the location of recognition is the same as in the *Odyssey*; cf. the illustration on p. 86.

⁸⁷ For a still valuable survey that nevertheless predates the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Gerhard Kittel, "δόξα," *TWNT* 2:236–240, 245–256.

⁸⁸ See Wilhelm Thüsing, *Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu im Johannesevangelium* (2nd ed. NTAbh 21. Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 243: "[Δ]οξάζειν bedeutet seinem Begriff nach ein Mitteilen bzw. Verschaffen von δόξα."

the hour of his return to the Father.⁸⁹ Glorification is one of the main subjects in Jesus' prayer in ch. 17. Commentators rightly emphasize that this prayer, as a conclusion of the farewell discourses in chs. 13–17, is a testamentary prayer dealing with the well-being of those left behind;⁹⁰ but one should not overlook that it also thematizes the destiny of the departing one, functioning as the returning Son's self-recommendation to his Father at the moment where he begins his heavenly *nostos*: "But now I am coming to you [i.e., the Father]" (17:13; cf. v. 11).⁹¹ This function is clearly thematized in the first verses of the prayer:

Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son so that the Son may glorify you...I glorified you on earth by finishing the work that you gave me to do. So now, Father, glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had in your presence before the world existed. (17:1, 4–5; cf. 12:23)

The Son reports to the Father that he has accomplished the required task of glorifying God and making him known (see vv. 6, 26), and he presents those whom the Father had given him as a token of this (17:6–8, 22–23). This is not a recognition token in the conventional sense, since God does not need to identify Jesus—he has already "set his seal" on him (ἐσφράγισεν; 6:27)—but the believers are a trace left by Jesus in the world, showing the results of his ministry. On the basis of the accomplished mission, the Son asks the Father to be acknowledged as part of the godhead. The above quotation also reveals that the events of the Passover are not going to convey *doxa* upon Jesus that he did not have beforehand (cf. 1:14; 12:28). The glorification is rather God's reconfirmation of Jesus' identity. The main reason that the glorification is a pivotal point in the Gospel is rather that it affects the recognition of Jesus by worldly observers. God is the ultimate power in the Gospel's axiological universe and thus also owns the ultimate right to define honor and shame, as he grants the highest form of social recognition: "It is my Father who glorifies me, he of whom you say, 'He is our God'" (8:54b; cf. 5:44; 7:18; 8:50, 12:43; 13:32). While various human actors in the Gospel seek to judge Jesus, God's evaluation of Jesus is ultimate: "I do not seek my own glory; there is one who seeks it and he is the judge" (8:50). In comparison, the honor that human beings ascribe to

⁸⁹ For broader discussions of the notion of glorification, see, e.g., Thüsing, *Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu*; Nielsen, "Korsets Kognitive Dimension," 72–112.

⁹⁰ Käsemann, *Jesu letzter Wille*, 14; Parsenios, *Departure and Consolation*, 49–76. Accordingly, Bultmann calls ch. 17 "Das Abschiedsgebet"; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 371.

⁹¹ See, e.g., Tolmie, *Jesus' Farewell*, 221.

each other is worthless (5:41, 44; 12:43). So, when Jesus returns to his disciples in chs. 20–21, he meets them as the one, who has now been received and recognized by the Father.⁹² As a heavenly observer, the Father resides over the successively introduced worldly observers, on certain occasions his voice even cuts in (1:33; 12:28), and when worldly observers come to see who the heavenly stranger really is, they are, in a sense, imitating the Father's acknowledgment of the one he knows so well (10:15). To the Father's mind, Jesus is far from being a stranger. God's glorification of Jesus is a recognition that bears a certain affinity with the recognitions of abandoned children in the romances. Although God never abandons Jesus (e.g., 8:29; 10:30), he sends him away and confirms his own fatherhood and Jesus' sonship, as they finally reunite.⁹³

⁹² See Huprich, "Jn 20:11–18," 20: "Jesus must return to the Father (to the original parent) in order to receive his true, full, and exalted identity as the Son (authentic identity) before he is able to return and dwell among his disciples...." Huprich's observation is basically right, but she does not separate between the moment of recognition (the resurrection) and the moment of return (the ascension), which must be done in the light of 20:17. For a discussion concerning the moment of Jesus' return to his father, see Thüsing, *Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu*, 262–269.

⁹³ Jo-Ann A. Brant has compared the observers' quest for Jesus' true pedigree in John with the abandoned child motif in the ancient romances; see idem, "Divine Birth and Apparent Parents: The Plot of the Fourth Gospel," in *Ancient Fiction and Early Christian Narrative* (eds. Ronald F. Hock et al.; SBLSymS 6; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 199–217. I suggest that this motif applies better to the Father-Son relation in the Gospel than to Jesus' relation to other observers.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECOGNITION AND DEPARTURE (JOHN 20–21)

*Bridging the Horizons*¹

According to the prevalent opinion in Johannine scholarship, the twentieth chapter of the Gospel constitutes its original ending. The chapter describes the discovery of the empty tomb (vv. 1–10) followed by three consecutive apparition stories where the resurrected One materializes before his followers (vv. 11–29) and, as a conclusion, the narrator presents the overall purpose of the Gospel in vv. 30–31. In contrast to the previous Johannine anagnorises, modern scholars have frequently noticed the fact that the appearances to Mary Magdalene (vv. 11–18) and Thomas (vv. 26–29) occur in the form of recognition type-scenes.² This observation made by modern exegetes, however, has its ancient antecedent in the early Christian apocryphal tradition of rewriting and elaborating the genres of the New Testament corpus, as may be seen in the mid or late second-century *Epistula Apostolorum* 10–12.³ This passage describes a postresurrection appearance composed of a blend of traditions appearing in the canonical Gospels—John and Luke in particular—and noncanonical material. By imitating and even expanding the recognition-scene features of the apparition narratives that function as the primary model (John 20:1–29), *Epistula Apostolorum*

¹ Cf. the heading in Ben Witherington III, *John's Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Lutterworth, 1995), 358.

² See, e.g., Hitchcock, “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” 316; Berger, *Formgeschichte*, 325–326; Culpepper, “The Plot,” 356; idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 85; Stibbe, *John's Gospel*, 36; van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love*, 199–208; Huprich, “Jn 20:11–18,” 15–21; Fehribach, *The Women*, 143–167; Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 50–57; Harstine, “Un-Doubting Thomas”: 435–447. The focus in scholarship on ch. 20 is explicable in light of the fact that the chapter recounts events of reunion, but the present study confirms Culpepper's and Stibbe's suggestion that one cannot confine the Johannine recognition scenes to the final part of the text, not even when understanding anagnorisis in a more exact, formal sense.

³ See Wilhelm Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung* (2 vols.; 5th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987–1989), 1:210–211.

marks out that it understands this model in terms of such type-scene conventions. In *Epistula Apostolorum*, Jesus is trying to convince his disciples of his resurrection and identity, at first by appearing to Mary Magdalene and later on to a certain Sara (according to the Ethiopian version); but since the disciples do not believe them, he has to appear to the disciples directly. The disciples, however, continue in their cognitive resistance by seeing him as a ghost in spite of the fact that he refers to his foreknowledge and foretelling of the past events and is able to recall Peter's denial (at which Jesus was not even present, according to the canonical gospels). Eventually, Jesus lets not only Thomas, but also Peter and Andrew, touch his wounded hands and side and observe his footprints, and this puts an end to their disbelief. This imaginative elaboration on the postresurrection appearances, leaves no doubt about how it understands the nature of its *Vörlage*. It clearly interprets the apparition narratives according to the conventions of the recognition scene by emphasizing and expanding recurrent features like the attempt to bring about recognition *dia mnēmēs* (Jesus' knowledge), the postponement of the moment of recognition, the touching of tokens by other disciples besides Thomas, and the insertion of an additional footprint token.⁴ It is quite remarkable that an early, second-century source, by its mode of retelling John 20, implies an understanding of the apparition scenes as belonging to the ancient type-scene of anagnorisis.

Although John 20 is certainly not the only locus of anagnorisis in the Fourth Gospel, it constitutes a recognition climax, epitomized in Thomas' confession—as far as full recognition is possible within the story-world. In the present chapter, I shall undertake a reading of the four recognition scenes of ch. 20, to which I include not only the two episodes already mentioned, featuring Mary and Thomas, but also the discovery of the empty grave (vv. 1–10) and Jesus' appearance to the disciples without Thomas (vv. 19–23).⁵ My reading is based on the observa-

⁴ The footprint (cf. Orestes' footprints) is more than a token of recognition; it also shows that Jesus' appearance is in the flesh (*Ep. Apost.* 12). In the context of the controversy between Gnostics and Proto-Orthodoxy in the early church, the apparition narratives came to attract interest as a means for understanding the form of Jesus' bodily appearance rather than in their capacity as stories about the disciples' identification of the risen Christ; see, e.g., Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* 4.43 (PL 2:265–268). For a list of further references, see Gregory J. Riley, *Resurrection Reconsidered: Thomas and John in Controversy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1995), 100, nn. 1, 3.

⁵ I shall also discuss Jesus' appearance in Galilee (ch. 21) at the end of the present chapter. In ch. 20 four anagnorises are also mentioned by Stibbe, *John*, 203 and

tion that the scenes make up a recognition *catena* with clear parallels to the successive encounter narratives in 1:35–51. Jesus’ final appearances in the Gospel come to mirror his first active performance in the story-world. As to these analogies, they do not only relate to Jesus’ question, “Whom are you looking for?” (20:15; cf. 1:38; 18:4, 7) or the use of the “Rabbi/Rabbouni” title (20:16; cf. 1:38), but they are also thematic and formal and concern the alternation between *telling/hearing* and *showing/seeing*, the play of presence/absence, the spreading of the news, and the attraction of other observers through testimony (see pp. 103–112). Regarding the question of form, Brown in his commentary suggested that 20:1–29 is composed of two consecutive sequences parallel in structure (20:1–18, 19–29), which may be reproduced in the following way:⁶

<i>Scene 1 (20:1–18)</i>	<i>Scene 2 (20:19–29)</i>
Time setting (v. 1)	Time setting (v. 19)
Episode 1 (vv. 1–10): A disciple comes to faith (The Beloved Disciple)	Episode 1 (vv. 19–23): The disciples come to faith (The disciples behind closed doors)
Episode 2 (vv. 11–18): Jesus appears before an individual (Mary Magdalene)	Episode 2 (vv. 24–29): Jesus appears before an individual (Thomas)
The individual’s coming to faith is related to a larger audience (v. 18)	The individual’s coming to faith is related to a larger audience (v. 29)

Brown’s division of the text in two parallel scenes is alluring since it creates a formal correspondence with the diptychon in 1:35–51 (vv. 35–42, 43–51), in addition to the thematic parallels, but the construction of two matching scenes in 20:1–29 halts on several points. First, the introductory episodes of the two scenes (20:1–10, 19–23) are not obvious parallels, since they take place in the absence and the presence of Jesus, respectively. Second, Brown has to leave out the time setting in v. 26 (μεθ’ ἡμέρας ὀκτώ) in order to elevate the ones in vv. 1 (τῇ δὲ μιᾷ τῶν σαββάτων) and 19 (οὔσης οὖν ὀψίας τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τῇ

Culpepper, *Gospel and Letters*, 85. In Culpepper’s earlier article, “The Plot of John’s Story of Jesus,” 356, however, he does not include the finding of the empty grave (20:1–10); see p. 14.

⁶ The reconstruction follows the observations made in Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:995. Brown’s own outline (2:965) contains more particulars than in the present reproduction, but the main structure is the same.

μᾶ σαββάτων) to be the main markers separating two distinct scenes. Instead of Brown's symmetrical outline of the postresurrection narratives in ch. 20, I shall suggest a reading that sees them as consisting of, first, a visitation to the empty grave (Jesus is absent) and, second, a series of three consecutive apparition stories (Jesus is present), so that the division does not put together the episodes two and two as in Brown (vv. 1–10, 11–18 corresponding to vv. 19–23, 24–29), but one and three (vv. 1–10 followed by vv. 11–18, 19–25, 26–29). This alternative way of structuring the material emphasizes the question of Jesus' presence and absence—one of the main themes of the type-scene—and is illustrated below. Moreover, it takes into consideration the modes of perception on the observer side employed in the *catena*. The outline shows that the sequences of the chapter, as in 1:35–51, from the very outset thematize the relation between *seeing* Jesus and *hearing* about him and thus lay the scene for the conclusive *Herrenwort* in v. 29, which comes not as an astounding surprise but rather summarizes the textual attempt to transcend the story-world that has already been prepared for in the apparition episodes that precede the saying (vv. 11–18, 19–25).

A. *The Empty Tomb* (vv. 1–10)

<i>Seeing</i>	Mary sees the removed stone (βλέπει, v. 1)
<i>Telling</i>	Having seen, Mary informs Peter and the Beloved Disciple (λέγει, v. 2)
<i>Hearing</i>	The two disciples hear her message (v. 2) ⁷
<i>Seeing</i>	The two disciples see the empty grave (βλέπει, θεωρεῖ, εἶδεν, vv. 3–10) ⁸

B. *Jesus and Mary Magdalene* (vv. 11–18)

<i>Seeing</i>	Mary sees the Lord (θεωρεῖ, vv. 11–17)
<i>Telling</i>	Having seen, Mary informs the disciples (εἰπὲ, ἀγγελλουσα, εἶπεν, vv. 17–18)
<i>Hearing</i>	The disciples hear her message (v. 18) ⁹

⁷ A verb of *hearing* is not used explicitly, but when addressees react to an act of *telling*, *hearing* is implied; cf. also the moments of *hearing* in vv. 18, 25, and 29 below.

⁸ The statement in v. 10 (“Then the disciples returned to their homes”) may possibly imply a subsequent act of *telling*.

⁹ The fact that the following scene does not refer to Mary's testimony may have to do with the redaction history of the text. See Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:996–1004.

C. *Jesus and the Disciples* (vv. 19–25)

- Seeing* The disciples (except Thomas) see the Lord (ἰδόντες, vv. 19–23; cf. ἑώρακαμεν, v. 25)
- Telling* Having seen, the disciples inform Thomas (ἔλεγον, vv. 24–25)
- Hearing* Thomas hears their message but does not believe (οὐ μὴ πιστεύσω, v. 25)

D. *Jesus and Thomas* (vv. 26–29)

- Seeing* Thomas sees the Lord (ἶδε, vv. 26–28; ἑώρακάς, v. 29; cf. ἴδω, v. 25)¹⁰
- Telling* Jesus' macarism implies future missionary telling without showing (μὴ ἰδόντες, v. 29)
- Hearing* Jesus blesses the true hearers of the abovementioned telling (πιστεύοντες, v. 29)

The above outline of vv. 1–29, shows a series of four sequences (A–D). In A, the perceptive elements are organized in accordance with the first recognition *catena* of the Gospel (1:35–51): *seeing-telling-hearing-seeing*. As we saw in the reading of those recognitions, they consist of two consecutive sequences where an observer, having *seen* Jesus, goes to *tell* it to other observers, who, after *hearing* the message, go to *see* for themselves (1:35–42, 43–51; cf. p. 111).¹¹ Episode A (20:1–10) repeats this pattern when Peter and the Beloved Disciple go to see for themselves, occasioned by Mary Magdalene's *telling*. Yet, when we first met the pattern in 1:35–51, which belonged to the entry into the story-world, this way of sequencing the recognition scene served an obvious purpose

¹⁰ As is typical in John, the time setting (v. 26a) signifies that a new link is being put on the chain; cf., e.g. 1:35, 42; 2:1 in the first collection of recognitions. Often commentators (and Bible translations—e.g., the NRSV) ignore this particular time indication's function as a marker of the boundary of the scene and place the beginning of the sequence in v. 24a; see, e.g., Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 537; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:965, 1031; Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium*, 3:355, 380, 390.

¹¹ This structure is also present in 4:4–42 (see p. 139). In ch. 5 and 9, however, since they are nonrecognition scenes, the secondary observers do not come and see, but are challenged by Jesus himself. Likewise in ch. 11, some of the *Ioudaioi*, having witnessed the raising of Lazarus (11:45), go to tell the Pharisees about it (11:46); the hard-hearted Pharisees and High-Priests, however, pass their sentence on Jesus without going to see with their own eyes (11:47–57). William Bonney rightly describes the structure of ch. 1 and 4 as a “pattern of testimony and contact,” but he does not notice the significant change in 20:11–29; see idem, *Caused to Believe: The Doubting Thomas Story as the Climax of John's Christological Narrative* (BIS 62. Leiden: Brill, 2002), 163–164.

of establishing Jesus' presence and accessibility. By concluding in an act of *seeing*, the recognition sequences in 1:35–51 contained a promise to story actors and the reader alike regarding the things they were now being permitted to witness: "Come and see!" (1:38, 46; cf. 4:29). The pericope culminated in Jesus' pledge concerning the "greater things" that the addressees were going to see (1:50–51). At the present point of the story, this promise of *seeing* reaches its final fulfillment, but at the same time the earthly Jesus is no longer accessible. He appears only when he decides, and what the disciples are able to "come and see" is an empty tomb. Like a mirror, John 20 is not only a copy but also an inversion of John 1. The typical recognition scene in John undergoes a generic modulation, since ch. 20, as the story's original exit chapter, closes the époque of *seeing*—whether this involves *seeing* performed by the story characters or by the reader (*told seeing*). Accordingly, this also becomes the place where the text most clearly seeks to reach beyond its own story-world. As already indicated, this is not something that happens only in Jesus' concluding words in v. 29, but it also appears in the sequencing of the modulated recognitions (B–D) that follow after the visit to the empty tomb. While A is in accordance with the pattern of 1:35–51, episodes B, C, and D (vv. 11–18, 19–25, 26–29) omit the last element (the final observers' act of *seeing*), thus illustrating that the conditions for getting access to Jesus have been radically altered so that those who receive the message of the eyewitness (*hearing*) can no longer go to see for themselves. So, whereas in 1:35–51 and 20:1–10 (A) the recognitions tend toward personal inspection (*seeing*), the concluding sequences of 20:11–29 (B–D) follow a tripartite course (*seeing-telling-hearing*) pointing away from *seeing* to the communicative modes of *telling* and *hearing*, which are the only means available as long as Jesus is physically absent.¹² Both the recognition *catena* in John 1 and the one in John 20 conclude with a forward-pointing saying by Jesus that not only illustrates the preceding course of recognition but also points toward the future modes of perceiving Jesus, i.e., from the point of view of the opening and the close of the narrative, respectively:

¹² We must of course not ignore that the disciples (vv. 19–23) and Thomas (vv. 26–28) get to see for themselves after hearing a testimony from a witness (cf. 1:35–51); but first, the disciples and Thomas cannot themselves gain access to Jesus as the second observers did in 1:35–51 and 4:40–42, and second, every act of *seeing* in 20:11–29 points toward *telling* ("Go to my brothers and say to them..."; v. 17; cf. vv. 21, 25, 29) thereby reversing how things are narrated in 1:35–51 where every act of *telling* tended toward *seeing* ("Come and see!" 1:38, 46).


While the Jesus-logion in 1:51 promises stupendous *seeing*, the macarism in 20:29b is oriented toward the *telling* and *hearing* of faith without *seeing*.

Having outlined the structure of the chapter and before turning toward the individual scenes, we must have in mind a significant difference that separates the present scenes from recognition in the earlier parts of the Gospel. I am not primarily referring to the fact that Jesus has now been recognized by the Father (“glorification”), which is of course very important (see pp. 180–184), but to the location of the scenes in the overriding journey-structure of the Gospel. What happens in ch. 20 is that John, because of Jesus’ death that has separated him from his followers, is able to imitate the *nostos*-type of recognition, where recognitions are reunions and not first encounters. So, within the overall narrative V-scheme of the plot, where the point of departure and return is in the Father’s heavenly realm, the situation is temporarily turned upside down in that Jesus is now returning to his disciples after overcoming the move of separation, which is of course not a journey as, e.g., in the cases of Odysseus, Dionysus, and Orestes, but his death and stay in the grave as a transitory disappearance. Thus the anagnorises in ch. 20, though still focusing on the social recognition of Jesus’ true roles, are more conventional in layout than the previous ones, since they are really *anagnorises*. This means that John, more than before, is able to familiarize the stranger. The diagram on the next page illustrates this point by depicting the Johannine Jesus’ alternating movements between absence and presence.¹³

As the illustration shows, the overall V-pattern of the Gospel runs from Jesus’ departure from the Father (1) through his presence in the world (2–4) to his heavenly homecoming (5).¹⁴ This is, from the viewpoint of the observers in the world, an absence-presence-absence movement. However, in the central part of this structure (2–4), which describes Jesus’ stay in the world, we find a subordinate movement that goes the other way: presence-absence-presence, i.e., Jesus’ ministry (2, presence), his death (3, absence), and his return to his followers in the apparition scenes (4, presence). We have until now seen how the Gospel

¹³ The arrows in the illustration show the development of the journey in stages. The eschatological and ultimate presence of Jesus with those belonging to him (stage 7) is indicated with a dotted arrow, since its fulfillment lies beyond the time of the narrative itself.

¹⁴ Cf. the descent-ascent schema in Nicholson, *Death as Departure*, 22.



narrates various recognition scenes in stage 2, and how God recognizes Jesus as his emissary son in stages 3 and 5. In fact, the Gospel even discusses the issue of recognition in stage 6: the future recognition of the Paraclete as “another Advocate” (14:16-17). The scenes to be studied in the present chapter belong to stage 4.¹⁵

The Race to the Empty Tomb: Acknowledging the Absent One (20:1-10)

The tomb is a place for mourning and, as the ancient Greek tongue indicates by its burial place terminology, a sign (σημα) that awakens the remembrance of the departed (cf. μνημεῖον, 19:41; 20:11).¹⁶ In ancient literary fiction, the tomb is moreover a recurrent locus of recognition, a secluded and liminal place, yet not a locality where social relations are established (like at the well), but the very place that symbolizes the termination of sociality. Since death is the ultimate breaker of social bonds, the appearance of a beloved one, thought to be dead, at the same time creates the most longed-for and the most unexpected recognition possible. Once again, the Electra-Orestes cycle is a good example, since its recognition scenes are closely related to visits at Agamemnon's tomb—the symbol of all that Electra has unjustly lost. In Aeschylus' version—the clearest example of the fact that recognition may take place at the very outset of ancient *mythoi*—the story opens

¹⁵ Due to the Gospel's realized eschatology, presumably, there is no problem of recognition in the final phase of eschatological indwelling (7). God's eschatological recognition/nonrecognition of human beings, however, is a theme in, e.g., Matt 7:23; 25:31-46; Luke 13:22-30; Rev 7:3.

¹⁶ Ancient Greek also holds other less significant terms like τάφος and τύμβος.

with a recognition scene at the grave, where Electra in great distress has come out in order to bring her libation (Aeschylus, *Cho.* 1–305; cf. 4, 168). She catches sight of the signs on the tomb that indicate that Orestes has been present (the lock of hair, the footprints), but her sorrow is not turned into joy until she sees him for herself, when he reveals himself to her. In Sophocles, Orestes sends before him the false message of his death, which extinguishes all of Electra's hopes (Sophocles, *El.* 673–763). The sad message is further confirmed, as she receives what she believes to be his urn (1113–1114, 1126–1173). Sophocles as well as Euripides do not make Electra visit the grave herself, but they insert an intermediary witness who comes to Electra to tell her with great enthusiasm about the tokens she or he has seen at the spot. In Sophocles (*El.* 871–937) the witness is Chrysothemis, Orestes and Electra's little sister; in Euripides (*El.* 487–584) it is the old pedagogue. The primary peripeteic recognition, however, does not happen in any of the three accounts until Orestes arrives in person.¹⁷

The first two recognition scenes in John 20 (vv. 1–10 and 11–18) are set in a garden at Jesus' tomb (cf., 19:41).¹⁸ In the first one, Mary Magdalene, one of the characters present when Jesus died on the cross (19:25), comes to the place in the early morning while the darkness of *agnoia* still prevails (σχοτίας ἔτι οὐσης; v. 1). She is alone, unlike in the synoptic parallels, and, again in contrast to the Synoptics, John does not say directly why she has come. According to the *Gospel of Peter* 50–

¹⁷ Fehribach (*The Women*, 147–149) tries to apply John 20:1–10 to a certain type-scene, which she coins the “Visitation to the Empty Tomb Scene,” reconstructing it on the basis of very few texts: Chariton, *Chaer.* 3.3 and Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 3.9–10. None of these texts, however, combine tomb visits with anagnorisis as in John 20. A better example, I would suggest, is Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 3.15–18, where Leucippe, apparently dead, rises from her coffin and is recognized by and reunited with her lover. Although there are certainly some striking parallels between John 20:1–10 and Chariton, *Chaer.* 3.3—the empty tomb, the removed stone(s), the question concerning where the body might be—it is unfortunate to restrict oneself to the romances when discussing recognition in John 20, as done by Fehribach, Huprich, and van Tilborg. In all three instances, this probably has to do with their overall interest in dealing with the “romantic” wedding and *agapē* motifs between recognizer and recognized in John 20. For further discussion of the “empty tomb” as motif, not as type-scene, see Andy Reimer, “A Biography of a Motif: The Empty Tomb in the Gospels, the Greek Novels, and Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*,” in *Ancient Fiction: The Matrix of Early Christian and Jewish Narrative* (eds. Jo-Ann A. Brant et al.; SBLSymS 32; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 297–316.

¹⁸ The garden setting has been understood, for example, as an allusion to Eden/Paradise (Lightfoot, *St. John's Gospel*, 321–322), to the Song of Songs (Fehribach, *The Women*, 157–158), or as a pastoral setting as in Longus, *Daphn.* (Huprich, “Jn 20:11–18,” 22, n. 15).

54, Mary went to the tomb (with her female friends) to mourn and grieve over Jesus, as was custom for women to do for their beloved departed (cf. Electra and Chrysothemis). According to Brown, “one may suppose that the *Gospel of Peter* divined correctly.”¹⁹ When Mary arrives, she sees the stone that has been removed from the grave and breaks into a run in order to give notice to Peter and the Beloved Disciple. Like Chrysothemis and the old man, she becomes an informant who, having observed an abnormality at the grave (the removed stone corresponding to Orestes’ tokens), runs off toward the final observer (Peter and the Beloved Disciple; cf. Electra).²⁰ Again, like the Sophoclean and the Euripidean messengers, Mary takes the abnormality as a sign, but unlike the former informants she misinterprets it, thinking that the sign conveys not an *eu-angelion* but a *dys-angelion*: “They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we do not know where they have laid him” (v. 2). Mary does not specify who “they” are (in the Greek original, the third-person plural subject is implied in the verb), but it is certainly not the disciples themselves (cf. Matt 27:64–66).²¹ Mary’s message becomes the starting signal for the race between Peter and the Beloved Disciple, which is often described as a status competition between the two, though it probably should not be interpreted as categorically as when Bultmann tentatively describes it as a contest between early Jewish and Gentile Christianity.²² The chase toward the locus of recognition is a topos in recognition scenes, when second-hand observers receive information in the absence of the person to be recognized. The present example resembles the running of Habrocomes (Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.13.2.), and in particular the race between Clitophon and his uncle Sostratos (and a personification of “Rumor”) toward the young girl Leucippe—Clitophon’s beloved and Sostratos’

¹⁹ Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:981. This assumption is further supported by Mary’s weeping in the following scene (20:11–15).

²⁰ The messenger’s haste is also reported in *Od.* 23.3; Euripides, *El.* 487–492; Sophocles, *El.* 872; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.13.1 (ἔτρεχον; cf. John 20:2, τρέχει). In Longus (*Daph.* 4.22), the messenger is not running toward the potential recognizer but toward the recognized.

²¹ In Chariton, *Chaer.* 3.3 the empty tomb gives occasion for two conclusions: Either grave robbers have removed the body or a god has carried it off. The same might be implied here.

²² Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 531. Mary’s call for the two disciples may also have the function of presenting more than a single witness to what has happened, as required by Jewish law (Deut 19:15; cf. John 5:31–32; 8:13–18). See Fehribach, *The Women*, 151.

daughter—whom they believed to be dead (Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.*, 7.15–16):

And so I was released from my bonds, and I quickly pressed [ταξύ μάλα ἡπειγόμεν] on to the temple. Sostratos was at my heels—I would suppose with joy similar to my own. Yet no one can run so fast [δρομικώτατος] that the wings of rumor [τῆς φήμης] will not outrun him. In this case too she reached Leukippe before us, bringing her the whole story of Sostratos and myself. Seeing us, she leaped from the temple and embraced her father, keeping her eyes the while on me.... Thus we fondly greeted each other with our eyes. (Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.*, 7.16.3–4 [Winkler])

In spite of the clear difference between the situation in John and Achilles Tatius—in John, they run to confirm the disastrous absence of a beloved one, whereas in the latter case they haste to confirm Leucippe's happy presence—they are all running with the purpose of *seeing* with their own eyes (vv. 5, 6, 8; Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 7.16.4). Now, what the Beloved Disciple and Peter see—the former having won the chase—are tokens supplementing the one that Mary saw: the linen wrappings and the cloth that had been on Jesus' head (vv. 5–7). John reports that the cloth did not lie with the linen wrappings but was rolled up in a place by itself (v. 7). Nothing is said about Peter's reaction to this, but the Beloved Disciple seems to take the tidying-up of the garments as indicating that there was no haste or violence involved when Jesus left the tomb: “[A]nd he saw and believed [καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐπίστευσεν]” (v. 8).²³ The phrase describing the Beloved Disciple's faith resembles Chrysothemis' words after her visit at Agamemnon's tomb: “I believe this story because I have seen sure signs with my own eyes [ἐγὼ, ... σαφῆ σημεῖ' ἰδοῦσα, τῷδε πιστεύω λόγῳ]” (Sophocles, *El.* 885–886 [Lloyd-Jones]). The subsequent comment by the narrator (v. 9), saying that they had not as yet understood the Scripture's words that Jesus would rise from the dead, reveals the content of the disciples' belief. The object of recognition in the present scene is, the first time round, not Jesus' personal identity but the fact that the resurrection, and not grave robbery, has occurred. God *did* recognize Jesus. Yet on this basis, the

²³ On the cloth as a *semeion*, see Sandra M. Schneiders, “The Face Veil: A Johannine Sign,” *BTB* 13 (1983): 94–97. As to the meaning of the arranging of the clothes, Brown quotes John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Joannem* 85.4 (PG 59:465): “If anyone had removed the body, he would not have stripped it first; nor would he have taken the trouble to remove and roll up the *soudarion* and put it in a place by itself”; see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:1007, cf. 1008. In Chariton (*Chaer.* 3.3) the one who claims that tomb robbers have been at work reasons on the basis of the fact that the funeral offerings have been carried off.

resurrection also functions as an ultimate sign pointing toward Jesus' true identity.²⁴ On the level of characterization, the Beloved Disciple is contrasted to Peter by being most eager in the recognition contest, and to both Peter and Mary in that he is able to read the recognition tokens properly. He functions as a model recognizer who, like John the Baptist (1:29–34), is able to activate previously received information in his interpretation of the events. In the present case, Scripture performs this *whispering* (v. 9).²⁵ In the expositional progression of the Gospel's recognition scenes, the scene becomes a turning point. Whereas it formally follows the Johannine pattern of *seeing-telling-hearing-seeing*, the final act of *seeing* is of a new kind, since Peter and the Beloved Disciple come to see, not Jesus, but an empty tomb. From now on, recognition scenes transform in order to thematize the call for belief in the era characterized by the absence of the earthly Jesus.

Mary Magdalene and the Gardener-Rabbi (20:11–18)

The Royal Collection at the Buckingham Palace in London contains a painting by Rembrandt, which is entitled “Christ and St Mary Magdalene at the Tomb” (1638). The motif is a continuation of the classical *Noli me tangere* motif cultivated by early to late renaissance painters, but in contrast to the previous versions of the motif, Rembrandt's depiction does not show how Jesus draws back at Mary's attempt to touch him (20:17), but instead captures the preceding moment of anagnorisis in 20:16. The painting in several ways constitutes an interesting piece of exegesis, but I shall only point to the most relevant aspects in the

²⁴ Aristotle mentions that some anagnorises relate not to persons, but to inanimate or chance things or to whether someone has or has not committed a deed (*Poet.* 1452a33–36). John 20:1–10 may be said to belong to these types of recognition though the Beloved Disciple certainly recognizes more than a state of affairs. Culpepper states that “if the narrator is reporting that seeing the grave wrappings led the Beloved Disciple to believe that Jesus had been raised from the dead, then that report implies recognition of something that for John is vital to Jesus' identity...”; idem, *Gospel and Letters*, 85.

²⁵ Here one might expect a reference to Jesus' foretelling of his glorification and his return to the disciples (see 14:27–28 et al.). This has led some interpreters to assume that “Scripture” refers to Jesus' own words or that the phrase is “eine Glosse der kirchlichen Redaktion”; Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 530. As Brown points out, these suggestions are not very convincing since the present way of using Scripture also appears elsewhere in John, cf. 12:14–16; 13:18–19; see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:987–988.

present context. Mary sits by the tomb in the garden, her body facing it, while she looks to the rear toward the source of light and the figure behind her.²⁶ The figure is Jesus, but he is not only represented with his standard paraphernalia (beard, long hair, white cloak)—otherwise, the painting would simply be showing an awe-stricken woman staring at Jesus—but he wears the mask of a gardener with brimmed hat, spade, and knife.²⁷ The painting illustrates the epistemological ambiguity and suspense evoked by the dual appearance of the observed, which also the Johannine text has a keen eye for. John's account, however, does not say that Jesus was in fact dressed like a gardener, but merely that Mary at first, in her initial state of not-yet-knowing, supposed him to be one (20:15). Thus, what the beholder of the Rembrandt painting observes is not the "objective" state of affairs, but the scene as perceived in Mary Magdalene's perspective. The beholder is invited to experience with Mary the very moment where her vision penetrates the Lord's gardener camouflage.²⁸

A certain pleasure of storytelling emanates from John's apparition narrative in 20:11–18, and it has not only fascinated the great masters of painting. We have already heard how Hitchcock praised John's knack

²⁶ One sees that Rembrandt has tried to get round the problem that Mary turns around twice in the story by reducing it to a single turn of the face. In John, Mary turns the first time when she sees Jesus (v. 14) and the second time when she realizes who he is (v. 16).

²⁷ Rembrandt here extends the gardener camouflage, which with other painters was merely a pickaxe (Giotto, Fra Angelico, Correggio, Titian), a spade (Jan Brueghel the Elder), or a spade and a hat (Fontana).

²⁸ The problem of representation in Rembrandt resembles what we have previously called the Actaeon problem (pp. 44–48). Both metamorphosis and anagnorisis are changes taking place in time, difficult to represent in a snapshot painting with no before and after; but whereas the former is a transformation in the (visible) pragmatic dimension, the latter is a change in the (invisible) cognitive dimension. Since classical painting, however, exclusively communicates by means of *showing*, it has to present what takes place in the interior cognitive dimension as if it were an exterior, pragmatic event. In his most illuminating article on textual variants in John 20:16, Tjitze Baarda reports that the medieval Byzantine monk Euthymius Zygabenus, in his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, claimed that Jesus was actually appearing to Mary in disguise: "Euthymius explains the difficulty that Mary did not recognize Him earlier by his voice by suggesting that Jesus had changed his person and voice (therefore she held Him to be the gardener) and now changed it again in the person and voice which she could remember"; Baarda, "'She recognized Him': Concerning the Origin of a Peculiar Textual Variation in John 20,16 Sy^s," in *Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn* (eds. T. Baarda et al.; Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1988), 32, n. 57.

for telling the story (p. 10);²⁹ and as to its genre, a variety of suggestions have appeared. Bultmann, not specifying exactly what he means, seems to be reckoning it among apparition stories influenced by “*novelistische Motive*,” which he found most clearly in the Walk to Emmaus in Luke 24:13–35.³⁰ C.H. Dodd, in his influential form-critical analysis of the postresurrection stories, thinks that it does not quite fit into his two main categories: “Concise Narratives” (e.g., Matt 28:8–10, 16–20; John 20:19–21) and carefully elaborated and dramatized “Circumstantial Narratives” (e.g., Luke 24:13–35; John 21:1–14). As he states, “There is nothing quite like it in the Gospels. Is there anything quite like it in all of ancient literature?”³¹ When asking in this way, the question can only be answered negatively; but the recognition scenes of ancient literature can indeed be seen as generic intertexts. John goes along with these genre conventions in the main part of the scene until he breaks with reader expectations in the final part in order to make a theological point. The scene’s formal likeness with ancient recognition scenes was vaguely suggested in the early twentieth century by Dibelius and Hitchcock, and this has been worked out more elaborately in the 1990s by, in particular, van Tilborg, Huprich, and Fehribach, who took the romances as main parallels.³² Yet, Jesus and Mary are not portrayed as reunited lovers, but as joint members in the *familia Dei*, i.e., as brother and sister on a symbolic level (v. 17, see below). The scene runs as follows:

²⁹ Note also the total surrender by G.H.C. MacGregor: “There follows the greatest recognition scene in all literature—and one told in two words! (Mary! Rabboni!).” It is not quite evident that Aristotle would have agreed (see the taxonomi on p. 29). I quote MacGregor’s 1928 commentary from Nicolas Wyatt, “‘Supposing Him to Be the Gardener’ (John 20:15): A Study of the Paradise Motif in John,” *JNW* 81 (1990), 38.

³⁰ Idem, *Geschichte*, 315; cf. 312–316 and idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 531.

³¹ Idem, “The Appearances of the Risen Christ,” 20.

³² Martin Dibelius, “Die alttestamentlichen Motive in der Leidensgeschichte des Petrus- und des Johannes-Evangeliums,” in *Abhandlungen zur Semitischen Religionskunde und Sprachwissenschaft* (eds. Wilhelm Frankenberg and Friedrich Kückler; BZAW 33; Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1918), 137; Hitchcock, “Is the Fourth Gospel a Drama?” 316; van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love*, 199–208; Huprich, “Jn 20:11–18,” 15–21; Fehribach, *The Women*, 143–167. Brant compares the scene with the recognitions in Sophocles, *El*, and Euripides, *El*; see eadem, *Dialogue and Drama*, 50–57. According to her, the scene is a good example of how John to a great extent informs the reader on a theatrical axis instead of employing the omniscient narrator.

<i>John 20:11–18</i>	<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>
The move of <i>agnoia</i> (vv. 11–15) Mary does not recognize the angels (vv. 11–13)	The move of cognitive resistance
Jesus appears, unrecognized (vv. 14–15a)	The meeting
Mary mistakes Jesus for the gardener (v. 15b)	The move of cognitive resistance
Jesus identifies Mary (v. 16a)	The moment of recognition (Mary as the recognized) The move of displaying the token (Jesus' recognition of Mary and his voice as token)
Mary recognizes Jesus (v. 16b)	The moment of recognition (Jesus as the recognized)
Jesus rejects Mary's attendant reaction of physical contact (v. 17a) Jesus imparts to Mary the proper attendant reaction (v. 17b), and she obeys (v. 18)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union

The move of agnoia (vv. 11–15). Jesus' appearance to Mary has little direct connection to the previous pericope. In fact, when Mary reenters the stage in v. 11, having left it in v. 3 as she went off to notice Peter and the Beloved Disciple of the empty tomb, she appears in the same state of confusion as in the preceding scene, still wondering where Jesus' body might be (v. 13, 15). She has no share whatsoever in what the Beloved Disciple has come to know but begins in total *agnoia*, as she stands by the tomb, weeping. When she bends over to look into the tomb, she sees two angels. They do not act as *angeli interpretes* bringing her the glad tidings of the resurrection like the youth in Mark 16:5–7, the angel in Matt 28:2–7, and the two men in Luke 24:4–7. Instead, they simply ask her why she is weeping. Her answer reads: "They have taken my Lord, and I do not know where they have laid him" (v. 13). She still does not understand the meaning of the empty tomb, and neither does she comprehend the second token being presented to her: the presence of two angels dressed in white. Although Jesus is of course the one to be recognized in the scene, also the angels are objects of observation, and so the recognition of Jesus is prepared by Mary's nonrecognition of the angels, which underscores how she is blinded by tears even before

seeing Jesus. When Jesus arrives, however, the text forgets about the angels, not even saying what Mary took them for, though it is certain that she did not recognize them as angels.

Now Mary turns around (ἐστράφη εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω, v. 14a) and sees Jesus without realizing who he is (οὐκ ᾔδει ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστίν, v. 14b). This comment by the narrator is quite revealing in regard to the epistemological *telos* of the scene. As we know, Johannine recognition is normally focused on the social recognition of Jesus' proper thematic roles, but the present scene, as a consequence of the *presence-absence-presence* trajectory created by Jesus' death, is about to reduce the problem to proper-name identification, as is often the case in the genre. The narrator does not say that she did not acknowledge him as Lord or God, but simply that she was not able to recognize him as Jesus (Ἰησοῦς, v. 14b). Jesus now repeats the angels' question and asks her what she is looking for (v. 15a; cf. 1:38; 18:4, 7), but she supposes him to be the gardener (δοκοῦσα ὅτι ὁ κηπουρός ἐστίν, v. 15b). As mentioned above, this does not indicate that Jesus was wearing a disguise, but it reveals the shortcomings of the observer. On a somatic level she is a sighted person, but cognitively she is blind.³³ By introducing the "gardener," John is again employing the conventional motif of false identification, which we first found in the Jerusalemite emissaries' questions to John the Baptist: "Are you Elijah? ...Are you the prophet?" (1:21). Yet, here it is not expressed directly by the observer, but only appears in Mary's mind to which the omniscient narrator gives us access. It is remarkable that when Jesus appears dually in this scene, the camouflage is not his *sarx* overshadowing his divine mark of *doxa*, but (from Mary's point of view) the *gardener* appearance that makes her unable to see his *Jesus* appearance. This further shows that anagnorisis, at this point, is not yet about social recognition but concerns the discovery of the Jesus-identity of the incognito man. Having said that Mary's initial nonrecognition has to do with her own lack of understanding, we must also notice that Jesus does not reveal

³³ The same is the case in Luke 24:18, where the two disciples take Jesus for a "foreigner" (παροικεῖς). In Luke, an explanation to the delayed discovery is given explicitly: "[T]heir eyes were kept from recognizing [ἐπιγινῶναι] him" (24:16). In the very brief version of the appearance to the two disciples on the road preserved in the Marcan appendix, however, Jesus appears "in another form" (ἐν ἑτέρῳ μορφῇ; Mark 16:12). This move of *agnoia* may be an apologetic motif showing that the appearances were not at all expected or made up by the disciples, but it is also a requirement of the type-scene.

himself right away. When asking her why she weeps and what she is searching for, he assumes the attitude of Odysseus, albeit only for a short while, since he does not need her to answer in order to know. He puts her to the test, in other words, by speaking elusively as he did to the Samaritan woman (4:4–25) and the man born blind (9:35). Thus, John is again about to employ the type-scene element of deception where the observed pretends to be someone else (cf. the motif of foretelling, pp. 60–61), but then breaks off in order not to give up his “counter-Odysseyan” view of Jesus’ will to reveal.³⁴

Jesus identifies Mary (v. 16a). The present recognition scene belongs to the mutual kind, but compared to the other examples in the Gospel (1:47–51; 4:4–42; possibly 1:42; 9:35), Jesus’ identification of the other character is recounted in as compact a manner as possible by a mere indication of her proper name: “Jesus said to her, ‘Mary!’”³⁵ Also in contrast to the previous examples, the recognition is not a demonstration of Jesus’ extraordinary knowledge since Jesus has in fact seen Mary before due to the *presence-absence-presence* structure. Instead, as pointed out by many commentators, it forms an illustration of Jesus’ “poetics” of recognition in the words about the shepherd in 10:3, “He calls his own sheep by name....”

Mary recognizes Jesus (v. 16b). Jesus’ identification of Mary brings about her recognition of him, “Rabbouni!” Her reaction seems to put into practice another statement from the shepherd discourse, “The sheep follow him because they know his voice [τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ]” (10:4; cf. 16, 27). Voice recognition is also a common motif in Greco-Roman literary anagnorises;³⁶ but if Mary really recognizes Jesus by his voice, why did it not happen at once in v. 15, as soon as he addressed himself to her? Bultmann considered such a question illegitimate—“Woran sie ihn erkannt hat, darf bei diesem wunderbaren Geschehen nicht gefragt werden”³⁷—but if we want to know how John understands recognition

³⁴ This part of the conversation creates a recurrent type of irony, as the dialogue partners are speaking of a person believed to be dead in that same person’s presence; cf., e.g., *Od.* 14.280–301; Sophocles, *El.* 1098–1220; Euripides, *Alcestis* 1008–1126. See, Richardson, “Recognition Scenes,” 229.

³⁵ The exclamation of the proper name at the moment of recognition is a regular feature in the type-scene, cf., e.g., *Od.* 23.209; Euripides, *Hel.* 625; Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.1.8 (see the quotation on p. 70).

³⁶ In the tragedies, the term φθῆγμα is used (Sophocles, *Ajax* 14; *El.* 1225), while the later romances use φωνή like John (Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.1.8; Xenophon Ephesius, *Eph.* 5.10.11). See also Achilles Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.* 3.18.1.

³⁷ Idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 532.

and the marks that identify Jesus to worldly observers, we cannot escape it. Now, if John really wants to illustrate the sheep's recognition of the shepherd's voice from ch. 10, and most commentators agree upon that, the inconsistency may be explained as a consequence of a collision between theology and type-scene conventions in John's use of the genre. If v. 15 (Jesus' first address to Mary) was not there, "Mary!" would be Jesus' first words, and the problem would not occur; but v. 15 serves the conventional function of postponing recognition by testing Mary and is, therefore, apparently indispensable.³⁸ The presence of v. 15, moreover, makes it clear that though there may be a play on the sheep's voice-recognition, she does not recognize him by his voice, but by his calling of her name. It is this aspect of recognition that is being stressed, i.e., the principle of mutuality also formulated in ch. 10: "I know my own and my own know me,..." (10:14b). Here, it is obvious that recognition is not just a cognitive phenomenon, but also changes the relation between recognizer and recognized peripeteically. Another motif of change in the text is indicated by the piece of information saying that Mary, in the moment of recognition, "turned around" (στραφεῖσα; v. 16). The statement has bewildered commentators (cf. Rembrandt) since Mary in v. 14 had already turned toward Jesus (ἐστράφη) with the consequence that Mary, if taking the statement literally, has now come to stand with her back to Jesus.³⁹ Most modern commentators, going back to Augustine (*In Evangelium Johannis tractatus* 121; PL 35:1957), take Mary's latter turn to be not a bodily but a mental conversion (see στραφῶσιν in the quotation from Scripture in 12:40), signifying that we are dealing with yet another example of Johannine use of metaphor. This interpretation also appears in some of the Syriac textual variations (Sy^s and probably also Tatian's *Diatessaron*) that, instead of the Greek phrase στραφεῖσα ἐκείνη λέγει αὐτῷ, present a text that may be rendered in English in the following way: "and she recognized Him and answered and (was) saying to Him."⁴⁰ The Syriac text probably reflects a scribal

³⁸ See Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 52: "The logic of her failure may reside within the action of recognition itself."

³⁹ See Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:991; Michael L. Peppard, "How Maria Magdalene 'Turned' into Mariam Magdalene in John 20:11-18" (paper presented at the Yale University New Testament Seminar, New Haven, Conn., March 2003), 1-7. The Greek verb in question may also mean "to turn toward" besides "to turn around"; cf. "sich zuwenden" in Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium*, 3:375, n. 49.

⁴⁰ T. Baarda, "'She recognized Him,'" 24. Baarda subscribes to A. Merx' and F. Blass' attempt to restore the Greek original from the Syriac translation in the following manner: καὶ ἐπέγνω αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπεκρίθη καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ.

emendation of the text, but it seems to capture the cognitive connotations of the Greek term (στυγαφείσα) very well.

Now, in what sense does Mary recognize Jesus? “Rabbouni” (Aram., “My Rabbi!”) is a thematic role, which is also used in its absolute form (“Rabbi”) in the recognition *catena* in John 1 (1:38, 49; cf. 3:2, 26; 4:31; 6:26; 9:2; 11:8). According to Brown, it is “a title that is characteristic of the beginning of faith rather than of its culmination,” and it certainly falls short of Thomas’ confession in v. 28.⁴¹ In fact, its function as a role designation seems to be weakened in the present context, so that it tends toward representing a proper name. Nowhere in the Gospel have story-world observers called Jesus by his proper name, so simply exclaiming “Jesus!” is no option to John, but the present recognition seems to be such an identification, as prepared for by the narrator in v. 14b (Ἰησοῦς). Mary, in other words, recognizes Jesus, she gets him back, but as the next verse shows, she does not understand the meaning of Jesus’ death and falls into the trap that was set up in v. 14 where the narrator provided the framework for a recognition scene limited to conventional proper-name identification and reunion.

Jesus rejects Mary’s attendant reaction of physical contact (v. 17a). The fact that there is something wrong in Mary’s response to Jesus is confirmed by Jesus’ reaction: “Do not hold on to me [μὴ μου ἅπτου].” Jesus’ words, on one hand, imply that Mary, in the moment of recognition, has moved toward Jesus in order to obtain physical contact, possibly in the same way as the man born blind (προσεκύνησεν; 9:38; cf. Matt 28:9), thus fulfilling the type-scene requirements.⁴² On the other hand, Jesus’ retort is a surprising violation of narrative convention, since physical contact and reunion is never denied in the recognition scenes unless

⁴¹ Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:1010. Brown’s interpretation is contested in, e.g., van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love*, 203. We may substantiate Brown’s position by pointing at the passage in 6:25 where the title is used by the unwise crowd. Another related problem is whether “Rabbouni” differs from “Rabbi” in any significant way. John translates them into the same Greek term (cf. διδάσκαλε in 1:38 [“Rabbi”], 20:16 [“Rabbouni”]).

⁴² See van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love*, 203–206. Some of the textual witnesses (e.g., $\aleph^1$, Θ , Ψ , Sy⁶) add the following to v. 16, καὶ προσέδραμεν ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ (“and she ran forward to hold on to him”). Commentators discuss if Mary is already touching Jesus when he rebukes her in v. 17, or if he manages to stop her in the attempt. Although most recent scholars opt for the former possibility, the matter is hard to settle on grammatical grounds and is in fact not as important as it has been made in reception history. The *Noli me tangere* motif in art reflects a preference for the latter reading. For further discussion, see Harold W. Attridge, “‘Don’t Be Touching Me’: Recent Feminist Scholarship on Mary Magdalene,” in *A Feminist Companion to John* (ed. Amy-Jill Levine; vol. 2; FCNT 5; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 140–166.

anagnorisis has not yet taken place, as when Electra reproaches the stranger (being Orestes) for catching hold of her: “Get out; don’t touch [μὴ ψᾶῖ]. You have no right to touch [ψάψειν] my body!” (Euripides, *El.* 223 [Vermeule]).⁴³ In the present text, however, Jesus does not primarily seek to protect Mary (and himself) from moral or ritual defilement, but to correct her understanding.⁴⁴ Mary thinks that the story has now come to an end, since she has been beautifully reunited with her beloved master (*presence-absence-presence*), and, accordingly, she seeks to hold on to this recovered reality. But this is where the scene leaves its literary parallels behind. For Jesus’ resurrection does not merely reestablish the tangible presence that was before, but points toward a new mode of being together. Therefore, Mary is told to let go so that Jesus, only just returned, may leave once again and turn back to the Father in order to convert his temporary and particular presence into an everlasting, universal presence (v. 17a; cf. stages 5–7 in the diagram on p. 192).⁴⁵ This is further developed in Jesus’ commission of Mary as a witness.

Jesus imparts to Mary the proper attendant reaction (vv. 17b–18). We have previously encountered several examples of how recognizers in John react by spreading the rumor of Christ (e.g., 1:35–51; 4:27–30, 39). This way of putting recognition into practice, however, is now turned into a veritable program through a conspicuous transformation of the genre. The proper reaction of recognizers is not to hold on to Jesus but to “leave” him: “But go [πορεύου] to my brothers and say to them, ‘I am

⁴³ Brant, *Dialogue and Drama*, 56, n. 90, displays some other Euripidean examples of characters that reprove other persons for touching or embracing them; cf. Euripides, *Bacch.* 1364–1366; *Ion* 523; *Iph. taur.* 793–799. The first example does not take place between observer and observed in a recognition scene; the latter two are situated before the moment of recognition, like the above example from Euripides.

⁴⁴ Mary Rose D’Angelo, however, makes an interesting attempt to rehabilitate the translation “touch” at the expense of “hold on to” or “cling to” on the basis of the parallel in *Apocalypse of Moses* 31.3–4. As she states, “[T]he command and warning of John 20:17 enters the realms of purity and danger because the appearance takes place in some sort of intermediary stage”; idem, “A Critical Note: John 20:17 and Apocalypse of Moses 31,” *JTS* 41 (1990), 532. But then again, why is Thomas allowed to touch (20:27)?

⁴⁵ Bultmann is right when saying about Mary, “Sie mißversteht ihn noch, insofern sie meint, er sei einfach aus dem Tode ‘zurückgekehrt’, er sei wieder der, der er war als ‘Lehrer’; sie meint also, das alte Verhältnis werde wieder erneuert, und sie will ihn—wie etwa der Freund den wiedergekehrten Freund—voll Freude umfassen...”; idem, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 532. On John’s characterization of Mary, see also Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 143–144.

ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God” (v. 17b). The saying is dominated by kinship metaphors and puts Jesus on an equal brother-to-brother level with the disciples who have the Father in common with him. This is a reminder of the new presence in the mutual indwelling spoken of in the farewell discourses, which will be instituted in the following scene (vv. 19–25). If we may include Mary, the bearer of the message, among its addressees, a new interpretation of the preceding events in the scene evolves. Because if the reader has read the scene as an echo from the erotic recognition scenes of the romances, it now comes forth that the reunion is not between a pair of lovers, neither between parent and child for that matter, but between a brother and a sister in the Father’s family of mutual recognizers. Thus, the recognition does not, at least in the explicit sense, convey a transformation from *eros* to paternal *agape* as suggested by Huprich,⁴⁶ nor does it remain within the erotic sphere by displaying the meeting between the bride and the messianic bridegroom as claimed by Fehribach,⁴⁷ but it primarily thematizes the reunion of spiritual siblings and points toward new, missionary activity.⁴⁸ When Jesus sends her off, Mary obeys him by taking the news to the disciples, “I have seen the Lord [τὸν κύριον]” (v. 18). Her use of κύριος is ambiguous. Is she merely remolding the form of polite address that she used in v. 15 when greeting the “gardener”? Or has she by now reached a new level of understanding so that she is formulating a Christological confession?⁴⁹ If so, Mary’s testimony contains the scene’s second climax by implying a “full” anagnorisis, which shows that Jesus’ correction of her partial recognition has developed into true belief. And true reaction: Her *seeing* leads to *telling*.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Idem, “Jn 20:11–18,” 20.

⁴⁷ Fehribach, *The Women*, 145–146, 154–155, 161.

⁴⁸ J. Duncan Derrett maintains that Jesus, when calling Mary by name, is presenting himself as the new Moses, since Μαριάμ is another form of Miriam, Moses’ sister; cf., e.g., Num 26:59. The argument may not be very convincing, but the conclusion that Jesus and Mary appear as brother and sister is correct; see Derrett, “Miriam and the Resurrection (John 20,16),” *DRev* 111 (1993), 179–181.

⁴⁹ The meaning of the title is also unclear in the occurrence in v. 2, but not in v. 13, where it describes her “master” (τὸν κύριόν μου), not “the Lord.”

⁵⁰ Although she did not recognize the angels (ἁγγέλους) in v. 11, she herself becomes a messenger (ἁγγέλουσα; v. 18) with a message parallel to the one spoken by the angelic figures at the grave in the Synoptics as noticed in van Tilborg, *Imaginative Love*, 206.

The Disciples: Recognizers on a Mission (20:19–25)

The third recognition scene of John 20 takes place in the evening, on the same day as the previous ones. Jesus appears to the disciples, and as in the apparition to Mary and Thomas, it follows the pattern that leads from the observers' act of eyewitnessing (*seeing*) toward their testimony (*telling*), which is addressed to characters who are not present in the scene (*hearing*).⁵¹ The scene may be divided into the following four moves:

<i>John 20:19–25</i>	<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>
Jesus appears to the disciples showing them his tokens of identity (vv. 19–20a)	The meeting; the move of displaying the token
The disciples recognize Jesus and react with joy (v. 20b)	The moment of recognition (no cognitive resistance); Attendant reactions and physical (re)union
Jesus points toward the attendant reaction of missionary activity (vv. 21–22)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union
The disciples tell Doubting Thomas that they have seen Jesus (vv. 24–25)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union

Jesus appears to the disciples showing them his tokens of identity (vv. 19–20a). Although the doors are closed, Jesus suddenly comes and stands in the midst of the disciples. Interpreters have taken this as an indication that Jesus is now manifest in a new, glorified form that enables him to pass through closed doors. According to this interpretation, we may add, Jesus' postresurrection appearances form a set of examples of the more general literary phenomenon about the departure of incognito gods in Antiquity, as described by H.J. Rose: "[W]hen they depart, gods often begin to take something more like their true forms, their disguise being

⁵¹ William Bonney operates with a more specific, tripartite pattern in John ("Jesus initiates the action. The disciples recognize him. Jesus commissions them"), which, however, does not reveal the importance of the modes of communication in the text. As a consequence, he is only able to apply the pattern to the preceding and the present episode, and does not find it in Thomas' recognition; see *idem*, *Caused to Believe*, 156, n. 74.

as a rule more effective from in front than from behind.”⁵² I do not think, however, that this applies to John in the same way as it may be said about the appearance of Jesus in a changed *morphē* in Mark 16:12. Not only is the text very brief about the miracle—for example there is no report of astonishment on the behalf of the disciples—but also we have even before the passion witnessed Jesus moving in space in counterintuitive ways—e.g., when walking on the sea in 6:16–21; cf. 6:25; 10:39. In John the earthly Jesus is from beginning to end a *sarx-doxa* hybrid, appearing dually, otherwise the disciples would no longer be able to recognize him. There is no clear indication in the postresurrection appearances that Jesus has become harder to recognize due to an external metamorphosis.⁵³

Jesus greets the disciples, “Peace be with you.” (v. 19; cf. v. 21, 26). The greeting, repeated thrice in the chapter, may not only be a salutation but also a conveyance of the peace that Jesus previously said he would leave with the disciples (14:27; cf. 16:33). It thus constitutes the first promise fulfilled by Jesus even within the story-world, the giving of the spirit in v. 22 being the second. Having greeted the disciples, Jesus immediately shows (ἔδειξεν; v. 20a) them the *typoi* on his body.

The disciples recognize Jesus and react with joy (v. 20b). The display of the tokens leads to an immediate recognition, and in contrast to the previous and the succeeding scene there is no cognitive resistance. As a joint body, the disciples represent the ideal eyewitnesses, and their immediate reaction is to rejoice (ἑχάρησαν)—as recognizers often do. The narrator tells us that their joy was awakened by their sight of “the Lord” (τὸν κύριον), but we do not hear a confession of Jesus’ thematic role on their part (yet, see v. 25 in the end of the scene). The exact nature of their recognition, besides that it evokes a reunion, is

⁵² Rose, “Divine Disguisings,” 71. Rose refers to Yahweh’s showing of his back to Moses in Exod 33:23 as an example.

⁵³ The problem also relates to the complicated question concerning the moment of Jesus’ ascension and full glorification in John, where mutually incompatible traditions may be colliding. On the one hand, the death on the cross is a “lifting up” (ὑψόω 3:14; 8:28; 12:32–34), but on the other, Jesus describes his return to the Father as a future event when speaking to Mary Magdalene after his resurrection (20:17). In other words, where does Jesus stay in the space of time between the resurrection and the appearances in chs. 20–21? For discussions of the problem, see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:1011–1017; Thüsing, *Die Erhöhung und Verherrlichung Jesu*, 262–269; and, in relation to ancient theory of physics, Gitte Buch-Hansen, “‘It Is The Spirit That Makes Alive’ (6:63): A Stoic Understanding of *Pneuma* in John,” (PhD diss.; University of Copenhagen, 2007), 335–387.

not clear and shows that in spite of the fact that the scene with the display of tokens is formally a recognition scene, its primary function is to equip the disciples with peace and the Holy Spirit, thus handing over authority to them before the story's close.

Jesus points toward the attendant reaction of missionary activity (vv. 21–22). Jesus now breathes into the disciples the Holy Spirit (ἐνεφύσησεν; v. 22) and “inspires” them to become emissaries, as he has been until this moment. As in the appearance before Mary, Jesus directs the observer(s) toward a response beyond spontaneous euphoria. Those who see must go and tell.

The disciples tell Doubting Thomas that they have seen Jesus (vv. 24–25). The concluding part of the scene is regarded by most interpreters, according to their division of the text, as the introductory remarks in the following scene. Although we may say that the two scenes to a certain degree overlap, I have tried to show in the above outline of the whole chapter that it makes good sense to include vv. 24–25 in the present scene (see p. 189). Not only do we find a new time setting in v. 26, but also the chapter's general focus on testimony as proper response to recognition pleads for this. The passage in vv. 24–25 makes up the phase, where the witnesses' *tell* and a third party *hears* (cf. vv. 2, 17–18 in the previous scenes). In the present case Thomas is the third party, and the meeting between those disciples who encountered Jesus inside the closed doors and Thomas illustrates their mission to those who have not seen. Thomas' response is negative. Like Doubting Penelope (*Od.* 23.72, 83, 93), he refuses to believe if he will not be given the possibility to see (ἰδω, v. 25) what the other disciples have already witnessed (ἑωράκαμεν, v. 25). As to this, the scene concludes by depicting a negative contrast image before presenting the ideal picture in the following scene.

Jesus and Recognizing Thomas (20:26–29)

Thomas is often regarded as an archetype of doubt. At the same time, however, he gives voice to the Gospel's christological climax: “My Lord and my God!” (20:28). This tension between emphasized cognitive resistance and ultimate confession creates one of the Gospel's most *ekphrastic* anagnorises. Thomas' confession, moreover, resounds like an echo from the opening verse of the prologue, “the Word was God” (1:1c), and so it constitutes the moment where the cognitive level of a character from the story-world finally reaches the level of knowledge

presented to the reader in the prologue. Regarding John's mode of forming his recognition scenes, the scene also has a salient role, since it represents a culmination of the genre modulation caused by the empty tomb. It becomes a vehicle for the story's reaching-out toward the reader; and the scene, as condensed as it may be, can be outlined as follows:

<i>John 20:26–29</i>	<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>
Jesus appears to Thomas and the other disciples (v. 26)	The meeting
Jesus shows the token of his wound marks (v. 27)	The move of displaying the token
Thomas recognizes Jesus (v. 28)	The moment of recognition (cognitive resistance appears in the previous scene, v. 25)
Jesus blesses believers who have not seen him (v. 29)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union

Jesus appears to Thomas and the other disciples (v. 26). As has already been argued for, the time setting (“after eight days”) in this verse indicates the beginning of a new scene. Again, the disciples are gathered behind closed doors (cf. v. 19), this time, however, also in the presence of Thomas. Jesus appears and greets them with a salutation of peace, as in the previous scene.

Jesus shows the token of his wound marks (v. 27). Jesus addresses Thomas directly and shows him his hands and side (cf. v. 25). This specific kind of token belongs to a long motif-tradition in ancient recognition literature (cf. *Poet.* 1454b23–24), where bodily features like scars and wound marks are not only physical indications of identity, but also imply a dramatic story about threats to the observed one's somatic existence. This also applies to the crucified but resurrected Jesus. Unlike Mary, Thomas is allowed to touch Jesus; he is in fact urged to do so. The touch in the present scene, however, is not an act of holding back, but an investigation of the validity of the tokens as in the *Aethiopica*, for example (cf. p. 119), or as when Eurycleia confesses that she was not able to recognize Odysseus until she touched him (19.474–475). This purpose of Thomas' touch becomes clear when Jesus says: “Do not doubt but believe” (v. 27). The fact that Jesus knows of Thomas' doubt adds another aspect to the recognition, since this also displays a hint at the *dia mnēmēs* motif.

Thomas recognizes Jesus (v. 28). In the previous scenes there was a tendency for them to almost become proper-name identifications due to the new set-up of *presence-absence-presence*. Mary tried to hold Jesus back, and the disciples' report to Thomas—"We have seen the Lord" (v. 25)—is as ambiguous as Mary's similar announcement in v. 18. Thomas, however, is clearly not allowed to be caught in this trap. Jesus' marks tell a story about crucifixion, and apparently their function as identity tokens only warrants the conclusion that the appearing one is to be equaled with the one who was crucified. At the same time, however, Jesus' living presence after his death now shows that he has been recognized and welcomed by the Father. For this reason, Thomas' confession is twofold. On the one hand, he identifies the appearing one as the Lord, which is probably equivalent to a proper name in the present context (as in Mary's recognition, vv. 13, 18), but on the other, he is not only identifying Jesus, but also acknowledging him as his God.⁵⁴ This leap takes recognition to a new level. Jesus is the sign of the divine, but also God himself. In Thomas' vision, the signifier and the signified have merged (cf. 10:30).

Jesus blesses believers who have not seen him (v. 29). In spite of the fact that Thomas pronounces the Gospel's climactic confession, Jesus reproves his act of believing through seeing. This reproach, however, is not as much an element in the Gospel's portrait of its characters as a transition toward the discourse level of vv. 30–31.⁵⁵ And John 20:29 is not a contradiction of 1:50–51 but thematizes a new mode of recognizing Jesus. Whereas the final saying of the *catena* in John 1 initiated the

⁵⁴ See C.H. Dodd, *Interpretation*, 430, n. 2: "Ο κύριός μου identifies the one who appears as 'the Jesus of History' (cf. xiii. 13–14); ὁ θεός μου adds a theological valuation of His person. I remember hearing F.C. Burkitt paraphrase Thomas's confession thus: 'Yes: it is Jesus!—and He is divine!'" See also Bromia's exclamation of recognition in Plautus: "It's Amphitryon! It's my master! [Amphitruo hic quidem est erus meus]"; idem, *Amph.* 1075 (Nixon). For interpretations taking "my Lord" as an equally exalted title as "my God," see Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 538, nn. 7–8; Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:1046–1048; Schnackenburg, *Johannesevangelium*, 3:395–398.

⁵⁵ Some interpreters see Jesus' saying as a positioning of the Beloved Disciple as the ideal believer: He came to faith without seeing, in the sense that he only saw an empty tomb (v. 8); see Brown, *Gospel According to John*, 2:1005; Riley, *Resurrection Reconsidered*, 125, n. 69. Van Tilborg confirms this, "Against the background of the last sentence which Jesus speaks in this chapter: 'Happy are those who do not see and yet believe' (20,29), one must say that the Beloved Disciple is the happiest of all and is the proto-type of all future believers"; idem, *Imaginative Love*, 202. Harstine ("Un-Doubting Thomas," 443–447), tries to rehabilitate Thomas by comparing him with faithful and realistic Penelope, but tones down the significance of Jesus' final saying in v. 29.

epoch of seeing, the conclusion of the recognition series in John 20 is the beginning of a new era of Jesus' physical absence. The kind of *seeing* that Jesus now abandons is of course not the cognitive "seeing," which was thematized in ch. 9, but the somatic seeing of eyewitnessing. Faith is now communicated by testimony that does not lead to direct contact, since secondary observers from now on cannot go to see for themselves. This was thematized in the previous recognition scenes: When Mary met Jesus, she brought her testimony to the disciples, but she did not take them back to Jesus, as did Andrew, Philip, and the Samaritan Woman in chs. 1 and 4. Jesus appeared to the disciples, but they could not bring Thomas to the risen One. And when the Lord finally appears to Thomas, the recognizer is criticized precisely because he is unable to accept these new conditions of recognition. According to Jesus, however, those worthy of praise are the believers under these circumstances. And according to the subsequent statement displaying the Gospel's purpose, such believers are John's model readers. The Gospel sees itself as a testimony of faith and a medium of communication from those who have seen to those who have not, and thus, the recognizers' testimony in the story-world is always an imitation of the Gospel's own self-understanding. The Gospel as a whole embodies the true attendant reaction in Johannine anagnorisis, which is not to cling to Jesus, but to bear witness (cf. 20:17, 18, 21). The new situation, however, is not a total separation from Jesus as the farewell discourses thematize. This is stressed in John's final recognition scene in the Gospel's epilogue.

John 21:1–14: Community with the Absent Jesus

Although John 21 is probably a secondary postscript added to the Gospel's original ending in 20:31, it is an important chapter, which, among other things, restores Peter and identifies the Beloved Disciple as the author of the Gospel.⁵⁶ The chapter presents Jesus' apparition to some of his disciples at "the Sea of Tiberias" (21:1), and the passage in vv. 1–14 contains clear recognition-scene features. I shall only mention them briefly. As in the scenes with the Samaritan woman and the Mary Magdalene scene, Jesus appears elusively and does not give himself

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Gaventa, "The Archive of Excess"; Carsten Claussen, "The Role of John 21: Discipleship in Retrospect and Redefinition," in *New Currents Through John: A Global Perspective* (eds. Francisco Lozada Jr. and Tom Thatcher; SBLRBS 54; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 55–68.

away to begin with, but tells the disciples to cast the net to the right side of their boat, while not yet being recognized by the disciples (see οὐ...ῥθεισαν; v. 4). As the nets become full of fish, the Beloved Disciple (as in 20:8) is the first to recognize the man on shore, and he tells it to Peter: “It is the Lord!” (v. 7). Peter jumps into the water, presumably in order to meet Jesus, reacting as recognizers often do. This makes up the first part of the recognition scene, which runs as follows:

<i>John 21:1–14</i>	<i>The Moves of the Recognition Type-Scene</i>
Jesus appears on the beach just after daybreak (v. 4a)	The meeting
The disciples do not recognize him (οὐ...ῥθεισαν; v. 4b)	The move of cognitive resistance
Jesus brings about the fishing miracle (vv. 5–6)	The move of displaying the token
The Beloved Disciple is the first to recognize Jesus: “It is the Lord!” (v. 7a; cf. v. 12)	The moment of recognition
Peter jumps into the sea (to meet Jesus on shore, v. 7b–8)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union
Jesus arranges a common meal (vv. 9–14)	Attendant reactions and physical (re)union, hospitality motif

When Jesus in the last part of the scene offers breakfast at the shore, the recognition by the other disciples is indicated by the following enigmatic statement: “Now none of the disciples dared [ἐτόλμα] to ask him, ‘Who are you?’ because they knew [εἰδότες] it was the Lord” (v. 12; cf. 4:27). As Bultmann suggests, this description of the recognition may be an indication of the new, physical distance between Jesus and his followers, which Jesus seeks to overcome by arranging a communal meal with a sacramental undertone.⁵⁷ In Luke’s version of the miraculous catch of fish, which forms his narrative of the calling of the first disciples (Luke 5:1–11), there is no such meal. In the present recognition type-scene, however, the meal appears as a conventional hospitality motif, which was also present at the end of Jesus’ meeting with the Samari-

⁵⁷ Bultmann, *Evangelium des Johannes*, 549–550. The scene presents a parallel to the breaking of the bread in the walk to Emmaus (Luke 24:13–35).

tans (4:40). Yet, whereas in the *Odyssey*, the hospitality motif introduces the recognition scene (see p. 60), in John it becomes the conclusion of anagnorisis, symbolizing the close connection between recognition and community. The ideology of identity inherent in the recognition genre, i.e., the confirmation of identities as social interaction (reunion, reintegration), is played out in relation to the Johannine idea of mutual indwelling between God and those who belong to him. The recognition scene of 21:1–14 thus seems to have the purpose of reminding the reader that the new condition of recognition presented in ch. 20 is not an abolishment of the believers' community with the Lord. The new presence—described by means of the kind of type-scene that most effectively creates a sense of presence—becomes manifest in the communal meal at which Jesus is the host (see v. 12). In the eyes of the believer, Jesus is no stranger; and, as we shall see below, this event of anagnorisis also takes place in relation to the implied reader of the narrative.

*The Reader as Anagnōstēs*⁵⁸

According to Terence Cave, modernist literature to a certain extent constitutes a movement of withdrawal from anagnorisis.⁵⁹ While present-day fiction has certainly not abandoned the epistemological plot, other devices have assumed the recognition scene's traditional role as an important vehicle of the thematics of knowledge, presence, and social acknowledgment. The modern turn toward open and ambiguous endings has evoked an attitude of skepticism and irony when confronted with anagnorisis as an instrument of narrative closure. Thus, in modern narrative fiction, the cognitive play of semblance and reality has performed a leap to a metalevel, i.e., to the relation between implied author and implied reader. As a consequence, contemporary literary criticism has transformed recognition into an epitome of the reading process itself, a process where the reader, page by page, chapter by chapter, accumulates information and thus moves from a phase of

⁵⁸ The act of reading in Antiquity was often a social activity performed out loud by the reader, the so-called *lector* or ἀναγνώστης (*anagnōstes*). The only occurrence of the verb ἀναγινώσκω in John is when the *Ioudaioi* read the superscription on the cross (ἀνέγνωσαν, 19:20). In the present chapter, I shall summarize and develop some of the previous results from an implied reader perspective.

⁵⁹ See Cave, "Recognition and the Reader," 49; idem, *Recognitions*, 1, 53–54.

agnoia toward *gnōsis*, though the content of this eventual knowledge may itself turn out to be a new *agnoia*.⁶⁰

With regard to this, John's Gospel is obviously not a piece of modern literature, and it does certainly not intend to leave the reader in bewilderment at the story's close. Yet, as a religious narrative, the Gospel thematizes the reader's participation in the recognition process in a way that we are not accustomed to seeing in comparable recognition literature of Antiquity. The reader is not only a spectator, watching the cognitive struggles of story-world actors, but is from the very beginning invited into the game of recognition. The Gospel claims that recognition has the same peripetetic significance for the reader as for the story-characters—"that through believing you may have life in his name" (20:31b).⁶¹ Such modeling of the reader appears most openly in the text, when the third-person discourse changes into first- and second-person, thus making explicit the line of communication between narrator and narratee. The narrator (who holds the same ideological position as the implied author) is constructed as a "we," who (1) speaks about past events (1:14), (2) has seen Jesus in his hybrid manifestation (ἔθεασάμεθα, 1:14; ὁ ἑώρακώς, 19:35), (3) has come to believe that Jesus' δόξα, not his σάϑξ, represents his true identity (1:14), and (4) presents the Gospel as a true testimony (19:35; 21:24).⁶² Yet, whereas the narrator has seen and come to believe, the narratee ("you," pl.) is situated in (1) the "now" of the enunciation (19:35, 20:30), where (2) he or she is a believer—potentially or actually, depending on the reading of 20:31—of things mediated, not through seeing, but through indirect hearing (20:29). This same line of communication between an eyewitness and a second observer is played out in the recognition scenes in the story-world

⁶⁰ See Gotthart Wunberg, *Wiedererkennen: Literatur und ästhetische Wahrnehmung in der Moderne* (Tübingen: Günter Narr, 1983), 188–195 and Cave, *Recognitions*, 260: "We are nowadays very preoccupied with readers and their responses, and with the extent to which each reading is a remaking of the work in question. But there is plenty of evidence to indicate that anagnorisis, once conceptualized as a term of art or a term in poetics, has always contained the germ of an equivocation between reading and recognizing."

⁶¹ See Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 97: "The story may depict an ideal past, but the present is related to that past in such a way that the story becomes determinative for the reader's present."

⁶² See also the narrator's comments in 3:31–36 (and maybe even in 3:16–21 as claimed in Stibbe, *John*, 57–62). On implied author (enunciator) and narrator in John, see Culpepper, *Anatomy*, 15–18. As to the narratee, it is (according to Seymour Chatman) one device among others "by which the implied author informs the real reader how to perform as implied reader, what *Weltanschauung* to adopt"; Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 150.

from the very beginning, with the first recognition of Jesus serving as a model (1:29–34). As we have noticed previously, John the Baptist's first recognition of Jesus, by means of the Spirit-token, forms a second-order narrative, which constitutes the basis of the Baptist's subsequent testimony to those who have not yet seen, this testimony appearing in the first-order narrative: "I myself have seen [ἑώρακα] and have testified [μεμαρτύρηκα] that this is the Son of God" (1:34; see pp. 96–103). On the overarching discourse level of the Gospel, a similar two-level communication takes place, since the entire story-world, including its recognition scenes, makes up the content of the narrator's own testimony. This testimony is phrased in striking likeness to the above words of the Baptist: "He who saw [ὁ ἑώρακώς] this has testified [μεμαρτύρηκεν] so that you also may believe" (19:35a). This communication doublet means that the implied reader, when watching second-hand observers in the story-world, is being subjected to the same kind of communication as they are (a double cognitive dimension). Yet, whereas the second observers in the story-world are able to make direct contact with Jesus, this is obviously not the case with the reader. Nevertheless, the Gospel, like narratives in general, simulates a kind of presence in the reading process. This ability to lead away attention from the relation between narrator and narratee toward a story-world of its own is probably one of narrative's key generators of persuasive power.⁶³ John, however, is not content with this, but explicitly seeks to absorb the reader into the world of seeing. Thus, in the first chapter of the story, Jesus—appearing in the story-world—seems to address the readers directly: "[Y]ou will see [ὄψεσθε] heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man" (1:51).⁶⁴

⁶³ Wolfgang Iser says: "Charakterisieren sich die von uns im Lesen gebildeten Vorstellungsgegenstände dadurch, daß sie Abwesendes bzw. Nicht-Gegebenes zur Präsenz bringen, so besagt dieses immer zugleich, daß wir in der Präsenz des vorgestellten sind"; idem, *Der Akt des Lesens: Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1976) 226; cf. 101–114, 219–227. Concerning this phenomenon and the gospel genre, see Geert Hallböck, "Den himmelske og den jordiske Jesus: Om forskellen mellem hymnerne og evangeliernes Jesus-billede," in *Frelsens biografisering* (eds. Thomas L. Thompson and Henrik Tronier; FBE 13; Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Forlag, 2004), 210–211.

⁶⁴ Since the saying is in the plural, in spite of the fact that only Nathanael is present, it is a direct address to the reader; see pp. 110–111. Regarding John's reproduction of the revelatory event, see Gail R. O'Day, "Narrative Mode and Theological Claim: A Study in the Fourth Gospel," *JBL* 105 (1986), 668: "Through the dynamics of the Johannine revelatory narrative, the fourth evangelist is able to recreate the revelation experience for the reader, engaging the reader in the text in the same way that Jesus engaged those whom he encountered."

After the death and resurrection of Jesus, the situation of the story-world observers changes. Jesus is no longer accessible in the same way as he once was. So, whereas John in the first phase of the narrative sought to include the reader in the experience of the story-world characters, he now turns around the circumstances by moving these characters towards the extratextual world of the reader—a situation where the earthly Jesus is no longer present. This is illustrated in the leap from the story-world to the level of discourse in 20:29–31. Jesus eulogizes believers who have not seen, and immediately afterward the narrator invites the reader to become the subject of this macarism.⁶⁵ In ch. 9, the position of believing without seeing was held open, but now the reader is encouraged to assume this role (p. 162). The reader may “see” or envision Jesus in spite of his absence. Although hearing without seeing is a substitute for direct seeing, this mode of belief receives an elevated position. This conveys legitimacy not only to the reader but also to the Gospel itself, as a testimony from a primary observer to a second observer.⁶⁶

In the prologue, the reader experiences a kind of anagnorisis, due to the postponed identification of the *Logos* as Jesus (see pp. 74–79). The reader is, from now on, situated in a privileged cognitive position, which in a certain sense turns the reading into a process of progressive reconfirmation.⁶⁷ This mode of displaying Jesus’ identity is also present in the Gospel’s story-world. *Whispering* creates foreknowledge and demonstrates that the observers’ pre-established relation to God has significant impact on their ability to recognize Jesus. In order to recognize, it must be granted by the Father (6:65; cf., e.g., 7:28; 10:26; 15:21; 17:6). To see the kingdom, one must be reborn from above (3:3; cf. 1:13; 8:23), and, as is said in the shepherd discourse, recognition is a mutual acknowledgment between Jesus and those who already belong to him (10:4–5, 14–15). The Baptist’s recognition of Jesus again forms

⁶⁵ The semiotizing of the reader as “blessed” does not depend on the choice of reading in 20:31.

⁶⁶ This is, of course, in the Gospel’s self-understanding. As a historical source, the Gospel is hardly an eyewitness account though there may be some relation to the eyewitnesses as argued in, e.g., Richard Bauckham, *Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospel as Eyewitness Testimony* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006), 358–371.

⁶⁷ Cf. the principle formulated in, for example, 14:29: “And now I have told you this before it occurs, so that when it does occur, you may believe.” Yet, one should not forget that the question of Jesus’ identity in the Gospels is not limited to whether he is the Messiah, but also in what sense he may be the Messiah; see Davidsen, *The Narrative Jesus*, 337.

an illustrative example, as God *whispers* to John how Jesus will appear (1:33). In chs. 5–19, however, the recognition of Jesus is challenged, as Jesus enters the territory of the enemies of anagnorisis. Jesus' claims contradict the "law" of the *Ioudaioi* that defines Jesus' thematic roles. In contrast, the prologue makes up a preconceived christognostic "law" or a semiotic habit that protects the reader from listening to the "pseudo-laws" of the *Ioudaioi* and of Pilate. The fact that this "law" overrules the codes of the world, is confirmed when God puts his seal on Jesus in the resurrection. In chs. 20–21, it is claimed that recognition is no longer in crisis, as the final recognition scenes confirm the already established fellowship between Jesus and his own. Thomas formulates the Gospel's climax and in a sense becomes the implied reader's *didymos* in the story-world. The recognition scene in ch. 21, ending with a communal meal, illustrates this close connection between recognition and reunion. The Gospel has, in more than one sense, established a new convention of recognition (cf. Lat., *convenio*). But the ending is also an "anti-closure."⁶⁸ For as regards both the followers of Jesus in the story-world and the reader, the final reunion with Jesus still awaits (21:22–23; cf. 14:2–3). At the story's close, however, Jesus is no longer a stranger like the unrecognizable ἀλλότριος in the shepherd discourse (10:5). The sheep belong to him, and since they know his voice, they will not adopt the hostile attitude of Actaeon's hounds when they meet him in the final reunion. Rather, the sheep will accept him as their longed-for master, as did Odysseus' dog.

⁶⁸ See Gaventa, "The Archive of Excess," 249.

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of the present inquiry to contribute to the ongoing discussion of the Fourth Gospel in its ancient literary environment. Our guiding questions have been the following: To what extent, in what sense, and for what expository and ideological purposes does John employ and transform the recognition type-scene of ancient Greco-Roman and Jewish literature?

The present study has argued that the recognition scene is a recurring, generic vehicle in John, which serves to host and thematize central problems in the Gospel concerning the knowledge of God through Jesus, as well as the believers' access to Jesus in his physical presence and absence. Like the homecoming Odysseus, Jesus appears in dual shape. He manifests himself both with a camouflage (σάρεξ) and a mark of divinity (δόξα). Accordingly, the incarnation is neither an illusion (Käsemann), nor a total *kenōsis* (Bultmann), but a partial disguise. When observers encounter Jesus and are put to the test, it is not a quest for Jesus' hidden identity behind the σάρεξ, but a dilemma instigated by his hybrid appearance in both flesh and glory. This mode of appearing not only implies that Jesus reveals God, but his hybrid form also discloses the observers' true orientation toward things "from above." From the outset of the narrative, Jesus appears as a stranger from heaven, so observers are challenged to recognize an unknown, unlike in the case of Odysseus. Equally in contrast to Odysseus, the recognition of Jesus is primarily social recognition of his divine thematic roles, not of his proper-name identity. This is a main emphasis in John's use of the scene. Moreover, Johannine recognitions, unlike in some of the tragedies, are always euphoric, since they change apparent disadvantages into eternal life. Non-recognizers, however, remain in *hamartia*.

As a type-scene in ancient literature, anagnorisis contains a number of recurring syntagmatic moves that can be determined on the basis of a comparative study of ancient epic, drama, and romance, in particular. I have reconstructed five basic, constant moves: (1) the meeting, which determines the economy of knowledge in the scene to fol-

low; (2) the move of cognitive resistance, which contains expressions of doubt, requests for proof, suggestions of alternative identification, judicial investigation, or sheer rejection; (3) the display of the recognition token; (4) the moment of recognition; and (5) the move of attendant reaction and physical (re)union. The recognition scene seems to reflect an ideology where identity is conceived of as integration into a social body. On the basis of the mentioned syntagmatic moves, as well as on the recurring motifs within the moves, a range of Johannine encounter scenes may be characterized as *anagnorises* (or *an-anagnorises*), in the sense that they play on literary conventions of recognition cultivated in contemporary literature.

John's recognition scenes begin as soon as the prologue completes its intoning of the Gospel's thematics of identity and recognition. Chapter 1 contains three well-established introductory scenes from earlier Christian tradition, but in the Johannine mold they become recognition type-scenes. In the first scene, John the Baptist is the one to be recognized, but he promptly redirects the thematic roles suggested for him toward Jesus. The Baptist is not the observed, but merely a privileged informant. His noetic privilege is presented in the following scene, where he does not baptize Jesus but recognizes him as the Lamb of God. His ability to recognize Jesus is due to his predisposed orientation toward God, as he listens to God's act of *whispering*. Also the call-narratives in 1:35–51 become recognition scenes in John's keeping. When Jesus recognizes Nathanael, the conventional motif of mutuality in recognition is introduced. This motif reappears in the encounter with the Samaritan woman, possibly in Jesus' second meeting with the man born blind, and in the apparition before Mary Magdalene, and is articulated in the programmatic statements in the shepherd discourse. The motif gives expression to the Gospel's vision of the close relation between recognition of Jesus and community with the divine world. The recognitions in 1:35–51, along with the previous scene, also illustrate how John transforms "the move of attendant reactions," which in the literary parallels appeared as physical embracement, astonishment, dumbness of surprise, and the like, toward mission and testimony addressed to new, potential recognizers of Jesus. This generic transformation is reinforced in Jesus' meeting with the Samaritan woman and receives its culmination in ch. 20, where Jesus reproaches Mary for responding to recognition like a romantic heroine instead of going away to tell the disciples. Afterward, also the disciples are sent to bear witness.

In present-day research, the encounter between Jesus and the Samaritan woman is commonly described as a betrothal type-scene. Yet, whereas such scenes appearing in the Hebrew Bible describe an exchange of pragmatic gifts, the recognition scene deals with both cognition and sociality, as does the pericope in question. Jesus' elusive discourse raises expectations of anagnorisis in the reader. As in the Homeric recognitions, the scene begins by presenting the motif of hospitality, but its fulfillment is postponed until the Samaritans invite Jesus to stay. The recognition of Jesus establishes community.

In John 5–19, recognition of Jesus undergoes a crisis, as the *Ioudaioi* see nothing but his carnal camouflage. The constant questioning of Jesus' identity corresponds to "the move of cognitive resistance" of the recognition scenes proper. The same development of recognition scene moves outside the actual type-scene appears in the *sēmeia*, which function in a manner comparable to the common tokens of identity (*sēmata*), and also in the "I am" sayings, which, beside their parallels in the ancient history of religions, echo the typical self-identification formula in anagnorisis.

The crisis of recognition in chs. 5–19 becomes evident in the recognition scenes in 5:1–18 and ch. 9. The first example is a piece of satire, which becomes evident from an anagnorisis perspective. Instead of fabricating a plain nonrecognition that breaks off at the move of cognitive resistance, John lets the *Ioudaioi* perform an unsuitable kind of recognition: They come to know that the man, who healed the paralytic, is Jesus. Such proper-name identification would be sufficient in the anagnorises of the *Odyssey*, for example, but in John's perspective it becomes a trap set up by the storyteller: The *Ioudaioi* ought to be looking for Jesus' thematic roles instead. This setup is repeated in John's version of Jesus' arrest. Judas and the soldiers are looking for "Jesus of Nazareth," but Jesus answers with the "I am" formula, thus revealing identity beyond the mere name. Ironically, Jesus' words force the soldiers to fall to the ground and perform a conventional gesture of "attendant reaction"—even though they have not come to believe. In ch. 9, the opponents move a small step beyond proper-name identification, since they ask the man born blind for Jesus' thematic roles. Jesus is absent in most of the chapter, and this gives rise to an almost playful employment of the type-scene. In order for recognition of Jesus to take place, the man born blind first has to be identified, which is not at all easy. He is a witness who has to be recognized so that Jesus may be acknowledged for the *sēmeion*. When Jesus reappears, he speaks elusively of himself in

the third person (as in his meeting with the Samaritan woman and with Mary Magdalene), which constitutes John's use of the motifs of initial deception and fake foretelling in the type-scene. Yet, John is careful not to develop the motif as far as Homer. After all, Jesus is not a simulator but a revealer; and since his "hour" is predetermined, the disclosure of his identity does not produce decisive threats against him. John 9 concludes with a discussion of the perception of the observers in terms of seeing and blindness (as in *Oedipus tyrannus*). The Pharisees are tragic characters, blinding themselves.

When Jesus' "hour" approaches, recognition scenes occur most frequently. As in ch. 1, the pericopes have clear parallels in the synoptic tradition. In contrast to the incidents recounted in ch. 1, however, the formal recognition-scene character of such scenes as the disclosure of Judas and Peter's denial is not a Johannine invention. Among these scenes, Jesus' trial before Pilate attracts most attention in its capacity as recognition scene. This nonrecognition is not an encounter between a limited number of actors but belongs to the forensic type of *anagnorisis*, which is played out in a trial setting as in, e.g., *Oedipus tyrannus* and Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*. In such scenes it becomes evident that social recognition is negotiated within taxonomic value systems ("laws") that may even compete for the power to perform judgment. According to one law, Jesus is a criminal who must be eliminated from society. Yet, according to the "law" of the Gospel, epitomized in the prologue and confirmed by the heavenly judge, Jesus wears a mark of divinity that places him high above the roles that Pilate and the *Ioudaioi* are able to formulate.

The recognitions in chs. 20–21 are exponents of a new situation. In the glorification of Jesus at the resurrection, the ever-present subnarrative regarding God's acknowledgment of Jesus breaks into the story. In this subnarrative there are no actual recognition type-scenes, but Jesus' prayer in ch. 17 does more than merely make up the conclusion of his farewell with the disciples; it also serves as the Son's self-recommendation at his *nostos* to the Father. When Jesus reappears before his disciples in chs. 20–21, the recognition scenes become true *re-cognitions*. This new situation, which resembles the conditions of recognition in most ancient examples, on the one hand constitutes a pitfall, since recognition may be taken as mere identification and as reestablishment of prior conditions of fellowship, as in the case of Mary Magdalene. Yet, on the other hand, the recognitions in chs. 20–21 create a possibility for worldly observers to imitate God's acceptance of

Jesus in the resurrection (Thomas the Recognizer), and they occasion John to make points about Jesus' communion-in-absence with his disciples. Since Jesus is no longer directly accessible, a genre-modulation takes place, occasioned by the circumstance that potential recognizers "at second hand" cannot go to see for themselves. And it becomes clear that the proper way for believers to perform "the move of attendant reactions" is to participate in the dissemination of the rumor of Christ. This is not only the case in the story-world, but the Gospel itself embodies this principle on the discourse level. The recognition of Jesus in 21:1-14 makes a final point concerning recognition and social interaction, as the motif of hospitality, which in Homer introduces the recognition scene, is once again dislocated to the end of the scene (cf. 4:40), where Jesus and the disciples celebrate anagnorisis by a communal meal. John uses the recognition scene—i.e., one of the ancient storyteller's primary tools for thematizing identity, acknowledgment, and presence (p. 72)—in order to speak about social integration or expulsion. Whereas Jesus was a stranger to begin with, the Johannine recognitions of Jesus establish a mutual indwelling between God and his own.

This is where the present study ends. But the conclusion is also an opening—modeled on the ending of the Fourth Gospel. While I have shown that the recognition scene is a recurring and modulating type-scene in John, one may further ask if the Gospel also contains a more explicit "theory" of recognition than is available in the type-scenes. The shepherd discourse, with its treatment of recognition between actors that are already interconnected, presents itself as a text to be further studied in the light of anagnorisis. Moreover, while the present study has included discussions of the inherent ideology of social integration in ancient anagnorisis, one may also ask whether the recognition type-scene has socio-historical "equivalents," either in a more or less traditional form-critical sense regarding the *Sitz im Leben* of the genre in early Christianity, or as a type of discourse that voices shared epistemes in the New Testament world. Such perspectives may further our understanding of the literary and social context in which John claimed that the stranger from heaven was no *pseudangelos*.

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